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Abstract 
 
Beginning with a critical inquiry into the reasons why the field of the political is 
traditionally elaborated in the archic nexus between government and state sovereignty, 
this study examines the possibilities of elaborating an alternative theory of the political in 
the intersections between Michel Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchist political 
theory.  Taking Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality as an 
alternative paradigm from which to reread the history of the political, the aim of this 
study is to demonstrate that the hallmark of Foucault’s work emerges in the ways in 
which his analytic of power strategically shifts the site of politics away from its 
traditional locus in the exercise of government to the question of resistance.  Under what 
I will elaborate in terms of the primacy of resistance, I argue that Foucault’s studies of 
power and governmentality reveal an anarchist hypothesis of the political in the critical 
caesura between the political as archē and the political as agōn.  Affirming a mutual 
alliance between anarchist theory and Foucault against the orthodox foundations of 
political philosophy not only exposes the conceptual principles that continue to sustain 
Western political practices, but also opens up the space to pursue the implications of a 
form of politics inseparable from the elaboration of permanent ethics of revolt, a distinct 
way of being in the world through resistance—that is, a specific art of not being 
governed.  When the concepts of power and government are understood to emerge on 
condition of resistance, the political conceived as archē reveals its own contingency, and 
the question of politics is redirected from a constituent theory of an oikonomia to a 
destituent theory of resistance, a critical ethos of becoming ungovernable, not as a 
revolutionary overthrow of power, but as an art of not being governed.  Rather than 
reducing Foucault to anarchism, however, it is my contention that the intersection 
between them emerges in the critical attempts to locate a form of politics which, in 
refusing to reconstitute itself as power, could never assume the form of an archē. 
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Introduction 
Anarchism, Foucault, and the Question of Government 
 
The State is the external constitution of the social power…This external constitution of 
the collective power, to which the Greeks gave the name the archē, sovereignty, 
authority, government, rests then on this hypothesis: that a people, that the collective 
which we all call society, cannot govern itself…it must be represented by one or more 
individuals, who, by any title whatever, are regarded as custodians of the will of the 
people, and its agents…According to this hypothesis…is the explanation of the 
constitution of the State in all its varieties and form.1 
--Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. 
It seems to me, in fact, that with the current economic crisis and the great oppositions 
and conflicts that are developing…one can see a developing crisis of government…This 
set of procedures, techniques, and methods that ensure the government of some by others 
appears to me to be in crisis now…People are more and more dissatisfied with the way 
in which they are governed: they have more and more problems with it and find it harder 
and harder to bear.  I’m talking about a phenomenon that’s expressed in forms of 
resistance, and at times rebellion, over questions of everyday life as well as great 
decisions…We are perhaps at the beginning of a great crisis of reevaluation of the 
problem of government.2 
 
I would like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power 
relations… one that implies more relations between theory and practice…It consists in 
taking forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point.3    
--Michel Foucault 
 
According to the French anarchist philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the history of 
political philosophy and practice finds its locution in a single hypothesis which, in 
presupposing what the Greeks referred to as archē, culminates in the paradigms of 
government and state sovereignty.  For Proudhon, then, “[t]he form in which the earliest 
men thought of order within society was the patriarchal or hierarchical form, which is to 
say, in essence, authority and, in operation, government.”4  Presupposing the primacy of 
                                                          
1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “Resistance to the Revolution,” in Property is Theft: A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
Anthology (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2011), 482. 
2 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. 
James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 295-296. 
3 Michel Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. 
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 329; 336. 
4 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “The Authority Principle,” in No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism, 
ed. Daniel Guerin (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 81. 
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government as the principal way in which order might be conceived within society is 
what Proudhon refers to as the “authority principle,” or, “the governmental prejudice.”5  
It is this principle of the archē, which as Proudhon correctly suggests both presupposes 
and privileges “government as the “sin qua non condition for order” in society—that has 
been absolutely foundational in the historical trajectory of Western political theory.6  
Since its origins in Greek political thought, the terms of the political and the very 
possibility of politics have been haunted by this paradigm which, following Proudhon, 
might be termed the crisis of the political, or that which assumes the primacy of archic 
government as the transcendental condition of possibility and material reality of politics.   
For Proudhon, within the history of political philosophy the “two notions—
government and order—therefore, allegedly, have a cause and effect relationship with 
one another: government being the cause and order its effect.”7  Working within the 
paradigm of government, traditional conceptions of politics are, as anarchists often argue, 
reducible to theories pertaining to the exercise of power, thus neglecting the potential 
manifestation of alternative conceptions of both political theory and politics.  Like the 
anarchist Lucy Parsons once maintained, “government in its last analysis is this power 
reduced to science.”8  It is in this regard that Mikhail Bakunin argues that the very term 
“politics,” as traditionally understood in political theory, is taken to refer to a certain 
simultaneity between authoritative power and government.  Exploitation and government, 
Bakunin contends, “are the two indivisible terms of all that goes by the name of politics,” 
wherein the former represents “the pre-requisite as well as the object of all government, 
which, in turn, guarantees and legalizes the power to exploit.”9  For Bakunin, then, the 
indivisible nexus between the emergence of “politics” and the problem of government 
forms the primary conceptual impasse of political theory from its classical incarnation to 
its present form.  Yet, according to Proudhon, the originary nexus between politics and 
government is itself subject to a fundamental hypothesis that has sutured the domain of 
                                                          
5 Ibid, 81. 
6 Ibid, 87. 
7 Ibid, 87. 
8 Lucy Parsons, “The Principles of Anarchism,” in Lucy Parsons: Freedom, Equality, Solidarity, ed. Gale 
Ahrens (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Company, 2003), 29. 
9 Mikhail Bakunin, “God and the State,” in No Gods No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism, ed. Daniel 
Guerin. (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 151-152. 
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the political to the manifestation of government as such.  Proudhon writes: the “external 
constitution of the collective power, to which the Greeks gave the name archē, 
sovereignty, authority, government rests on this hypothesis: that a people, that the 
collective being we call society cannot govern itself” (original emphasis).10  In Western 
political thought, the history of the concept of politics not only begins with the practice of 
government as its own transcendental condition of possibility, but also with an originary 
nexus that legislates a specific continuity between archē and politeia.  Between the 
domain of the political and the paradigm of government lies the originary principle of the 
archē, and it is this principle that has hitherto fundamentally structured the dominant 
narrative of political theory and practice in the West.  
 With the paradigm of the archē acting as the theoretical and practical framework 
from which a critical conception of the political might begin, the very rationale that posits 
a fundamental nexus between the domain of the political and the manifestation of 
government has never been called into question, and political thought from its classical 
form through its present incarnation begins with the concept of government as its 
fundamental presupposition.  As Proudhon’s dissent demonstrates, within the historical 
trajectory beginning with the seminal works of Plato and Aristotle, and stretching to 
modern political theorists such as Hobbes and Schmitt, the general terms of political 
theory arise by presupposing a synthesis between politics and the exercise of government 
which, in turn, is subject to the principle of an archē.  It is this principle of the archē that 
at once designates the condition of possibility and teleological limit for thinking through 
what lies at the essence of the political.  In classical political theory, beginning with the 
primacy of the archē has had the effect of both naturalizing the paradigm of government 
as the fundamental essence of politics, while simultaneously demonstrating that what 
causes the political to emerge as such is analogous to, and made possible by, power 
exercised as government.  It is precisely this conceptual model of the political that, until 
recently, has remained unchallenged by the majority of philosophers, and has further 
prevented political theorists from conceptualizing an alternative theoretical and practical 
framework for the field of the political that could never assume the form of an archē as its 
privileged domain. 
                                                          
10 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “Resistance to Revolution,” 482. 
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With such preliminary problematics in mind, this study takes as its critical turning 
point the inquiry into the reasons why the terms of the political in the West have assumed 
the form of government as the condition of possibility for a theoretical and material 
conceptualization of politics.  Contributing to what has recently been referred to as the 
“anarchist turn”11 in politics and political theory, as well as to the development of what I 
take to be an integral, yet historically neglected and critically undervalued concept found 
in the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s collected works, the aim of this study is to 
think through the philosophical and political problems underlying the historical terrain 
that reduces and structures politics to the spacing and act of government in light of what I 
posit as a key intersection between the resurgence of anarchist thought and practice and 
the key concept of resistance found in Foucault’s political thought and writings.  
Appropriating the concept of resistance as developed in anarchist political theory, as well 
as its further elaboration in Foucault’s thought, in terms of the critical locus from which 
to reread the history of the political against the primacy of government, it is my 
contention that what must be at stake in contemporary debates about political theory 
hinges on a unique relationship between Foucault’s philosophy of resistance and 
anarchism that creates a fundamental rupture in the political logic of an archē, or the 
specific rationale that presupposes the question of government as the implicit starting 
point for a critical conceptualization of the political as such.  Taking seriously the 
potential of postanarchist philosopher Saul Newman’s claim that the goal of political 
theory is to “affirm anarchism’s place as the very horizon of radical politics” (original 
emphasis),12 this project pursues the implications of the emerging body of anarchist 
praxis and scholarship along a trajectory following a core tenet of anarchist theory found 
in Foucault’s thought—what will be elaborated throughout this project as the primacy of 
resistance.  Recognizing that resistance is primary with respect to power not only reveals 
an alternative critical methodology that shifts the site of politics away from its traditional 
archic locus in the exercise of power, but in doing so further illuminates the possibility of 
developing an anarchist theory of politics in its irreducibility to the principle of an archē.      
                                                          
11 Simon Critchley, introduction to The Anarchist Turn, eds. Jacob Blumenfeld, Chiara Bottici and Simon 
Critchley (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 2.   
12 Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 2. 
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In contemporary political theory, the logic of the primacy of resistance has most 
recently been broached by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in their text Multitudes: 
War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. 13  Inspired by a reading of the preface to the 
first volume of Capital in which Marx claims that labor both materially and politically 
precedes capitalist development, Hardt and Negri argue that such a theory corresponds 
with a critical methodology that begins with the question of resistance.  Insofar as labor 
can be understood as holding a position of primary with respect to the development of 
capitalist domination, Hardt and Negri’s point is to uphold that the “same is true of 
resistance” (original emphasis) since the former concept is traditionally appropriated as 
the substance that makes possible the dissolution of capital in the materiality of class 
struggle.14  Such a tradition of inverting the relation between capitalist development and 
labor toward the latter’s capacity for resistance has a trajectory that stretches back toward 
the Italian movements of Operaismo in the 1960’s and later Autonomia in the later 
1970’s, both of which Negri played a role as a key theorist.  In these movements, Negri 
alongside Mario Tronti, Sergio Bologna, and others build upon Marx’s claim that capital 
reacts to the active struggles of the working class, in order to suggest that class struggle is 
materially prior to socially developed capital.  In other words, since work is the dynamic 
                                                          
13 See: Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitudes: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: 
Penguin, 2005), 64-69.  Despite the direct correlations with Foucault, with their use of the term “the 
primacy of resistance” Hardt and Negri instead turn to Marx and derive the concept from a critical theory 
of labor.  Indeed, as a concept inspired by a Marxist theory of labor, Hardt and Negri’s use of the term 
suggests that labor is the primary force in capitalist society in which the former’s capacity for resistance 
always precedes the latter’s strategies of domination.  The concept of the primacy of resistance, however, 
is not a key term developed throughout this text, and is instead invoked as a theoretical bridge toward 
developing a theory of resistance realized in what they refer to as the “democracy of the multitude” (67).  
It is in the context of this democratic multitude, and its universal struggle against “our permanent present 
war,” that Hardt and Negri suggest that “the primacy of resistance allows us to see history from below 
and illuminates the alternatives that are possible today” (64).  Nevertheless, while Hardt and Negri’s 
attempt at a critical methodology that begins with the question of resistance is, in many ways, particularly 
keen, since they frame their understanding of the primacy of resistance in the dynamic between capital 
and labor, it is more adequately the question of labor rather than resistance that is given the status of 
primacy.  Indeed, Hardt and Negri’s work is less a theory of resistance than a theory of what they refer to 
as “immaterial labor” in which the production of immaterial products such as knowledge and ideas might 
come to be understood as a particular site of resistance (65).  Emerging in the intersections between 
Foucault, anarchism, and political theory the notion of the primacy of resistance articulated in this study 
will be first distinguished from the universal characteristics Hardt and Negri prescribe for a politics of 
global revolt.  Furthermore, rather than invoking the concept of resistance as a way rethink the question 
of labor in contemporary capitalist society, it is my contention that the question of resistance requires a 
serious inquiry of its own right.      
14 Ibid, 64. 
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force of capitalist society, what is at stake for these theorists is that the concept of labor 
contains a certain capacity for resistance that always precedes capitalist domination.15  
Such a conception of labor’s inherent capacity to resist the strategies of capital ultimately 
invokes an alternative critical methodology that begins with the question of resistance 
rather than domination, and as such invites an affinity with an important aspect of 
Foucault’s thought—that is, that resistance is primary with power.16  
Although the logic of the primacy of resistance has briefly been discussed by 
Hardt and Negri in terms of a Marxist theory of labor and the coming politics of a global 
democracy, and while Mark Coté has established a specific continuity between the 
Autonomists and Foucault’s theory of power in terms of reversing the traditional polarity 
between capitalist domination and class struggle, it is nevertheless a mistake to reduce the 
question of resistance to a theory of labor, especially in the context of Foucault’s project.  
Rather than invoking the primacy of resistance as a concept that amends the traditional 
polarity between capitalist strategies of domination and labor, it is my contention that 
such a rationale as it arises from Foucault is best expressed in the context of anarchism 
                                                          
15 For example, see: Mario Tronti, “Lenin in England,” Marxists.org, accessed November 4, 2016, 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/tronti.html.  Originally published in 
January, 1964 in the first issue of Classe Operaia, in this text Tronti outlines the possibility of a critical 
Marxist methodology that inverts the traditional relation between capital and labor in such a way that 
class struggle becomes the operative force in the dynamic between the two.  In a passage key to the 
theoretical development of Operaismo and Autonomia, Tronti maintains that traditional Marxists have: 
“worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first and workers second.  This is a mistake.  And 
now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse the polarity, and start again from the beginning: 
and the beginning is the class struggle of the working class.”  Tronti’s work has been of key interest to 
Hardt and Negri’s work (see note 14 above) and Mark Coté (see note 16 below) and has influenced a 
restructuring of the dynamic between capitalist domination and class struggle.     
16 The similarities between the Autonomist’s reversal of traditional Marxist methodology and Foucault’s 
analytic of power have not gone unnoticed.  Indeed, in a particularly keen dissertation titled The Italian 
Foucault: Communication, Networks, and the Dispositif (PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 2007), Mark 
Coté has outlined the ways in which Foucault’s reconceptualization of power directly influenced several 
critical Italian theorists, including Tronti and Negri, to fundamentally rethink the history of capitalism in 
such a way that gives priority to the question of resistance.  As Coté suggests, the Autonomist “reversal of 
Marxist orthodoxy was in profound affinity with Foucault’s reconceptualization of power” in terms of how 
both valorize the question of resistance over strategies of domination within their respective critical 
methodologies (222).  It is in the relay between the Autonomists and Foucault’s analytic of power that 
Coté speaks of an “Italian Foucault” in which the key characteristic that defines such an intersection arises 
with the idea that “resistance comes first.” (74)   While Coté’s work is particularly astute in highlighting 
the importance of the question of resistance in Foucault’s work, his claim that Foucault’s analytic of 
power expands Marxist critique as developed by the Autonomists tends to overemphasize the question of 
labor not only as the privileged site of labor, but also the central locus through which the question of 
resistance can be posed as such.    
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instead of Marxism.  Staging an intersection between anarchism and Foucault’s theory of 
resistance against the orthodox history of political theory not only seeks to expose the 
ontological and political principles that continue to sustain Western political practices 
but, more importantly, attempts to open a space for political praxis beyond the horizon of 
state-based politics.  Situating Foucault’s theory of resistance in the context of anarchism 
is not, however, a simple ideological preference, but rather, as we will see, that which 
arises from a close reading of Foucault’s texts, lectures, and interviews from various 
periods of his work.  Thus, instead of reducing anarchist thought to Foucault’s 
philosophy, or Foucault to contemporary approaches to anarchism, this project reveals 
that Foucault’s political philosophy and anarchist theory intersect by locating the 
question of resistance as the key concept through which the field of the political can be 
rethought as a permanent domain of agonistic struggle irreducible to, and in confrontation 
with, the state and power exercised as government.  
In an interview from 1978, Foucault, like anarchist theorists before him, begins to 
situate his thought in relation to the “developing crisis of government,” and further 
establishes the trajectory of his work “at the beginning of a great crisis of reevaluation of 
the problem of government.”17  It is well known that during his lectures at the Collége de 
France, particularly in 1977 and 1978, Foucault begins to shift his emphasis from an 
analytics of power to an analytics of the forms of rationality intrinsic to Western practices 
of government, or what he refers to as “governmentality.”18  With the turn toward the 
study of the history of governmentality Foucault indicates three primary shifts in the 
focus of his work at this time.  First, rather than focusing on specialized practices of 
power and their deployment within specific institutional locations, as he did in Madness 
and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, and to a certain extent in Discipline and Punish, 
                                                          
17 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” 296. 
18 The lecture titled “Governmentality” was initially published in the Italian journal, Aut-Aut, and then 
reproduced twice, once in the journal, Actes, and again in the French collection Dits et Ecrits.  The first 
English version, translated from the Italian by Rosi Braidotti, republished and revised by Colin Gordon in 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, eds. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).  The most recent version, included in Security, Territory, 
Population, is a revised version taken from a live recording as well as the original manuscripts from the 
lecture given at the Collège de France.  Given that the majority of critical works on Foucault tend to cite 
from the first English translation, all further citations are from the edition published in in Power. Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 202-222. 
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Foucault shifts his focus toward the analysis of specific complex forms of political 
rationality and techniques of power exercised as a government over an entire population, 
or what he theorizes as “biopolitics.”19  Second, Foucault analyzes government in terms 
of an ensemble of practices operating through specific forms of political rationality 
inherently different from the forms of logic intrinsic to political sovereignty and 
disciplinary power.20  Indeed, following the lectures collected as Security, Territory, 
Population, many of the proceeding series of lectures given at the Collége de France are 
set to analyze the specific forms of rationality intrinsic to power exercised as government.  
Lastly, Foucault traces how the emergence of what he refers to as “pastoral power” 
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries begins to combine with the logic of the state 
and “gradually becomes governmentalized.”21  In this regard, although traditional 
political theory often presupposes the state as the constituent component required for the 
emergence of the political, Foucault maintains to the contrary that the state can only be 
understood in terms of its essential relation to the question of government.     
Yet, while the turn toward “governmentality” marks a critical turning point in 
Foucault’s thought, his work is not limited to the study and analysis of power exercised 
as government.  Instead, this analysis of government directly corresponds with, for 
Foucault, a genealogical analytic of the counter-historical movements of resistance 
against governmentality.  Indeed, the turn toward the study of government, especially as 
developed throughout several of his core writings, lectures, and interviews contains an 
often over looked conceptual hinge, a key turning point in Foucault’s thought, that 
fundamentally links the study of government to a critical theory of resistance.  Thus, in a 
crucial passage from a lecture given in 1978 titled “What is Critique?” Foucault proposes 
a fundamental nexus between the history of government and the counter-historical 
movements of resistance as the domain proper to the political.  Foucault writes: 
                                                          
19 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” 218. 
20 Ibid, 220.  Here, Foucault describes the how the process of governmentalization occurring during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries took place at the intersection between a “whole series of specific 
governmental apparatuses” and the “development of a whole complex of knowledges” 220. 
21 Ibid, 220.  Foucault’s point here is to draw an important connection between the problematic of 
government and the traditional conceptualization of the state in political theory.  Rather than 
understanding the state in terms of sovereign power and juridical law, Foucault argues that the “state can 
only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality” 221. 
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[t]his governmentalization, which seems to me to be rather characteristic of these 
societies in Western Europe in the 16th century, cannot apparently be dissociated 
from the question “how not to be governed”…And if we accord this movement of 
governmentalization of both society and individuals the historic dimension and 
breadth which I believe it has had, it seems that…as both partner and adversary to 
the arts of governing, as an act of defiance…as a way of limiting these arts of 
governing…there would have been something born…both a political and moral 
attitude, a way of thinking…which I would very simply call the art of not being 
governed.22  
Here, Foucault points toward the way in which the historical question of government is 
simultaneously posed with the counter-historical problematic of revolt against these 
forms of governmentality.  More fundamentally, however, it is my contention throughout 
this study that the way in which Foucault outlines a specific correspondence between 
power and resistance—that is between power exercised as government and the art of not 
being governed—reveals a radical new perspective from which to read the history of the 
political anarchically.  This is why in the turn toward the study of governmentality 
Foucault continuously reiterates that the very questions of power and government 
necessarily coincide with another political question, a “phenomenon” which Foucault 
states is historically “expressed in forms of resistance.”23  According to Foucault, it is 
through a critical theory of politics as resistance, and not of government alone, that one 
can begin to suggest an alternative “way to go further toward a new economy of power 
relations.”24  Yet, in the search for an new analytic of power, it is not simply the analysis 
of government that designates Foucault’s principal concern at this period; instead, rather, 
Foucault clarifies that it is the concept of “resistance” which forms the primary 
“philosophical problem of our days.”25  At its core, this study affirms the concept of 
resistance as the principal problematic explored by Foucault throughout the entirety of his 
work, while simultaneously suggesting that it is through Foucault’s theory of resistance 
                                                          
22 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth, ed. Sylvère Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth. 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 44-45. 
23 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault,” 296. 
24 Michel Foucault, “Subject and Power,” 329. 
25 Ibid, 336. 
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that the question of anarchism can be reopened within contemporary debates in political 
theory.   
While the concept of resistance forms the critical axiom from which a new theory 
of the political might arise, an elaboration and study of the role of resistance, I claim, 
simultaneously acts as the theoretical and conceptual framework from which Foucault’s 
political thought can be fully understood.  Rather than presupposing the primacy of 
government and the manifestation of political power as the implicit starting point for a 
theory of the political, Foucault argues to the contrary that the very possibility of a new 
political economy of power relations “consists in taking the forms of resistance against 
different forms of power as a starting point.”26  By beginning with the concept and 
practice of resistance as the very basis from which a new economy of power relations 
might arise, Foucault fundamentally reverses the orthodox logic of standard political 
theory, and radically denies the monopolization of the political by the paradigm of 
government.  Yet, taking the concept of resistance as a beginning point from which to 
understand the history of politics, necessarily requires an alternative analytic framework 
from which to reread the history of the political as such.  This means, however, that 
resistance is not only primary with respect to the history of the political, politics and 
relations of power, but also in terms of Foucault’s methodology.  In order to understand 
the very nature of politics one must begin, as Foucault suggests, by situating resistance in 
a relation of primacy with the history of governmentality.  Between the crisis of 
government and the coinciding philosophical problem of resistance lies the great arc of 
Foucault’s thought.    
Furthermore, it is my contention in this study that between the paradigm of 
government and the corresponding critical theory of resistance, Foucault ultimately 
reveals a unique nexus through which his thought can be situated within the context of 
anarchist political theory.  Although critics have and continue to argue that Foucault’s 
development of what might be considered a political theory of resistance is practically 
“impossible and even conceptually incoherent,”27 staging an intersection between 
                                                          
26 Ibid, 329.   
27 See: Linda Alcoff, “Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits of a Collaboration,” in Crises in Continental 
Philosophy, eds. Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott with P. Holley Roberts (New York: SUNY Press, 
1992), 74. 
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anarchism and his thought through a rethinking of the idea of resistance invites a 
reconsideration of the political possibilities offered by Foucault’s work, as well as a 
radically new way from which to read the history of the political that transcends the 
paradigm of government.  In this regard, central to my argument in the chapters that 
follow is that Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality—which reads “[w]here there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this position is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power”—
incorporates a radical political and ethical claim regarding the essence of politics which, 
in turn, forms an interesting affinity with anarchism that remains to be fully explored.28  
As I will argue throughout this project, what places Foucault’s work in line with the 
history of anarchist thought is the way in which he situates resistance as the being-
political of politics; rather than presupposing the paradigm of government as the principle 
of intelligibility of politics, Foucault argues to the contrary that the history of government 
is contemporaneously parallel with the counter-historical movements of resistance—that 
is, resistance is primary with the history of government, and as such acts as an alternative 
grid from which to reread the terms of the political.  I therefore assert that the resurgence 
of anarchist thought and practice gives Foucault’s political project a renewed sense of 
urgency, and further makes possible a redefinition of historical struggle irreducible to the 
history of governmentality.    
Contrary to the practice of assimilating the political to the techniques of power, 
what is at stake for Foucault is that resistance must be understood and situated in a 
relation of primacy with respect to power.  Under what I will elaborate throughout this 
project as the primacy of resistance, I argue that the political turns upon that which 
animates the counter-history of governmentality—that is, the question of resistance, or 
what Foucault refers to in 1978 as “the art of not being governed.”29  If Foucault’s fifth 
thesis can be understood, as one theorist suggests, in terms of the “locus classicus for 
assessing the possibility of a critical stance in his thought” (original emphasis),30 it is my 
                                                          
28 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 
1990), 95. 
29 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 45. 
30 Kevin Thompson, “Forms of Resistance: Foucault on Tactical Reversal and Self-Formation,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 36, (2003): 113. 
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contention that his work intervenes in the history of political philosophy precisely by 
attempting to redefine the terms of the political not from the point of view of political 
power, but from the possibility of the counter-histories of resistance that run parallel, yet 
heterogeneous, to the historical possibility of power as such.  In other words, Foucault 
reframes and redefines the field of the political from the point of view of resistance, and 
it is in this way that the general arc of his thought can be situated in relation to the history 
of anarchism.  Staging an intersection between anarchism and Foucault’s theory of 
resistance, I argue that a redefinition of the terms of the political beyond the principle of 
archic power is made possible through animating the practices that continuously ward off 
all acts of governance.  This is to say that, if there is a potential for a form of politics and 
corresponding critical theory of the political beyond its culmination in the dual paradigms 
of power exercised as government and the logic of the state, it is to be found in the taking 
place of revolt, or the art of not be governed—a unique political rationality expressed in 
the intersection between the logic of the primacy of resistance and a corresponding forms 
of politics that animates the condition of possibility for life without government. 
Throughout several of his works, Foucault gestures towards a fundamental 
rupture with the history of political thought which, not only acts as the beginning point 
for a new political philosophy against the history of political power, but also the general 
trajectory that forms an interesting link between Foucault’s project and the history of 
anarchism with regard to the question of resistance.  Rather than exclusively focusing on 
the question of governmentality as the primary site of political and philosophical 
problems, Foucault argues to the contrary that what is needed vitally “is a political 
philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty.”31  If, as Foucault was 
often apt to say, that we still need to “cut off the king’s head” in political theory, I 
maintain that this regicide of political philosophy intersects with anarchist thought 
precisely by attempting to redefine the terms of the political not from the point of view of 
political power, but from the perspective of a counter-history of resistance parallel, yet 
heterogeneous, to the historical possibility of political power.32  As Foucault importantly 
                                                          
31 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. 
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994,) 122. 
32 Ibid, 122. 
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reminds us, what must be at stake in political thought is not simply the analytics of power 
and the study of governmentality, but that “which allows us to constitute a historical 
knowledge of struggles, and to make use of this knowledge in contemporary tactics.”33 
To be sure, Foucault’s genealogical—or as we will see, “anarchaeological”—method is 
itself a testament of the primacy of resistance.34  Rather than beginning with the question 
of power, Foucault instead begins anarchically—that is, with a “meticulous rediscovery 
of struggles, and the raw memory of fights”—a “memory” of a form of politics expressed 
as resistance which, as Foucault reminds his audience, has traditionally been “confined to 
the margins” of theoretical and political thought.35 (C-SMD 8). 
In his emphasis on historical struggle, Foucault’s work is set to both revive and 
actualize the counter-history of sovereign power and biopolitical governmentality, and in 
this way marks not only an important turn in contemporary theory but, also, and even 
more fundamentally, a critical renewal of one of the central tenets of anarchist theory and 
practice—that is, a form of politics expressed as resistance to governmentality.  Thus, in 
staging an intersection between anarchist thought and Foucault, what is at stake in this 
study is that this critical alliance can be made by reintroducing the concept of resistance 
as the vital and permanent component that reveals the field of the political in its agonistic 
specificity.  Contrary to the practice of assimilating the political to the operability of 
power, what Foucault refers to as the political turns on that which animates the counter-
history of political power—that is, a politics as resistance, a certain “art of not being 
governed.”  Yet, and consequently, this means for Foucault that resistance is primary not 
only with power, but with the terms of the political as well.  In other words, a critical 
theory of the political necessitates, per Foucault, a theory of resistance as its elemental 
component.  In this way, it is my contention that to understand the possibility Foucault 
posits of a political theory irreducible to sovereignty, the question of resistance—what I 
will elaborate throughout this project as the primacy of resistance in relation to the 
paradigm of government—must not be subordinated to the study of the history of political 
                                                          
33 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, trans. David 
Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 8. 
34 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living. Lectures at the Collège de France 1979-1980, trans. 
Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2014), 77-79.   
35 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 8. 
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sovereignty or to the study of the biopolitical governmentality.  Instead, the primacy of 
resistance responds to the crisis of governmentality in a way that is itself fundamental; 
Foucault’s historical ontologies of power, politics, and governmentality derive their 
incredible force from the affirmation of a counter-historical ontology of resistance that is 
heterogeneous to, yet cotemporaneous with, the history of political power.  It is only 
through a critical investigation of the primacy of resistance inscribed within the history of 
government as its “irreducible opposite” that will allow us to “escape,” as Foucault 
writes, “from the system of Law-Sovereign which has captivated political thought for 
such a long time.”36 
In outlining the intersections between the return of anarchist philosophy and 
Foucault’s study of resistance, this study asserts the primacy of resistance across two 
main points of intersection.  First by thinking through the philosophical and political 
problems underlying the historical terrain that reduces and structures politics to the 
spacing an act of government, it is my contention that what must be at stake in outlining 
the growing relationship between contemporary radical thought and anarchist philosophy 
hinges on elevating the study of anarchism to a more fundamental level in order to 
cultivate the emergence of a new theory of the political in its irreducibility to the political 
as archē.  Affirming anarchist theory against the foundations of political philosophy not 
only seeks to expose the ontological and political principles that continue to sustain 
Western political practices, but also opens the space to pursue, in the chapters that follow, 
the implications of the emerging body of anarchist praxis and scholarship along a 
trajectory following a core tenet of anarchist theory found in Foucault’s thought: an 
agonistic theory of politics as resistance.  Paving the critical framework from which to 
understand the general implications of the turn toward anarchism, I additionally contend 
that Foucault’s problematic of resistance provides a more consistent framework from 
which to rethink the terms of the political consequent upon the turn toward anarchism.  
Instead of reducing current debates in radical political theory to anarchism, this study 
reveals that Foucault intersects with anarchist theory by asserting the concept of 
resistance as the theoretical and practical framework from which this alternative theory of 
the political might take place.  As such, this study aims to redefine anarchism and 
                                                          
36 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 96-97. 
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Foucault’s philosophy in relation to the fundamental politico-philosophical problem of 
resistance, while simultaneously posing the primacy of resistance as the vital component 
from which to rethink the domain of the political in its agonistic and anarchic specificity.     
An attempt to trace the logic of the primacy of resistance within Foucault’s 
philosophical and political works and its relation to anarchist political theory will be 
elaborated in the chapters that follow.  While working within the tradition of political 
theory, my study of Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchist political theory further 
traverses three inter-disciplinary axioms: Foucault studies, anarchist studies, and the more 
recent field of resistance studies.  Within of these distinct fields of study, several critical 
insights regarding the significance of resistance to Foucault’s political project have been 
made; and, yet, a thorough study of both Foucault’s theory of resistance and its relation to 
anarchist political has only scarcely been broached.  In affirming the place of resistance 
in Foucault’s thought, my own approach seeks to avoid the tendency to reduce Foucault’s 
concept of resistance to the analytics of power; instead, I argue, that the notion of 
resistance—especially as developed by Foucault—warrants a study in its own right.  
Furthermore, in staging an intersection between Foucault and anarchism my intention is 
not, however, to demonstrate that Foucault’s productive theory of power somehow 
amends the shortcomings of classical anarchist thought, as has been claimed by certain 
anarchist theorists.37  Instead, my intention is to demonstrate to the contrary that rather 
than overturning a flawed conception of anarchist resistance, Foucault’s theory instead 
compliments the anarchist conception of resistance and emphasizes its key importance 
within the history of political theory.  In this regard, it is necessary to briefly outline 
certain critical positions from which my own study of the intersections between 
anarchism and Foucault’s theory of resistance proceeds. 
Foucault and the Political  
 
                                                          
37 See: Todd May, “Anarchism from Foucault to Rancière,” in Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An 
Introductory Anthology of Anarchy in the Academy, ed. Randall Amster, et al. (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 11-14.   
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First at stake in my analysis of Foucault’s study of resistance is a rereading of the 
relationship between his work and political theory.  While Foucault is often celebrated for 
making key contributions to the study of politics through his retheorization of power 
relations, as one critic nevertheless suggests, “Foucault did not characterize himself as a 
political theorist or philosopher and wrote no text intended to sum up his political 
thought.”38  Even so, while Foucault refused to self-identify as a political philosopher, it 
is well documented that, from the late 1960s until his untimely death in 1984, his work 
increasingly took a more political turn.  In regard to this political turn, Foucault’s 
biographers often point out how his work began to engage more directly with political 
questions after witnessing a student revolt in Tunisia during 1966,39 which in Foucault’s 
own account “was a true political experience.”40  Others have identified Foucault’s 
political turn in the events following the revolts in France during May of 1968.41  Indeed, 
throughout these years, Foucault’s project develops as an archaeological and genealogical 
analysis of the forms of political rationality coupled with an analytic of power that 
ultimately culminates in the study of the “history of governmentality.”42  Taking this 
genealogy of governmentality as the central critical axis from which to develop an 
alternative analytic of power, Foucault’s project, and the critical gesture that arises out of 
it, ought to be understood and situated in relation to the larger history of political 
philosophy.  My argument, however, is not simply that Foucault ought to be incorporated 
within the history of political thought as a central rather than marginal figure, but instead 
that it is through the logic of resistance continuously developed throughout his work 
whereby Foucault carves out the most trenchant interventions within the history of 
political theory.   
                                                          
38 Colin Gordon, introduction to Michel Foucault, Power, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 
1994), xi. 
39 See: David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (Hutchinson: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 191.  
On the significance of the Tunisian revolts to Foucault’s political thought, see the interview between 
Foucault and Duccio Trombadori titled “Between ‘Words’ and ‘Things’ During May ’68,” in Michel 
Foucault: Remarks on Marx, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991), 
132-140. 
40 Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx, 134. 
41 See: James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 286.  In 
Foucault’s own account of the significance of the events in France in May of 1968, he maintains that 
“without May of ’68 I would never have done the things such as I’m doing today” (Remarks on Marx, 140). 
42 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” 217.  
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Despite the importance Foucault continuously attaches to the political nature of 
his work, the question of politics remains one of the more highly contested topics within 
his oeuvre.  While several theorists have analyzed Foucault’s work in relation to the 
question of politics and the political, full studies of his relation to political theory are 
lacking in comparison to the amount of work dedicated to other aspects of his thought.  
As a recent critic argues, then, regardless “of the political importance of Foucault’s 
thought, and perhaps to some extent because of its radicalness, the study of politics is an 
area in which Foucault was until recently relatively neglected by comparison with other 
social sciences and literary humanities.”43  Traditionally, theorists tend to argue that 
Foucault intervenes in the history of political thought by developing a radically new 
analytic of power, and scholars often tend to focus on the question of power while 
bracketing the corresponding concept of resistance.44  It is often the case that Foucault’s 
readers therefore tend to credit his thought for “welcoming the concept of power into the 
contemporary philosophical landscape,” while neglecting to notice how this analytic of 
power fundamentally turns upon the question of resistance, without which it would lose 
its specificity.45   
Despite the copious amount of secondary literature on Foucault, there is a 
surprisingly minute amount of work done in regard to the concept of resistance as 
continuously developed throughout his thought.  Until recently, works engaging with 
Foucault’s political theory often include short sections dedicated to a conceptual pairing 
between “power and resistance.”46  Yet, although Foucault consistently argues for the 
importance of a theory of resistance, critics and scholars rarely attempt to engage with the 
notion of resistance as a concept that warrants a full study of its own, nor have they 
noticed the way in which resistance functions in Foucault as the principle of intelligibility 
                                                          
43 Mark G. E. Kelly, Foucault and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2014), 2. 
44 Ibid, 105-107. 
45 Michael Kelly. Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. (Boston: MIT Press, 1994), 
1. 
46 For example, see: Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 99-100; Ellen K. 
Feder, “Power/Knowledge,” in Michel Foucault: Key Concepts, ed. Dianna Taylor (Durham: Acumen 
Publishing, 2011), 63-65; Sara Mills, Michel Foucault (New York: Rutledge, 2003), 40-42. 
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from which to reread the history of the political and the question of power.47  Thus, while 
theorists such as Chloë Taylor highlight how “Foucault is perhaps best known as a 
theorist of power,” the concept of resistance is often disregarded or bracketed as an after-
thought to the analytics of power.48  In this regard, Brent Pickett observes that while there 
have been attempts to engage with the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, 
“[m]ost discussions of resistance are merely codicils to lengthy examinations of 
power.”49  Standard introductions to Foucault’s thought attest to this idea, and generally 
include extended discussions on how the notion of power designates one of the key 
concepts elaborated throughout his work.  Thus, in Clare O’Farrell’s introduction to 
Foucault we read that his “name is linked most famously with the notion of power.”50  
Similarly, Sara Mills suggests that it is Foucault’s “analysis of power that has most 
profoundly influenced political thinking.”51  Although both O’ Farrell’s and Mills’ 
introductions both include a short sections titled “Power and Resistance,” these pieces 
nevertheless tend to focus more directly on Foucault’s notion of power.     
Furthermore, while Foucault’s understanding of politics is most commonly 
reduced to his theory of power, there have been relatively few full studies written on 
Foucault’s relation to political theory.  John Rajchman’s Michel Foucault: The Freedom 
of Philosophy,52 Jon Simons’ Foucault and the Political,53 and Mark G. E. Kelly’s texts 
The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault54 and Foucault and Politics: A Critical 
Introduction55 are notable in this regard.  These texts have made important contributions 
                                                          
47 An early notable exception is Todd May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, 
and Knowledge in the Thought of Michel Foucault (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1993), 111-128.  Here, May, whose work would later become seminal for the development of a theory of 
poststructural anarchism, dedicates a rare discussion regarding the significance of resistance in Foucault’s 
thought.  More recently, in his text The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, Mark Kelly dedicates a 
whole chapter to the place of resistance in Foucault (see: chapter 5, 105-121). 
48 Chloë Taylor, “Biopower,” in Michel Foucault: Key Concepts ed. Dianna Taylor. (Durham: Acumen 
Publishing, 2011), 41. 
49 Brent Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance,” in Polity 27, 4, (1996): 446. 
50 Clare O’Farrell, Michel Foucault, 96. 
51 Sara Mills, Michel Foucault, 30. 
52 John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Philosophy of Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985). 
53 Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political (London: Routledge, 1995). 
54 Mark G. E. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
55 Mark G. E. Kelly, Foucault and Politics: A Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2014). 
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to the study of Foucault’s relationship to political theory, and have also significantly 
expanded the focus on the question of resistance in his thought.  What is particularly 
significant in these studies is how each of them highlight certain concepts by which 
Foucault attempts to rethink the limits of political theory.  Rajchman, for example, has 
pinpointed the concept of “freedom” as the theoretical and practical thread that links 
Foucault’s thought to the history of political theory, and has usefully tied the concept of 
freedom to the elaboration of a Foucauldian “politics of revolt.”56  Affirming the question 
of revolt as a vital part of Foucault’s critical lexicon, Rajchman’s goal is to demonstrate 
that Foucault’s political thought develops a “post-revolutionary politics,” whereby 
Foucault turns toward the analysis of historically specific instances of resistance instead 
of revolution.57  While Rajchman significantly emphasizes the importance of revolt in 
Foucault’s thought and provides an extensive outline of how this approach to politics 
differs from other major philosophical schools on the left, his text strangely never 
mentions the notion of resistance, thus neglecting a critical concept from which to 
understand the questions of freedom and revolt in Foucault’s work.  In a similar reading, 
Simons argues that the political theory offered by Foucault ought to be understood in 
relation to the question of revolt, and ultimately that Foucault’s work is elaborated in 
terms of an “ethic of permanent resistance.”58  Yet, while Simons clearly highlights the 
significance of resistance in Foucault’s thought, he also argues that “resistance is 
drastically undertheorized in his work,” and thus that “he does not make these arguments 
clearly.”59  For Simons, then, Foucault’s failure to fully develop the concept of resistance 
undermines its potential and efficacy.  “Without theorizing resistance,” Simons argues, 
“Foucault’s own formulations about what makes resistance possible are opaque and 
allude to some sort of underlying, indomitable of agonal subjectivity that always resists 
power.”60  Despite Simons’ criticisms, my own approach resists the idea that the idea of 
resistance is an undertheorized concept in Foucault.  As I will demonstrate the concept of 
resistance is one of the more consistent themes in all of Foucault’s work.  Furthermore, 
                                                          
56 John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Philosophy of Freedom, 6-7; 43-76. 
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while I affirm alongside Simons that Foucault’s thought ultimately turns upon elaborating 
an ethos of permanent revolt, I nevertheless contend that this critical ethos does not rely 
on a hidden form of essentialism underlying the very possibility of resistance, but is 
instead what arises as the very activity of politics.    
In general, however, traditional studies of Foucault’s relationship to politics are 
often oriented towards his work in the 1970s in which a critical shift occurred in his 
thought and was directed toward the analytics of power and the study of 
governmentality.61  This critical shift in Foucault’s thought leads Kelly to maintain that 
“all of Foucault’s work has to do with power.”62  In particular, three concepts from 
Foucault’s work during this time—“disciplinary power,” “biopower,” and 
“governmentality” have been of particular interest to scholars.63  With these concepts, 
there can be no doubt that Foucault has increasingly influenced the study of politics, but 
his influence within the history of political theory has primarily been analyzed in relation 
to the study of a new analytics of power at the expense of neglecting how the study of 
power for Foucault itself turns upon the question of resistance as its key theoretical and 
methodological focal point.  It is therefore my contention throughout this study that any 
critical consideration of Foucault’s political theory cannot be achieved without regard to 
the concept of resistance.  Indeed, as Foucault maintains in an interview, the analytic of 
power is itself made possible through the question of resistance: 
[since the] mechanics of power in themselves were never analyzed…this task 
could only begin after 1968, that is to say, on the basis of daily struggles at grass-
                                                          
61 See: Mark G. E. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 31.  Here Kelly reconstructs Foucault’s 
theory of power “across a ten-year period in which his thought changed considerably, into a single, 
coherent account of power,” 31. 
62 Ibid, 31. 
63 For example, see: Michel Foucault: Key Concepts, ed. Diana Taylor (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 
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(299-400).  With the exception of Jon Simons’s “Power, Resistance, and Freedom (301-319), the rest of 
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roots level, among those whose fight was located in the fine meshes of the web of 
power.  This was where the concrete nature of power became visible.64 
While Foucault’s readers tend to focus directly on his conception of power, they neglect 
to realize that such an analytic of power is only made possible in Foucault through an 
analytic of resistance.  To be sure, it is through the study of resistance that reveals the 
visibility of power as such.  This is indeed the key point Foucault continuously reiterates 
throughout several of his texts, lectures, and interviews.  Thus, power is not something 
that can be analyzed in itself—that is, “power is not a substance”—but rather, as Foucault 
importantly suggests, that which is contingent upon the permanent potentiality of 
resistance amongst the dynamic to which power refers.65  Indeed, Foucault’s own 
methodology begins with analyzing points of resistance in order to determine the 
specificity of power, and not the other way around.  As Foucault therefore writes in “The 
Subject and Power,” the development of an analytic of power necessarily “consists in 
using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations.”66  
Because resistance is what reveals the specificity of power, Foucault argues that “[r]ather 
than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of 
analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies.”67  It is this analytic of 
power, which fundamentally turns upon the question of resistance, that Foucault’s 
thought can be seen as adding a key contribution to the history if political thought.  Yet as 
I will argue, in order to understand the breadth of Foucault’s thought, the concept of 
resistance must be situated in a position of primacy with respect to power and politics.  It 
is in regard to the logic of the primacy of resistance that Foucault designates an 
alternative principle of intelligibility from which the history of the political and politics 
can be reread both agonistically and anarchically.     
More recently, Kelly’s works The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault and 
Foucault and Politics have both helped to elevate the concept of resistance to a more 
fundamental position in Foucault’s political thought.  As Kelly’s work makes clear, it is 
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impossible to fully understand Foucault’s analytics of power without the concept of 
resistance.  Accordingly, the concept of resistance “is so essential to Foucault’s 
conception of power,” Kelly writes, “that it requires a dedicated explanation.”68  Despite 
its strengths in regard to reintroducing to importance of resistance to Foucault’s political 
theory, Kelly’s work nevertheless suffers from rejecting, a priori, the affinity between 
Foucault’s critical conceptualization of resistance and anarchist political theory.  
Although Kelly upholds that Foucault was an “anarchist…inasmuch as he urges us to 
fight against existing power structures,” he further concludes that Foucault is “neither 
anarchist nor socialist in so far as he does not have an a priori commitment to abolishing 
the state or capitalism, nor an alternative vision of how society might operate.”69  Thus, 
“while Foucault clearly had certain anarchist tendencies,” Kelly maintains that Foucault 
“does not endorse a ‘fundamental anarchism’ that is opposed to government.”70  By 
positing a unique relation between anarchist theory and Foucault through the concept of 
resistance, my argument is not to suggest the ways in which Foucault could be read as 
endorsing a “fundamental anarchism” against the history of government.  As has already 
been noted, Foucault often refused to align his thought with political ideologies.  Instead, 
rather, as I will argue in the chapters to follow, Foucault and anarchist political theory 
intersect by asserting the primacy of resistance as the key concept for rethinking the 
history of the political in such a way that it cannot simply be reduced to problem of 
governmentality.  Such a critical perspective, however, neither implies for anarchists nor 
for Foucault a fundamental essence as the fulcrum for resistance, but rather an alternative 
perspective from which to rethink the terms of the political anarchically and 
agonistically.   
Further at stake in the reconsideration of Foucault’s relation to political theory is a 
rethinking of the question of resistance as it develops in relation to the larger scope of his 
oeuvre.  Critical developments in radical political theory and anarchist studies, as well as 
the posthumous publications of Foucault’s lectures given at the Collège de France from 
1971-1984, allow for a rereading of the ways in which the concept of resistance is 
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expanded and developed throughout his career.  Rather than taking the analytic of power 
as the key focal point from which to understand Foucault’s thought, I argue that the 
concept of resistance broaches new and interesting ways from which to draw critical 
connections between the differing periods of Foucault’s work.  In this way, rethinking 
Foucault’s study of resistance in relation to the turn toward anarchism additionally 
requires, I argue, a reevaluation of the concept of resistance as it develops in relation to 
what Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow refer to as the four stages of Foucault’s 
thought—particularly in relation to transition from what is typically characterised as his 
genealogical analysis of power relations to his studies of ethics and subjection.  Indeed, at 
the end of their famous study of Foucault, Dreyfus and Rabinow pose the question of 
resistance as one of the possible focal points for Foucault studies.71  In this regard, certain 
theorists have recently invoked the concept of resistance as a new critical arc from which 
to draw connecting threads between Foucault’s different works and conceptual themes.  
Johanna Oksala has traced—albeit rather briefly—the concept of “resistance” across 
three thematic points connecting the seemingly disparate periods of Foucault’s thought, 
and argues that his later works ought to be “read as a deliberate attempt to elaborate on 
his rudimentary account of resistance in The History of Sexuality and to answer the 
criticisms against” his use of resistance.72  Similarly, Brent Pickett divides “Foucault’s 
writings into three periods defined by Foucault’s different understandings of 
resistance.”73  Kevin Thompson maintains that Foucault offers two distinct models for 
resistance—a “tactical reversal” and “aesthetics of existence”—throughout his work.74  
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Such preliminary work has broached new ways from which to elevate the concept of 
resistance to a more fundamental position in Foucault’s critical lexicon, and yet no full 
studies of the concept of resistance in Foucault’s thought have been produced. 
Foucault and Resistance 
 
A reevaluation of the place of resistance in Foucault’s thought and its relation to anarchist 
political theory furthermore entails an engagement with what has recently come to be 
known as “resistance studies.”75  Historically, “resistance” has remained a relatively 
under researched field in philosophy, political theory, and the social sciences.  With the 
advent of resistance studies, however, more serious attention has been directed toward 
elevating the concept of resistance to a more fundamental level that warrants its own 
studies and methodologies.  Within this nascent field of study, scholars have invoked the 
concept of resistance as a key component within several different disciplines.  James 
Scott, whose work has come to be paradigmatic in the field of resistance studies, argues 
that resistance acts as a sort of “hidden transcript,” that reveals an “infrapolitics” at the 
cusp of political power.76  David Couzens-Hoy has usefully highlighted the concept of 
resistance as a key term for continental theorists including Foucault.77   Louise Amoore78 
and Barry Gills79  have both situated resistance as consequent effect of globalization and 
invoke the concept of resistance as a key component of global studies; Stephen 
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Duncombe80 has addressed the problem of resistance in relation to cultural studies; Benita 
Parry81 has theorized resistance in relation to postcolonial studies; Catherine Eschle82 has 
made a critical link between resistance, the anti-globalization movement and the field of 
International Relations; while Mona Lilja and Stellen Vinthagen83 have contributed to a 
heightened interest in the study of resistance by formally establishing the field of 
“resistance studies.”  With such elevated interest in the study of resistance, Hollander and 
Einwohner maintain that “we are now experiencing a flood of research and theory which 
purports to the issue of resistance.”84   
While within resistance studies there exists a plurality of definitions and concepts 
employed with regard to the concept of resistance, what holds resistance studies together 
is, as Vinthagen maintains, the idea that “resistance needs analytically speaking to be” 
understood as a completely “different phenomenon from power.”85  That the concept of 
resistance ought to be understood as fundamentally different in kind from power has 
immense consequences for political theory and philosophy, consequences that will be 
unpacked with a critical reading of Foucault’s work and its relation to anarchist theory.  
To be sure, the advent of resistance studies opens new possibilities for understanding the 
significance of resistance in Foucault’s thought.  Yet, while the study of resistance is 
reappearing as a concept of particular interest throughout several differing disciplines, the 
contributions made by Foucault to the field of resistance studies have been widely 
ignored.  Although the increased attention paid to the importance of the concept of 
resistance would appear to warrant further study into the question of resistance as 
developed throughout Foucault’s career, scholars involved in resistance studies have 
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remained strangely mute on Foucault, and have further sought to discount his critical 
conception of resistance as self-refuting in terms of his analytics of power.  As Vinthagen 
maintains: “while Foucault made a paradigmatic turn in our understanding [of] 
power/resistance he is not very helpful in understanding power/resistance.”86  As his 
choice italicization suggests Vinthagen, like critics before him, emphasizes that Foucault 
only focuses on the analytics of power while neglecting a full study the question of 
resistance.  Thus for Vinthagen, Foucault studies power “with resistance always in 
brackets, and he did it from the view of power.”87  In this respect, my own study proposes 
a contrary reading regarding the place of resistance in Foucault’s thought; rather than 
theorizing resistance from the perspective of power, it is my contention that Foucault’s 
analytic of power fundamentally depends on elaborating a theory of resistance as the key 
component that reveals the specificity of power relations and the political as such.  As a 
whole, the discipline of resistance studies tends to focus on primarily sociological studies 
and problems, while neglecting the relation of resistance to political theory, and as such 
have overlooked an important aspect of Foucault’s work.  As I will argue, however, 
Foucault’s assertion that resistance is primacy with power fundamentally offers a new 
way to reread the history of politics from the perspective of resistance, thus contributing 
to the discipline of resistance studies in several ways that should not be overlooked.  
Additionally, while there have been several significant contributions pertaining to 
the concept of resistance in Foucault, the literature on the subject is nevertheless lacking 
in comparison to the focus dedicated to his analytics of power.  In this way, although 
Brent Pickett correctly maintains that “it is impossible to comprehend Michel Foucault’s 
politics without fully understanding his concept of resistance,” scholars and critics of 
Foucault historically tend to disagree on the consistency, efficacy, and practical nature of 
the political possibilities afforded by his work regarding the question of resistance. 88  It is 
for this reason that Oksala maintains that “resistance is one of the most contested and 
divisive concepts in Foucault’s thought.”89  The concept of resistance is divisive in 
Foucault because it holds the key to understanding his analytic of power.  Yet, it 
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contested for the way in which several scholars argue that Foucault lacks a clear theory of 
resistance.  In this regard, Kelly notes that although the concept of “resistance entered 
Foucault’s technical vocabulary somewhat after power,” he further suggests that 
“Foucault’s reconception of power requires a reexamination of resistance.”90  As such, 
the concept of resistance often appears secondary in relation to Foucault’s study of power 
and governmentality.  To be sure, scholars have never agreed on the consistency of 
resistance in Foucault’s thought.  There have nevertheless been attempts to trace the 
concept of resistance through a variety of other connecting concepts spread throughout 
Foucault’s different works in order to locate a more consistent pattern pertaining to the 
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought.  While some theorists have looked for 
precursors to the concept of resistance in Foucault’s thought in terms of  “the outside,”91 
and the concept of “freedom,”92 others like Judith Butler have argued that the concept of 
resistance in Foucault’s thought is later replaced with the ethics of “virtue.”93  
Furthermore, Arnold Davidson maintains that resistance is further revised in Foucault’s 
late work as an ethos of “counter-conduct.”94  While each of these studies has advanced 
the study of resistance in Foucault by tracing its growth alongside other key concepts, it 
is my contention that the concept of resistance in Foucault requires a full study of its own 
in order to fully understand how several other themes in Foucault find their respective 
bases in a theory of resistance. 
Regardless of these attempts to affirm the significance of resistance in Foucault, 
the concept is perhaps the most contested term in all of his critical lexicon, and scholars 
rarely agree on how to conceive of the question of resistance in Foucault.  Customarily, 
Foucault’s critics often interpret the question of resistance in one of three manners.  First, 
it is argued that Foucault’s conception of power—especially as depicted in Discipline and 
Punish and the History of Sexuality—presents a ubiquitous and all-encompassing theory 
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of power that paralyzes rather than promotes resistance.  In this regard Duccio Trombardi 
writes “[t]here is no escaping the impression that Foucault, far from providing a new 
stimulus to demands for liberation, limits himself to describing a mechanism of pure 
imprisonment.”95  Moreover, critics such as Habermas96 and Thomas McCarthy97 have 
suggested that Foucault’s concept of resistance is fundamentally self-refuting in terms of 
his analysis of power.  While acknowledging that Foucault often directs his attention to 
the question of resistance, Nancy Fraser98 and Hartstock99 have argued that Foucault 
comes close to affirming the absolute necessity of resistance without either prescribing 
what such forms of resistance might look like, or a specific normative criterion from 
which the activity of resistance might be justified.  For Fraser, a Foucauldian conception 
of resistance therefore fails on two accounts.  Foucault’s theory of resistance first fails 
insofar as he does not specify who is resisting and what is to be resisted, and again since 
he refuses to introduce certain normative criteria whereby one might be able to explain 
“why domination ought to be resisted.”100  Still others argue that “Foucauldian radicalism 
fails, in effect, to hypothesize another possible response beyond the pure and simple 
“refusal of politics.”101  As we will see, Foucault’s theory of resistance, on the contrary, 
is not developed in terms of a pure negation, but also in terms of ethical struggle toward 
new forms of ungovernable subjectivities animated in practices of resistance.  In this 
respect, it is my contention that these approaches either come short of recognizing the 
way in which the development of a concept of resistance undermines the history of 
governmentality in crucial ways which help to redefine the scope of the political as a 
genuine anarchic possibility, or how the continuity between Foucault’s political and 
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ethical periods reveals a productive tension between resistance, politics, and ethics key to 
understanding the entirety of his works.  Despite these claims from Foucault’s critics 
regarding the seemingly impossible task of developing a coherent political theory of 
resistance, the question of resistance, I argue, is not only central to understanding the 
breadth of Foucault’s thought, but vital to the possibility of rethinking the domain of the 
political against the paradigm of governmentality. 
Foucault and Anarchism 
 
Finally, affirming the relation between Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchist 
political theory requires and engagement with the more recent turn toward “anarchist 
studies” in continental thought. 102  With the turn toward “anarchist studies,” significant 
contributions have been made across a wide-range of disciplines including political 
philosophy, anthropology, political science, economics, history, sociology, and 
anthropology.  Commenting on this growth of anarchist ideas, Randall Amster suggests 
that “in recent years, anarchism has enjoyed a resurgence among activists and academics 
alike.”103  The rebirth of anarchist theory has not gone unnoticed within in studies of 
political theory.  With the development of “anarchist studies” breaking new ground from 
which to critically engage with the history of politics, Simon Critchley has argued for an 
“anarchist turn in politics and our thinking of the political.”104  Similarly, Saul Newman’s 
work affirms anarchism “as the very horizon of radical politics,” and has made significant 
contributions to rethinking the history of political theory through anarchist 
perspectives.105  While critical turns toward anarchism have helped to break new ways 
from which to reread the history of political theory, the turn toward anarchism has 
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additionally opened up new critical territory from which to understand Foucault’s critical 
theory of resistance.    
While Foucault by no means self-identified as an anarchist, he does often invoke 
examples from historical anarchist movements in support of his ideas.106  The 
methodological approach to unmasking the genealogy of historical struggle does indeed 
suggest a retheorization of the practices of resistance which, as Foucault claims, derive 
their collective force from an “anarchist thematic.107”  Towards the end of his career, 
Foucault even suggests that “what should of course be studied” is “European and 
American anarchism.”108  Foucault, unfortunately, completed no such study.  
Nevertheless, in recent scholarship the collected works of Foucault are coming to play an 
increasingly pivotal role in the retheorization of the political consequent upon the 
resurgent turn toward anarchism within the contemporary political landscape.  Over the 
past two decades, to be sure, Foucault’s thought has been increasingly mobilized by 
anarchist philosophers in a variety of important ways.  The intersections between 
Foucault’s works and anarchism have been most clearly elucidated in the thought arising 
out of the works associated with what has been called, following Todd May, Saul 
Newman, and Lewis Call respectively, “poststructural anarchism,”109 “postanarchism,”110 
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and “postmodern anarchism.”111  May’s work is particularly ground-breaking in this 
regard, and his text The Political Philosophy of Post-Structural Anarchism provides a 
clear outline of how Foucault can be read within an anarchist context.  In this respect, 
May argues that Foucault’s works in general “offer a compelling anarchist vision that at 
once emerges from and continues the anarchist tradition.”112  With a basis in May’s work, 
Newman further contends that an engagement with the relation between Foucault and 
anarchism will “enable us to further engage the possibility of resistance to power.”113   In 
his analysis of Foucault’s relation to the history of anarchism, Jimmy Klausen argues that 
“Foucault’s anarchism in fact extends, or at least can be read as extending, to a new 
theorization of anarchistic practice.”114  Such preliminary advancements, especially in 
May and Newman’s work, help to uncover new possibilities for exploring the still 
nascent relationship between Foucault’s work and anarchism, and as such mark a critical 
turning point from which my own study proceeds.115  Yet May and Newman both 
underestimate the importance of resistance in Foucault’s thought, and tend to argue 
instead that it is his analytic of power, and not his theory of resistance, that allows for a 
connection between anarchism and Foucault to be made.  As I will argue in a later 
chapter, postanarchist approaches to Foucault often fail in affirming the potential of 
resistance in Foucault’s work, mistakenly focusing instead on the ways which his theory 
of power helps to overcome the certain limits in ‘classical’ anarchist thought, in order to 
“theorize the possibility of resistance without essentialist guarantees.”116   
With the notable exception of postanarchism, traditional scholars of Foucault, as I 
will demonstrate throughout this project, either deny any possible link between anarchism 
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and Foucault, or attempt to reduce Foucault’s thought to a politically weak, or generic 
anarchism.  To be sure, Foucault’s indebted refusal to either engage in political polemics 
or to outline a program for political emancipation has led to a wide-range of criticism and 
confusion regarding the practicality of his political theory.117  In an interview from 1984 
following the question “[w]here do you stand?” (original emphasis), Foucault’s response 
highlights his refusal to identify with a particular political party or school of thought.  
Foucault responds: 
I think I have in fact been situated in most squares on the political checkerboard, 
one after another and sometimes simultaneously: as anarchist, leftist, ostentatious 
or disguised Marxist, nihilist, explicit or secret anti-Marxist, technocrat in the 
service of Gaullism, new liberal and so on…None of these descriptions is 
important by itself; taken together, on the other hand, they mean something.  And 
I must admit that I rather like what they mean.118 
Refusing to take a firm political position, has led Foucault to be criticized for invoking a 
“skeptical apolitical stance,” culminating in a form of “radicalism pushed to the extreme 
of nihilism.119  An early critic of Foucault’s political theory, Michael Walzer, has 
summarized Foucault’s political thought in terms of an “infantile leftism,”120 wherein 
Foucault displays a commitment to “anarchism/nihilism.”121  Similarly, in an interview 
from 1983, Foucault is referred to as “an anarchistic heir of Nietzsche.”122  Furthermore, 
often frustrated at the lack of a strict philosophical system linking together the seemingly 
disparate periods characterizing Foucault’s thought, scholars often comment that 
Foucault’s “fondness for remaining elusive and unclassifiable” undermines his attempts 
                                                          
117 Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations.” Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth. Essential 
Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 111. 
118 Ibid, 113. 
119 Sara Mills. “Foucault’s Intellectual and Political Development.” in Michel Foucault. (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 16. 
120 Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. D. Couzens Hoy 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 51.   
121 Ibid, 61. 
122 “Politics and Ethics: An Interview,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Vintage, 
2010,) 375. This interview was conducted in April of 1983 in Berkeley by Paul Rabinow, Charles Taylor, 
Martin Jay, Richard Rorty, and Leo Lowenthal.   
33 
 
to rethink the limits of political philosophy.123  Indeed, Foucault often reiterates the claim 
that neither the task of philosophy, nor the goal of political thought is to prescribe (as in 
Lenin’s terms) ‘what is to be done.’  The refusal to outline or prescribe a normative 
political theory has led some critics to dismiss Foucault’s work as “self-indulgent radical 
chic,”124 while Habermas famously refers to Foucault as a “young conservative”125 whose 
thought lacks a practical theory of emancipation.   
The position of Habermas is further shared by Walzer who criticizes the political 
possibilities offered in Foucault’s work.  While Walzer highlights the importance of 
resistance in Foucault’s thought by suggesting that Foucault’s political theory is a “tool 
kit not for revolution but for local resistance,” he radically denies the effectivity of the 
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, and takes it as a simple refusal of politics.126  
For Walzer, it is through the state and not movements of revolt, as Foucault argues, that 
make resistance possible: “it is the state that holds open or radically shuts down the 
possibility of local resistance.”127  According to Walzer, insofar as Foucault radically 
denies the state as an effective model for political change, the concept of resistance in 
Foucault’s thought is the “catastrophic weakness of his political theory.”128  Despite his 
intentions, however, Walzer points toward the way in which Foucault’s concept of 
resistance aligns him with anarchist thought.  With the concept of resistance acting as the 
key component of Foucault’s political thought, Walzer claims that it is “for this reason 
Foucault’s politics are commonly called anarchist, and anarchism certainly had its 
moments in his thought.”129     
While in the chapters that follow, I will engage more thoroughly in the criticisms 
launched against the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, as well as his 
approaches to the questions of politics and anarchism, this study offers a rather 
unorthodox reading of these criticisms and affirms the possibilities of what his harsher 
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critics tend to deny.  Whereas critics of Foucault tend to deny the possibility of an 
emancipatory political theory in Foucault’s thought, often pejoratively reducing his work 
to a call for a benign anarchism, I affirm Foucault’s relationship to anarchist political 
theory, and further assert that it is with the framework afforded by anarchism that 
Foucault’s contributions to political theory can be brought to light with respect to the 
question of resistance.  An attempt to trace the relation between Foucault and anarchism 
can be better elaborated, I argue, in the ways in which he rethinks an alternative theory of 
historical struggle which, not only reveals the counter-history of governmentality through 
the logic of the primacy of resistance, but also that which, in doing so, fundamentally 
denies the monopolization of the political by the state and the paradigm of government.  
As I will argue, it is through the question of resistance—indeed the primacy of 
resistance—that Foucault’s work intersects with anarchist theory most forcibly.  
Foucault’s work internally turns upon and develops an affinity with anarchism through 
his concept of resistance, while anarchism is what marks the critical threshold from 
which to locate the political possibilities offered in Foucault’s theory of resistance. 
Towards a Theory of the Primacy of Resistance 
The above discussion was set in order to create a preliminary critical framework from 
which to orient and situate Foucault’s theory of resistance within the history of anarchist 
political theory in a way that still needs to be explored today.  As I will demonstrate 
throughout this project, with the technical vocabulary of resistance, Foucault’s project 
works toward reversing the general tenets of political theory.  Posing the problem of 
resistance against the history of governmentality not only seeks to expose the ontological 
and political principles that continue to sustain Western political practices and thought, 
but, more importantly, attempts to open a space for political praxis in which the very 
notion of struggle with governmentality becomes the central, operative force of politics.  
Until the more recent publications of Foucault’s lecture series during his tenure at the 
Collège de France, the complexities of his engagement with the questions of resistance to 
the history of governmentality have remained subordinate to the study of the two 
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interrelated poles comprising the general turn toward the biopolitical.130  In Foucault’s 
work, however, it is this very persistence of power that pushes him toward rethinking the 
conditions, origins and principles of legitimacy of political power, but also the possibility 
of a radical politics of resistance parallel, yet heterogeneous, to the history of the 
governmental.  Although the concept of resistance enters Foucault’s critical lexicon later 
than the concept of power, it nonetheless forms the framework from which he begins to 
think through the problem of politics; resistance as I will argue is not an isolated concept 
in Foucault’s thought, and its presence stretches through to his last works.  Rather than 
crediting Foucault with developing a philosophical concept of power, Foucault might 
therefore be better known as a philosopher of resistance.  As a theorist of resistance, it is 
my contention that what is crucial about Foucault’s work is how he reintroduces the 
concept of resistance into the field of politics and political philosophy in such a way that 
a critical caesura between the political as archē and the political as agōn is revealed.  
Indeed, under the logic of the primacy of resistance, it is my contention that Foucault’s 
political theory ultimately unmasks the field of the political in its anarchic and agonistic 
specificity.  Rather than tracing the emergence of the category of the political to the 
advent of government and state sovereignty, the permanent potentiality of resistance 
amongst the dynamic in which politics refers and consists reopens the field of the 
political as an agonistic dynamic of struggle between power exercised as government and 
the counter-historical movements of resistance.  As agōn, the primacy of resistance not 
only designates a permanent component of politics but, more fundamentally, the 
condition of possibility from which power relations are transformed into a relation of 
struggle.     
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Through Foucault we can begin to point toward the ways in which the 
engagement with the history of political power reveals not simply the set of practices of 
resistance that turn against it, but that the fundamental fact of revolt reveals the 
possibility of a life emancipated from the paradigm of government —indeed, of other 
possibilities “turned back against the system that was bent on controlling it.”131  While 
Foucault explicitly situates his work in relation to the complexities of governmentality as 
the site for political and philosophical problems, what is crucial is that he simultaneously 
unmasks and posits the possibility of a non-sovereign politics of resistance.  This history 
of revolt, which reveals the counter-history of archic governmentality, is precisely the 
point in which Foucault attempts to carve out a new terrain for political theory.  Although 
it is often overlooked in his work, or simply dismissed as the affirmation of a “quasi-
anarchism,”132 Foucault’s engagement with the history of governmentality is set to 
demonstrate the potential to slip into its opposite, what he calls in one work a “tactical 
reversal” and in another the “counter-power” of the primacy of resistance.133  That is, 
Foucault reopens the site of the political as fundamentally cognisant of the very 
possibility of anarchism, of being-without-government through what Kropotkin refers to 
as the “spirit of revolt.”134  If as Foucault suggests in “What is Critique?” that the history 
of politics has been fundamentally bound to the political question of how to govern, the 
counter-histories revived throughout his work are guided by a question that is not only 
irreducible to the history of the former, but perhaps even the principle question posed by 
anarchism.  Foucault writes that the “perpetual question” that needs to be asked in 
relation to the history of political philosophy, and one that his work is set to revive, takes 
the form of asking “how not to be governed.”135  Indeed, according to Foucault born 
alongside the history of sovereign power and the art of governing is the counter-history of 
what he pointedly refers to as the “art of not being governed.”136  It is this “art of not 
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being governed” that Foucault both takes as the key referent from which a new political 
theory beyond the paradigm of government might be thought, as well as the ethical basis 
for a form of politics conceived as resistance to power exercised as government.  
Thus, what is of absolute importance, yet highly under-theorized in Foucault 
studies is, however, that alongside the analytics of power and the study of 
governmentality, Foucault begins to develop a theory of historical struggle and resistance 
against the techniques of governmentality.  The question regarding “how not to be 
governed” is, for Foucault, the ethical framework from which a new form of political 
thought might begin; politics as such must be reframed in terms of “the art of not being 
governed.”  When Foucault famously argues for a regicide in political theory, it is my 
contention that he is specifically concerned with addressing the possibilities of resistance 
that counter the forms of power exercised as government.  In Security, Territory, 
Population, Foucault highlights this theme as a central component to his work.  Against 
the history of governmentality, Foucault writes:  
There must be a moment, when breaking all the bonds of obedience, the 
population will really have the right, not in juridical terms, but in terms of 
essential and fundamental rights, to break any bonds of obedience it has with the 
state and, rising up against it, to say: My law…must replace the rules of 
obedience.  Consequently, there is an eschatology that will take the form of the 
absolute right to revolt, to insurrection, and to breaking all the bonds of 
obedience: the right to revolution itself.137 
It is through the concept of resistance and the “right to revolt” that Foucault saw the 
greatest potential to challenge, and perhaps even negate, his theory of governmentality.  
To be sure, Foucault intervenes in the history of political philosophy by attempting to 
think politics against the reduction to the first principle of archic governmental power.  
Indeed, it is in Foucault that the question of resistance reappears as a key term thus far 
neglected in political philosophy. 
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Furthermore, with the concept of resistance acting as the theoretical framework 
from which to rethink the notion of politics, a critical conceptualization of resistance 
additionally acts as the point from which to rethink the history of the political and 
political theory.  For Foucault, then, resistance forms the point of “extreme brightness” in 
political theory because it means that “we ought to have the courage to begin anew.”138  
Understood in this way, resistance means: 
We have to abandon every dogmatic principle and question one by one the 
validity of all the principles that have been the source of oppression.  From the 
point of view of political thought, we are, so to speak, at point zero.  We have to 
construct another political thought, another political imagination, and teach anew 
the vision of a future.139   
Here, Foucault importantly points toward the way in which the very possibility of an 
alternative theory of the political requires an engagement with the question of resistance.  
Yet, this alternative theory of the political is simultaneously posed with a 
reconceptualization of what constitutes the essence of politics.  In the manuscripts to the 
lectures compiled as Security, Territory, Population, Foucault points toward what it 
might mean to construct another form of political thought through the question of 
resistance.  Foucault writes: “politics is nothing more and nothing less than that which is 
born with resistance to governmentality, the first revolt, the first confrontation.”140  As 
Foucault indicates here, “politics” is analogous to the emergence of resistance and revolt.  
In this way, although resistance for Foucault is directly immerged within relations of 
power, politics nonetheless refers to a permanent sphere of agonism “born with resistance 
to governmentality.”  In its most basic sense, then, a Foucauldian theory of politics 
designates the space of “resistance to governmentality.”  In other words politics, 
according to Foucault, emerges as a paradigm of revolt.  If politics, for Foucault, is that 
which is born with resistance to governmentality, then it is my contention that the logic of 
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the primacy of resistance directly informs an entirely different analytic framework from 
which to rethink the history of the political. 
Although work on Foucault’s approach to a theory of resistance is at times both 
skeptical and evasive, what Foucault outlines in his fifth thesis on power in The History 
of Sexuality is key to understanding the way in which he hopes to re-evaluate the terms of 
the political beyond the paradigm of government.  Indeed, this thesis is the decisive 
moment in Foucault’s thought that provides the possibility for a critical stance against the 
history of governmentality.  That resistance is present in a position of non-exteriority to 
power, means that resistance is part of the relation of power itself—that is, resistance is 
“inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite,” and as such is always primary with 
power.141  As Foucault clarifies in a later interview, resistance is fundamental to a 
retheorization of the political because: 
It means that we always have possibilities, there are always possibilities of 
changing the system…You see, if there was no resistance, there would be no 
power relations.  Because it would simply be a matter of obedience…So 
resistance comes first, and resistance remains superior to the force of the process; 
power relations are obliged to change with resistance.  So I think that resistance is 
the key word, in this dynamic…To say no is the minimum form of resistance.  
But, of course, at times that is very important.  You have to say no as a decisive 
form of resistance (original emphasis).142 
As the “key word” in the dynamic between power and resistance, it is clear that Foucault 
begins to associate politics with the two-fold operative character of resistance.  First, the 
potential space of resistance inherent to relations of power means that wherever there is 
the possibility of power there is also, and consequently, the space where “we always have 
possibilities”—that is, potential for resistance.  In this way, “resistance comes first”—that 
is, resistance is primary with power.  Additionally, this primacy of resistance is the 
condition of possibility for “changing the system,” the act of opening up the spacing of 
the political in order to transform it.  Finally, Foucault additionally points toward 
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something fundamental regarding the logic of power itself.  The condition of possibility 
of power is neither the state nor the paradigm of government; instead, rather, the 
condition of possibility of power is itself resistance, without which “there would be no 
power relations.”  With the primacy of resistance Foucault fundamentally reverses the 
very principles of traditional political theory.  By understanding resistance as being 
primary with power, what I refer to as the primacy of resistance is set to overcome the 
allegations from certain critics of Foucault that he presents a picture of power that stifles 
rather than develops resistance.143  The fact that resistance is present wherever there is 
power does not mean that power is inescapable; rather, the primacy of resistance means 
precisely that power is itself relational with its own adversarial force, and cannot be 
conceived beyond this relation.  As Deleuze reminds us in his study of Foucault, what is 
crucial is that “the final word on power is that resistance comes first” (original 
emphasis).144   It is not therefore power that is inescapable, but resistance; in its position 
of primacy, resistance is the condition of possibility of both power and politics—that is, 
resistance is what allows for the category of the political to emerge as such.  It is this 
potentiality inherent to power that ultimately allows for a preliminary reinterpretation of 
Foucault’s fifth thesis as follows: if the potentiality for resistance is inherent wherever 
there is power—that is, inasmuch as the history of governmentality is simultaneously the 
expression of its own counter-history—and politics is that which becomes manifest 
through “resistance to governmentality,” then resistance can be seen as the anarchist 
invariant of political power and the history of governmentality.  
Through the technical vocabulary of resistance, Foucault fundamentally reinvents 
an alternative way to reread and revaluate the history of politics and political theory.  
Although Foucault is still criticized for undermining the potential for a grounded political 
position throughout his work, as early as 1968 Foucault begins to describe the arc of his 
work in terms of developing a theory of resistance, distinct from both orthodox political 
philosophy and other forms of politics.  Setting up his work in contradistinction from 
other prevalent forms of politics at the time, Foucault writes: 
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A progressive politics is a politics which recognizes the historical and specified 
conditions of a practice, whereas other politics recognize only ideal 
necessities…A progressive politics is a politics which defines, within a practice, 
possibilities for transformation and the play of dependencies between those 
transformations, whereas other politics rely upon the uniform abstraction of 
change.145 
Rather than understanding politics as the prescription of “ideal” strategies and “uniform 
abstractions” Foucault, as early as 1968, begins to describe a form of politics that begins 
with and takes into account the potential for radical transformation as its constituent 
component.  Although the language of a “progressive” politics now appears dated 
(Foucault himself abandoned the notion of progression), it is clear that rather than 
developing an apolitical stance, Foucault instead is committed to the development of an 
alternative theory of the political that grounds the question of politics within the space of 
transformation—a concept he later develops as the phenomenon of resistance.  In this 
way, if resistance allows for a fundamental rethinking of the “principles” which have 
hitherto structured the terms of the political, it is my contention that in order to 
understand the possibility of affirming anarchism as the horizon of contemporary radical 
thought, the question of resistance, must not be subordinated to the study of the history of 
the archipolitical.  Instead, the primacy of resistance responds to the crisis of 
governmentality in a way that is itself fundamental; Foucault’s historical ontologies of 
power derive their incredible force from the affirmation of a counter-historical ontology 
of resistance that is heterogeneous, yet parallel, to the history of the governmental. Yet, 
and consequently, in its relation of primacy to the domain of the political, resistance is 
not only a vital component of politics and the political, but that which makes visible the 
political as such.    
Thinking against Foucault’s critics, then, the primacy of resistance as articulated 
throughout this project can be seen, I argue, as forming the locus from which not only a 
new theory of politics might begin, but the very principle of intelligibility from which to 
rethink the domain of the political.  By beginning to rethink politics through the question 
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of resistance and radical transformation, Foucault calls for a radical reanalysis of 
precisely what constitutes the political and the politics of resistance.  As Paul Patton 
notes, with Foucault’s intervention “one can no longer accept the conquest of power as 
the aim of political struggle; it is rather a question of the transformation of economy of 
power itself.”146  Recent developments in anarchist studies demonstrate a strong affinity 
between Foucault’s work and the history of anarchism.  Yet, at the same time, anarchist 
theorists who engage with Foucault have remained strangely mute with regard to the 
question of resistance.  By elevating the concept of resistance as a vital philosophical 
problem and key concept in Foucault’s lexicon, what is at stake in the attempt at 
rethinking the political consequent upon the turn toward anarchism today is that the 
primacy of resistance both designates the condition required to begin to think politics 
against and beyond the paradigm of government, as well as the historical force for 
creating new possibilities in life without government, an art of not being governed.   
Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter one, “On The Crisis of the Political: Government, Sovereignty, and the Paradigm 
of the Archē,” takes as its critical turning point the inquiry into the reasons why the terms 
of the political used by political theorists presuppose an archic nexus between the 
paradigms of government and state sovereignty as the condition of possibility for 
theoretical and material conceptualization of politics.  As way to establish the historical 
and philosophical context from which my own study proceeds this chapter traces two 
dominant political paradigms through Aristotle and Schmitt which, when taken together, 
provide a general narrative regarding the ways in which the field of the political in the 
West is historically elaborated in terms of a form of politics as archē—that is, the 
principle that locates the question of politics at the intersection between power exercised 
as government and the logic of state sovereignty.  As I will demonstrate, it is precisely 
this conceptual model for the domain of the political that, until recently, has remained 
unchallenged by political theorists and philosophers, and as such has prevented us from 
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conceptualizing an alternative theoretical and practical framework for a theory of the 
political that neither assumes government or the state as the privileged site of the 
political.  Taking the unique nexus between the principle of the archē and the paradigms 
of government and state sovereignty as the conceptual horizon from which to situate the 
turn toward anarchism in political theory, I then place anarchist theory in conversation 
with two recent trends in contemporary theory—postanarchism and what Critchley refers 
to as the “meta-political moment.”147  Contrary to the history of political theory which 
locates the field of the political between government and state sovereignty my argument 
is that, in their respective responses to the crisis of the political, postanarchism and 
metapolitical theory both attempt to rethink the possibility of politics and the political 
against the logic of the archē, and yet because of this require not only a rethinking of 
anarchism as the basis from which a new thought of politics might emerge, but also an 
anarchist hypothesis of the political that takes resistance as its principal domain.  Such 
developments in contemporary political theory not only open up unexplored possibilities 
for the continued retheorization of anarchism, but also, as I will argue in the chapters to 
follow, the critical framework to orient and situate Foucault’s theory of resistance that 
begs to be explored today. 
Responding to the archic paradigm that synthesizes the terms of the political with 
government and state sovereignty, chapter two, “Anarchy and Anarchism: Rethinking the 
Political at the Horizon of the State and Government,” argues for a return to the study of 
anarchism in order to reveal a theory of the political in its irreducibility to the logic of the 
archē.  Following what postanarchist philosopher Saul Newman refers to as the 
“anarchist invariant,” or, the “recurring desire for life without government that haunts the 
political imagination,” I examine the relevance of anarchism to contemporary political 
theory across two primary axes—rethinking the political against the paradigms of 
government and state sovereignty, and a corresponding theory of politics as resistance 
that animates this alternative conception of the political as such.148  Here, my intention is 
to first reintroduce anarchism as itself a distinct form of political philosophy that 
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fundamentally turns upon an alternative hypothesis of the domain of the political in its 
irreducibility to the political as archē, and second to demonstrate how the concept of 
resistance animates and forms the central component from which this new conception of 
both politics and the political can become discernible.  Together these two ideas—that is, 
the political situated at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government, as well as 
the elaboration of an alternative paradigm for politics as resistance—form the locus of 
what I hold not only to be the essential task for political theory, but also the vital 
characteristics from which anarchism informs the context of Foucault’s political thought.  
In this regard the focus of this chapter is to both reintroduce anarchism in terms of its 
fundamental gesture toward developing an anarchist hypothesis of the political, an 
alternative theory of politics in which the question of resistance reveals the political in its 
anarchic and agonistic specificity.   
Chapter three, “An Anarchist Hypothesis of the Political: Foucault, Critique and 
the Art of Not Being Governed,” introduces the concept of resistance as the key term that 
gives meaning to Foucault’s critical inquires into the problematics of power, politics, and 
governmentality, and further seeks to situate Foucault’s thought as such within context of 
anarchism.  Taking Foucault’s philosophy as exemplary of the attempt to affirm an 
anarchic politics situated at the horizon of the state and government, in this chapter I 
argue that the notion of “critique,” as developed between two key lectures Foucault gave 
in 1978 and 1984 under the respective titles “What is Critique?” and “What is 
Enlightenment?” corresponds with a different conceptualization of the terms of the 
political which, in turn, redefines the spacing of the political as the history wherein power 
always coincides with the fundamental truth of its own resistance.  In this regard, it is my 
contention in this chapter that with the concept of “critique” Foucault not only 
emphasizes how the notion of resistance designates the key term central to his 
philosophy, but also how it designates the principle from which the political, in its 
agonistic specificity, can be interpreted anarchically.  Taking the concept of “critique” as 
the hidden critical locus from which to locate the problem of resistance in Foucault’s 
thought, it is my contention that his work increasingly reveals what I refer to as the 
anarchist hypothesis of the political—in which the term ‘politics’ refers to an ongoing and 
permanent dimension of agonism between the exercise of government and the counter-
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historical movements of resistance animated as an “art of not being governed.”  Rather 
than beginning with the question of power (which, of course, can never be neglected in a 
study of Foucault) the overall goal of this chapter is two-fold: to first demonstrate how 
the notion of “critique” functions in Foucault as the critical concept that locates the 
trajectory of his works with the context of a theory of resistance, and further that 
Foucault’s theory of resistance rethinks the question of politics in a manner that invokes a 
reconsideration of the connection between his work and the history of anarchism.   
Chapter four, “The Primacy of Resistance,” designates the key focal point around 
which my study of the intersection between Foucault and anarchism is based.  Utilizing 
the theoretical space of the anarchist hypothesis of the political as outlined in the previous 
chapter, this chapter discusses Foucault’s important contribution to the often neglected 
questions pertaining to the relationship between politics, power and resistance.  Taking 
the permanent interplay between power and resistance as both the constituent material 
and principle of intelligibility of the power and politics, I argue that Foucault’s analytic 
of power in The History of Sexuality posits what I refer to as the primacy of resistance, in 
which the question of politics is reinvigorated and made possible only insofar as 
resistance is to be understood as a vital, permanent characteristic of power.  Central to my 
argument, here, is that Foucault’s fifth thesis incorporates a radical claim which reverses 
the essential being-political of politics, and thus has significant implications for the 
continual development of anarchist thought.  Rather than reducing the sphere of the 
political to the historical operability of governmentality, through the logic of the primacy 
of resistance Foucault reverses the archic principle that has hitherto structured Western 
political thought, ultimately revealing a new way from which to reread the history of the 
political from the point of view of resistance rather than government.  Taking seriously 
the notion that an alternative theory of the political—indeed an anarchist hypothesis of 
the political—can be made in regard to the question of resistance, what is at stake in this 
chapter is that such a theory ultimately first finds its basis in Foucault’s fifth thesis on 
power.   
Chapter five, “From Archē to Agōn,” seeks to establish a theoretical continuity 
between the primacy of resistance as broached in The History of Sexuality and the lecture 
series given under the provocative title Society Must Be Defended in which the 
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power/resistance dynamic is directly reinvigorated by Foucault as the basic framework 
from which to read the question of politics and the history of the political.  As its primary 
focal point, this chapter will focus on Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the war model 
of politics, in which resistance is not only primary in relation to the domain of the 
political, but that which acts as the principle of intelligibility from which the political as 
such can be read.  More specifically, while the previous chapter is set to reveal and 
explicate how Foucault’s fifth thesis posits the primacy of resistance as the condition of 
possibility and principle of intelligibility for a new economy of power relations, this 
chapter traces how Foucault invokes this same thesis as the basis from which to rethink 
the history of the political as a domain of an agōn in which the power/resistance dynamic 
is recast in terms of interpreting politics as a continuation of war.  In this regard, it is my 
contention that insofar as a vital connection between the analytic of power from The 
History of Sexuality and the analytic of the political as extensively theorized in Society 
Must Be Defended can be made in terms of the primacy of resistance, that this theoretical 
nexus is itself made possible in Foucault’s strategic inversion of Carl Von Clausewitz’s 
proposition regarding the ways in which war designates the continuation of politics by 
other means.  By tracing the ways in which Foucault’s fifth thesis is redeveloped in 
Society Must Be Defended, it is my argument in this chapter that Foucault’s assertion 
regarding how resistance is primary and absolutely co-extensive with the field of power 
is indicative of an alternative hypothesis from which to interpret the political as agōn 
rather than archē.  The central claim here is that just as resistance is primary with power 
for Foucault, the agonistic model of the political asserts that resistance is also primary 
with the history of politics.   
In the final chapter, “The First Revolt: Politics as an Ethics of Resistance to 
Government,” I outline a specific correspondence between Foucault’s theory of 
resistance and the turn toward the study ethics at the end of his career.  While the three 
previous chapters are set to situate Foucault’s work in relation to the history of political 
philosophy and anarchist thought, it is my contention in this final chapter that this 
anarchist hypothesis of the political which takes the primacy of resistance as its 
constituent component, also turns upon an ethics of revolt that animates and makes 
possible Foucault’s agonistic analytic of power and politics as such.  Following Arnold 
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Davidson’s idea that Foucault’s notions of conduct and “counter conduct” as developed 
in Security, Territory, Population, contain a key “conceptual hinge” linking together the 
political and ethical axes of his thought, I argue that Foucault adds an explicitly ethical 
component to the logic of the primacy of resistance.149  With the notion of counter-
conduct acting as the conceptual hinge between the political and ethical periods of 
Foucault’s thought, resistance can be seen I argue not simply in terms of an absolute 
refusal of government, but rather as that which in its struggle with government, affirms 
another possibility in life.  In light of the way in which a continuity between the political 
and ethical axes of Foucault’s thought can be drawn through the concept of resistance, it 
is at once my contention in this chapter that there is an explicitly political dimension of 
Foucault’s theory of ethics that itself turns upon the question of resistance, as well as how 
this turn toward the study of ethics reveals an important way in which the relation 
between politics and resistance can be rethought in terms of a critically resistant ethos, 
not as a prescriptive set of moral codes and normative rules, but ethos defined as a mode 
of resistance to the exercise of power as government.  More specifically, it is my claim 
that Foucault’s ethical turn ought to be understood as an attempt to locate a continuity 
between a form of ethics that animates his theory of resistance, and a form of politics as 
resistance resistance—that is, an distinct ethos, or art of not being governed. 
  
                                                          
149 See: Arnold Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” History of Human Sciences 24: 4, (2011): 25-41.   
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Chapter 1 
1 On The Crisis of the Political: Government, Sovereignty, and 
the Paradigm of the Archē 
Since its origins in Greece, politics has carried within itself a metaphysics of order.  It 
begins from the premise that people must be governed, either democratically by 
themselves or hierarchically by others…If we have a politics to advance, it is the one that 
begins from the opposite hypothesis…There is an open battle between, on the one hand, 
this fear…that we can only live on condition of being governed, and on the other hand, 
an inhabited politics that dismisses the question of government altogether.150   
--The Invisible Committee 
 
Perhaps there is a different way of thinking about the political principle—one that is 
detached from state philosophy and works against it in the name of an entirely different 
kind of political community.  This is where the autonomy of the political translates into 
the politics of autonomy–a politics and an understanding of the political community 
which is outside of, and autonomous from, the state.151 
--Saul Newman 
 
In the historical narrative that has continuously helped shape the structure and practice of 
Western politics, political theorists from classical antiquity to our own contemporary 
situation have consistently taken the dual paradigm of the exercise of power in the form 
of government and the coinciding problematic of sovereignty as the twin a priori 
presuppositions from which a critical conceptualization of politics and political 
philosophy might begin.  To be sure, since Plato’s political treatise The Republic—a text 
often considered by many theorists to be the foundational work on Western political 
philosophy152—political theory has been haunted by the originary nexus that locates 
politics and the terms of the political in the intersections between the exercise of 
government and the state.  Indeed, within the historical and theoretical trajectory that 
stretches through the foundational texts such as Plato’s The Republic and Aristotle’s 
Politics, to Thomas Hobbes’s political treatise the Leviathan, and later Carl Schmitt’s 
controversial work On the Concept of the Political, the history of political philosophy 
traditionally begins by presupposing an a priori nexus between the field of the political 
                                                          
150 The Invisible Committee, “Spread Anarchy, Live Communism,” in The Anarchist Turn, eds. Jacob 
Blumenfeld, Chiara Bottici, and Simon Critchley (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 230-231. 
151 Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism, 99. 
152 See: John Ferrari, “Introduction” to Plato, The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), xi. 
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and the paradigms of state sovereign power and the techniques of government.  
Underlying this theoretical nexus and historical continuity between the exercise of 
government and the paradigm of sovereignty lies what can be termed the crisis of the 
political, in which the history of politics and the political is reduced to the primacy and 
first principle of what the Greeks referred to as archē, the paradigmatic nexus that binds 
the question of politics and the political to the logic of government exercised within the 
domain of state sovereignty.    
As a distinct history pertaining to the way in which the question of politics 
radically coincides with and is indistinguishable from the art of governing, the French 
insurrectionary collective, The Invisible Committee, thus indicates how western political 
philosophy, since its incarnation in Greece, presupposes a certain “metaphysics of 
order”—that is, the very question of “politics” begins with a fundamental “premise that 
people must be governed, either democratically by themselves or hierarchically by 
others.”  As Robert Paul Wolff further notes in his text, In Defense of Anarchism, the 
orthodox notion of “politics” as such has traditionally been understood and elaborated 
within the unique paradigm of state sovereign power, wherein the term “politics” is taken 
to refer to the “exercise of the power of the state.”153  Consequently, insofar as the 
question of politics has been traditionally elaborated in terms of the exercises of 
government and sovereign power, the history of “political philosophy” is therefore 
analogous, as Wolff writes, to the “philosophy of the state.”154  Standard definitions of 
political theory, political science, and the term “politics” reflect this reduction of the 
history of the political to the dual a priori presuppositions of government and state 
sovereign power as the criteria proper to a critical inquiry into the question of politics.155  
                                                          
153 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper Publishers, 1970), 3. 
154 Ibid, 3.  
155 For example, see: Wilbur W. White, White’s Political Dictionary (New York: The World Publishing 
Company, 1947), 220.  Here, White defines “political science” as the “study of the formation, forms, and 
processes, of the state and government,” and “political theory” as the “study of the philosophy of the 
state and government, or a particular idea thereof.”  Inasmuch as both political science and theory refer 
to the study of state and government, White therefore defines “politics” as that which at once refers to 
the “processes of government,” as well as the “study of governmental forms.”  More recent collections of 
political terms and their respective definitions reveal little variations in how the term “politics” continues 
to be understood and used, and further reflect this general reduction of the history of politics to the dual 
paradigm of government and the state.  See: Lain McLean and Alistair McMillan, The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 223.  Here, “political science” is defined in 
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In its traditional and orthodox use, the most common definition of the term “politics,” is 
initially derived from Aristotle and refers to “the science and art of government,” or “the 
science dealing with the form, organization and administration of a state or a part of one, 
and with the regulation of its relations with other states.”156  In this regard, it is my 
contention that the history of political theory and politics can at once be read as a history 
in support of the philosophy of the state, as well as in support of a distinct form of 
politics manifest in the continuation of the art of governing.  More specifically, it is my 
argument in this chapter that the history of political theory can be interpreted as a 
historical elaboration pertaining to how politics at once emerges from Aristotle as a 
unique paradigm of government, a certain art of governing realized in terms of what is 
referred to in Greek as oikonomia, as well as how political theory presupposes a certain 
continuity between sovereign power and the concept of the political in such a way that 
the emergence of the field of the political (as proposed by Hobbes and later Schmitt) 
coincides with and is indistinguishable from the state.157  While the dual paradigms of 
government and state sovereignty are traditionally accepted by political theorists as the 
key terms pertaining to the essence of politics, the originary archic nexus that locates the 
question of politics at the intersection of government and sovereignty is itself rarely 
called into question.    
Taking the anarchist turn in contemporary political theory as a key referent from 
which to rethink the basic tenets and theoretical principles that have hitherto sustained 
political theory, this chapter takes as its pivotal turning point a critical inquiry into the 
reasons why the domain of the political in the West has assumed the dual form of 
government and sovereignty as the condition of possibility for a theoretical and material 
conceptualization of politics.  Indeed, under what I hold to be the key paradigm inherent 
to the history of political philosophy, the exercise of government and the theory of 
sovereignty traditionally retain a certain originary position of primacy in regard to the 
                                                          
terms of the “study of the state, government, and politics,” while “politics,” at once refers to “the art and 
science of government,” and as “the practice of the art or science of directing and administrating states.” 
156 Stephen D. Tansey, Politics: The Basics (London: Routledge, 2000), 4. 
157 On the translation of the term oikonomia see: The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Peter L. Phillips Simpson 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), xxxvi.  As Phillips Simpson notes, the most 
common translation of the term oikonomia is “household management,” whereby the term “comes from 
oikos, meaning a household, and nomos (law), and gives us our word economy,” xxxvi. 
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founding terms that allow for the political to emerge.  By position of primacy, we might 
highlight what the French anarchist philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon refers to as the 
founding tripartite condition of possibility of politics in the West—that is, the elemental 
relation between “sovereignty, authority, [and] government”—which marks the historical 
condition of possibility of politics and the emergence of the political as such.158  What 
Proudhon points toward here in terms of the conceptual triptych that has historically 
conditioned the ways in which we theorize and practice politics allows us to glimpse the 
political in its most paradigmatic form.  In Proudhon’s interpretation, the terms of the 
political can be conceived as the history in which politics takes place in the field whose 
extremes are “government” and “sovereignty,” between them “authority,” archē in Greek.  
As we will see, what is at stake in the relation between government and sovereignty is the 
constitution of an originary nexus through which politics coincides with, and is 
indistinguishable from, the paradigm and first principle of an archē.  Indeed, as the key 
concept through which the history of politics is expressed in the duality between 
government and sovereignty, the term archē designates the domain in which the political 
is revealed in its most authoritative form.  It is precisely this logic of the archē that this 
study of Foucault and anarchism calls into question.      
As both form of power and administration of order, as both exercise of 
government and state sovereignty, it is my assertion in this chapter that the original nexus 
that binds the question of politics to the history of the archē both presupposes government 
and sovereignty as the substance and material manifestation of politics and the political.  
Insofar as a critical conceptualization of the political as archē begins with the hypothesis 
that one must be governed, then the material substance and activity of politics is itself 
reduced to the exercise of government as a form of political power.  Understood in this 
way, politics not only rests upon a “metaphysics of order” that presupposes the necessity 
of government as its own precondition, but also what The Invisible Committee refers to 
in terms of “government as a specific form of power” (original emphasis).159  Indeed, as I 
will argue below it is in Aristotle’s seminal text, Politics, in which the origins and 
foundations of politics can be shown to be directly tied to the expression and exercise of 
                                                          
158 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “Resistance to the Revolution,” 482. 
159 The Invisible Committee, To Our Friends, trans. Robert Hurley (California: Semiotext(e), 2015), 68. 
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government as a specific form of power—that is, as an oikonomia.  At the same time, in 
the transition from the political theory of classical antiquity to modern political 
philosophy, the question of politics is more directly elaborated as a paradigm of 
sovereignty in addition to the exercise of government.  While the field of politics 
designates the exercise of power in the form of government, in the tradition that stretches 
from modern political theorists such as Hobbes to that of Schmitt, what is at stake for 
these theorists is that politics as such refers to that which is situated and takes place 
within the domain of the state.  Consequently, however, what is ultimately revealed in 
both Hobbes’s and Schmitt’s respective models of the political is a certain equivalency 
between the exercise of government and the theory of sovereignty in terms of the 
historical agent, or motor of politics and the political as such.  While the history of 
politics as government has a much older tradition than that of modern theories of 
sovereignty, it is nevertheless my contention that the two can be understood as forming a 
single paradigm whereby the logic of the archē designates the nexus through which 
politics is expressed and historically manifest in the field between the exercise of power 
as government and state sovereignty. 
Even though the discourses of government and sovereignty continue to 
fundamentally shape the ways in which political theory is both conceived and practiced, 
recent developments in radical political theory, particularly the return of anarchist 
political theory, are beginning to rethink the possibilities of a political philosophy that 
can neither be reduced to the critical framework of government, nor that of sovereignty.  
With the crisis of the political marking the pivotal point from which to understand the 
critical intervention posed by the resurgence of anarchism today, it is my contention that 
the anarchist turn itself turns upon exploring and elucidating an alternative critical theory 
of the political that is fundamentally irreducible to the archic paradigm of government 
and sovereignty.  In this regard, we might point, as does The Invisible Committee, toward 
the ways in which the contemporary political landscape is coming to be marked by an 
“open battle” between theorists working within the orthodox framework of government 
and those who begin by dismissing the “question of government altogether.”  It is in 
relation to the latter position, that The Invisible Committee proposes a critical “exit from 
the framework of government” as the central—and even vital—task for contemporary 
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political theory.160  If the history of political philosophy traditionally begins by 
presupposing an archic nexus in which politics is expressed in the field between 
government and sovereignty what is called for, and perhaps even required in the return to 
anarchism is, as The Invisible Committee suggests, a radically new framework from 
which to rethink the condition of possibility of politics and the political—that is, what is 
required is a critical theory of the political “that begins from an opposite hypothesis.”  
Similarly, as Newman further maintains in the epigraph above, if political theory is to 
free itself from the dual paradigms of government and the state then what is further 
essential is an alternative framework for “thinking about the political principle” that 
creates a critical caesura between the Schmittian paradigm of the “autonomy of the 
political” and an anarchist “politics of autonomy.”161   
Responding to the ways in which anarchist political theory sets itself the task of 
rethinking the conditions, origins, and principles of legitimacy of sovereign state power, 
while simultaneously positing the possibility of a politics not conditioned by the history 
of government, the first two sections of this chapter trace two dominant paradigms of 
politics through Aristotle and Schmitt, in which the form of the political in the West can 
be revealed as a nexus between the primacy of government and sovereign power.  Indeed, 
it is my contention that the Aristotelian and Schmittian theories of the political ought not 
be understood as representing two separate models, but instead that the intersections 
between the two represent a single paradigm of the archē in which the political designates 
the nexus through which politics assumes the form of an oikonomia exercised within the 
domain of state sovereignty.  Taking the history of the political (via Aristotle and 
Schmitt) as the critical axiom upon which to situate and understand the anarchist turn in 
political theory, I then trace the return to anarchism across two points of intersection as 
framed in the continuity between the search for politics beyond the exercise of 
government and a rethinking of the domain of the political situated at the horizon of state 
sovereign power.  Here I place anarchist theory in dialogue with two recent critical turns 
in contemporary thought—postanarchism and what Critchley refers to as the “meta-
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political moment” 162 around which the central tenets of anarchism are being mobilized in 
such thinkers as Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley, Saul Newman, and 
Todd May in order to argue that the central concerns of their respective political theories 
can be characterized as the continuity between the search for a politics beyond the 
exercise of government and subsequently an alternative methodological and critical 
framework for rethinking the history of the political.  Contrary to the history of political 
theory which assumes the primacy of government as the paradigmatic form of the 
political my argument is that, in their respective responses to the crisis of the political, 
both postanarchist and meta-political theory attempt to rethink the possibility of politics 
and the political against the logic of an archē.  Yet, because these critical turns intervene 
in the history of political thought by attempting to rethink the political at the horizon of 
the state and the exercise of power as government, the interventions made by 
postanarchism and metapolitics require not only a rethinking of anarchism as the basis 
from which a new thought of the politics might emerge, but also an anarchist hypothesis 
of the political that takes resistance, rather than the exercise of government as its 
principal domain.   
Indeed, against the background of the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of the 
political, what is ultimately at stake in this chapter is to demonstrate the ways in which a 
critical turn toward anarchism not only relies upon a fundamental rethinking of the 
political and politics, but also that this alternative theory of the political is itself made 
possible by a critical inquiry into the problematic of resistance, a key term from which 
the question of politics can be rethought.  Such developments in contemporary political 
theory not only transcend the orthodox paradigms of political theory while opening 
unexplored possibilities for the continued retheorization of anarchism, but also the critical 
framework to orient and situate my critical inquiry into Foucault’s theory of resistance 
that begs to be explored in relation to the turn toward anarchist theory today.  With this in 
mind, the aim of this chapter is to form the critical, theoretical, and historical context 
from which my own study precedes.  First, by thinking through the philosophical and 
political problems underlying the historical terrain that reduces and structures politics to 
the topology and practice of government, it is my contention that what must be at stake in 
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outlining the growing relationship between contemporary radial thought and anarchism 
hinges on elevating an anarchist theory of the political to a more fundamental level in 
order to cultivate the emergence of a new political logic which forms a fundamental rift 
with the historical continuity of the logic of the archē.  Affirming anarchist theory against 
the foundations of political philosophy not only seeks to expose the ontological and 
political principles that continue to sustain Western political practices, but also opens the 
space to pursue, in the chapters that follow, the implications of the emerging body of 
anarchist praxis and scholarship along a trajectory following a core tenet of anarchist 
theory found in Foucault’s thought: an anarchic politics of agonistic resistance.  Instead 
of reducing current debates in radical political theory to anarchism, this chapter reveals 
how critical turns in radical political theory such as metapolitics and postanarchism 
intersect with an anarchist hypothesis of the political by forging the space for the political 
outside of the nexus that locates politics between government and the state, and further 
that this anarchist turn culminates in the need for rethinking through the theory of 
resistance proposed throughout the works of Foucault.   
1.1 The Aristotelian Paradigm of the Archē: Politics as an 
Exercise of Government 
Politics…is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in the state…since 
politics…legislates what we are to do and what we are to abstain from…the state seems 
at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve…it is 
finer and more godlike to attain for it a nation or for city-states…it is political science.163 
--Aristotle 
 
With the exception of Plato, there is perhaps no figure within the history of political 
philosophy other than Aristotle who occupies such a paramount and influential place in 
the history of political thought.  Although the wider scope of Aristotle’s thought can by 
no means be limited to the question of politics, for many political theorists his “greatness 
lies in his reputation as the father of political science.”164  As a founding figure within the 
history of political theory, Aristotle’s work on the question of politics, particularly in the 
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two texts The Politics and Nichomachean Ethics, has not only established the theoretical 
framework and conceptual terminology for a critical inquiry into politics and the history 
of the political, but also the groundwork for how politics has historically been conceived 
and practiced.  As one Aristotelian theorist notes, since “Aristotle occupies a paramount 
place in the history of political ideas, not only for the range and robustness of his theories 
of society and the state, but also for the relevance of his theories” to contemporary 
political thought, any serious study pertaining to politics and the political necessarily 
requires (at least to a certain extent) an engagement with the works of Aristotle.165  To be 
sure, while Aristotle’s work in political theory antedates contemporary political thought 
by over two-thousand years, his thought continues to exert large amounts of influence on 
contemporary theories of the political as characterized by his philosophical reflection on 
certain fundamental issues embedded in contemporary debates.  “Despite the profound 
divide separating classical and modern theories of government,” as another commentator 
writes, “contemporary thinkers have, with surprising frequency, turned to the political 
teaching of Aristotle in order to assess both the possibilities and limitations for politics in 
liberal societies.”166  Moreover, while there is a continued and renewed effort to place 
Aristotle’s political theory in dialogue with contemporary political discourse, this had led 
some theorists to claim that the persistent reappearance of Aristotle in contemporary 
debates about politics subsequently reveals the “persistence of political philosophy 
itself.”167  If there is a certain persistence of Aristotle within contemporary studies of the 
political that coincides with the perseverance of political theory, this is made possible not 
in the way that Aristotle is continuously renewed in contemporary contexts, but rather in 
the way that the paradigm of government continues to fundamentally shape the various 
ways in which we discuss, theorize and practice politics. 
For Aristotle, politics (politikê in Greek) is short for the science of the political 
and composes one of the three main categories of the Aristotelian sciences.  Politics, like 
ethics, economics, and rhetoric composes the basis of what Aristotle refers to as the 
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practical sciences (as distinct from the theoretical and productive sciences), and is clearly 
divided into questions pertaining at once to government, statesmanship and legislation.168  
While Aristotle’s work in Politics can be read as a disinterested inquiry into the nature 
and substance of politics, the text can also be understood more correctly as a work 
organized with the general aim of instructing those in power.  Thus, as one commentator 
affirms, “Aristotle’s main purpose in in the Politics is not to give an academically 
dispassionate account of political phenomena but to provide a handbook or guide for the 
intending statesman; ‘political science’ (politikê) is also a ‘statesmanship’.”169  In this 
regard, Aristotle’s Politics can be read alongside other works directed as advice to those 
in power such as Plato’s Republic before him and later Machiavelli’s The Prince.  Yet, 
although the Politics of Aristotle can indeed be read as an instructional guide suggesting 
the proper methods of governing for those who already are or might eventually be in 
power, it is necessary to briefly return to Aristotelian political theory in order to reveal 
how the emergence of the category of the political and the manifestation of politics is 
founded upon and sutured to the paradigm of government, a specific form of power in 
which the term ‘politics’ comes to signify the techniques of government exercised within 
a sovereign state.  While, it is incontestable that Aristotle’s founding works on political 
theory have and continue to shape the ways in which we think and practice politics, a 
return to Aristotle is required not in terms of how his political works might be invoked as 
way to critically interrogate the possibilities afforded in contemporary liberal 
democracies but, more fundamentally, as a way to interrogate the ways in which the 
condition of possibility of politics and the emergence of the political assume the 
paradigmatic form of an oikonomia.  Indeed, it is by returning to Aristotle that the 
concept and practice government—that is, of oikonomia—can ultimately be revealed as 
the implicit starting point for a critical inquiry into the nature of politics and the political.   
In order to understand how Aristotle forms an originary nexus between the 
emergence of politics, the state, and the exercise of government as the constituent 
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components of the political, it is first necessary to turn toward a seminal passage from 
Nichomachean Ethics, in which “politics” is defined as a distinct tripartite relationship 
between government, legislation and the state.  “Politics,” Aristotle writes:   
is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in the state…since 
politics…legislates what we are to do and what we are to abstain from…the state 
seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to 
preserve…it is finer and more godlike to attain for it a nation or for city-states…it 
is political science.170 
From the first sentence it is clear that the question of “politics” and the disciplinary field 
of “political science,” according to Aristotle, ought to be studied within the framework of 
a state—that is, the very question of politics is framed within the horizon of the state.  As 
anarchist philosopher Nathan Jun notes, since Aristotle understands the state as the basis 
and limit of the political, his work is “politicocentric; it is always concerned with, and to 
a certain degree presupposes the state under some description or other.”171  In its most 
preliminary form, the terms of the political, then, in Aristotle’s thought are rendered 
indiscernible from its basis within the state in such a way that the state coincides with the 
emergence of the political.  Additionally, however, while Aristotle directly situates the 
practice and study of politics within the domain of a state, his definition also outlines a 
specific synthesis between the activity of politics and the exercise of government, and 
further that this movement or exercise of politics becomes manifest within the art of 
governing, or the legislation of another’s conduct and activity.  As Jun further observes, 
insofar as Aristotle presupposes a synthesis between the art of governing and the very 
activity of politics, then the manifestation of politics within the domain of the state is 
itself always a normative discourse legislating the activity and conduct of others; “it is 
concerned with how human social relations ought to be organized” (original emphasis).172   
Politics in the Aristotelian sense, therefore refers to the practices of government which 
legislate the actions and potential actions of others—that is, politics as defined by 
Aristotle designates the exercise of government as a specific form of power, in which the 
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aim and activity of politics is to govern the field of one’s conduct in order to achieve a 
specific end.  Taken together, what is at stake in this early—indeed paradigmatic—
definition of politics is a specific synthesis between politics as an exercise of government 
and the domain of the state—that is, politics as a distinct art of governing which legislates 
“what we are to do and what we are to abstain from” is framed by Aristotle within the 
horizon of the state.  To be sure, it is with this definition that we have the earliest 
rendition of what designates the crisis of the political, or the archic nexus that establishes 
a certain continuity between the exercise of government, sovereignty and the state.   
It is with these two basic premises—that is, that the domain proper to the sphere 
of politics is that of the state, and further that the exercise of politics is analogous to the 
exercise of government within the horizon of the state—through which Aristotle outlines 
the theoretical nexus between the domain of the political and what can be termed primacy 
of government.  By the primacy of government, I mean to point toward the way in which 
the terms of the political, particularly in the works of Aristotle, have at once been 
historically reduced to the paradigm of government as the very exercise of politics, as 
well as the condition of possibility of the political as such.  Indeed, as initially utilized by 
early political theorists like Plato and Aristotle the word political is repeatedly rendered 
inter-convertible with the theoretical conceptualization and material manifestation of 
government.  Often translated as “form of government” and “constitution” from the 
Greek politeia, the word “political” designates for the ancient philosophers both a system 
of government and its practice.173  Classical definitions of the political as politeia have 
had the effect of strategically locating the essence of the political within the paradigm of 
government, while subsequently naturalizing the exercise of government as the 
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conceptual framework, or limit point, for thinking through the possibility of politics and 
the political.  As Jun maintains in reference to Aristotle: 
the very word political means having to do with forms of government…Like the 
axioms of Euclid’s geometry, government has been an implicit starting point, 
always assumed and never justified—the transcendental condition of possibility 
for thinking, writing, and talking about human social organization.174 
At once meaning and referring to the sphere that has to do with forms of government, as 
well as its exercise as the legislation of the conduct of others, the terms of the political 
and the very possibility of politics since Aristotle have been haunted by this paradigm 
which assumes the primacy of government as the transcendental possibility and material 
reality of the political as such. 
Through Aristotle, we have seen how the notion of “politics” refers to a distinct 
art of governing exercised within the domain of a state, and thus that the terms of the 
political as politeia are reducible to the primacy of government in terms of both the 
transcendental condition of possibility and material realization of the field of the political 
as such.  Framing the terms of the political as a unique synthesis between the exercise of 
government and the state both valorizes the exercise of governing as the theoretical limit 
point for conceiving the political, and in doing so naturalizes the state as the horizon for 
the political as such.  Yet, in order to fully understand how the term “politics” comes to 
designate the art of governing exercised within the domain of a state, what needs to be 
further investigated is the specific rationale Aristotle invokes as the basis from which his 
theory of the political emerges—that is, what is further required is a critical inquiry into 
the specific rationality that allows for the political to emerge as a synthesis between the 
exercise of government and the state.  Indeed, while the horizon of the state and the 
exercise of government together form the nexus proper to the domain of the political, the 
primary goal of the Politics is not, however, to arbitrarily assign a fundamental relation 
between the exercise of government and the state but, more specifically, to outline a 
certain continuity between politics and a particular view of human nature whereby the 
latter directly informs the former and makes it possible.  As Aristotle maintains in the 
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Physics, of all the things that exist “some exist by nature, some from other causes.”175  
Similarly, in the Politics, what Aristotle takes as his model of the political—that is the 
synthesis between the exercise of government and the domain of the state—can be 
understood as a critical elucidation of the natural condition of politics; politics according 
to Aristotle is that which proceeds from nature.  Several theorists have engaged with the 
concept of “political naturalism” in Aristotle and have outlined how one of the primary 
goals of the Politics “is to derive political values from facts about human nature.”176  In 
this regard, Aristotle’s work in the Politics can be understood as ultimately resting upon 
three fundamental presuppositions from which a certain correspondence between his 
view of human nature and his theory of politics can be drawn: first, human beings are, by 
nature, “political animals;”177 second, the state exists in nature and is thus prior to the 
individual; and finally politics, as the art of governing, exists in nature and finds its basis 
in the management of the household (oikos).  There is therefore a certain political 
naturalism that makes possible Aristotle’s conceptualization of politics in which the 
terms of the political, the state and the exercise of government are all understood to have 
their respective foundations within certain practices inherent in nature; politics according 
to Aristotle is, in fact, a natural condition of human existence.  While Aristotle’s claim 
regarding how human beings are political by nature has informed several critical inquiries 
into Aristotle’s conception of the political, it is the latter two presuppositions that 
ultimately reveal the history of the political in its most paradigmatic form.   
It is in regard to the Aristotelian conception of political naturalism in which we 
can fully understand how the terms of the political and the history of politics begin to 
coincide with the primacy of government, the state, and sovereign authority as the origins 
from which the practice of politics is derived.  In other words, it is Aristotle’s 
understanding of human nature that forms the foundation of his theory of politics—that 
is, Aristotle’s theory of politics is inextricably linked to his understanding of human 
nature, and it this particular understanding of nature through which we can trace the way 
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in which the terms of the political begin to coincide with the exercise of government and 
the state.  Aristotle begins his argument in the Politics by tracing how politics is in fact an 
inherent condition of human nature rather than an arbitrary convention, and outlines how 
the question of the political—in which politics designates the exercise of government 
within a state—therefore first finds its basis in the pre-existent models of the household 
and village. 178  Since Aristotelian political theory considers the state the final cause, or 
teleological end of human political association, then “the state” is to be taken according 
to Aristotle as itself “a creation of nature.”179  Yet, while the household (oikos) forms the 
basic foundation from which the political emerges, throughout the Politics Aristotle 
presupposes the primacy and naturalization of the state as that which is prior to yet, at the 
same time, the natural end point of political organization.  Thus, while Aristotle indeed 
maintains that the domain proper to the sphere of politics is the state, what underlies 
Book 1 of the Politics is a secondary thesis which attempts to ground this understanding 
of politics not simply within a specific conception of human nature, but rather in the 
state.  Although the state finds its basis within and is modeled after the management of 
households, an organic unit which would logically appear prior to the formation of a 
state, Aristotle nevertheless maintains that “the state is by nature clearly prior to the 
family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part.”180  Aristotle’s 
argument here is that the state can be understood as attaining an existence prior to its 
constituent components in a similar way to how humans and animals are prior to the 
respective organs that constitute the whole of their bodies as such.  However, by 
understanding the state as a type of social organism in which the whole precedes its 
constituent components, Aristotle neglects to notice, as one theorist suggests, that 
“human beings obviously can exist apart from the polis”—that is, by assuming that the 
state exists prior to its constituent components Aristotle fails to explain how or why all 
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humans necessarily tend toward the development of a state.181  At the same time, 
however, although Aristotle understands the state as an organic whole that exists prior to 
its constituent components, what he additionally fails to adequately explain is how or 
why the state as such is to be taken as the singular form through which the political can 
be expressed.  If the state is not only the natural end for thinking through the concept of 
the political, but also that which is at once prior to its constituent components, then the 
Aristotelian theory of the political contains, even if only in terms of a potentiality, the 
primacy of the state as the very condition of possibility for a critical theory of the 
political as such.  Although logically inconsistent, in terms of that which pertains to both 
the origin and end of politics, the presupposition of the state acts as the theoretical and 
conceptual framework required for by Aristotle to think through the very possibility of 
the political.  
In addition to the way in which Aristotle presupposes the primacy of the state as 
the ultimate horizon of the political, what is further at stake in the Politics is that the state 
as such is to be understood as the authoritative expression to which all human beings 
collectively strive toward to attain what the Greeks referred to as eudemonia.  Indeed, at 
the beginning of Politics Aristotle takes great care to demonstrate a certain continuity 
between the highest good (eudemonia) in which all humankind naturally strives toward 
and the state as the ultimate political end in which this condition of virtue can be 
achieved.  Insofar as “man is by nature a political animal,” then the state is defined not 
only as the ultimate horizon in which a critical conception of the political might take 
place, but also as the teleological end in which a community aimed at the highest good 
might be achieved.182   Thus, in the opening canonical passage from Politics, we read that 
“if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the 
highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims a good in a greater degree than any 
other, and at the greatest good.”183  As Barker further notes, “[w]hat makes the State 
natural” in Aristotle’s view “is the fact that, however it came into existence, it is as it 
stands the satisfaction of an immanent impulse in human nature towards moral 
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perfection—an immanent—impulse that derives men upwards, through various forms of 
society, into the final political form.”184  In Aristotelian political theory, then, the state is 
understood as natural when it is taken as the institution toward which the whole of nature 
strives.185  In other words, the state is justified in Aristotle insofar as it designates the 
horizon through which humankind might be able to achieve moral perfection—that is, 
because human beings have an immanent impulse toward moral perfection, the state 
forms the limit point in which this condition of being can be achieved through the 
exercise of politics.   
Yet, while it has been acknowledged that Aristotle is well-known for his 
argument pertaining to how the state forms the ultimate horizon through which the 
condition of eudemonia can be achieved, it is precisely the claim that “politics is natural 
to man and that man’s happiness is dependent upon being a citizen of a well-run polis or 
city-state” that needs to be investigated, according to political theorists Peri Roberts and 
Peter Sutch.186  Indeed, while Aristotle frames his argument pertaining to the 
naturalization of the state in terms of a perpetual striving toward human happiness and 
virtue through the model of the state, and justifies its existence primarily on this basis, 
what is ultimately overlooked or uncritically accepted by Aristotelian theorists is how 
Aristotle’s justification of the state simultaneously naturalizes all of the features Aristotle 
understands as evolving into the state, such as the master/slave relation, private property, 
and patriarchal family relations.  If the state is understood by Aristotle as natural, this 
means as one commentator correctly suggests, that “[a]ll the features of its life—slavery, 
private property, the family—are equally justified, and also natural, when, or in so far as, 
they serve that sovereign end.”187  Consequently, insofar as there is a specific continuity 
that can be drawn between Aristotle’s view of human nature and his theory of politics, 
what is ultimately at stake is that Aristotle presupposes from the outset the ways in which 
the “political relations of ruling and being ruled are among the things that develop 
naturally.”188  Precisely because Aristotle naturalizes the state as the conceptual 
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framework and horizon for thinking through the possibility of the political, the state 
(including the models of slavery, private property, and patriarchy) is not to be understood 
in Aristotelian political theory as an arbitrary form of political power, but is instead the 
logical consequence of human nature.  To be sure, by presupposing the state as the basis 
and horizon of the political, Aristotle simultaneously reproduces the effects of slavery, 
property relations, and patriarchal rule as the basis that makes the state possible, and 
justifies their continuation as a consequence of human nature.  In its reduction to the 
primacy of the state, the critical threshold of the domain of the political was never itself 
called into question, and the naturalization of the state since Aristotle has traditionally 
formed both the original structure and critical limit regarding the ways in which the 
political has and continues to be theorized and practiced.     
While the naturalization of the state, and the view of human nature that sustains it, 
together form a large part of Aristotle’s argument in the Politics, it is ultimately the 
critical inquiry into the paradigm and exercise of government that makes possible 
Aristotle’s conception of politics and the political.  What is further at stake for Aristotle 
in the classical definition of the political and politics is, then, a specific continuity 
between the form of government and the form of organization of the polis—where the 
active element defining the sphere of politics refers to the specific “arrangement of the 
inhabitants of a state” in order to achieve a specific end.189  Neither simply government 
nor the social fabric of the polis, the question of politics specifically refers to the ways in 
which a polis is governed which, for Aristotle, begins with and takes as its model the 
“management of the household (oikonomia).”190  Within the history of political theory, 
Aristotle’s Politics not only analyzes the fundamental relationship between the household 
(oikos) and the state, but more specifically how the model of the household and its 
relationship to the state is made possible through the unique paradigm of government—
that is, the concept of oikonomia is at once the foundation from which Aristotle theorizes 
the condition of possibility of politics, as well as the nexus that makes possible the 
specific continuity between the domain of the political and the domain of the state.  From 
the Greek words oikos (household) and nomos (law), the concept of oikonomia refers to 
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specific form of power as government, and the term’s most common translation as the 
“management of a household” retains this notion of power exercised as government.191   
Like the model of the state, Aristotle similarly maintains that the household exists 
in nature, and attempts to delineate a theory of politics per its foundation in the oikos.  
Consequently, however, the way in which Aristotle takes the administration of the 
household as the model for politics historically tends to naturalize the paradigm of 
government as the essence of politics, in a similar manner to the way in which the state is 
naturalized as the horizon of the political.  Thus, insofar as “the governmental idea arises 
out of family practice and domestic experience,” as Proudhon laments, then “there was 
no objection voiced, government appearing as natural to society as the subordination that 
obtains between the father and his children.”192  In its paradigmatic form, it is this 
naturalization of the problematic of government, of an oikonomia, that acts as the locus 
from which to determine how the domain of the political assumes the form of a 
government in terms of both its structure and activity.  In this way, because the political 
is rendered analogous to the form politics takes as an exercise of government, we can also 
read the very basis of Aristotle’s theory of politics as simultaneously naturalizing 
political subjection as a necessary component of politics.  Indeed, according to Aristotle 
the fact that “some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but 
expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for 
rule.”193  One is reminded here of Plato’s famous “Foundation Myth” in Book 4 of The 
Republic in which Socrates recounts the origin of political rule, wherein some are born 
qualified to govern and others to be governed.194  In this way, the essence of politics is 
not simply the exercise of governing others.  Instead, rather, it is the fundamental 
distinction between those who govern and are governed that makes possible the theory of 
politics in Aristotle—that is, as a specific form of power exercised as government, what 
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makes a theory of politics possible as such is the distinction between those who govern 
and those who are governed.   
By beginning with the oikos as the model from which politics assumes the form 
of government, classical political philosophy at once has had the effect of naturalizing the 
paradigm of government as the fundamental essence of politics, while simultaneously 
demonstrating that what causes the political to attain its form as such is analogous to the 
key distinction between those who govern and those who are to be governed.  At the 
same time, however, the concept and model of the oikos is, according to Aristotle, at 
once the foundation from which politics assumes the form of government, as well as the 
basis from which this model of politics as government coincides with the domain of the 
state.  Thus, insofar as the state in Aristotelian theory is understood as a conglomerate 
“made up of households” we find in the Politics that “before speaking of the state we 
must,” Aristotle claims, “speak of the management of households.”195  While we have 
already seen that the state is prior to its constituent parts (oikos), what is revealed in this 
passage is not an inconsistency inherent to Aristotle’s political theory.  Instead, what is 
revealed is that we must return to the model of oikos in order to fundamentally 
understand not only how the exercise of politics is manifest as a paradigm of government, 
but how this model of politics is what makes possible the continuity between the exercise 
of government and the state as the key terms of the political.  Thus, while the concept of 
oikonomia refers to the management or government of a household, this same notion also 
designates the ways in which politics as such is exercised within the domain of the state.  
Etymologically, then, the term oikonomia at once signifies “the management of a family, 
but also more generally the administration, the government of a state.”196  What Aristotle 
refers to in terms of oikonomia therefore designates a specific elision of borders between 
the oikos and the polis, the home and the state, through which the politics of the oikos is 
governmentalized within the domain of the state, and exercised as a form of political 
power.  Two ideas are of key importance here: oikonomia at once designates the 
paradigm in which politics is exercised as a form of government and, yet, at the same 
time it is this paradigm of government that Aristotle invokes as the nexus that links the 
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political to the model of the state—that is, oikonomia not only forms principle of 
intelligibility from which the question of politics is analogous to the exercise of 
government, but also the paradigm through which the state becomes the fundamental 
presupposition through which politics as government is exercised.  
With the concept of oikonomia we can see how the foundations of political theory 
begin with an indissoluble nexus between the terms of the political, the exercise of 
government and the state.  At the cusp of this nexus, the concept of oikonomia forms the 
grid from which to understand the history of the political and the exercise of politics in its 
most paradigmatic form.  In several recent texts, the philosopher Giorgio Agamben has 
taken Aristotle’s concept of an “oikonomia” as the hidden key to understanding the 
history of political theory and practice.  In Agamben’s thought, Aristotelian political 
theory forms the critical axis from which the history of political philosophy can be 
revealed in its most paradigmatic form, or the locus from which to determine the “reason 
why power in the West has assumed the form of oikonomia, that is, a government of 
men” (original emphasis).197  Here, Agamben maintains a specific continuity between the 
exercise of government and the exercise of political power—that is, Agamben suggests 
that political power ever since Aristotle has assumed the form of an oikonomia, a 
decisive paradigm in which the history of politics and the political power of a state is 
exercised in the form of government.  In other words, oikonomia designates the distinct 
ways in which politics and political power have become governmentalized as their 
original condition of possibility.  Taking the paradigm of the oikonomia as the basic 
framework for defining the political within the paradigm of government, politics, 
therefore, in the Aristotelian sense directly refers to the practice of governing others, a 
practice which has its basis in and is derived from specific models of domination, 
hierarchy, and submission.  It is in this regard that Agamben maintains that the concept 
and practice of “oikonomia may constitute a privileged laboratory for the working and 
articulation—both internal and external—of the governmental machine” (original 
emphasis).198  Taking the concept of oikonomia as the key term around which Aristotle’s 
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theory of politics is based, it is my contention that the Politics ought to be read as the 
definitive text within the history of political theory in which the terms of the political are 
fundamentally rendered synonymous with power exercised in the form of government 
within the domain of a state.  Although certain theorists have taken the concept of 
oikonomia as the key term around which the Politics is based, while extensively tracing 
the ways in which the model of the household serves as the theoretical and material 
foundation from which Aristotle is able to conceive of politics, it is my contention that it 
is with the concept of oikonomia that we can begin to fully understand how the domain of 
the political radically coincides with the horizon of the state and becomes 
governmentalized through the logic and first principle of the archē.  
Arising out of Aristotelian political thought, the origins of political philosophy 
begin by presupposing the concept and practices of government exercised within the 
domain of a state as the foundational principle from which the emergence of the political 
is made possible.  What is perhaps equally important, however, is the synthesis Aristotle 
posits between the political as a form of government and the fundamental principle 
known to the Greeks as the archē.  Perhaps the most pivotal word in the history of 
political thought, the question of the archē is at once the most foundational and the least 
challenged.  Archē, and its plural form archai, has a wide and sometimes contradictory 
spectrum of meanings in early Greek culture which have led the word to be mobilized for 
both cosmogony and political theory.  Meaning at once “beginning,” “origin,” or “first 
cause,” and later “sovereignty,” “dominion,” and “authority,” the term archē suggests 
both the first principle from which something proceeds and the basic foundation for 
authoritarian governance.  Yet, in his analysis of the key concepts used by Aristotle in the 
Politics, Barker maintains a specific synthesis between the alternate meanings of the 
concept and further reveals a distinct way in which the term archē comes to designate the 
paradigmatic nexus that ultimately motivates Aristotle’s understanding of the political.199  
As Barker writes, the “word [archē] originally signifies ‘beginning’ or ‘initiative’; and we 
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may imagine that the reason it was extended, by an easy transference, to mean authority 
or rule was that the Greeks regarded those in authority as beginning, or starting, or 
initiating a course of political action.”200  It is in this way that the term archē can be 
understood as designating the key paradigm from which to read the question of politics in 
Aristotle.  As we can see here while the term archē originally refers to “beginning” or 
first principle, the concept can be extended within the context of politics in order to 
designate the authority or rule of a government.  Yet, what is ultimately at stake is that 
the term more correctly signifies the ways in which the Greeks regarded individuals in 
positions of authority—governors, rulers, or statesmen (archon)—as “initiating a course 
of political action.”  In other words, archē designates the course through which politics 
emerges as a form of government—that is, archē for the Greeks at once refers to the 
principle that animates, or brings into being politics, as well as that which initiates the 
activity of politics as a distinct exercise of government.  Indeed, within the history of 
political theory, the concept of an archē ought to be understood as the paradigmatic form 
through which politics and the domain of the political in the West proceeds as the 
exercise of government within the domain of the state. 
Taking the concept of an archē as the paradigmatic frame of reference from which 
to understand Aristotelian politics in terms of the exercise of government, it is possible to 
demonstrate how Aristotelian political theory at once presupposes a synthesis between 
the primacy of government and the exercise of politics, as well as a synthesis between 
state and the domain of the political.  Between the terms of the political and the exercise 
of politics as government is the paradigmatic nexus of archē, the radical origin from 
which the category of the political emerges and is manifest as a tripartite condition of 
government, sovereignty authority and the state.  Perhaps the clearest example of an early 
definition of the political that begins not simply with the notion of government as its 
implicit beginning point, but rather in the archic nexus that binds the question of politics 
to the exercise of government within the domain of a state, can be found in the Politics 
when Aristotle defines the essence of the political as a unique synthesis between forms of 
government (politeia) and the first principle of authority (archē).  Thus, in Book 3 from 
the Politics, where Aristotle seeks to define the state, and hence the domain of the 
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political by its reference to differing typologies of political power, he also sets forth the 
claim that has in every way been seminal to the historical development of Western 
political thought.  Aristotle writes: “[t]he words constitution and government (politeia) 
have the same meaning which is the supreme authority (archē) in states.”201  Here, we see 
that the terms of the political are reducible to the paradigm of government—that is, the 
domain of the political and the exercise of government are defined by Aristotle in such a 
way that the two terms collapse into one another.  At the same time, however, insofar as a 
zone of indistinguishability is established between the terms of the political and the 
paradigm of government, what is ultimately at stake in Aristotle’s definition is that this 
zone of indistinction reveals the logic of an archē as the hidden locus through which the 
political is reducible not only to the exercise of government, but the exercise of 
government as a specific form of power manifest in the sovereign authority of states.  
Insofar as the terms of the political are reducible to the manifestation and exercise of 
government, then what defines the essence of the political is, according to Aristotle, the 
way in which “government is everywhere sovereign in the state.”202  What is therefore 
key to Aristotelian political theory is that the point of departure for a critical theory of the 
political presupposes an originary nexus between the domain of the political, the exercise 
of government, and state sovereignty in such a way that the term archē comes to 
designate the condition of possibility for the emergence of the political as such.  In other 
words, what gives the political its form as an oikonomia, and makes possible its 
continuation as such, is the first principle of an archē, the sovereign authority that binds 
the terms of the political to the question of government exercised within the domain of a 
state.  Archē as such designates the threshold through which the domain of the political 
coincides with the topology of the state sovereign power and is governmentalized.   
At this juncture, it is necessary to note three characteristics of orthodox classical 
political theory, which form what I hold to be the key paradigm of the political that has 
hitherto been seminal in the historical elaboration of Western political philosophy, and 
which composes my point of departure in analyzing the intervention anarchism makes in 
the history of Western politics as such.  First, the paradigm of government acts as the 
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theoretical limit point or horizon for a critical conceptualization of the political; in 
Aristotelian political theory, the originary synthesis between politeia and oikonomia acts 
as both the conceptual framework and the transcendental condition of possibility for the 
terms of the political as such.  Within the history of political theory, this is why Proudhon 
maintains that there exists a specific link between the primacy of government and the 
domain of the political.  “Government,” Proudhon writes, is to political philosophers “the 
necessary and immutable a priori, the principle of principles, the eternal archeus” 
(original emphasis).203  Presupposing a primary synthesis between the terms of the 
political and the paradigm of government causes the domain of the political to have a 
form analogous to the form of government that makes the political possible as such.  The 
political is not only subject to the archē as its dominion, but the archē as oikonomia is 
additionally itself the subject of politics.  Political philosophy and modern theories of 
sovereignty arise and are derived from this dual paradigm of the archē.   
Secondly, with the paradigm of government acting as the conceptual framework 
for a theory of the political, what lies at the essence of politics, and makes its activity 
possible, are the techniques of government exercised as a specific form of power 
(oikonomia) that legislates the actions and conducts of others.  What is additionally at 
stake in the Aristotelian paradigm is, then, the first principle of an archē that grounds the 
essence of politics within the exercise of government and which, in turn, naturalizes 
political subjection, domination, and hierarchy as the essence of politics as such.  As the 
exercise of oikonomia, politics designates a fundamental distinction between those who 
govern and those who are governed, whereby the exercise of government acts as the force 
that gives the political its form as such.  As that which defines the structure and form of 
the political assumes, the question of government, as Jun maintains, should be understood 
not simply a political force, but also as an “ontological force, preceding and constituting 
the polis and not the other way around.”204  Finally, under the paradigm of government, 
orthodox political theory reduces the concept of the political to the primacy of the archē, 
in terms of both cosmological origin and teleological end, as both sovereign origin and 
sovereign authority, and finally as the nexus in which the political coincides with the 
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state and becomes governmentalized.  Indeed, anarchist philosopher John Clark has 
importantly pointed toward the way in which the concept of archē as “origin denotes its 
claim to primacy and priority, in the senses of both metaphysical ultimacy and historical 
precedence.”205  What is therefore key to the Aristotelian paradigm is not that the domain 
of the political contains, even if only terms of a potentiality, the primacy of archic 
government as the very condition of possibility for a critical theory of the political as 
such, but more specifically how the first principle of the archē is the key concept through 
which the domain of the political and the history of politics assume the form of an 
oikonomia.   
1.2 The Schmittian Paradigm: Sovereignty as a Political 
Paradigm of Government 
 
The Concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political…State and politics 
cannot be exterminated. 206 
--Carl Schmitt 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the Aristotelian paradigm of the political begins 
with an original presupposition, an originary archē that locates the political in the nexus 
between the exercise of government and the state—that is, politics in Aristotelian 
political theory assumes the form of an oikonomia not only in terms of the exercise of 
politics as archē, but also in terms of the condition of possibility of the political as such.  
In this way, we might read the basic subject of Aristotle’s Politics as a work that 
establishes an essential continuity between the paradigm of oikonomia and the 
manifestation of politics, in which the terms of the political come to designate the 
exercise of government within the domain of a state.  While Aristotle poses a formidable 
nexus between politics exercised as government and state sovereignty in terms of the 
indistinguishable relation between politeia (form and exercise of government) and archē 
(supreme authority within a state), it is necessary to turn to Carl Schmitt’s text The 
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Concept of the Political in order to understand how the essential continuity between the 
logic of the archē and the terms of the political is reinvigorated as a paradigm of 
sovereignty.  As we will see, by asserting an indivisible link between the state, politics 
and sovereign authority, Schmitt’s central thesis regarding the “autonomy of the 
political” renews the Aristotelian paradigm in which the political (politeia) is understood 
as the supreme authority (archē) within a state.  Thus, while the Politics of Aristotle 
reveals the way in which a critical conception of politics in the West assumes the form of 
an oikonomia, or government of men, it is necessary to return to Schmitt’s work in order 
to fully understand how the field of the political is reduced to and radically coincides 
with state sovereign power.  Indeed, by turning to Schmitt it is my contention that the 
paradigm of the archē, which in Aristotle establishes a formidable link between politics, 
government, and the state, reappears as a specific continuity between the terms of the 
political and state sovereign power in which the state becomes endowed with a monopoly 
on politics. 
Over the past few decades there has been, as one theorist notes, “a veritable 
explosion of Anglo-American interest in the works of Weimar constitutional and political 
theorist, Carl Schmitt.”207  Although a contentious figure in the history of political 
thought primarily due to his membership in the Nazi party, as well as his direct juridical 
support of Hitler’s policies,208 Schmitt’s work on political theory, like Aristotle, has 
nevertheless continuously contributed to and helped shape our understanding of modern 
politics and the condition of the political.  Thus, in a recent work, political philosopher, 
Montserrat Herrero, writes that “[w]hen dealing with political theory today, reference to 
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Schmitt is also required.”209  At the very least, Schmitt’s work has been useful for 
scholars and political theorists insofar as his work has provided serious studies examining 
the fundamental relation between the state, politics, and sovereignty as the key terms of 
the political.  In regard to his key contributions to our understanding of modern politics, 
Chantel Mouffe claims that “Schmitt is one of the great political and legal theorists of 
this century,” a claim she continues that is “now widely recognized” by theorists on the 
right and left sides of the political spectrum.210  Although, Schmitt’s theory of the 
political has recently been subject to severe criticism,211 his work still represents one of 
the more substantial attempts within the history of political theory to offer a critical 
conception of what can be understood as the constituent components composing the 
domain of the political, and continues to influence contemporary political theorists such 
as Mouffe.212  Indeed, in contemporary scholarship Mouffe’s project, perhaps more than 
any other, advocates for a return to Schmitt’s work in order to contest what she refers to 
as the “anti-political vision which refuses to acknowledge the antagonistic dimension 
constitutive of the political.”213  Despite Schmitt’s serious critique of liberalism against 
which his theory of the political is based, Mouffe proposes to “think with Schmitt against 
Schmitt” in order to reveal a “new understanding of liberal democratic politics instead of 
following Schmitt in rejecting it.”214  While Mouffe invokes Schmitt as the theoretical 
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framework from which to rethink the question of politics within a contemporary 
democratic framework, her use of Schmitt can be juxtaposed against the ongoing work of 
Giorgio Agamben whose project takes Schmitt’s theory of the political as the critical 
turning point from which to critique the ways in which the question of sovereign power 
increasingly appears as the “dominant paradigm of government in contemporary 
politics.”215  Indeed, alongside Agamben it is my contention that Schmitt’s theory of the 
political offers key insight into the ways in which the history of the political coincides 
with the state in such a way that the very condition of possibility of politics appears as the 
meaning of state sovereign authority and a paradigm of government.   
As Schmitt argues at the beginning of his text, despite its continual use throughout 
the history of political philosophy, what is lacking within political theory is a simple 
“clear definition of the political.”216  Reflecting upon this general problematic, Schmitt’s 
text formulates a crucial distinction between “politics” and the “political,” and the 
decision to title his analysis The Concept of the Political clearly reflects these intentions.  
As found in the epigraph above, what is ultimately at stake for Schmitt in The Concept of 
the Political is to retrospectively outline a theory of the political that not only attests to 
the permanence of the state as the key component that coincides with the emergence of 
the political, but also to the permanence of the state’s monopolization of politics.  Thus, 
in Schmitt we find that the intrinsic relationship between the “state and politics cannot be 
exterminated”—that is, Schmitt posits an essential and permanent continuity between the 
state and politics in such a way that the term “politics” coincides with and is monopolized 
within the domain of the state.217  At the same time, however, Schmitt additionally 
maintains that the “concept of the state,” which has a permanent relationship with the 
field of politics, necessarily “presupposes the concept of the political.”218  In this context, 
Schmitt’s aim in this text is to trace the history of the basic principles which have allowed 
for the domain of the political to emerge as an a priori relation between state and politics, 
a relation that ultimately gives the field of the political its defining characteristic as a 
paradigm of sovereignty.  Against this background, Schmitt’s text is significant in the 
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history of political theory in that it serves as one of the first full studies inquiring into 
what he refers to as the essence or “nature of the political,”219 and as such attempts to 
delineate the categories by which a clear definition of the political might be traced.  Thus, 
as Schmitt claims towards the beginning of his text “a definition of the political can be 
obtained only by discovering and defining the specific political categories.”220 
In its most preliminary form, the category that is specifically political for Schmitt 
is the state, and it is this conception of the political that takes the state as its principal 
domain that Schmitt maintains is in danger of being forgotten.  Schmitt, like Aristotle 
before him, therefore presupposes the state as the defining characteristic and condition of 
possibility of the political as such.  In contrast, however, to the way in which Max Weber 
defines the state as that which has a monopolization on legitimate violence,221 what 
Schmitt takes as the principle component essential to the domain of the political is the 
sovereign state’s monopolization on what can be considered “politics.”  In offering a 
preliminary outline of the specific categories constitutive of the political Schmitt takes, as 
the critical turning point for his analysis regarding the distinct nature of the political, 
specific concern with the ways in which certain social forces arising in the nineteenth 
century began to challenge the state’s monopolization of politics.  Indeed, it is within the 
context of the perceived dissolution of the political proper that motivates the general 
force of Schmitt’s work.  Under what are referred to as “neutralizations and 
depoliticizations,”222 Schmitt argues that the key features of nineteenth century 
liberalism, or what he calls elsewhere “political romanticism” (i.e. the religious, cultural, 
economic, legal and scientific phenomena), all correspond with the antithesis of what is 
taken to be proper to the domain of the political.223  Indeed, Schmitt concisely 
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summarizes the loss of a clear conceptualization of the political in the following manner: 
“[w]hat had been up to that point affairs of the state become thereby social matters, and, 
vice-versa.”224  What Schmitt is particularly concerned with, then, is that the historical 
entrance of liberal democracy into modern politics has had the effect of obscuring what 
he holds to be the substantive conceptualization of the political—that is the fundamental 
relation between state and politics that defines the domain of the political as such.  
In contrast to the depoliticizations of the nineteenth century, what Schmitt claims 
is required in order to avoid losing sight of the characteristics proper to the political, are 
the specific set of criteria that distinguish the independence—or what is referred to as the 
“autonomy of the political”—from other domains.225  Proceeding from the assumption 
that independent domains of human social activity have their own criteria establishing 
their respective positions of autonomy,226 Schmitt resists providing an “exhaustive 
definition” of the political, instead opting for a definition in the sense of a “criterion of 
the political and of what it consists.”227  Insofar as the political is to be critically 
distinguished and taken as independent from other areas of social activity such as the 
realms of ethics and morality, what Schmitt refers to as the “autonomy of the political” 
simply means that “the political must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to 
which all action with a specifically political meaning can be traced.”228  If as Schmitt 
suggests that the criterion for a theory of morality is based off of the antithesis between 
good and evil, the theory of ethics off of the antithesis between right and wrong and so 
forth, then the critical question Schmitt invokes as the pivotal point from which his 
inquiry into the nature of the political is to inquire into the possible criterion required to 
understand the autonomy of the political.  According to Schmitt, the answer to this 
question can be found in terms of how a “specific political distinction to which political 
actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy,” whereby this 
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antithesis “denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an 
association or dissociation.”229  Here, Schmitt demonstrates that what distinguishes the 
domain of the political from other fields is to be found in the antithesis between forms of 
“association or dissociation,” whereby the nature of the political as such is defined by the 
“degree of intensity” between friend/enemy.  It is this fundamental antithesis between 
friend and enemy manifest in the intensity between forms of association and dissociation, 
that Schmitt affirms as the antagonistic dimension constituting the domain proper to the 
political.   
In Schmitt’s conception, the antithesis that renders discernible the defining 
characteristic of the political is concerned with forms of association and dissociation—
that is, the formation of a collective we opposed to a collective they.  Precisely because 
the criterion for distinguishing the political takes as its basis the existential distinction 
between friend and enemy, Schmitt necessarily locates a permanent dimension of 
antagonism inherent to the substance of the political.  In other words, insofar as the 
political is itself made possible, according to Schmitt, by the degrees of intensity between 
friend and enemy, what is ultimately at stake is that the field of the political therefore 
culminates in a realm of permanent conflict and antagonism.  For Schmitt, then, given 
that the criteria for distinguishing the political is based only upon the friend/enemy 
antithesis, the material, or “substance of the political is contained in the context of 
concrete antagonism” between forms of association and dissociation.230  It is with these 
two criteria—that is, the friend/enemy antithesis and the levels of antagonism between 
them—that Schmitt attempts to distinguish the categories specific to the political as such.  
Thus, in what appears as the most decisive statement regarding the nature of the political 
according to Schmitt, we read that “the political is the most intense and extreme 
antagonism, and every concrete antagonism, becomes the more political the closer it 
approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.”231  So, in 
Schmitt’s conception, the existential distinction between friend and enemy, which thus 
culminates in the permanent antagonism between differing forms of associations and 
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dissociations, is what distinguishes the domain of the political from other domains; 
antagonism, according to Schmitt, is what reveals the nature of the political as a space 
distinguished by the permanence of both power and conflict.  It is in regard to this 
dimension of antagonism through which Mouffe maintains that a distinction between the 
political and politics can be drawn in a way that reflects the basis of Schmitt’s theory.  
Thus, in Mouffe’s work, “the political” refers to the “dimension of 
antagonism…constitutive of human societies,” while “politics” designates the “set of 
practices and institutions through which order is created, organizing human coexistence 
in the context of conflictuality provided by the political.”232  Here, while Mouffe 
maintains (via Schmitt) that the “political” is constituted by the permanent “dimension of 
antagonism” inherent within “human societies,” what she refers to as “politics” 
nevertheless designates the techniques and practices of government “through which order 
is created” within the domain of the state.233            
What is often taken for granted by theorists such as Mouffe, who read Schmitt’s 
work as an authoritative discussion of the nature of the political, is that this concept of the 
political is inherently reducible to the theories of the state previously articulated in the 
works of earlier political theorists such as Hobbes.  In this regard, immediately following 
the definition of the political as a concrete antithesis between the friend/enemy distinction 
is a third criteria which is not only absolutely crucial for understanding the very basis of 
Schmitt’s concept of the political, but categorically decisive in highlighting the way in 
which Schmitt’s theory radically reduces the field of the political to the question of 
sovereign power exercised within the domain of the state.  Regarding, therefore, the third 
criteria required for an understanding of the domain of the political, Schmitt writes with 
absolute finality: “[i]n its entirety the state as an organized political entity decides for 
itself the friend-enemy distinction.”234  It is with this third and final criteria that Schmitt 
posits a specific continuity between the state and the terms of the political, wherein the 
state acts as the foundation for the domain of the political.  In this way, the very 
criteria—i.e. the friend-enemy antithesis and the antagonistic interplay between them—
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required for Schmitt’s model of the political are radically framed within the horizon of 
the state: “antithesis and antagonism” Schmitt writes “remain here within the state’s 
domain.”235  In other words, at stake in Schmitt’s theory is a specific continuity between 
the political, the state, and ultimately sovereign power.  Schmitt’s conceptualization of 
the political here invokes the question of sovereignty as elucidated in his later work, 
Political Theology.  In this text, sovereignty—which according to Schmitt is identical to 
domain of the political—is defined as the absolute power to make decisions based upon 
the state of exception.236  In this way, the political is according to Schmitt linked to the 
principle of state sovereignty as both its principal domain and condition of possibility—
that is, the political according to Schmitt designates the field through which the 
friend/enemy distinction and the corresponding dimension of antagonism inherent in this 
antithesis coincide with the sovereign power of the state.  Indeed, were this sovereign 
“entity to disappear, even if only potentially,” Schmitt argues, “then the political itself 
would disappear.”237  Schmitt thus forms an indivisible link between the state, politics, 
and sovereign power as that which is proper to the domain of the political.  With this final 
turning point, then, Schmitt makes clear that the criterion of the political is not simply 
based upon the ongoing antagonism between differing friend-enemy groupings; instead, 
rather, the domain appropriate to the political is according to Schmitt the domain of the 
state—indeed, the sovereign state’s monopolization of the politics of antagonism as such.   
Insofar as the domain of the political cannot exist outside of a state framework, 
and as such, is meaningless without absolute sovereign power, Schmitt’s central thesis 
regarding the nature of the political invokes the Aristotelian paradigm in which the 
political contains, even if only terms of a potentiality, the primacy of the state as the very 
condition of possibility for a critical theory of the political as such.  Whereas in Aristotle, 
the logic of a oikonomia formed the basis from which to understand the nature of politics, 
in Schmitt it is the state and sovereign power that define what is proper to the structure of 
the political.  This is why in the opening thesis of The Concept of the Political, Schmitt, 
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like Aristotle before him, posits a decisive link between the state and the political: “the 
concept of the state,” Schmitt writes, “presupposes the concept of the political.”238  
Beginning his investigation into the nature of the political with the assertion that the 
political precedes the state, it would appear that Schmitt wants to provide the basis for the 
appearance and continuation of the state.  This is to say, that insofar as the political is 
taken to be primary with the state, then the concept of the political is invoked by Schmitt 
in order to provide the legitimate foundation for the sovereign state.  On the contrary, 
however, the way in which Schmitt formulates a primary link between the state, 
sovereign power, and politics demonstrates that an analysis of the political as such can 
only take place by presupposing a sovereign state.  In other words, what is primary within 
this relation is neither the political nor the criteria which distinguish the domain of the 
political from other domains, but the state itself, which according to Schmitt takes its 
model from the modern European sovereign state as it emerges in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.   
From both the tone of the treatise as well as the thematic focus on the forms of 
“depoliticizations” that effectively weaken the strength of the sovereign state, Schmitt 
clearly laments the loss of what he holds to be the primary relation between the sovereign 
state and the political.  To be sure, Schmitt invokes the concept of political in order to 
provide a theoretical framework for returning to the model that renders the political 
indiscernible from the state and sovereign power as initially inaugurated by Machiavelli, 
Bodin, and Hobbes.  Thus, in the preface to the original German edition of The Concept 
of the Political, Schmitt concisely summarizes the basic stakes of his treatise.  “The 
decisive question” regarding the concept of the political, Schmitt argues  
concerns the relationship of…state and politics…A doctrine which began to take 
shape in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a doctrine inaugurated by 
Machiavelli, Jean Bodin, and Thomas Hobbes, endowed the state with an 
important monopoly: the European state became the sole subject of politics.  Both 
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state and politics were linked just as indivisible as polis and politics in Aristotle 
(original emphasis).239 
While Schmitt locates the genesis of the concept of the political in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century theorists of sovereignty, his allusion to Aristotle demonstrates a 
much larger historical trajectory.  As noted earlier, the terms of the political, since 
Aristotle presupposed an a priori nexus between the state as the domain of the political 
and politics as the exercise of government.  Yet, Schmitt points toward the ways in which 
the Aristotelian paradigm culminates in political philosophies of sovereignty whereby the 
state’s monopolization of politics finds its ultimate expression in the concept of sovereign 
power.  What is at stake in Schmitt’s analysis of the political is not so much the criterion 
invoked to distinguish the political as such, but the critical foundation for understanding 
what the basis of the state is as a political entity.  In Schmitt’s model, insofar as the very 
criteria that distinguish the political from other domains (i.e. the permanent antagonism 
between the existential friend-enemy distinction) takes place within the state’s domain in 
terms of the primary sovereign decision, then the basis of the political is rendered 
analogous with the basis of the state.  The political, in the Schmittian model, is therefore 
reduced to sovereign authority and the primacy of the state, whereby it is the prerogative 
of the sovereign to define the content of the political. 
It is in this way that we can fully understand the thesis which opens The Concept 
of the Political.  If the concept of the political precedes the concept of the state, this is 
only made possible because Schmitt’s model of the political, like Aristotle’s before him, 
presupposes the primacy of the state as that which is prior, yet at the same time made 
possible by the basis of the political itself.  Schmitt is thus not concerned with the origin 
of the state as a political entity, nor its legitimacy; the origin of the state and the 
coinciding legitimacy of sovereign power are both given variables in his model of the 
political.  Schmitt’s principal concern therefore lies in providing the conceptual 
foundation for the nexus that links together state, sovereignty, and politics, and thus 
makes possible the state’s monopolization of politics in terms of both the antithesis 
between friend and enemy and the fundamental antagonism between them.  For Schmitt, 
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then, “the political entity is by its very nature the decisive entity, regardless of the sources 
from which it derives…If it exists, it is the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the 
authoritative entity.”240  Here, Schmitt posits an immediate and primary synthesis 
between the domain of the political and the sovereign state (decisive entity), which 
insofar as it exists, begins with the “authoritative entity,” or the primacy of the archē that 
makes possible the originary nexus between the domain of the political and the state.  In 
Schmitt’s model, the archē is the principle that, in establishing a specific continuity 
between the domain of the political and the sovereign state, renders them indiscernible.   
In working through and outlining both the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of 
the political, my key point of departure has been to demonstrate the ways in which the 
history of the political, from classical to modern political thought, assumes the dual 
paradigm of the exercise of government and the domain of sovereignty not only as its 
condition of possibility, but material manifestation as well.  Indeed, between Aristotle 
and Schmitt lies the general crisis of the political in which the synthesis between the 
political and archē coincides with and makes possible politics as the paradigm of 
governing and the political as the paradigm of sovereignty, both of which are to exercised 
within the domain of the state.  Although the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of the 
political appear as antinomical, these two models are not incompatible with one another, 
but are instead theoretically and functionally related as the two dominant paradigms 
which compose the general of history of the political as archē.  Beginning with 
Aristotle’s seminal text, we have seen how the Politics begins with a unique synthesis 
between politeia and archē, in which the domain of the political is analogous to a form of 
government exercised in terms of the supreme authority of a state.  Aristotle therefore 
formulates a binding nexus between politics as oikonomia and sovereignty in such a way 
that the synthesis between the terms of the political and the paradigm of government 
causes the political to assume a form analogous to the state.  The paradigm of 
government and the synthesis between politeia and archē both act as the theoretical limit 
point or horizon for a critical conceptualization of the political; indeed, within the history 
of political philosophy, the state and the consequent problematic of government have 
been taken as the privileged sites of politics.  In a similar manner, Schmitt’s model of the 
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political poses an indivisible link between the state, politics and sovereign power which, 
like Aristotle’s model, paradigmatically renders the domain of the political analogous to 
sovereign power.  Schmitt’s central thesis regarding the autonomy of the political invokes 
the Aristotelian paradigm in that the domain of the political contains, even if only in 
terms of a potentiality, the primacy of the state as the very condition of possibility for a 
critical theory of the political as such.  Rather than focusing on the question of 
government as the key characteristic of politics, however, Schmitt reopens the domain of 
the political as a field of antagonism made possible in the sovereign friend/enemy 
antithesis.  Yet, because, Schmitt’s model presupposes the state’s monopolization of 
politics as such, the field of antagonism is itself reducible to the paradigm of sovereignty.  
As long as the paradigm of government and the primacy of the state together constitute 
the fundamental horizon of the domain of the political, the very question of politics is 
inherently reducible to a theory of power, and the archic nexus that connects the terms of 
the political to the techniques of government and sovereign power exercised within 
domain of the state has traditionally been left unchallenged by the majority of political 
philosophers.  
1.3 Critical Turns Toward Anarchism: Postanarchism and Meta-
Politics 
 
[N]otwithstanding…the seemingly insurmountable nature of the powers we confront, we 
are nevertheless witness to the emergence of a new paradigm of radical political thought 
and action…if we turn our gaze away from the empty spectacle of sovereign politics, we 
can glimpse an alternative and dissenting world of political life and action that can only 
be described as anarchistic. 241 
--Saul Newman 
 
Against the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms, which have in every way been 
seminal in the historical development of Western political philosophy, one of the core 
problems contemporary radical theory is coming to grapple with is how to build a new 
political theory beyond the nexus that reduces the political to an originary archic nexus 
between government and state sovereignty.  It is in this way that Agamben importantly 
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seeks to establish a new task and basis for political theory in such a way that it cannot 
reproduce the paradigms of government and sovereignty.  Thus, in “Notes on Politics” 
Agamben maintains that if it is possible to rethink the history of political theory against 
its origins and current limitations, then the domain of the political “cannot still take a 
state-form, given that the state is nothing other than the presupposition and the 
representation of the being-hidden of the historical archē” (original emphasis).242  
Arguing instead that what is at stake in contemporary political thought is to rethink the 
political outside of the logic of the archē, Agamben writes that political theory “must 
open the field to a nonstatal and nonjuridical politics and human life—a politics and a 
life that are yet to be entirely thought” (original emphasis).243  Indeed, opening the field 
of political theory to a “nonstatal” form of politics that cannot be reduced to the historical 
paradigm of the archē is, perhaps, the fundamental task for contemporary critical theory, 
consequent upon the turn toward anarchism.  As we will see, critical turns in 
contemporary political theory such as postanarchism and metapolitics necessary confront 
the central tenets of orthodox political theory, and as such invoke and gesture toward a 
fundamental rethinking of anarchism as the critical basis for a radically new conception 
of the domain of the political.   
Taking seriously the anarchist turn as a crucial intervention in both the history of 
critical philosophical thought and as a key referent for current debates in radical 
continental political philosophy, the following section situates the return of anarchism in 
relation to what I have referred to as the general crisis of the political in order to 
demonstrate that what the above critical positions demand and even require is an 
anarchist hypothesis of the political.  Although the political theory of anarchism 
traditionally attempts to dislocate politics and political theory from the dual paradigms of 
government and sovereignty it has nevertheless failed to be accepted in the history of 
political philosophy as a legitimate political theory.  As anarchist historian Peter Marshall 
notes at the end of his history of anarchist thought and practice, anarchism “cannot be 
called a ‘political’ theory in the accepted sense since it does not concern itself with the 
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state.”244  Given the way in which anarchism marks an unbridgeable gap with the 
political discourses of the state, what might be seen as the political theory of anarchism 
falls outside of and underpins the traditional categories and ideas that sustain orthodox 
political theory.  Although Marshall is dismissive of considering anarchism a political 
theory, arguing instead that “it places the moral and economic before the political,” he 
nevertheless points to something fundamental in regards to the rupture anarchist theory 
forms with political philosophy.245  “If anything,” Marshall dismissively comments, 
anarchism “wishes to go beyond politics in the traditional sense of the art or science of 
government.”246  What Marshall attributes here as a minor characteristic of anarchist 
thought, not only points toward the core crisis of political philosophy, but is at the same 
time precisely what aligns anarchism with the task assigned by contemporary theorists to 
rethink the political at the horizon of the dual exercise of government and sovereignty.  
Anarchism neither subordinates the political to the moral, nor the economic; instead, 
anarchism contributes to the discourse of political philosophy by rethinking the very idea 
of politics against and beyond its culmination in the exercise of government.  As such, 
anarchism begins, and is marked by, the potential of rethinking the political without the 
first principle of government, thus responding to the fundamental paradigm which lies at 
the heart of traditional political theory.   
At this juncture, it is necessary to point toward certain critical positions in which 
anarchism is coming to change the general framework from which both politics and 
political philosophy are being conceived and practiced.  First, consequent upon the 
resurgence of anarchist theory and practice, there is not only a growing interest in 
revisiting anarchist texts amongst philosophers, but also a way (re)reading the history of 
philosophy and political theory anarchically, and to further point out how certain 
theorists invoke and rely upon concepts and ideas inherent to the political theory of 
anarchism without necessarily acknowledging them as such.  As Jun notes, the turn 
toward anarchism involves a new methodology of “reading anarchically”—or the 
“hermeneutic practice of discovering anarchist attitudes, ideas, and thoughts in literature, 
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philosophy, and other venues.”247  This hermeneutic practice of reading “anarchically” 
has significantly helped with the development of a critical anarchist methodology with 
which to reread the history of philosophy and political theory from an entirely different 
perspective that transcends the limitations of orthodox thought.  Over the past two 
decades, a great deal of research has been accomplished which both demonstrates 
previously unexplored affinities between anarchist theory and certain philosophers or 
schools of thought, while simultaneously helping to forge a new methodological 
framework required for rethinking the limitations of traditional philosophical and 
political theory.   
  In contemporary scholarship further critical work has been done with certain key 
figures in the history of philosophy such as Nietzsche,248 Bataille,249 Levinas,250 
Rancière,251 Spinoza, and Sartre252 amongst others.  What is at stake in these approaches 
is the attempt to develop “a way of thinking about anarchism as a philosophical or 
theoretical trope which recurs transhistorically.”253  If anarchism can be understood, at 
least in part, as a transhistorical and philosophical trope, then it would be a mistake to 
limit the history of anarchist thought and the historical anarchist movements of the late 
nineteenth century.  By developing anarchist framework or critical methodology from 
which to reread the history of philosophy, recent turns toward anarchism have helped to 
afford new possibilities for beginning to broach the development of an anarchist theory of 
the political.  The postanarchists in particular have been seminal in developing this 
critical method, and have shown how philosophers such as Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, 
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Lyotard, Baudrillard and Derrida amongst others often invoke anarchist ideas and 
concepts, and as such that one can reread their works through the development of a 
critical anarchist framework.  Although there is no general consensus amongst the 
thinkers who make the postanarchist canon of thought, the general claim posited by 
postanarchists is not that the above philosophers are nominally “anarchist.”  Instead, the 
general intervention of postanarchism is at once to demonstrate how certain aspects of 
poststructuralism and other schools of philosophy help to rethink the limits of ‘classical’ 
anarchist thought, thus contributing to a retheorization of anarchism, or postanarchism, 
while simultaneously invoking anarchist theory as the critical framework from which to 
rethink the history of political philosophy.  As Todd May argues in The Political 
Philosophy of Post-Structural Anarchism, the essential goal in theorizing the possibility 
of a political theory of poststructural anarchism is to “sketch the framework for an 
alternative political philosophy…not only in the vision it provides, but also in the style of 
intervention it advocates.”254   
Another critical position suggests that the questions posed by anarchism are 
coming to bear upon the work of contemporary philosophers, in such a way that as David 
Graeber demonstrates “even those who do not consider themselves anarchists feel that 
they have to define themselves in relation to it, and draw on its ideas.”255   Faced with the 
limitations of more orthodox political theories, as well as the dominance of Marxist 
thought within the continental left, a new critical and methodological framework for 
thinking through the question of politics is developing which, although often 
unacknowledged, gestures toward a more distinctly anarchist approach to political theory 
and philosophy in general.  One of the more recent critical trends that appears to invoke 
an unacknowledged anarchist basis from which to reconceive the notion of politics has 
been developed under what the French philosophers Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou 
refer to as “meta-politics,” or what Simon Critchley later terms “anarchic meta-
politics.”256  In the attempt to liberate political philosophy from its foundation within the 
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dual paradigms of government and sovereignty the central thesis arising out of the 
metapolitical tradition is as Critchley claims that “politics should be conceived at a 
distance from the state.”257  What is at stake, then, in the attempt to rethink politics 
outside of the state is to recreate the space for a critical conception of politics which 
cannot be reduced to the paradigm of government.  The principal problem, then, of 
contemporary radical politics, as posited within the metapolitical tradition, is how to 
reconceive certain conditions in which the very notion of “politics” can be situated 
outside and at the limit of the state.  Arising out of the critical positions of postanarchism 
and metapolitics is a radical call to forge a new space for politics situated at the horizon 
of paradigm of government, and therefore to additionally ask how we can redefine the 
domain and terms of the political as cognizant of this turn toward anarchism.   
In other words, if we can speak of a resurgence of anarchism this is because in its 
first instance contemporary political positions such as postanarchism and metapolitics 
explicitly situate themselves in relation to the task of developing an alternative hypothesis 
of the political outside and against the dual paradigms of government and sovereignty.  
The relevance of anarchism for contemporary debates in radical political theory lies in 
this gesture toward redefining politics as that which is situated against and beyond the 
state, and in turn allows the field of the political to transcend its historical limitations, 
while providing it with a more consistent framework.  Reflected in such figures from the 
contemporary continental left as Alain Badiou, Simon Critchley, Jacques Rancière, Todd 
May, and Saul Newman is a new critical methodology that sets itself the task of 
undermining, displacing, and unmasking the primacy of archic power in order to rethink 
both politics and the terms of the political against and beyond the history of 
governmentality.  At stake below is not simply that the central tenets of anarchism are 
reappearing in contemporary critical thought, but that the problems posed by anarchist 
philosophers anticipate current debates in critical theory, which in turn contribute to the 
ongoing retheorization of an anarchic politics situated at a fundamental rethinking of both 
the domain of the political and the essence of politics against the logic of the archē.  In 
other words, I contend that a rethinking of the problem of the political and of political 
philosophy today not only requires a rethinking of the questions and interventions posed 
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by anarchism, but also an alternative critical methodology for reading the history of 
political theory anarchically.  
 While the postanarchist and metapolitical traditions continue to open unexplored 
possibilities in the affinity between philosophy, political theory, and anarchism, I want to 
point toward the way in which these critical positions ought to be situated in response to a 
growing crisis of the political.  The importance, then, regarding this trajectory being 
carved out between the return of anarchism and the philosophical left is a critical 
rethinking of the fundamental premises and assumptions that allow us to rethink the 
rationale of the first principle the archē, in which politics is grounded within the 
techniques of government exercised within the domain of the state.  Yet, what is 
ultimately at stake within these critical traditions is not simply that their respective 
interventions begin to offer a preliminary framework for an anarchist hypothesis of the 
political, but that this rethinking of the political itself turns upon and is made possible by 
a critical inquiry into the question of resistance to the exercise of government.  As I will 
argue in the penultimate section, what these critical positions gesture towards, and even 
require, is the possible development of an anarchist theory of the political which turns 
upon the question of resistance located in the intersection between anarchism and 
Foucault’s theory of power, politics and governmentality. 
1.4 Postanarchism 
 
Postanarchism is not a specific form of politics; it offers no formulas or prescriptions for 
change.  It does not have the sovereign ambition of supplanting anarchism with a newer 
name.  On the contrary, postanarchism is a celebration and revisitation of this most 
heretical form of (anti)politics.  Indeed, so far from anarchism being surpassed, the 
radical struggles for autonomy appearing today on the global terrain indicate that, on 
the contrary, the anarchist moment has finally arrived.258 
--Saul Newman 
 
Over the past decade, postanarchism has exerted a significant amount of importance in 
academic circles, and has considerably helped in the resurgence of anarchist political 
theory.  In its most basic sense, postanarchism “demonstrates a desire to blend the most 
promising aspects of traditional anarchist theory with the developments in post-
                                                          
258 Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism, 181. 
92 
 
structuralist and post-modern thought.”259  While postanarchism has been critiqued for 
offering a reductive and selective reading of classical anarchist thought,260 as well as the 
claim that classical anarchism “founds its politics on a flawed conception of power,”261 it 
has nevertheless tremendously helped to reinvigorate interest in the study of anarchism as 
a distinct discipline.  Saul Newman’s texts, particularly From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-
authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power, The Politics of Postanarchism, and 
Postanarchism, have been decisive in highlighting the ways in which anarchism is both 
coming to influence contemporary political theory, while at the same time gesturing 
towards a new critical understanding of the domain of the political.  By identifying the 
appearance of anarchist themes and ideas throughout both the history of political thought 
and contemporary political thinkers, Newman concludes that anarchism “might be seen 
as the hidden referent for radical political thought today.”262  For Newman, the 
reappearance of anarchist themes and ideas is understood as the coming framework from 
which to rethink the limitations of political philosophy and practice as a whole, and is 
thus the “eternal aspiration,” “horizon,” or “forgotten link” in which radical theory 
appears to culminate.263   If we can begin to speak of an anarchist turn in practice and 
philosophy, then what is at stake for Newman is that contemporary political philosophy 
and practice turn on what he refers to as the “anarchist invariant,” or, the “recurring 
desire for life without government that haunts the political imagination.”264  As a hidden, 
or forgotten “invariant,” what is thus of key importance in the connections currently 
being sketched between contemporary politico-philosophical movements and the 
resurgence of anarchism is that the principle tenet of anarchist theory—that the domain of 
the political and field of politics is irreducible to the paradigm of sovereignty and the 
exercise of government—once again appears at the forefront of contemporary theory. 
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With the political possibilities offered by anarchism acting as a “hidden referent” 
for radical theory, one of the recent tasks of contemporary scholarship has been to draw 
points of convergence between contemporary political theory and anarchist thought in 
order to lay the groundwork for rethinking the political at the limit of the paradigm of 
government.  Like Kropotkin once suggested, what must be elevated to a more 
fundamental level is the demonstration of the “logical connection between modern 
philosophy…and anarchism.”265  Indeed, drawing connections between contemporary 
political thinkers and anarchist thought is one of Newman’s strengths as a theorist, and is 
what ultimately allows him to conclude that anarchist thought is reappearing today as the 
ultimate horizon for contemporary political thought.  In the Politics of Postanarchism, 
Newman invokes contemporary political theorists such as Alain Badiou, Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri, Jacques Rancière, and Giorgio Agamben in order to highlight not 
only the anarchist tendencies of these thinkers, but that certain works in contemporary 
political theory gesture toward and require an alternative hypothesis of the political that 
cannot simply be reduced to the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms.  At stake in 
Newman’s work is therefore not simply outlining the connections between anarchist 
thought and contemporary philosophical positions in such a way that helps supplement 
the critical limitations of traditional political theory; instead, rather, what is at stake for 
Newman is that contemporary radical political theory appears to require an investigation 
into anarchist political theory as the critical framework required for rethinking the 
political at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government.   
With reference to the above theorists, Newman highlights three points of 
intervention in which a unacknowledged call for a return to anarchism can be staked out 
across contemporary philosophical debates: “a politics no longer confined to the 
parameters of the state, party and class.”266  Highlighting the ways in which the domain 
of the political must be rethought outside of the state, without the notion of vanguard 
party politics, and a break with the idea that class relations are the determining factor in 
political struggles, Newman’s work makes significant advances toward the preliminary 
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development of an alternative theory of the political that overcomes the limitations found 
in the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms.  In the Politics of Postanarchism, Newman 
takes Schmitt’s definition of the political as the critical axiom upon which to demonstrate 
how anarchist political theory posits an alternative understanding of the political that is 
fundamentally opposed to what I have outlined in terms of the paradigm of government 
that has helped to structure Western political through and practice.  In this way, 
Newman’s work significantly takes as its basis the argument regarding how 
(post)anarchism “provides us with a new conception of the autonomy of the political, 
which transcends both the Schmittian and liberal paradigms.”267  Against Schmitt’s 
insistence that the appropriate domain of the political is identical with the state, Newman 
fundamentally reverses this logic, arguing instead that: 
The state is actually the order of depoliticization: it is the structure of power that 
polices politics, regulating, controlling, and repressing the insurgent dimension 
that is proper to the political; it is a forgetting of the conflict and antagonism at 
the base of its own foundations.268 
In reversing the Schmittian paradigm, Newman’s point is to demonstrate that the domain 
appropriate to the political is not, in fact the state, but rather the “autonomous spaces 
defined in opposition to” the state.269  In its fundamental opposition to the state, 
anarchism begins, according to Newman, with the assertion that the “political” can be 
redefined as the “constitution of a space of autonomy which takes its distance from the 
state, and thus calls into question the very principle of state sovereignty.”270  Understood 
as such anarchism defines a rupture with the historical rationale that traditionally grounds 
the terms of the political within the space and practice of government, and in this way 
forges a permanent, unsurpassable gap between the art of governing and its counter-
history.  In its irreducibility to the political topology of the state and governance, the 
significance of the postanarchist turn arises with an alternative conception of the political 
which, in its autonomy from the state, transcends the logic of an oikonomia.    
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 Newman is correct in suggesting that the return of anarchism today provides an 
alternative conceptualization of the domain of the political that cannot simply be reduced 
to the logic of an oikonomia.  Such an approach necessary comes into confrontation with 
the central tenets of orthodox political philosophy, and to a certain extent calls for a 
fundamental overturning of the history of political theory.  What is at stake in the attempt 
to free the political from the nexus that binds it to an originary archic power, is that 
anarchism at once “conceive[s] of a space for politics outside and against the state,” as 
well as a coinciding form of political praxis “through which the principle of state 
sovereignty is radically questioned and disrupted.”271   What is equally important, 
however, is the way in which Newman argues that this alternative conception of the 
political needs to be supplemented with a reconceptualization of politics generated by 
movements of resistance situated outside of the framework of state power.  As Newman 
contends, the tendency to rethink the political at the horizon of the state is, in fact, a 
tendency that is “being borne out in many radical movements and forms of resistance 
today.”272  For Newman then, what is required for a radical reconceptualization of the 
political that cannot be reduced to the paradigm of government is a theory of politics that 
takes resistance as the basis from which a new theory of the political becomes manifest.  
Indeed, as Newman importantly claims, it is these “movements of resistance” that make 
possible and “open up new political spaces, characterized by ‘anarchist’ forms of 
organization, which are outside of the ontological order of state sovereignty.”273 
According to Newman, then, insofar as postanarchism can be seen as reappearing 
as the “eternal horizon” of political theory, and as such requires an alternative theory of 
the political that transcends the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms, what is further at 
stake is that this reconceptualization of the terms of the political itself turns upon the 
question of resistance.  To be sure, the strength of Newman’s contributions to both the 
development of postanarchist theory and the history of political theory more generally 
arise in the attempt to rethink the basis of the political in the general context of a theory 
of resistance.  Against the Aristotelian and Schmittian models of the political, then, 
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Newman radically redefines the domain of the “political” as the “constitutive space 
between society and the state,” and further that “it is in this space that the current 
struggles against global capitalism and state authoritarianism must be situated” (original 
emphasis).274  In Newman’s conceptualization of the political what is ultimately 
presupposed is a radical dissolution of the originary nexus between the paradigm of 
sovereignty and the exercise of government; yet, this rupture with the logic and discourse 
of the archē is not a given variable for Newman, it is instead what is brought about and 
made possible through a critical conceptualization of resistance.  In this way, by 
resituating the space of the political in the interstitial space “between society and the 
state,” what is ultimately at stake for Newman is that this reconception of the political 
includes two distinct ideas that turn on the question of resistance.  First, Newman 
maintains that such a conception of the political designates how “politics must signify a 
disruption or break with the idea of an established order.”275  Second, Newman maintains 
that a retheorization of the political is set to emphasize how the “tasks of radical politics 
are not reducible to the overthrowing of state power.”276  In the first instance, Newman 
posits that resistance marks the condition from which the question of politics cannot be 
simply reduced to the exercise of government and state sovereignty, while in the second, 
the concept of resistance is invoked in relation to the history of radical political theory—
that is, resistance marks the condition by which the history of struggle cannot be reduced 
to a revolutionary struggle over the power of the state.  At stake in both these instances is 
that a critical theory of the political consequent upon the turn toward anarchism is made 
possible on condition of a vital retheorization of resistance.    
Indeed, the question of resistance has been at the forefront of postanarchist 
political theory since its inception.  In Todd May’s book, The Politics of Poststructural 
Anarchism, resistance at once forms general framework for his critical inquiry into the 
limitations of orthodox political theory, as well as the critical locus from which he 
attempts to rethink the limits of classical anarchist thought.  Under what are referred to as 
the “twin assumptions,” or dual “a priori that haunts anarchist thought,” May argues that 
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the classical anarchist “view of power as suppressive” and “their humanist naturalism” 
incites “the search for a transcendental or quasi-transcendental ground from which to 
recover a pure, untainted source of resistance” (original emphasis).277  This point is 
shared by political theorist Derry Novak who, two decades prior to May, argues that 
“anarchism misjudged the nature of social forces, particularly the nature and potentialities 
of political power,” a misjudgement from which anarchism “inevitably declined.”278  
Rather than assuming that the ‘classical’ anarchist view of power led to its demise, May’s 
point, however, is more critically to demonstrate that poststructural philosophy, 
particularly Foucault and Deleuze’s insistence that power is not merely repressive, but 
productive, reveals a new critical framework from which to overcome the limits of 
classical anarchist thought, and thus a point of departure from which to rethink the 
possibility of anarchist resistance.  For May, insofar as power is understood as productive 
rather than repressive in the Foucauldian sense, then it is the specificity of forms of 
power according to May that give “rise not only to that which must be resisted, but also, 
and more insidiously, to the forms of resistance itself often takes.”279  As May further 
concludes, “the liberation from specific forms of power must take into account of the 
kind of resistance that is being engaged in, on pain of repeating that which one is trying 
to escape.”280  In other words, the poststructural conceptualization of power is what 
allows for a reconceptualization of anarchist resistance that begins with, and arises out of, 
a specific analysis of power as its basis rather than pure, “untainted” point of departure.   
Like May, in From Bakunin to Lacan: Antiauthoritarianism and the Dislocation 
of Power Newman takes the paradox of the uncontaminated place of resistance as the 
turning point from which to rethink the limits of classical anarchism consequent upon a 
poststructuralist conceptualization of power.  According to Newman classical anarchist 
political theory is faced with a “theoretical impasse” which presupposes, through 
essentialist and universal premises, a pure place of resistance outside, rather than within 
power: “if there is no uncontaminated point of departure from which power can be 
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criticized or condemned, if there is no essential limit to the power one is resisting, then 
surely there can be no resistance against it.”281  It is this conceptual aporia—based upon 
the general problematic of a theory of resistance—that composes the basis, according to 
Newman, for the development of postanarchist reconceptualization of politics.  For 
Newman, then, it is “by using the poststructuralist critique” of power that “one can 
theorize the possibility of political resistance without essentialist guarantees: a politics of 
postanarchism” (original emphasis).282  For both May and Newman, the central task of 
rethinking the political at the horizon of the state takes as its critical turning point the 
question of resistance; to be sure, resistance is the key concept by which a new theory of 
the political is made possible.  Postanarchism not only highlights how resistance is a 
central concept inherent to anarchist political theory, but also the significance of this 
concept for rethinking the political in its irreducibility to the logic of the archē.   
The postanarchist turn in political theory has not gone unchallenged (especially 
amongst anarchists), and several theorists have criticized the postanarchist understanding 
of classical anarchist thought, as well as the central thesis regarding how a 
poststructuralist intervention into anarchist thought allows for a retheorization of a non-
essentialist anarchist philosophy.  Alan Antliff challenges May’s “claim that ‘classical’ 
anarchism—and by extension, contemporary anarchism—founds its politics on a flawed 
conception of power and its relationship to society.”283  Against this idea Antliff argues 
that “classical anarchism does have a positive theory of power,” while simultaneously 
offering an “alternative ground for theorizing the social conditions of freedom” in a non-
essentialist manner.284  Similarly, Nathan Jun, has challenged the central thesis of 
postanarchism regarding the way in which “postmodernist political philosophy represents 
an altogether new form of anarchism,” and argues to the contrary that “classical 
anarchism is arguably the first political postmodernism.”285  Another criticism against 
postanarchist can be further maintained in relation to the question of resistance as 
developed in anarchist political theory.  Despite the ways in which May and Newman 
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centralize the discourse of resistance to the project of postanarchism, it is my contention 
that while they both correctly point to the concept of resistance as a vital component of 
anarchist political theory, it is nevertheless a critical mistake to reduce the question of 
resistance in anarchist theory to an essential, or humanist ground that acts as the 
transcendental source of revolt.  Despite their intentions, both May and Newman locate 
the place of resistance within the limits of power, and as such tend to presuppose the 
primacy of political power as the framework from which a critical conceptualization of 
resistance might take place.  Regardless of its critical shortcomings, what is crucial about 
the postanarchist turn in contemporary radical theory is that the possibility of rethinking 
the political at the horizon of the state requires a more fundamental engagement with the 
concept of resistance.  As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, the relation 
between anarchist political theory and resistance is not developed through a fundamental 
reliance on a benign human essence; instead, the question of resistance posed in anarchist 
theory at once redesignates politics as the struggle with the exercise of government, as 
well as the pivotal point from which an alternative hypothesis of the political can be 
found.   
1.5 Metapolitics 
 
As far as archē is concerned, as with everything else, the conventional logic has it that 
there is a particular disposition to act that is exercised upon an equally determinate 
inferiority…for there to be politics, there must be a rupture in this logic…Politics is a 
specific rupture in the logic of archē. 286 
--Jacques Rancière 
 
In many important respects the meta-political turn, like postanarchism, represents a 
crucial turning point in the history of political theory consequent upon the resurgence of 
anarchist political theory.  Beginning with the argument that a failure to transcend the 
nexus linking politics to the state is one of the more pressing issues political theory must 
come to grapple with, metapolitical theory calls for a fundamental overturning of the 
history of political theory.  In this regard, at the beginning of his influential text, 
Metapolitics, Badiou confrontationally suggests that “one of the core demands of 
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contemporary thought is to have done with political philosophy.”287  For Badiou, the 
formidable problem of political philosophy, or what he refers to as the “great enigma of 
the century,” is to think through the ways in which politics ultimately gives “rise to 
bureaucratic submission and the cult of the state.”288  Political philosophy has failed, 
according to Badiou, to transcend the relation that binds the political to the state.  To be 
done with political philosophy means, then, that we must begin to rethink politics in such 
a way that “it is impossible for it to be governed by the state,” which for Badiou and 
others requires a theory of “meta-politics,” or the critical conception of the space for 
politics outside and against the state.289  To be sure, consequent upon the resurgence of 
anarchism, one of the central tasks for contemporary radical theory is to search for an 
alternative space for politics outside of the framework which traditionally locates the 
state as the condition of possibility for the emergence of the political.  At its core, meta-
politics attempts to transcend the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms by 
reconceptualising politics in such a way that it cannot be reduced to either sovereignty or 
the exercise of government.     
Perhaps the first to contribute to the development of the metapolitical moment in 
continental thought is the French philosopher Jacques Rancière, whose work often 
parallels anarchist theory, and has become increasingly integral for rethinking the history 
of political theory anarchically.290  Rancière’s principal text in political theory, 
Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, and the coinciding supplementary essay “Ten 
Theses on Politics,” both provide a new conception of politics that significantly aids in 
the possibility of critically dislocating the state’s monopolization on politics within the art 
of governing and sovereign law.  In Disagreement, Rancière asserts a fundamental 
distinction between what he refers to as “archipolitics” and “metapolitics” in order to 
fundamentally rethink the basis upon which political theory traditionally presupposes the 
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paradigm of government as the condition of possibility of politics.291  It is with this 
distinction that Rancière provides a preliminary passageway toward rethinking the 
political anarchically.  The paradigm of classical politics—which I have suggested begins 
with an originary nexus between politeia and archē—is according to Rancière the 
fundamental myth, or originary “lie that invents some kind of social nature in order to 
provide the community with an archē” (original emphasis).292  Insofar as traditional 
political theory presupposes an originary link between the very notion of politics and the 
paradigm of government, Rancière proposes to rename this history under the heading of 
“archipolitics,” or the political “project of a community based on the complete realization 
of the archē of community.”293  What Rancière nominates under the heading of 
“archipolitics” is useful in identifying a paradigm of political theory in which the very 
condition of possibility of politics always becomes manifest within the logic of an archē, 
and as such presupposes an originary link in which the domain of the political assumes 
the form of government.  It is in this way that the orthodox history of political philosophy 
has, according to Rancière, been none other than the history of the archipolitical. 
 By pointing out that the historical terms of the political are conditioned by the 
crisis of the archē, thus culminating in the problematic of archipolitical government, what 
is at stake for Rancière is to demonstrate the ways in which the traditional 
conceptualization of politics has effectively been reduced to theories and relations of 
power.  Because politics in its traditional conceptualization arises out of the 
presupposition of an archē as its principal domain, and therefore culminates in the logic 
of government, the very history of archipolitics becomes manifest in what Rancière 
renames in terms of the logic of the police.  Archipolitics as such is, according to 
Rancière, “just as much a form of archipolicing that grants ways of being and ways of 
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doing.”294  In this regard, Rancière describes the relation between archipolitics and the 
logic of the police in the following manner: 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and 
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution 
of places and roles, and the system for legitimizing this distribution.  I propose to 
give this system of distribution and legitimization another name.  I propose to call 
it the police (original emphasis).295 
By “the police,” a term invoked with reference to Foucault’s studies of the biopolitical 
and governmental policing of populations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
Rancière means to describe the ways in which the paradigm of government forms the 
framework for the domain of the political.296  What Rancière identifies here as the logic 
of the police directly invokes Aristotle’s oikonomia, or the way in which the domain of 
the political traditionally assumes the primacy of government as its condition of 
possibility.  Politics takes on the logic of the police for Rancière because it is an ordering 
“of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of 
saying”297—in short, politics as archipolitics is for Rancière none other than the exercise 
of power as the art of governing. “To put it simply,” Rancière concludes, “the politeia of 
the philosophers is the exact identity of politics and the police” (original emphasis).298  
Insofar as political philosophy attempts locate the possibility of politics within the 
paradigm of government then, as Rancière suggests, it “is condemned to have to re-
identify politics and police.”299  Archipolitics as such points toward the core crisis of 
political philosophy that renders politics indistinguishable from the exercise of 
government.  Indeed, according to Rancière the specific continuity established between 
politics and power exercised as government ultimately amounts to a radical “reduction of 
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the political to the state” in the sense of both the Aristotelian and Schmittian 
paradigms.300  
Yet, what is at stake for Rancière is that the very gesture that grounds the political 
within the realization of an archē “cancel[s] out politics through the gesture that founds 
it.”301  Indeed, if the political cannot be reduced to the single foundation of an 
archipolitics, then what is crucial is the way in which Rancière both reserves and reopens 
a space for politics outside of its culmination in the logic of an originary archē.  Unlike 
the postanarchist critique of locating a pure space for politics outside of the state, the 
‘outside’ that forms the substance of politics is not, for Rancière, made possible by an 
essential foundation, but an entirely different logic that dislocates the state’s 
monopolization on politics.  The key critical aspect of metapolitical theory thus begins 
with and turns upon the idea that politics is irreducible to the exercise of power, and as 
such must be understood on its own terms.  At the same time, however, this means that 
what is required for Rancière is an entirely different logic for politics, a specific rationale 
antinomical to the art of governing.   
Taking Rancière’s first thesis on politics from his seminal essay, “Ten Theses on 
Politics,” as a beginning focal point from which to understand this key distinction, we can 
directly point toward the ways in which an alternative conceptual and methodological 
approach to the question of the politics is developing that directly challenges and 
undermines the traditional categories that sustain orthodox political theories.  In the 
opening component of his first thesis on politics, Rancière writes with absolute certainty 
that “[p]olitics is not the exercise of power.”302  This is a bold claim, and one that is 
clearly directed at the history of traditional political theory as outlined in the first sections 
of this chapter.  If the activity composing politics, as Rancière posits here, cannot be 
reduced to the exercise of power then what is at stake in this thesis is foremost the claim 
seeking to overturn the core tenets of political theory from Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and 
Schmitt.  In its irreducibility to the exercise of government, traditional political theory 
has, both conceptually and practically, remained none other than a philosophy of power 
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and the coinciding theoretical investigation into the origins and legitimacy of power as 
such.  For Rancière, then, rendering “politics with the exercise of, and struggle to 
possess, power is to do away with politics.”303  Contrary to Schmitt’s insistence that the 
appropriate domain of the politics is the state, from Rancière’s perspective the state is 
more correctly the site of depoliticization—that is, it is the locus of sovereign power that 
polices the domain of politics as the exercise of government.  In this way, if the history of 
political philosophy could more correctly be referred to, as Rancière argues here, in terms 
of a historical theory of power, then what might still be considered political philosophy 
necessarily requires an entirely different framework for a critical understanding of the 
very possibility of politics.  Indeed, in the second component of his first thesis on politics, 
we read that “[p]olitics ought to be defined on its own terms.”304  Defining the notion of 
politics on terms that are irreducible to the politics of the state opens up new possibilities 
for developing alternative approaches to political theory distinct from theories of 
sovereign power, and therefore outside the history of archipolitics.   
Insofar as the possession of and struggle toward power is to be understood as 
analytically different in kind than the proper domain of politics, what is therefore 
required for political theory is a conceptual framework which begins with a fundamental 
redefinition of what “politics’ in its non-statist form consists of as such.  In Rancière’s 
thought, the proper character of what is to be considered the essence of politics cannot, as 
we have seen, be reduced to the exercise of power.  Indeed, politics as distinct from 
archipolitics, is that which escapes in the Schmittian sense those with the sovereign 
power to define what is proper to the domain of politics, as well as its manifestation in 
the exercise of power as government.  Instead, rather, turning to Rancière’s seventh thesis 
on politics we find that the essence of politics lies in its opposition to the paradigm of 
government and logic of policing: “politics,” Rancière writes, “is specifically opposed to 
the police.”305  In its irreducibility to the exercise of power, politics is that which disturbs 
power in order to bring about what Rancière refers to as the “impossibility of the 
archē.”306  In its irreducibility to the struggle for and possession of power, what is proper 
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to the domain of politics is the space of autonomy that lies in opposition to the state; 
politics is that which confronts the logic and manifestation of the archē.  Distinct from 
archipolitics, Rancière therefore “propose[s] to reserve the term politics for an extremely 
determined activity antagonistic to policing” (original italics).307  In this conception, the 
appropriate domain of politics is neither the state, nor the fundamental field of 
antagonism between the friend/enemy distinction as posited in Schmitt’s model, but the 
sphere of agonism defined in opposition to the state and the logic of the police exercised 
as government.  As that which actively opposes the police, Rancière’s 
reconceptualization of “politics” retains the sense of antagonism as found in Schmitt’s 
model.  Yet, precisely because this antagonism is directed against the state the critical 
conceptualization of politics found in Rancière’s thought is defined by and begins with a 
framework that is more consistently aligned not only with anarchism, but with an 
anarchist conception of politics as resistance.  With this alternative framework in place, 
the turn toward metapolitical theory can be understood as an attempt to liberate political 
philosophy from its foundation within the space of government and sovereign law in 
order to create an alternative space for a politics in which the techniques of 
governmentality are both questioned and disrupted.  
 Arising out of Rancière’s political thought is a need for a fundamental rethinking 
of new forms of politics that can be situated outside of the terrain that reduces the 
political to the archipolitical.  This is to say, a reconceptualization of alternative 
possibilities for the political which can neither be reduced nor assimilated to the 
archipolitical, requires a different political topology which, in its radical dislocation from 
the archipolitical, attempts to open the space for political practice beyond the horizon of 
state-based politics.  It is in this context, that Rancière posits the possibility of a transition 
from archipolitics to metapolitics.  For Rancière, metapolitics defines a radical space 
which, although outside of, comes into conflict with the archipolitical through the 
manifestation of “dissensus.”308  The key concept of dissensus in Rancière’s thought 
resists the reduction of the political to the archipolitical; dissensus points toward the 
essence of politics because it designates a radical sphere of praxis in which the primary 
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locus of politics arises in the insurgent form of agonism against archipolitical policing.  
Rancière’s conceptualization of politics as the realm of ongoing conflict and agonism 
radically reverses Schmitt’s central claim regarding how the political is marked by the 
sphere of antagonism exercised within the state.  What can be understood as politics for 
Rancière, however, is neither the object nor objective of the state, but a distinct form of 
praxis that disrupts and resists the archipolitical.  Thus, Rancière’s third thesis on politics 
reads: “politics is a specific rupture in the logic of the archē.”309  Working within an 
alternative framework for understanding the domain of the political that resists the logic 
of archipolitics, Rancière locates a real political and philosophical possibility; as the 
activity by which politics defines a rupture with the “logic of the archē,” the praxis and 
substance of politics is not only interpreted anarchically, but anarchic by definition.   
Contrary, then, to the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms, in Rancière’s 
understanding politics is what becomes manifest in direct opposition to the state, and 
therefore reverses the very principle of state sovereignty.  Whereas in Aristotle and 
Schmitt, politics directly refers to and takes place within the domain of the primacy of 
government, for Rancière, the domain proper to the sphere of politics might better be 
characterized—although he does use this language—by resistance to the archipolitical.  
Against the rationale of the first principle of an ontological and authoritarian force that 
grounds politics in the problem of government and legitimates this act as the terms of the 
political, what is crucial regarding Rancière’s work, is how he importantly helps to 
reformulate the question of politics from the perspective of resistance rather than the 
paradigm of government.  It is by further elaborating this conceptual nexus between the 
locus of politics and the praxis of resistance that we can begin to rethink the history of 
politics in terms of carving out a distinct “rupture with the logic of the archē” in a more 
consistent manner.    
There are clear parallels that can be drawn between the metapolitical moment and 
the political theory of anarchism, especially in terms of rethinking politics from a 
different critical logic than the logic of the archē.  Anarchist political theory traditionally 
begins by providing a different way for thinking about the terms of the political—one that 
both defines a rupture with the logic of the archipolitical and situates politics outside and 
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against the state.  Indeed, it is this search for a place for politics situated at the horizon of 
the state that incites the search for a ground from which the politics of resistance might be 
found.  Thus, if as Badiou and Critchley suggest that the goal of contemporary political 
thought is to rethink politics meta-politically—that is, as a form of politics that “puts the 
state at a distance”310—anarchism can be seen as providing a more consistent framework 
from which to situate and understand the implications of the meta-political moment.  
Critchley is thus correct to assert both that this “meta-political moment is anarchic” 
(original emphasis), and again, like Rancière, that “politics is the manifestation of 
dissensus, the cultivation of an anarchic multiplicity that calls into question the authority 
and legitimacy of the state.”311  Crucially, however, Critchley’s reconceptualization of a 
theory of politics that “puts the state at a distance” places, as its conceptual and practical 
framework, the question of resistance as the very basis from which a new theory of 
politics might begin.312  It is in this regard that Critchley importantly maintains that this 
politics as “[r]esistance is about the articulation of a distance, the creation of space or 
spaces of distance from the state.”313   
The strength of Critchley’s work arises in the way in which he locates the concept 
of resistance as the central concept that composes the retheorization of politics as 
proposed by Rancière.  At the same time, Critchley’s conceptualization of an anarchic 
politics of resistance that, in its very activity, creates spaces outside of the state, 
additionally makes possible the search for a non-essentialist “outside” to power as 
theorized by the postanarchists.  The creation of spaces outside the state are what 
Critchley refers to as “interstitial distance[s].”314  As Critchley argues in a separate work, 
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“these interstices are not given or existent,” but made by the very activity of politics.315  
If the creation of the distance from the state is what is produced by politics, then 
Critchley’s understanding of politics affirms the postanarchist search for a non-
essentialist outside to power that can act as the ‘ground’ for resistance.  Yet, at the same 
time this “outside” is not an essential place of resistance that comes from the outside, but 
is instead, somewhat paradoxically, forged from within the state.  In this way, “the 
activity of politics” is, according to Critchley, “working within the state against the 
state…the forging of a common front, imagining and enacting a new social bond that 
opens a space of resistance and opposition to government.”316  The distinction Critchley 
makes is crucial.  If the active component of politics finds its locus and logical expression 
in the concept of resistance instead of the state or the art of governing, Critchley’s 
understanding of politics demonstrates that resistance is what forges the outside of the 
state by its very activity as such.  Such as approach does not posit a pure outside to 
power, but instead demonstrates that a radical exteriority is made possible by resistance.  
In the chapters that follow it is my contention that the theoretical nexus in which the 
question of politics is inextricably linked to the question of resistance must be rigorously 
thought through to its fullest extent.  
1.6 Conclusion: Toward a Critical Theory of Anarchism 
 
This chapter addressed and took as its critical turning point the ways in which the domain 
of the political in the West often assumes a form of government as its historic condition 
of possibility.  The paradigm of government, and the synthesis between politeia and archē 
acts as the theoretical limit point or horizon for a critical conceptualization of the 
political.  Indeed, within the history of political philosophy, the state and the consequent 
problematic of government have been taken as the privileged site of the political.  Taking 
the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms as historical examples of this I have shown 
that the terms of the political begin with a unique synthesis between politeia and archē, in 
which the domain of the political is analogous to the exercise of government within a 
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sovereign state.  Presupposing a primary synthesis between the terms of the political and 
the paradigm of government causes the domain of the political to have a form analogous 
to the form of government that makes the political possible as such.  As long as primacy 
of the state and paradigm of government constitute the fundamental horizon of the 
domain of the political, the very problem of the political has been reduced to the 
paradigm of government, and the archic structure that connects the domain of the 
political to the domain of the state has traditionally been taken for granted, and 
unfortunately unchallenged by the majority of political philosophers.   
Taking the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms as the critical turning point 
from which to locate the return of anarchist political theory, I then situated the resurgence 
of anarchist political theory through the postanarchist and meta-political turns in 
contemporary theory in order to demonstrate that contemporary political theory appears 
to demand an alternative hypothesis of the political located at the horizon of the state.  At 
the same time, however, while critical turns such as postanarchism and metapolitics help 
to contribute to the resurgence of anarchist political theory by asserting the autonomy of 
the political from the state and redefining politics in terms of a radical struggle with the 
state, what is further required is the unique question of resistance that has always been 
posed by the logic of anarchism.  What is crucial in the turn toward anarchism is 
therefore not only the formation of politics beyond the framework of the state, but a form 
of politics that is centred on, and arises out of a critical inquiry into the general 
problematic of resistance.  It is nevertheless my contention that the tradition of anarchist 
theory has always affirmed the critical moves made in postanarchist and metapolitical 
theory, and therefore that what is required is itself a return to the study of anarchism in 
which the question of resistance can be shown in its specificity.   
As I will maintain in the following chapter, the key intervention made by 
anarchist political theory in its most basic form, ought to be understood against the 
background of the crisis of the political.  Rather than reducing anarchism philosophically 
as a simple rejection of the state counter-posed with a utopic view of a desirable future, 
or to a radical “rejection of politics,”317 anarchist political theory begins by positing an 
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entirely different theory of the political that begins with a critical exiting from the 
paradigm of government.  One of the ways, then, in which to understand the recent turn 
toward anarchism is, as Dimitri Roussopoulos argues, that a rethinking of anarchist 
political theory affords “new horizons…for a transformative political philosophy that 
promotes” innovative political possibilities “without a centralizing authority, that is a 
state…without a fixation on a nation state.”318  In light of this possibility, the following 
chapter addresses the way in which a rethinking of anarchism affords us a way of 
thinking through alternative political possibilities by presupposing a radical dissolution 
with the nexus that confines the political to the paradigm of government.  In doing so, the 
overall goal is to demonstrate the ways in which anarchist philosophy posits an 
alternative hypothesis of the political which, as we will see, itself turns upon the question 
of resistance to the exercise of government rather than the archic nexus between 
government and sovereignty as a way to rethink the possibility of a non-statist politics.  
Anarchism intervenes in the history of political philosophy by rethinking the fundamental 
categories that ground the political within the paradigm of government, while at the same 
time resituating the concept and practice of resistance as the vital condition that makes 
possible an alternative theory of the political.        
With the paradigm of government acting as the critical turning point from which 
to understand the turn toward anarchism as such, the following chapter is therefore 
devoted to further exploring the implications of developing an alternative hypothesis of 
the political through an engagement with anarchist political theory.  More specifically, in 
the next chapter I revisit anarchism in order to make a case for a reading of the history of 
anarchist thought as turning upon a vital distinction between the exercise of government 
and the politics of resistance, in which a critical theory of resistance comes to designate 
the specificity of the political as such.  Although anarchism is often reduced to, as 
political theorist A.J. Simmons suggests, a single “central claim [that] unites all forms of 
anarchist political philosophy”—that is, the claim that “all existing states are 
illegitimate,”319 I maintain that reducing anarchism to the claim that there can be no 
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legitimate states is itself historically inaccurate and fails to take into consideration several 
other characteristics distinct to anarchist theory.  While the anarchist critique of the state 
does indeed mark a central point of contention within the tradition of anarchist thought, it 
is my contention that the locus of anarchist critique is, more fundamentally, directed at 
the nexus that binds the domain of the political to the dual paradigms of the exercise of 
government and sovereign power as outlined in this chapter.  Furthermore, by reducing 
anarchism to an abstract critique of the state, traditional political philosophers often 
neglect and fail to take into account the ways in which anarchist political theory 
fundamentally turns upon an alternative theory of “politics,” whereby the term itself 
designates for anarchists, not solely the exercise of government, but the counter-
movements of resistance against the deployment of government as such.  By rethinking 
anarchism in terms of elaborating an alternative hypothesis of the political through a 
critical theory of resistance, my general intentions are twofold: to first define, or perhaps 
redefine, anarchism qua the unique concept of resistance, while simultaneously invoking 
the concept of resistance the principle from which to read the history of the political.  
Such a critical conception of anarchism designates the critical framework from which to 
situate Foucault’s theory of resistance amongst this tradition in the chapters that follow.  
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Chapter 2 
2 Anarchy and Anarchism: Rethinking the Political at the 
Horizon of the State and the Exercise of Government 
 
Government is stationary…Governments always stand for the “established order of 
things.”  Hence, we use the word anarchy, the negative of government, and will retain it 
when the political state has merged into the social commonwealth.320 
--Lucy Parsons 
 
Anarchism is the method by which to achieve anarchy through freedom and without 
government, that is without authoritarian organisms which, by using force, even, possibly 
for good ends, impose their will on others.321 
--Errico Malatesta 
 
Anarchism can be described first and foremost as a visceral revolt.  The anarchist is 
above all…in revolt.322 
--Daniel Guérin 
  
By way of establishing the general problematic and theoretical framework from which 
my own study proceeds, the previous chapter outlined and addressed the ways in which 
the domain of the political traditionally presupposes the paradigms of government and 
sovereignty as the transcendental and material condition of possibility of politics as such.  
Tracing this nexus between the exercise of government and the theory of sovereignty as 
the fundamental conceptual impasse posed within the history of political theory, the goal 
of the previous chapter was two-fold.  To first demonstrate—through a reading of 
Aristotle and Schmitt—two dominant paradigms within the history of political 
philosophy in which the historical condition of possibility of the political is conditioned 
by the principle of an archē that forms the nexus between politics exercised as oikonomia 
and state sovereign power.  Furthermore, while outlining the preliminary intersections 
between the return of anarchism and the critical positions of both postanarchist and 
metapolitical theory, the second aim of the previous chapter was to demonstrate that there 
is a strong current in contemporary thought to fundamentally rethink the philosophical 
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and political problems underlying the historical terrain that reduces and structures the 
terms of the political to the techniques of government exercised within the domain of the 
state.  Rather than working within the historical framework that reduces the question of 
politics to the exercise of government and the domain of the political to the advent of 
state sovereign power, contemporary critical positions such as postanarchism and 
metapolitics demand the invention of new political topologies outside this very nexus, 
and thus fundamentally gesture toward the preliminary development of what can be 
referred to as an anarchist hypothesis of the political, an alternative theory of the political 
that begins anarchically, and reopens the space of the political as a topology of agonistic 
struggle instead of a sovereign art of government.   
What is ultimately at stake in staging a decisive juxtaposition between the 
orthodox tradition of political philosophy and the critical interventions posed by 
postanarchism and metapolitical theory is how these latter two positions adopt the basic 
tenets of anarchism as the key referent from which the history of the political can be 
rethought, thus carving out a distinct space for the revitalization of anarchist political 
theory in contemporary scholarship.  We have seen that the central claim arising out of 
both postanarchism and the metapolitical theory is that the domain of the political is 
irreducible to the exercise of government, or what Rancière aptly refers to as the 
“archipolitical.”323  Because the politics is irreducible to the logic of the archē, the 
political as such for Rancière begins anarchically.  Furthermore, within the postanarchist 
tradition we have seen how Newman reverses Schmitt’s paradigm pertaining to the 
continuity between the domain of the political and state sovereignty.  Contrary to 
Schmitt’s argument regarding how state sovereignty forms the substance proper to the 
domain of the political, Newman instead maintains that the state is itself an “order of 
depoliticization”—that is, state sovereignty is the “structure of power that polices 
politics, regulating, controlling, and repressing the insurgent dimension that is proper to 
the political; it is a forgetting of the conflict and antagonism at the base of its own 
foundations.”324  The critical question, then, central to postanarchist and metapolitical 
theory revolves around how to create a rupture with the political logic grounded in the 
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archic nexus between state sovereignty and the exercise of power as government.  In turn, 
this requires an alternative hypothesis for the political that at once reveals what Newman 
refers to as the agonistic “insurgent dimension proper to the political,” and what Rancière 
refers to as the form of “politics” that carves out a “specific rupture in the logic of the 
archē” (original emphasis).325  By situating the question of politics and the political at the 
horizon of the state and the exercise of government, postanarchist and metapolitical 
theory both affirm what can be preliminarily referred to as the anarchic terms of the 
political, in which what is ultimately presupposed is not the primacy of the first principle 
of government, but a critical caesura between the political as archē and the “insurgent 
dimension” of the political manifest in terms of a distinct rupture with the logic, 
discourses, practices of politics as archē.        
In both postanarchist and metapolitical theory, however, the preliminary 
development of this alternative hypothesis of the political requires, and is paired with, the 
task of locating as Newman, Badiou, and Critchley all claim a radical new space for 
forms of “politics situated at a distance from the state,”326 or reserving the terms 
“politics,” as does Rancière, to designate an “extremely determined activity antagonistic 
to policing.”327  Thus, while there is a strong current amongst the above theorists to 
rethink the terms of the political as an insurrectionary rupture with the logic of the archē, 
what is at stake is how these theorists reintroduce the concept of historical struggle—that 
is, of resistance—as the very condition from which the basic tenets of political theory can 
be retheorized.  Rather than presupposing, as does Aristotle, that politics designates the 
techniques of government exercised within the domain of the state, we see here that 
politics can, in fact, be rethought at once as that which is located “at a distance from the 
state,” as well as the field of agonistic struggle “antagonistic to policing”—that is, as 
resistance to the techniques of government exercised as a specific form of power.  As that 
which is located and takes place outside of the logic of the archē, a critical theory of 
“politics” for these theorists is fundamentally revitalized, elaborated, and posed in regard 
to a critical inquiry into the question of resistance as the very locus that makes possible 
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an alternative space for politics located at a “distance from the state.”  Crucially, then, 
while the continuation of anarchist thought reappears with particular force in terms of 
developing an alternative hypothesis of the political, what is ultimately at stake in this 
retheorization is the reappearance of the critical question of resistance, a new paradigm 
from which the basic tenets of political theory can be rethought.  Indeed, as I will argue 
throughout this chapter, the concept of resistance is not only the central (and perhaps 
even vital) component that has always remained at the very heart of anarchist political 
theory since its incarnation, but the key concept by which the political and the question of 
politics is reopened as a fundamental agonistic space of struggle—that is, it is through the 
unique question of resistance that anarchist political theory is able to posit an altogether 
different theory of the political.   
In this way, while metapolitical theory appears to invoke anarchist thought as the 
basic turning point from which to rethink the logic and structure of the political, and 
although postanarchism invokes poststructural political philosophy as a way to overcome 
the alleged limits of “classical anarchism,” it is my assertion that the political theory of 
anarchism both affirms and prefigures the major critical moves established and 
articulated in these schools of thought. 328  In other words, anarchist political theory, I 
maintain, has historically set the terms of debate that make possible the metapolitical and 
postanarchist interventions.  In this regard, these critical positions ought to be understood 
as designating a historical continuation of the vital attempt initially posed by anarchist 
theorists to rethink the field of the political and the subsequent question of politics on 
condition of the unique place of the permanence of resistance amongst the field to which 
politics refers and consists.  Since its origins, anarchist political theory has presupposed a 
radical dissolution with the statist imagery of orthodox political philosophy, and in this 
way prefigures the political possibilities offered through the more recent critical trends of 
postanarchism and metapolitics.  Thus, if the intersections between contemporary 
political theory and anarchist thought can be maintained, as Saul Newman suggests, in 
terms of a permanent (albeit at times hidden) “invariant”329 of political theory in which 
the history of government is simultaneously haunted by the possibility of life without 
                                                          
328 See: Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, 65; 87. 
329 Saul Newman, The Politics of Postanarchism, 1.   
116 
 
government, it is my contention in this chapter not only that the resurgence of anarchism 
requires the development of a radically alternative hypothesis of the political, but more 
fundamentally that this critical task itself requires a return to the study of the question of 
resistance as posed in anarchist theory.   
With this critical framework in mind, what is ultimately at stake in this chapter is 
two-fold: to first reintroduce anarchism as itself a distinct form of political philosophy 
that fundamentally turns upon an alternative hypothesis the political irreducible to the 
logic of the archē, and second to demonstrate how the concept of resistance animates and 
forms the central component from which this new conception of both politics and the 
political can become discernible.  Together these two ideas—that is, the political situated 
at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government, as well as the elaboration of 
alternative paradigm for politics as resistance—form the locus of what I hold to be the 
essential task for political theory.  In this regard, the focus of this chapter is to both 
reintroduce anarchism as a more consistent theoretical framework from which to rethink 
the political anarchically, as well as how this theory of the political turns upon an 
agonistic theory of resistance as the key component that reveals the political as such.  
Whereas the political concept of “anarchy,” as well as a politics of resistance have both 
been traditionally excluded and discounted within the history of political theory, the 
overarching goal of this chapter is to reintroduce the political theory of anarchism as that 
which asserts an alternative hypothesis of the political through a critical theory of 
resistance.  To do so, the concept of “anarchy” will be elaborated in three distinct yet 
interrelated manners that might act as the preliminary framework from which to rethink 
the political on condition of resistance: as a philosophical principle that affirms an 
alternative starting point for a critical theory of the political; as a historico-political 
principle in which the history of the political is retheorized as a permanent domain of 
agonistic struggle; and as a paradigm of politics as resistance.  In this regard, this chapter 
aims to define, or perhaps even redefine anarchism, at once as a critical political theory 
that attempts to identify within the history of politics an alternative set of criteria from 
which the domain of the political cannot be reduced to a priori paradigm of government, 
as well as how anarchist thought turns upon and is critically coupled with the affirmation 
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of a unique theory of resistance as the vital principle from which to read the history of the 
political in radically new ways.   
2.1 Drawing the Line Once Again: Anarchism and Marxism on 
the Concept of Struggle 
 
[T]he situation in politics can be defined as a breakdown of the state and its entire 
failure…the collapse of states will become more than a question of time, and the most 
peaceful of philosophers will see in the distance the dawning light by which the great 
revolution manifests itself. 330 
--Peter Kropotkin 
 
The novelty of the coming politics is that it will no longer be a struggle for the conquest 
or control of the State, but a struggle between the state and the non-State (humanity), an 
insurmountable disjunction between whatever singularity and the State organization.331 
--Giorgio Agamben 
 
In the trajectory that stretches from the anarchist Peter Kropotkin who, over a century 
ago, defined the “situation in politics” as a “breakdown of states,” to contemporary 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s claim pertaining to the ways in which “novelty of the 
coming politics” can be defined in terms of an “insurmountable disjunction,” or 
fundamental “struggle between the State and non-State,” we can underline the ways in 
which anarchism reappears as the horizon from which politics and the political might be 
rethought as a paradigm of historical “struggle,” or what I will elaborate hereafter as a 
distinct form of politics as resistance.  With this problematic in mind, it is my contention 
that what must be at stake in outlining the growing relationship between contemporary 
radical thought and anarchism hinges on elevating an anarchist theory of the political to a 
more fundamental level in order to cultivate the emergence of a alternative political logic 
in which the “insurmountable disjunction” between a conception of the political as archē 
and an alternative theory of the political redefined in terms of an agonistic struggle 
“between the State and Non-state.”  At stake, then, in what Agamben refers to as the 
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“novelty of the coming politics” is a return to rethinking the questions of the political and 
politics within the paradigm of historical struggle.  This turn toward a more anarchist 
approach to a theory of the political, as well as the retheorization of politics as resistance 
has not been without its various critics.  More specifically, a large portion of the 
criticisms directed at the return of anarchism are most commonly set forth by 
contemporary Marxist theorists.  This is, of course, nothing new.  Ever since the dispute 
between the Marxist-communists and the anarchists that led to a divisive split in the fifth 
congress of the International Workingmen’s Association in 1872 over questions 
pertaining to the revolutionary use of in Bakunin’s words, “a state, a government, [and] a 
universal dictatorship”332 in order to achieve one’s political goals, a firm line pertaining 
to their respective theories of historical struggle has been drawn between the two most 
radical traditions in the history of political philosophy.  Indeed, what Agamben alludes to 
as the novel forms of politics to come fundamentally appears to echo the historical divide 
pertaining to how the concept of struggle has been conceptualized in the revolutionary 
traditions of both anarchism and Marxism.  As a struggle neither for the “conquest or 
control of the state,” but that which is situated between the “state and non-state," 
Agamben appears to reference the fundamental debate between anarchism and Marxism 
over the critical use of how the concept of struggle is to be conceived and practiced.  
What is at stake in the divide between anarchist and Marxist thought is not, therefore, a 
set of fundamental ideological differences, but a contestation over the paradigm of 
historical struggle and its use within the field of politics—that is, the fundamental break 
between anarchism and Marxism arises in regard to their respective conceptions 
pertaining to a historical theory of struggle, or resistance.  While the confrontation 
between anarchism and Marxism has been well documented by historians, the dispute 
between Marx and Bakunin is useful in pinpointing a fundamental confrontation between 
two dominant theories of historical struggle within the revolutionary tradition. 333  Indeed, 
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it is by tracing the preliminary distinctions between these two theories of struggle that an 
anarchist hypothesis of the political can be shown to be simultaneously paired with 
historical theory of resistance that ultimately motivates this conception of the political as 
such.   
Following his expulsion, alongside James Guillaume and other anarchists, from 
the First International, the Russian insurrectionary anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, argued 
that an unbridgeable gulf had been forged between the authoritarian communisms 
inspired by Marxist doctrine and the anti-authoritarian tendency of anarchism.  This 
pivotal schism between Marxism and anarchism not only helped to define a new direction 
for nineteenth and early twentieth century radical thought, but also brought to the 
forefront of the modern political imagination an alternative critical social philosophy 
which, at its very core, questions the fundamentally authoritarian premises of Western 
political thought and practice.  Accordingly Bakunin clarifies that between these two 
nascent tendencies in radical thought, there is a “very palpable difference…a yawning 
gulf.”334  Marxists, Bakunin concludes, are “governmentals and we are anarchists.”335  In 
regard to the question of historical struggle, Bakunin reveals that Marxism is to be 
distinguished from anarchism since its theory of resistance remains, in fact, bound to the 
fundamental presuppositions of modern Western political thought insofar as it 
understands the state as the transcendental and material condition of possibility for 
overcoming capitalism.  Despite their attempts at a revolutionary theory of class struggle 
as the principle component of history as such, Bakunin maintains that Marxists 
nevertheless “worship the power of the state,” thus reinvigorating the logic of the archē 
endemic within the entire tradition of political philosophy. 336  As Bakunin’s dissention 
demonstrates, although orthodox Marxism attempts a critical conceptualization of the 
politics of struggle, this theory of struggle fundamentally relies on the very condition it 
opposes.  Marxist-communists, Bakunin laments, can therefore “acknowledge no other 
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emancipation than the one they expect from their so-called people’s State.”337  The 
implications of Bakunin’s critique of Marxism are far-reaching; insofar as Marxism 
traditionally presupposes the use of the state as a means toward a proletariat revolution, 
the notion of class struggle as a dominant theory of resistance is revealed by Bakunin as 
itself a statist project.  Bakunin is clear, however, that an anarchist theory of resistance is 
that which can only take place “independently of any government tutelage.”338  It is 
within the fundamental thesis that a politics of struggle must take place independent of 
the framework of government that forms the basis of the anti-authoritarian ethics that 
distinguishes anarchism from other political traditions.  At the heart of this fundamental 
chasm between Marxism and anarchism lies a basic distinction that has at once become 
central to the elaboration of the anti-authoritarian ethics distinct to anarchist thought, and 
the resurgence of anarchism consequent upon what May refers as the “failure of 
Marxism.”339  The advent of anarchism, as a distinct political theory, is not simply based 
off of an a priori rejection of authoritarian modes of political organization, but more 
fundamentally that this rejection is coupled with and informs the notion that both politics 
as well as critical theory of historical resistance must be conceived independent of the 
principle of government, and further that the paradigm of struggle as such cannot take 
place either within the framework of a state or as a struggle for control of the state.   
Today, in both theory and practice, the vital distinction between the anarchist and 
Marxist conceptualizations of historical struggle is once again reappearing.340  To be sure, 
contemporary Marxist-communist philosophers such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek 
are in many ways at the locus of this debate.  Although metapolitical theory can be seen 
as sharing and advancing a certain affinity with anarchism—particularly in its central 
assertion regarding the autonomy of the political from the state as well as gesturing 
toward an alternative theory of politics as struggle—it is precisely around the questions 
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pertaining to both anarchism and the politics of resistance that Badiou and others have 
problematized in relation to recent developments in radical political philosophy.  Given, 
as Badiou states in Metapolitics, that the central question—or “great enigma of the 
century”—in which contemporary political philosophy must grapple takes the forms of 
asking “why does the subsumption of politics…ultimately give rise to bureaucratic 
submission and the cult of the State?,” it is easy to locate an anarchist dimension of 
Badiou’s political thought, particularly in regard to the way in which he attempts to 
rethink political theory against the “cult of the state.”341  Yet, whereas Newman argues 
that Badiou’s thought draws “upon a certain kind of anarchism without acknowledging 
it,”342 Badiou nevertheless maintains that his theory of a “politics without a party” ought 
not be reduced to the critical framework of anarchism.343  Thus, in The Communist 
Hypothesis Badiou writes: 
We know today that all emancipatory politics must put an end to the model of the 
party, or of multiple parties, in order to affirm a politics ‘without a party’ and yet 
at the same time without lapsing into the figure of anarchism which has never 
been anything else than the vain critique, or the double, or the shadow, of the 
communist parties, just as the black flag is only the double or shadow of the red 
flag.344 
Here, Badiou clearly valorizes communism as the political theory from which to frame 
the general intervention set forth by metapolitics, while also reducing anarchism to a 
mere “shadow” of communist thought.  Responding to this claim, anarchist theorist 
Gabriel Kuhn argues that Badiou’s “characterization of anarchism is simply false,” and 
once again reinvigorates the “anti-anarchist prejudice” initially arising out of the clash 
between the anarchists and Marxists over how the historical concept of struggle is to be 
conceived.345  In context, Badiou’s critique of anarchism arises out of a series of 
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conferences and texts, which as he claims, are established to put the word 
“communism…back into circulation” consequent upon the failures of both Marxist 
critique and historical communist practice. 346  Yet, although Badiou aspires to reinvent 
the idea of communism in response to the historical failures of the Marxist left, his 
argument regarding the way in which “we have to take up the challenge of thinking 
politics outside of its subjection to the state and outside of the framework of parties” 
makes it clear that the reappearance of the communist hypothesis appears as such in its 
adaptation to certain tenets that have always been central to anarchist political theory.347   
Despite Badiou’s obstinate reliance on the authoritarian models of political 
emancipation, it is my contention that the critical questions metapolitical theory poses in 
relation to a theory of historical struggle might better find its theoretical elaboration 
within the anarchist tradition, rather than in Marxism.  Historically, anarchists have 
remained sympathetic to several of the basic tenets of communism, and have often sought 
to rethink communism through the framework of anarchist thought.348  At the same time, 
however, anarchists have traditionally contested not only the means by which Marxist-
communist thought and practice attempts to prescribe and implement a revolutionary 
program to overcome the class relations within the history of capitalism, but also what 
can—by way of contrast to Schmittian concept of the state’s monopolization of the 
political and politics—be referred to as the Marxist monopolization of a theory of the 
politics of struggle.  To be sure, ever since the Manifesto of the Communist Party was 
published in 1848, Marx and Engels’s opening thesis pertaining to how the “history of all 
                                                          
346 Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis, 36.  Between the 13th and 15th of March, 2009 a conference 
took place in London under the title of “The Idea of Communism.”  Other participants, or what Badiou 
refers to as the “great names of the true philosophy of our times” (The Communist Hypothesis, 36) 
included: Slavoj Žižek, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, and Terry Eagleton among others.  Also see: The 
Communist Idea, eds. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (New York: Verso, 2010). 
347 Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. Steve Corcoran (New York: Verso, 2006), 270. 
348 See: Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchist Communism: Its Basic Principles,” in Anarchism: A Collection of 
Revolutionary Writings,” ed. Roger N Baldwin (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 44-78.  This text 
offers one of the clearest statements regarding the case for free anarcho-communism.  Here Kropotkin 
claims that, as anarchists, “[w]e are communists” (61).  Yet for Kropotkin, insofar as anarchism might be 
connected with communism, it can only do so by beginning with a fundamental basis of anti-
authoritarianism.  Thus, Kropotkin writes: “[o]ur communism is not that of the authoritarian school: it is 
anarchist communism, communism without government, free communism” (61).  The distinction 
Kropotkin makes here is essential to the elaboration of new schematics of politicization that do not 
relapse into previous political models.      
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hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,” has not only been understood 
by scholars as the defining statement on the history of struggle, but also the very critical 
framework from which the very concept of struggle is to be elaborated. 349  Thus, while 
Badiou maintains that the “black flag” of anarchism is none other than the “shadow of the 
red flag” of communism, it is perhaps better stated that anarchism has been 
overshadowed, if not historically than at least within the academy, by the dominance of 
the Marxist paradigm of class struggle.  Yet, as anarchist theorist Cindy Milstein 
importantly notes, “it’s not that anarchists didn’t take this history seriously,” but more 
fundamentally that anarchists have always maintained that “there were other histories”—
that is, “other struggles” that cannot be reduced to the form of class struggle.350  Indeed, it 
is these “other histories” and “other struggles” that Milstein argues is “something that 
anarchism would continue to fill out over the decades.”351  Thus, while anarchists have 
indeed both participated in the history of class struggles and taken the history of this 
struggle as such quite seriously, anarchist political theory has traditionally maintained 
that by reducing the history of struggle to the universal logic of class struggle turns upon 
a thoroughly limited theory of resistance.  It is therefore my contention that the very 
question of historical struggle must be rethought, not in a way that discounts the material 
reality of class politics and coinciding the struggles around them, but in a much more 
expansive and theoretically intricate manner.     
Insofar as Marxist theory cannot itself account for the varying forms of historical 
resistance without radically reducing these struggles to the paradigm of class, one of the 
goals of this chapter is to make a case for a return to anarchism in order to fundamentally 
account for an anarchist theory of the political animated not in terms of the paradigm of 
class struggle, but in terms of a form of politics redefined as a form of resistance to the 
exercise of government.  As anarchist theorist Gabriel Kuhn importantly suggests, rather 
than working within the paradigm of class struggle, perhaps contemporary theory ought 
to begin by asking an different “strategic question”—that is, whether “anarchism would 
                                                          
349 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. 
Robert C, Tucker (New York: Norton and Company, 1972), 335. 
350 Cindy Milstein, Anarchism and Its Aspirations (California: AK Press, 2010), 23. 
351 Ibid, 23. 
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not be a more promising name than the name communism.”352  Phrased in terms of a 
“strategic question,” what is at stake here is not a simple valorization of anarchism over 
communism.  At the same time, however, if one of the central goals of contemporary 
radical political philosophy is to invent new modes of politicization without relapsing 
into the previous models of political analysis and criticism, then what is required is a 
retheorization of the political that does not invoke the framework provided by previous 
models of politicization.  To be sure, this is why Critchley borrows from Badiou’s work 
in order to help develop a more “anarchic” dimension to critical field of meta-politics.353  
Although Marxist-communism asserts that “class struggle” is the principle motor of 
history as such, the very tradition of Marxism often relies on the same models of the 
political traditionally utilized in order to provide the basis for the problematic of 
authoritarian government.  In this way, what I intend to demonstrate in this chapter is that 
there are several key advantages in developing and elaborating an anarchist hypothesis of 
the political which underpins contemporary radical philosophy, and yet, at the same time 
turns upon the question of resistance instead of “class struggle” as the basis from which 
such a theory of the political might begin.  
An additional critique arising out of current discussions in radical thought thus 
revolves more directly around the questions, both philosophical and political, pertaining 
to the elaboration of a theory of politics as resistance.  In this regard, critical theorist 
Benjamin Noys maintains that Badiou’s critique of anarchism can further be read in 
terms of an extended critique of the problem of resistance as developed in both anarchist 
theory and poststructural political philosophy.  Despite its similarities with anarchism, 
Badiou’s political thought, according to Noys, maintains a “general skepticism towards 
what he regards as the anarchist faith in the ‘pure’ movement of resistance.”354  The 
problem Badiou finds with the development of an unadulterated movement of resistance, 
arises not so much against the question of resistance as a general political praxis, but 
                                                          
352 Gabriel, Kuhn, “The Anarchist Hypothesis, or Badiou, Žižek, and the Anti-Anarchist Prejudice,” 4. 
353 See: Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding, 112.  Critchley, of course, is not uncritical of developing a 
specific anarchic dimension in Badiou’s work.  To be sure Critchley claims that the attempt to develop an 
“anarchic meta-politics are somewhat at odds with Badiou,” (160 n31) and cites Badiou’s comments on 
the “anti-globalization movement” as exemplary of his anti-anarchist prejudice. 
354 Benjamin Noys, “Through a Glass Darkly: Alain Badiou’s Critique of Anarchism,” in Anarchist Studies, 
16, 2 (2008): 5. 
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rather, as Noys suggests, in the tendency to posit a “simple-minded opposition between 
power and resistance,” which reduces politics to a form of weak dialectics for Badiou.355  
Badiou’s critique of resistance (launched here at Foucault as much as it is at the 
anarchists), is directed against a “constrained sense of the possibilities of politics that 
remains in a dualism of resistance versus power.”356  As Noys further argues, the 
“monolithic conception” of the power/resistance dialectic “prevents a properly political 
assessment of the complex arrangements of political power and the means by which 
capitalist state power might not only be resisted but overthrown.”357   
Perhaps nowhere is the contestation over the question of resistance as a paradigm 
of struggle more apparent than in the debate between, on the one hand Simon Critchley 
who defends an anti-authoritarian anarchist position, and on the other Slavoj Žižek whose 
obstinate defense of authoritarian communism has become a mainstay in certain 
contemporary philosophical circles. 358  Directed against what is vaguely referred to as 
the “postmodern left,” Žižek critiques the philosophers who “call for a new politics of 
resistance…by withdrawing from [the state’s] terrain and creating new spaces outside its 
control.”359  Thus for Žižek, the meta-political question regarding the “politics of 
resistance is nothing but the moralizing supplement to a Third Way Left.”360  As to be 
expected, Žižek (like Schmitt before him) maintains a static conception of the political as 
a strict dichotomy between the state power and no power at all; rather than “resisting 
state power,” Žižek contends that one should “ruthlessly” acquire and use “state 
apparatuses” to promote one’s political “goals.”361  As Critchley points out, the debate 
between his own work and Žižek again reinvigorates “the conflict between 
authoritarianism and anarchism that is focused historically in the polemics between 
                                                          
355 Ibid, 5. 
356 Ibid, 7. 
357 Ibid, 7. 
358 The debate between Critchley and Žižek over the question of resistance began in 2007 with the 
appearance of Žižek’s short essay titled, “Resistance is Surrender,” in London Review of Books, 29, 22, 
November 15, 2007.  Critchley initially offered a short response to Žižek called, “Resistance is Utile: 
Critchley Responds to Žižek”,” (Harper’s Review, May, 2008) and later dedicated a whole chapter of his 
text, The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology (see: chapter 5 “Nonviolent Violence,” 
pgs. 237-246).   
359 Slavoj Žižek, “Resistance is Surrender,” 3. 
360 Ibid. 3. 
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“Marx and Bakunin, or between Lenin and anarchism.”362  To be sure, since orthodox 
Marxism which, to a certain extent, logically culminates in Žižek’s position, calls for a 
radical use of the state as the political means to achieve revolution, then we might think 
of the tradition of Marxism is itself the continuation of the “archipolitical” by other 
means.  Suggesting that it is precisely the question of resistance and not that of the state 
that needs further elaboration, Critchley refuses the simplicity of the Žižek’s political 
binary, and argues instead that “genuine politics is about the movement between these 
poles.”363  What is crucial, for Critchley, is that the “movement” of the political is 
“neither given nor existent but created through political articulation.”364  Rather than 
amounting to a fundamental “surrender” as Žižek would have it, Critchley maintains that 
resistance is what arises in the “movement” of politics—that is, resistance becomes 
manifest and is created through “political articulation,” not as its essence, but as the very 
movement of politics.   
With this key distinction between the Marxist and anarchist approaches to the 
question of posing politics in terms of historical struggle in mind, the remainder of this 
chapter seeks to reintroduce and affirm anarchist political theory as the theoretical 
framework from which to rethink the political at the horizon of government and state 
sovereignty, while at the same time demonstrating that such turns in political theory 
require an engagement with the question of resistance as the key concept from which a 
retheorization of the political and a politics of struggle becomes possible.  To do so, I first 
reintroduce several common attributes that designate anarchism not simply as radical 
critique of state and capital, but more fundamentally as a dynamic political philosophy 
which transcends the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms of the political, as well as the 
Marxist paradigm of class struggle.  As we will see, what is ultimately at stake in 
reintroducing “anarchy” as a seminal concept within the history of political theory is how 
this critical conception designates the pivotal point from which an alternative hypothesis 
of the political can be made, not as an archic nexus between the exercise of government 
and sovereign power, but in terms of a permanent field of struggle and conflict between 
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movements of governmentalization and movements of resistance.  Thus, while I contend 
that anarchy marks the possibility of rethinking the political at the horizon of the state, I 
further maintain with this concept we can begin to point toward a way to fundamentally 
reread the history of the political through the concept of resistance.  In other words, with 
the concept of anarchy marking the vital manner by which the field of the political is 
shown to designate a dynamic field of struggle between the exercise of power as 
government and the counter-force of resistance, what is ultimately at stake is to 
demonstrate how anarchist political theory redesignates the political as the historical field 
of agonistic struggle.  Contrary, however, to both Schmitt’s theory in which the dynamic 
field of antagonism made possible in the friend/enemy antithesis is itself contained and 
radically reduced to the sphere of sovereign power, and the Marxist paradigm in which 
the concept of antagonism is reduced to the sphere of class struggle, anarchist theory 
reveals the historical domain of the political as neither a struggle between sovereign 
states, nor between opposing classes, but in terms of an permanent agonistic struggle 
between the exercise of the government and the counter-movements of resistance.   
2.2 Defining Anarchism 
 
Given the way in which anarchism has often been misrepresented in both the popular 
imagination and the academy, it is an almost compulsory task for writers on the subject to 
begin by attempting to define exactly what anarchism is,365 or in other cases what it is 
not.366  Since its origins, anarchism has been fraught with several internal contradictions 
                                                          
365 Several definitive histories of anarchism begin by discussing the problem and difficulty of defining 
anarchism.  See for example: George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and 
Movements (New York: Meridian Books, 1962),9-34; and Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A 
History of Anarchism, 3-12.  Furthermore, in contemporary scholarship, several texts include a section 
which thinks through the problem of defining anarchism.  Although not an exhaustive list, see for 
example: Paul McLaughlin’s Anarchism and Authority: A Philosophical Introduction to Classical Anarchism 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 25-36; Nathan Jun Anarchism and Political Modernity, 111-119; 
and John Clark’s seminal essay “What is Anarchism?” in The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, 
Nature and Power (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1984), 117-140. 
366 Given the way in which anarchism has traditionally been misrepresented, anarchist writers are often 
forced to outline what anarchism is not as much as they are motivated to define anarchism affirmatively.  
For example, see: Alexander Berkman, “The ABC of Anarchism,” in Life of an Anarchist: The Alexander 
Berkman Reader, ed. Gene Fellner (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1992), 277.  Here, while 
introducing the basic ideas of anarchism, Berkman first attempts to dispel some of the more common and 
popular misrepresentations of the anarchist tradition.  “I must tell you,” Berkman writes, “first of all, what 
128 
 
and points of divergence that have continuously forged the need for endless texts 
clarifying its unorthodox positions.  Both within and outside the movement, anarchism 
has historically and culturally been defined in numerous and sometimes contradicting 
ways.  Unlike most traditions in political theory, anarchism does not therefore lend itself 
easily to simple classification.  As historian David Goodway suggests, one of the central 
problems one comes to face when discussing anarchist thought, then, is that “it is 
notoriously difficult to delineate anarchism.”367  Since anarchism is a neither a uniform 
theoretical doctrine nor a political program, the complexities of anarchist thought and 
practice appear to resist classification.  According to one of the foremost historians of 
anarchism, George Woodcock, “simplicity” is therefore “the first thing to guard against” 
when writing about anarchism.368  As John Clark more pointedly reiterates two decades 
later, “any definition which attempts to define the term [anarchism] by a single idea” 
ultimately misunderstands the complexities of anarchism, and thus “fails abysmally to do 
justice” to the inherently varied phenomena to which anarchism refers.369   
Although there remains a debate amongst scholars regarding the precise origins of 
anarchist thought and political praxis, there are three general ways of theorizing 
anarchism historically: as a trans-historical and trans-cultural open-ended set of ideas and 
practices; as a political theory developing out of the Enlightenment; and as an actually-
existing revolutionary movement beginning in nineteenth century Europe.  As both trans-
historical and trans-cultural idea, historians tend to argue that the roots of anarchism 
“reach deep in the ancient civilizations of the East” and further that the “cynics of the 
third century came even closer to anarchism.”370  As a political theory, others suggest that 
                                                          
anarchism is not” (original emphasis).  Anarchism Berkman concludes: “is not bombs, disorder, or chaos.  
It is not robbery and murder.  It is not a war of each against all.  It is not a return to barbarism or to the 
wild state of man” (original emphasis).  As Emma Goldman comments in the preface to the 1937 reprint 
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presidents and other lurid descriptions of those awful criminals, the anarchists, bent on murder and 
destruction” (xvii). 
367 David Goodway, introduction to For Anarchism: History, Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 
1989), 1. 
368 George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements, 9.  
369 John Clark, The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, Nature and Power, 118, 117.   
370 Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism, 54, 68.  Others have additionally 
traced the idea of anarchism in similar ways.  See: Robert Graham, Anarchism: Documentary History of 
Libertarian Ideas. Volume One: From Anarchy to Anarchism 300CE to 1939 (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 
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the first clear statement of anarchist principles can be found in William Godwin’s 
seminal text An Inquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793),371 and is therefore a 
phenomena born from the Enlightenment.372  Others, however, have found hints of the 
beginning of anarchist thought two centuries earlier than Godwin in Étienne De La 
Boétie’s vitally important text the Discourse on Voluntary Servitude (1574).373  Focusing 
more exclusively on anarchism as a revolutionary tradition based in class struggle, others 
further claim that “[a]narchism did not rise as a primordial rebel state of mind as far back 
as Lao Tzu in Ancient China or Zeno in ancient Greece,” but rather grew out of the 
“seedbed of organized trade unions…in opposition to classical Marxism’s imposition of 
socialism-from-above.”374  To be sure, the trouble in pinpointing the origins of anarchism 
demonstrate that the positions of anarchist thought and practice might be better 
characterized in terms of a tradition, rather than ideology, which historically develops 
from a broad repertoire of anarchistic ideas and practices.  Insofar as the history of 
anarchism refers to a “complex and subtle philosophy embracing many different currents 
of thought and strategy,” then we might understand “anarchism” as does historian Peter 
                                                          
2005), 1-4; Peter Kropotkin, “Anarchism—Encyclopedia Britannica Article,” wherein he claims that the 
best exponent of anarchist philosophy in Ancient Greece was Zeno” (288 of the cited edition); and Randal 
Amster, Anarchism Today, page xviiii. 
371 See for example Kropotkin’s “Anarchism—Encyclopedia Britannica Article,” in Anarchism: A Collection 
of Revolutionary Writings, ed. Rodger N. Baldwin (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), 289.  Kropotkin 
states that Godwin was “the first to formulate the political and economic conceptions of anarchism, even 
though he did not give that name to the ideas developed in his remarkable work.”   
372 See for example: Richard Sonn, Anarchism, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 13.  Sonn takes the 
position that as both philosophy and movement, anarchism was a “product of the mid-nineteenth 
century,” and as such develops out of the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Denis Diderot, and the 
Marquis de Condorcet. 
373 Murray N. Rothbard, “The Political Thought of Étienne De La Boétie,” in The Politics of Obedience and 
Étienne De La Boétie ed. Paul Bonnefon (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2007), 11.  Also see: Peter Marshall, 
Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism, 109-112. 
374 Michael Schmidt, Cartography of Revolutionary Anarchism, (Oakland: AK Press, 2013), 3. Schmidt’s 
position has proved quite controversial within contemporary anarchist scholarship.  In locating and 
defining anarchism in relation to syndicalist movements of class struggle, Schmidt limits the scope and 
boundaries of anarchism to the late 19th and early 20th century, which creates the problem of conflating 
anarchist history with anarchist philosophy.  For critiques on Schmidt and van der Walt’s work in dating 
and defining anarchism to the 1860’s see: Robert Graham, “Black Flame: A Commentary,” in Anarchist 
Developments in Cultural Studies 2013 issue 1, 189-192; and Nathan Jun, “Rethinking the Anarchist Canon: 
History, Philosophy, and Interpretation,” in Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies 2013 issue 1, 82-
116; and van der Walt’s response to Jun and Graham “(Re)Constructing a Global Anarchist and Syndicalist 
Canon: A Response to Robert Graham and Nathan Jun on Black Flame,” in Anarchist Developments in 
Cultural Studies issue 1, 2013, 193-203. 
130 
 
Marshall further notes “like a river with many currents and eddies, constantly changing 
and being refreshed by new surges but always moving towards the wide ocean of 
freedom.”375  Less figuratively, we might add as the celebrated anarchist historian Rudolf 
Rocker long ago recognized that anarchism does not develop as a determinate theory or 
doctrine—that is, anarchism is not “a fixed, self-enclosed social system, but a definite 
trend,” or permanent strand in history, “which, in contrast with the intellectual 
guardianship of all clerical and governmental institutions, strives for the free unhindered 
unfolding of all the individual and social forces in life.”376   
While there is a certain difficulty in locating the specific origins of anarchist 
thought and practice, anarchist theorists are faced with another difficulty insofar as no 
canon of work is, or can be, exhaustive of anarchist thinking—that is, neither a single 
individual, nor a group of thinkers, can claim priority over determining the limits and 
scope of anarchism.  Indeed, recent developments in anarchist studies suggest that an 
insulated reading of the classical canon of nineteenth century anarchist thought is 
infinitely problematic and fails to recognize the expansive development of a varied range 
of tendencies in anarchist thought and practice over the past century.  Despite, however, 
several attempts to think though this common problem, the contemporary anarchist 
milieu still faces a similar difficulty.  Since anarchism has increasingly come to represent 
a large and diverse range of tendencies and ideas while directly intersecting with several 
other disciplines of thought and movements of resistance such as feminism,377 anti-racist 
                                                          
375 Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 3. 
376 Rudolf Rocker, Anarcho-syndicalism (Oakland: AK Press, 2004), 31 
377 Since its beginnings, anarchism has always had a strong relationship with the history of feminism in all 
its incarnations and, at certain cases, has directly collided with and inspired the continuation of feminist 
thought and practice.  For early examples of the connection between anarchism and feminism see: The 
Selected Works of Voltairine De Cleyre, ed. Alexander Berkman (New York: Mother Earth Publishing 
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Connection,” in Anarchism: A Documentary History of Libertarian Ideas, Vol. 2: The Emergence of the New 
Anarchism (1939-1977), 492-499.  For a contemporary collection outlining the intersections between 
anarchism and feminism see: Quiet Rumors: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader (California: AK Press, 2012).    
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struggles,378 anti-colonial,379 queer struggles,380 ecological struggles,381 amongst others 
no unitary definition, it seems, is possible.  Indeed, precisely because anarchism at once 
develops as a transhistorical idea, a socio-political philosophy, and a historico-political 
movement, all of which intersect with several other movements of struggle, critical 
consensus suggests a near impossibility in defining anarchism in either an overly 
simplistic or singular manner.382   
Despite that anarchism’s typically variegated developments and interventions 
render it incoherent as a political philosophy, several theorists have nevertheless made 
rigorous attempts to define certain key characteristics of historical anarchist thought and 
common practices throughout specific, theoretical, cultural, and philosophical contexts, 
while outlining several key characteristics common to anarchism as a distinct political 
theory.  According to Uri Gordon, what is first required is itself a basic framework for 
understanding not necessarily the “content” of anarchist political theory, but a general 
outline regarding certain commonalities that might compose a preliminary understanding 
of anarchism.  Accordingly, Gordon proposes three distinct, yet interrelated, ways from 
which a critical understanding of anarchism might begin.  Anarchism is first a “social 
movement, composed of dense networks of individuals, affinity groups and collectives 
which communicate and coordinate intensively, sometimes across the globe.”383  Second, 
“anarchism is a name for the intricate political culture which animates these networks 
                                                          
378 For example, see the chapter titled “The Nation in Light of Modern Race Theories,” in Rudolph Rocker 
Nationalism and Culture (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1997). 
379 On the of the history of anarchism and anti-colonial struggles see Benedict Anderson’s seminal study 
titled Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination (New York: Verso, 2005). 
380 See for example: Paul Goodman,” The Politics of Being Queer,” in Anarchism: A Documentary History of 
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Queering Anarchism: Undressing Power and Desire, eds. C.B. Darling, J. Rogue, Derric Shannon, and Abbey 
Volcano (California: AK Press, 2012). 
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and infuses them with content”384  Finally, anarchism is a “collection of ideas’ (emphasis 
in original).385  John Clark, however, maintains that in order to link these seemingly 
disparate bodies of historical movements and schools of thought, a more comprehensive 
definition is required that takes into consideration both the historical and philosophical 
dimensions of anarchism, while simultaneously allowing for the continual evolution and 
trajectory of ideas and practices through its past and contemporary incarnations.  In an 
attempt to develop a clear statement of the tradition of anarchist political theory, Clark 
proposes a four-point definition which not only tries to capture the diversity of the 
historical and philosophical character of anarchism, but in doing so opens up a 
preliminary way of defining anarchism as a unique form of political theory.  “For a 
political theory to be called anarchist it must contain,” according to Clark, the following: 
1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of 
existing society and its institutions based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view 
of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress toward the ideal; 
and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive, 
non-authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives.386 
Although somewhat burdensome, Clark’s definition provides an adequate summary of 
the differing components that can be seen as outlining the basis for anarchism as a 
distinct form of political theory.  Without, perhaps, the third thesis (which has been the 
subject of much contention in anarchist thought)387 regarding a distinct perspective of 
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386 John Clark. “What is Anarchism?”, 126-127.   
387 It is in regard to questions pertaining to the relation between anarchist thought and an essentialist 
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objectively understood” (46).  At the same time, however, the postanarchist claim that anarchism relies 
on a benign conception of human nature from its critique is morally legitimated has not been without its 
own critics.  For critiques of the postanarchist representation of “classical anarchism” see for example: 
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“human nature that justifies” and motivates anarchist struggle, recent definitions of 
anarchism as a political theory, albeit with minor variations, affirm this basic outline.  
Thus in his work on anarchism and political philosophy, Nathan Jun simplifies Clarks 
definition and maintains that the political theory of anarchism can be understood as: “a 
universal condemnation of and opposition to all forms of closed, coercive authority 
(political, economical, social, etc.), coupled with [a] universal affirmation of an 
promotion of freedom and equality in all spheres of human existence” (original 
emphasis).388  From these definitions it is clear that anarchism is neither simply reducible 
to a political critique of the state nor an economic critique of capitalism.  Instead the 
critical impetus of anarchist thought is directed more specifically as a critique and rupture 
with the logic of the archē, a distinct logic manifest in the varying forms of political, 
economic, social, forms of authority, hierarchy, and domination.  
At the same time, however, what is implied yet glossed over in these definitions is 
that anarchist political theory as such turns upon entirely different theory of the political 
that is critically paired with a shared emphasis on the politics of resistance from which 
anarchist political theory as such becomes manifest.  In this way, we might add, as 
Gordon does, that anarchist political theory further includes both a “shared repertoire of 
political action based on direct action,” and the “shared political language that 
emphasizes resistance to capitalism, the state, patriarchy and more generally to hierarchy 
and domination” (my emphasis).389  Two ideas are of key importance here.  First, Gordon 
maintains that anarchist political theory turns upon a form of political praxis “based on 
direct action,” and further that this distinct form of praxis is itself animated by a 
collective political discourse of “resistance.”  Yet, while Gordon importantly emphasizes 
not simply the relation between anarchist political theory and the paradigm of resistance, 
but the way in which resistance animates anarchist political theory as such, this claim can 
be further amended in order to arrive at what I hold to be vital crux of anarchism.  While 
it is true that a collective emphasis on resistance is what animates both the politics and 
political theory of anarchism, this need not be directed against the often monolithically 
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abstract notions of state, capitalism, etc., but more specifically in opposition to the 
exercise of power as government often personified and manifest in state sovereignty, 
capitalism, as well as in the varying techniques of domination, hierarchy, and oppression.   
Between then, on the one hand what Jun refers to as the anarchist critique of the 
manifestation of authoritarian political, economic, and social relations, counter-posed 
with the affirmation of freedom against the exercise of power as government, and on the 
other Gordon’s emphasis on the political praxis of direct action there is a certain 
simultaneity and reflexivity that locates the political theory of anarchism within the 
paradigm of resistance.  Despite the fundamental difficulty in defining anarchism, I want 
to briefly turn to a key definition of anarchism from Kropotkin’s early writings in order 
to reveal how we might understand anarchism as pertaining to an alternative theory that 
at once takes the non-acceptability of power and the politics of resistance as its starting 
point.  “The anarchist,” Kropotkin writes, “denies not only existing laws, but all 
established power, all authority; yet the essence remains the same; the anarchist rebels—
and this is where he begins—against power, authority, under whatever form it may 
appear.”390  As Kropotkin first suggests here, anarchism begins with a unique position 
that takes the non-acceptability of all power and authority as its starting point—that is, 
anarchism according to Kropotkin presupposes a fundamental rupture with the logic of 
the archē.  At the same time, however, this means for Kropotkin that anarchism “begins” 
or takes as its “essence” resistance against power and authority as the starting point from 
which the logic of the archē can become potentially ruptured.  In other words, the 
anarchist critique and opposition to the exercise of power as government, as manifest in 
varying political, economic, and social forms, is itself animated and coupled with the 
politics of resistance; at the same time, the paradigm of resistance—within which the 
praxis of anarchism is located—is that which is made possible and finds its consistency 
within the critique of the political as the exercise of government.  It is my contention that 
this understanding of anarchism forms the basis from which an alternative historical 
theory of the political can be posed in relation to the unique question of resistance that 
animates anarchism as such.   
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2.3 Anarchy as Philosophical Principle 
 
Anarchy is the word which comes from the Greek, and signifies, strictly speaking, without 
government: the state of a people without any constituted authority, that is, without 
government. 391 
--Errico Malatesta 
 
In the history of political philosophy, the concept of anarchy, like the political theory of 
anarchism, is perhaps one the most misunderstood and undervalued concepts in political 
theory.  From its inception, the term anarchy has primarily been invoked by philosophers 
and political theorists in a pejorative sense, denoting both disorder and chaos, and as such 
the negation of political order; to be sure, the concept of anarchy has historically come to 
signify the converse anterior to what is typically understood as constituting politics.392  If 
the history of politics and political philosophy has, as I have pointed towards, taken the 
concept of the archē as the implicit starting point from which a critical conceptualization 
of politics begins, then by its very definition the term anarchy is irreducible to the 
political as archē—that is, it is the philosophical and political concept by which we can 
begin to rethink the political at the horizon of the state and the exercise of government.  
Despite, however, the ways in which anarchy, and consequently by extension, the 
political philosophy of anarchism has and continues to remain marginal, the very concept 
of anarchy in both its philosophical and political senses is in every way seminal to the 
history of political philosophy, and is what ultimately renders the paradigm of struggle as 
resistance more acute. 
Etymologically, the word “anarchy” comes from the Greek word αναϱχια 
(anarchia in Latin) where the prefix αν designates ‘without’ and αϱχια, translated as 
archē, which means at once “beginning,” “origin,” or “first principle,” and later as 
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“sovereignty,” “supreme authority,” and “government.”393  Rather than assuming the 
primacy of an archē, anarchy in its philosophical sense designates an entirely different 
theoretical plane from which a new critical conceptualization of the political might begin 
that does not assume the state and government as its constituent components.  As a 
philosophical concept, anarchy is the idea which, in the absence of the principle of 
authority, designates a critical position of exteriority from which to question the 
foundations of political thought.  Unlike in the history of political thought, where politics 
is derived from and determined by the first principle of archē, anarchy in contrast 
designates a critical unfounding, or radical disordering, of these authoritative 
foundations—that is, it destabilizes the presence and dominance of an archē.  It is within 
this context that Proudhon delineates what might be considered the earliest attempt at 
ascribing to anarchism one of its key philosophical characteristics in relation to the 
problem of the political.  “The meaning ordinarily attached to the word anarchy,” 
Proudhon writes in his seminal 1840 text What is Property?: An Inquiry into the 
Principle of Right and of Government, “is absence of principle, absence of rule; 
consequently it has been regarded as synonymous with disorder.”394  Yet Proudhon is 
clear that it is not anarchism that expresses disorder, but rather “our accustomed habit of 
taking man for our rule, and his will for law” which forms the “height of disorder and the 
expression of chaos.”395  Reversing the accusations launched at anarchists back toward 
the heart of government, Proudhon famously suggests that just “as man seeks justice in 
equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.”396  We have seen how the paradigm of 
government has traditionally retained a sense of primacy in relation to political questions 
pertaining to how best to conceive of “order” in society.  Yet, rather than attempting to 
think through the question of political “order” within the framework of an archē, 
Proudhon instead posits the concept of anarchy as an alternative beginning point—that is, 
Proudhon paradoxically suggests that we might also rethink the notion of “order” within 
the topology of anarchy.   
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What is at stake for Proudhon is that the concept of anarchy might form the basis 
for a new principle from which to radically rethink both the terms of the political and 
very concept of politics as it has been understood in both society and philosophy.  Given 
that the subtitle of Proudhon’s text suggests that it is the very “principle” of government 
that forms the point of departure for his argument, anarchy—which, for Proudhon might 
be rewritten as an-archy to emphasis the prefix ‘without’—comes to suggest the way of 
thinking through alternative political potentialities without assuming a formidable link 
between the political and the first principle of the archē.  In its most basic form, the 
concept of anarchy, which Proudhon also defines in the same work as “the absence of a 
master, of a sovereign” reveals an alternative principle from which to reconceptualise the 
history of the political and politics without the first principle of the archē.397  Yet, if we 
understand the history of the concept of the archē as the principle that has at once 
conditioned our understanding of politics and ordered the field of the political 
accordingly we might, following Kropotkin, more critically suggest that the very question 
of “order” within political theory means to “speak of order as it is conceived in our 
present society.”398  Thus, according to Kropotkin if we “take a look at this order which 
anarchy seeks to destroy,” then the term anarchy can be better understood as referring to 
the “negation of order” (original emphasis)—indeed, the negation and struggle with the 
order of the archē.399  In this way, while Kropotkin maintains that “order is servitude,” 
the concept of anarchy might therefore be taken in its most basic form as a radical 
disordering of the present order as archē. 400  As that which creates a distinct rupture in 
the logic and order of the archē, Kropotkin maintains that a critical conception of anarchy 
thus finds its locus in the concept and practice of “disorder” rather than order.  Yet rather 
than simply designating a condition of chaos, the concept of “disorder” and its relation to 
the term anarchy can be understood in the following way according to Kropotkin: 
“disorder”  
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[i]s the uprising of the people against this ignoble order…It is the revolt of 
thought on the eve of the revolution…Disorder is the abolition of ancient 
slaveries, it is the uprising of the communes…Disorder is the insurrection…an 
incessant struggle…Disorder is the blossoming of the most beautiful passions and 
the greatest of devotions, it is the epic of supreme human love.401   
In attempting to attain a preliminary definition of the concept of anarchy, two ideas in 
Kropotkin’s definition are of key importance here.  First, the relation between the 
concepts of “anarchy’” and “disorder” refers to a radical rupture (in the sense provided by 
Rancière) with the logic and order of the archē.  As that which takes a rupture with the 
logic of the archē as its starting point, anarchy as such designates an alternative basis 
from which to rethink the concept of the political.  At the same time, however, because 
anarchy begins with a radical disordering of the logic of the archē, the term also comes to 
designate a specific mode of political praxis, a process where politics seeks to create a 
fundamental rupture with the present order as archē.  As a politics of disorder, anarchy 
thus refers to the politics of “uprising”, of “revolt, of “insurrection,” and of “incessant 
struggle.”  As the form of politics, then, that animates a rupture with the logic and order 
of the archē, anarchy begins with and takes as its basis a theory of resistance that 
animates the concept of anarchy as such.  It is in this way that we might come to 
understand the concept of anarchy as itself a philosophical principle, or alternative basis 
from which the question of politics and the political can begin to be rethought.   
  Emphasizing that the philosophical and political character of anarchism ought to 
be defined in relation to the foundational onto-political problem of the archē, nineteenth 
century American anarchist Benjamin Tucker (in a manner that prefigures Rancière’s 
work) argues that anarchism is distinguished philosophically by its rupture with the logic 
of the archē.  “Anarchy” Tucker claims: 
[d]oes not mean simply opposed to the archos, or political leader.  It means 
opposed to archē.  Now, archē, in the first instance, means beginning, origin.  
From this it comes to mean a first principle, an element; then first place, supreme 
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power, sovereignty, dominion, command, authority; and finally a sovereignty, an 
empire, a realm, a magistracy, a governmental office (original emphasis).402 
In its most fundamental sense, “anarchy” as Tucker maintains here designates an 
opposition to archē.  Paying careful attention to the etymological development of the term 
archē, Tucker identifies two ways of understanding anarchy in relation to the crisis of the 
political outlined in the previous chapter.  Whereas in the pre-political sense “anarchy,” 
as Tucker suggests, first comes to mean “without guiding principle,” when extended into 
the political sphere it takes on an additional meaning as “without dominion” or “without 
authority.”403  Anarchism, as understood here by Tucker, cannot be reduced 
philosophically to a radical rejection of the state, but instead as a rejection, or opposition 
to, archē as both the “beginning” and “origin” of the political space which eventually 
becomes articulated as a “supreme power,” and as such develops as “sovereignty,” 
“authority,” and government.  In other words, anarchy is opposed not just to the political 
as politeia, but the way in which politics affords primacy to the concept of archē as the 
terms of the political expressed in the continuity between sovereignty and the exercise of 
government.  What is at stake for Tucker in affirming the concept of anarchy in 
opposition to the archē, is a critical conceptualization of anarchy as an alternative 
“fundamental principle in the science of political and social life.”404   
In essence, the idea of anarchy as a “principle” appears at two levels in Tucker’s 
work.  First, anarchy refers to that which precedes and eludes all archē; anarchy is prior 
to all guiding principles.  Yet, at the same time, the notion of anarchy in the philosophical 
sense does not exclude the elaboration of a political conceptualization of anarchy.  
Indeed, we might understand anarchy as the principle which negates the totality of the 
archipolitical.  While it appears contradictory to assert that which eludes the origin of 
principle as a principle itself, what Tucker ultimately points toward here are the ways in 
which the concept of anarchy formulates an alternative logic of the political which is 
continuously in conflict with the history of the archipolitical.  Along this line of thought, 
in a crucial footnote to Otherwise than Being, Emanuel Levinas sets forth a definition of 
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“anarchy” that helps to further elaborate what Tucker means by establishing anarchy as a 
“principle.”  “Anarchy” Levinas writes: 
cannot, under pain of contradiction, be set up as a principle (in the sense that 
anarchists understand it).  Anarchy, unlike archē, cannot be sovereign.  It can 
only disturb, albeit in a radical way, the State, prompting isolated moments of 
negation without any affirmation.  The State, then, cannot set itself up as a 
whole.405 
Anarchy, according to Levinas, cannot be understood as a political principle in the sense 
that it resists totality.  Yet, as Levinas maintains here anarchy is that which radically 
disturbs the totality of the state.  Although anarchy cannot be established as a “principle,” 
this same concept forms the critical topology which proves that the archipolitical can 
never establish itself as a whole.  In Levinas’s thought, then, anarchy, is what resists the 
state’s claim to totality, and in this way forges a permanent, unsurpassable gap between 
two warring conceptions of the political—the sovereign archē and the figure of the 
anarchē which disturbs the terms of the political in a radical way.  Yet, as Miguel 
Abensour observes in his analysis of the anarchist implications of Levinas, the fact that 
anarchy is rendered apolitical by Levinas does not mean that it has no relevance for 
political theory.  Instead we find that the space carved out by “anarchy disturbs politics to 
the point where we can speak of the disturbance of politics…to separate an-archy from 
sovereignty, to separate it from a principle does not mean that anarchy dos not affect 
politics or leaves it unchanged” (original emphasis).406    
Rather than designating something apolitical, the principle of anarchy defines a 
point of rupture with the historical rationale that traditionally grounds the political within 
the space and practice of government—anarchy is what disturbs and disorders the 
political as a continuation of the logic of the archē.  Although Levinas emphasizes that 
the concept anarchy can only disturb the state “without any affirmation,” anarchists have 
nevertheless consistently refused to reduce the notion of anarchy to a mere negation of 
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order.  Thus, while Kropotkin suggests that “originally, anarchy was presented as a 
simple negation,” he also maintains the following key distinction: 
“No State,” or “No Authority,” in spite of its negative formulation, had a deeply 
affirmative meaning when spoken by [anarchists].  It was both a philosophical 
and practical principle which signified that the whole of life of human societies, 
everything, from daily individual relationships between people to broader 
relationships between races across oceans, could and should be reformulated 
sooner or later, according to the principles of Anarchy.407 
For Kropotkin, then, the radical “negation of all forms of authority,” which forms the 
basic logic behind the anarchist critique of society is paired with, according to Kropotkin, 
an “affirmation—the conception of a free society, without authority.”408  It is because the 
anarchist negation of the state is coupled with the affirmation of alternative political 
possibilities in life outside of the paradigm of government that Kropotkin maintains that 
“anarchy was understood by its founders as a great philosophical idea,” or “a general 
philosophical principle.”409  
It is by taking the political and philosophical principle of anarchy in opposition to 
the first principle of an archē that we can begin to rethink the political at the horizon of 
the state.  While in the previous chapter we saw how the term archē not only refers to that 
which designates the way in which the political assumes the form of the techniques of 
government exercised within the domain of the state, but also the first principle that 
brings forth politics as such, anarchy, in contrast, at once reveals an alternative beginning 
point for a critical conception of the political, as well as an alternative principle which is 
brought into being as a form of resistance to the exercise of government.  Thus, insofar as 
the concept of anarchy designates the vital manner by which the political can be 
fundamentally rethought, the word itself has further significant political meanings.  
Indeed, the word anarchy also refers to an onto-political position of praxis—that is, a 
condition of being without government.  As Marshall notes, the concept of anarchy 
therefore additionally refers to “the condition of being without ruler,” whereby, in the 
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political sense, anarchy “comes to describe a condition of people living without any 
constituted authority or government.”410  Jun shares Marshall’s position and maintains 
that anarchy “can be roughly translated as the state of being without a ruler.”411  
According to Marshall, then, “anarchy is usually defined as a society without 
government, and anarchism as the social philosophy aimed at its realization.”412  In its 
most preliminary sense, we can point toward two ways from which to begin to 
understand anarchy as a philosophical principle: the principle of anarchy at once signifies 
a radical position of critique and a position of praxis, a state of being without 
government.   
In his entry on anarchism for the eleventh edition of The Encyclopedia Britannica 
(1905), Kropotkin further expands upon this notion of anarchy.  Anarchism, which 
Kropotkin acknowledges as the first political theory “contrary to authority”—is defined 
as the “principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without 
government.”413  In its philosophical connotation, anarchy designates a critical theory of 
the political “contrary to authority,” as well as a critical conceptualization regarding the 
possibility of political life without government animated by the principle of anarchy.  
Affirming the concept of anarchy as a “principle” contrary to the first principle which 
provides the political with an archē—that is, as an alternative political principle 
“conceived without government,” anarchism constructs a different set of relations for the 
terms of the political which seeks, at its core, to overcome the limitations of the 
archipolitical.  Indeed, as Kropotkin claims anarchist political theory maintains that the 
“ideal of the omnipotent and beneficent state is merely a copy from the past,” to which 
anarchists “opposed it with a new ideal—an-archy: that is the total abolition of the 
state…by means of the free federation of popular forces.”414  By opposing the concept of 
anarchy to the concept of archē we might, following Kropotkin’s logic, adopt the 
concept as itself the critical framework which provides the space for a theory of the 
political outside and against the history of the archipolitical.  Anarchy is the philosophical 
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and political concept—indeed principle—from which the history of the political can be 
rethought in such a manner that does not leave the nexus between the exercise of 
government and sovereignty intact; instead anarchy at once designates that which resists 
the state’s claim to totality, as well as a unique form of political praxis that continuously 
ruptures the logic and practices of the archē.  
2.4 Anarchy as an Historical Principle of Intelligibility of the 
Political 
 
As a philosophical principle, directed not just simply as a critique of the state, but more 
fundamentally a critique against the first principle of an archē that reduces the political to 
the continuity between state sovereignty and the exercise of government, the concept of 
anarchy, then, must be thought against its typical use in political theory.  Rather than 
invoking the term anarchy as the condition of chaos overcome by the advent of the state, 
we ought to understand the concept as a philosophical principle and coinciding form of 
praxis that disorders the continuation of the logic an order of the archē.  Understood as 
such, the concept of anarchy as described above can also be taken to designate a unique 
way to reread the history of the political itself, even within the history of archipolitical 
thought.  In this regard, although Hobbes might be understood within the history of 
political theory as one of anarchism’s foremost adversaries, it is by turning to his seminal 
political treatise the Leviathan that we might locate a key example within the history of 
political theory from which the concept of anarchy can at once be understood as an 
alternative principle of intelligibility from which to read the history of the political from 
the perspective of resistance.  Indeed, in the Leviathan the concept of anarchy cannot 
only be shown as the implicit starting point for the main argument of the text, but also a 
seminal (albeit historically neglected) concept within the history of political theory that 
ultimately turns upon an alternative theory of the political that is to be overcome, or 
superseded, in Hobbes’s writings by the advent of sovereign power.  While it has been 
noted that what Hobbes refers to as the continuity between the “state of nature” and the 
condition of “anarchy” is one of the more significant elements of which his political 
thought is based, it is my contention that that the importance of Hobbes’s use of the 
concept of the “state of nature” lies in its fundamental gesture toward a critical 
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conception of the political as anarchy. 415  In other words, despite his intentions, what 
Hobbes ultimately reveals as the condition of “anarchy” in the Leviathan is not a violent 
“state of nature” eradicated with the advent of sovereign power, but instead a vision of a 
politics as anarchy inspired by a completely different understanding of the political.    
As is well known and often cited, Hobbes invokes the figure of “anarchy” in the 
Leviathan at once as the condition prior to the establishment of sovereign power,416 as 
well as the justification for the social contract that forms the artificial body of the 
sovereign state.417  Although there has been some serious debate amongst theorists of the 
Leviathan regarding whether Hobbes intended his concept of the “state of nature” to be 
understood as a “kind of thought-experiment,” or a historically “practical possibility,”418 
it is my contention that the notion can be interpreted in terms of an agonistic conception 
of political conflict opposed to the theory of sovereignty.419  Against, then, the more 
orthodox readings of Hobbes, in which the “state of nature” is posed in terms of the 
condition that needs to be “averted only by the existence of an ordered society governed 
by a coercive sovereign,” the Leviathan can instead be interpreted as masking an 
alternative principle of intelligibility from which to reread the history of the political 
agonistically. 420  More specifically, although Hobbes maintains that the terms of the 
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political are marked by the way in which the state and sovereign power arise through the 
eradication of the condition of “anarchy”—a condition manifest in what Hobbes refers to 
as “civil war”—it is my contention that the Leviathan nevertheless reveals a preliminary 
manner from which the history of the political can be reread from the perspective of 
anarchy. 421  Indeed, rather than premising the birth of politics upon the eradication of the 
condition of anarchy, what Hobbes reveals in the Leviathan is history of the political in 
its agonistic specificity—that is, a permanent struggle between the state and non-state in 
which the concept of “anarchy” is not only primary with regard to the politics of state 
sovereignty, but that which is manifest and animated through a unique paradigm of 
political resistance, or “civil war.”  In this regard, it is necessary to briefly turn to some of 
the central components of the Leviathan in order to demonstrate how the theory of 
sovereignty, which Hobbes premises on the eradication of the condition of anarchy, 
effectively masks an alternative conception of the political that takes the condition of 
anarchy as its starting point, and further that this conception offers key insight on how to 
reread the question of politics against the historical paradigm of the archē.    
It has been noted that Hobbes’s concept of the “state of nature” has become an 
inescapable point of reference for political thought, and further that this concept has 
subsequently “had a profound impact on our understanding of human nature [and] 
anarchy.”422  In its most common understanding, commentators on the Leviathan have 
maintained that the “state of nature” in Hobbes’s usage means that the “condition in 
which man is placed by mere nature is one of conflict and insecurity—a war of every 
man against every man.”423  While there remains some critical contention in regarding the 
state of nature as “state of continual and overt violence,”424 it is clear that Hobbes is 
referring to a direct state of conflict.425  Yet it is in regard to this perpetual state of 
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conflict that Hobbes forms the contextual background from which political order can be 
derived—that is, the state of nature designates the condition in which human beings 
conduct themselves in a situation without the existence of sovereignty, thus forming the 
background upon which the need for sovereign government becomes justified according 
to Hobbes.426  In this regard we might take the notion of the “state of nature” as the 
concept from which the notion of state sovereignty can be contrasted.  Thus, as Evrigenis 
acknowledges, the “stark contrast between the misery that accompanies anarchy and the 
peace that comes through government, seems enough to explain the appeal of the image 
of the state of nature” in Hobbes.427  In other words, it is the state of conflict Hobbes 
represents through the concept of the state of nature that is ultimately contrasted with the 
theory of sovereign power in the Leviathan.  Yet, this might mean, as Evrigenis argues, 
that the Leviathan nevertheless represents a “powerful and succinct account of a 
condition sufficiently undesirable to cause one to reconsider one’s plan for rebellion.”428  
Because Hobbes understands the “state of nature” in terms of a condition of conflict that 
ought to be overcome with the politics of the state, it is my contention that the “state of 
nature” designates, not humankind in its natural condition, but rather a form of politics 
manifest in terms of an agonistic praxis of struggle—indeed a politics of rebellion and 
resistance—and further that Hobbes’s argument in favor of overcoming this condition 
can be interpreted as an attempt to mask this agonistic conception of the political as 
anarchy with a theory of sovereignty.      
Indeed, at the beginning of chapter thirty-one of Leviathan, Hobbes establishes a 
specific nexus between the “state of nature,” “anarchy,” and the “condition of war,” and 
further maintains that these conditions are to be eradicated from the field of the political 
with the advent of sovereignty.  In a passage that is in every way seminal to the history of 
political theory, Hobbes therefore writes that the “the condition of mere Nature, that is to 
say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Sovereigns, nor Subjects, is 
Anarchy, and the condition of War.”429  Here, Hobbes draws an explicit connection 
between the pre-sovereign condition of “nature” and “anarchy,” represented here as a 
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“condition of war”—that is “nature,” according to Hobbes, is analogous to both the 
condition of anarchy and the praxis of civil war.  To be sure, the eradication of this 
condition of anarchy through sovereign power and the advent of the commonwealth 
designates the premise against which the question of sovereign power is posed and, as 
such, is what Hobbes posits as the ultimate telos of the political. “The final Cause, End, 
or Design of men,” Hobbes therefore contends, is “of getting themselves out from that 
miserable condition of war.”430  What is required by Hobbes in order to overcome this 
“miserable condition of war” is not simply the advent of a central sovereign power, but 
more fundamentally a collective contract or “covenant” wherein all mutually agree to 
forfeit what might be understood through Hobbes as a pre-juridical right to autonomy: “I 
authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of 
men, on this condition,” Hobbes writes, “that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize 
all of his actions in a like manner.”431  What is ultimately at stake for Hobbes is therefore 
not simply to demonstrate that the condition of sovereignty is preferable to the non-
political conditions of “state of nature,” “absolute liberty,” and “anarchy,” but that the 
advent of sovereignty turns upon overcoming and eradicating a pre-juridical “right” 
toward self-governance manifest in the condition of civil war.432      
While this passage is itself in every way seminal to the history of political 
thought, Hobbes’s use of the term “anarchy” is traditionally reduced to two simplified 
ideas.  First anarchy is often taken by Hobbes as the concept that describes the absence of 
political society, or a state of nature famously defined as the “war of every man against 
every man.”433  Here in its most reductive sense, the concept of anarchy denotes for 
Hobbes the mere absence of sovereign power, and as such is rendered synonymous with a 
natural condition of “liberty” prior to the advent of sovereignty and the politics of the 
state.  Additionally, however, precisely because the condition of “anarchy” describes the 
absence of sovereignty and a permanent condition of war, the concept paradoxically 
“signifies want of government.”434  Two ideas are of key importance here.  First, the 
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concept of “anarchy” in Hobbes forms the historical condition ultimately leading to the 
contract that constitutes sovereign power.  In other words, this means that “anarchy” is 
what is presupposed by Hobbes in order to justify the collective need for sovereignty; 
sovereignty is therefore secondary to the condition of anarchy.  In this way, the concept 
of anarchy in Hobbes’s thought describes a condition prior to the politics of the state and 
as such, on the other, the justification for the need of a state—that is, in both cases the 
reality of the condition of anarchy is what forms the beginning point of Hobbes’s theory.  
Yet, because the concept and condition of anarchy is what is presupposed by Hobbes in 
order to justify the need of government, as well as the manifestation of state and 
sovereign power, it is my contention that the condition of anarchy can be understood as 
an alternative principle from which to read the history of the political in a radically new 
manner.  Given the ways in which Hobbes argues that the state and sovereign power is 
founded upon and arises out the attempt to overcome the state of anarchy, by his own 
logic Hobbes both demonstrates that anarchy, as a condition prior to the state, designates 
the implicit starting point for modern political philosophy as such.  What is at stake, then, 
is not that the condition of anarchy in Hobbes designates a radical outside to the state and 
sovereign power, but rather that its presence fundamentally denies the state’s claim 
toward primacy and dominance within the history of politics and political theory. 
While the intended goal of Hobbes’s text is to demonstrate the institution of 
sovereignty through the mutual transferral of the collective right to self-governance and 
autonomy, the very premise of this argument at once presupposes and demonstrates the 
possibility of an alternative theory of the political as expressed through the condition of 
anarchy—not as an essence transcendent to sovereign power—but that which is manifest 
and made possible in what Hobbes refers to as “civil war.”  Yet, insofar as Hobbes 
understands anarchy as a condition of war prior and parallel to the politics of the state, we 
might further understand the condition of anarchy as designating a form of politics—
indeed a form of political praxis—that is irreducible to, and arises in conflict with the 
history of the state.  To be sure, it is this distinct sphere of praxis that, according to 
Hobbes’s own logic, is at once prior to the manifestation of sovereignty, as well as the 
condition by which the advent of sovereignty is itself historically said to overcome and 
eradicate.  Indeed, Hobbes offers a brief glimpse of this dissenting form of politics when, 
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in Chapter 29 of the Leviathan, he discusses the varying causes that lead to the 
dissolution of sovereign power and commonwealth.  Herein Hobbes writes that “the 
Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power,” the historical movements of rebellion 
referred to as “pretenders [of] Politicall (sic) Prudence,” are “animated by False 
Doctrines.”435  Here Hobbes reveals the ultimate polemic of his argument; what Hobbes 
attempts to eradicate with the advent of sovereign power is not a human condition 
wherein all war against all, but instead another form of politics that resists the absolute 
power of the sovereign, a politics of civil war.  Following Agamben, we might therefore 
redefine Hobbes’s “state of nature” as a “mythological projection into the past of civil 
war.”436  In this way, whereas Hobbes draws an explicit connection between anarchy and 
the condition of civil war and traces the way in which the birth of sovereignty is said to 
eradicate anarchy from the field of the political, his theory of the advent of sovereignty 
also reveals, according to Agamben, how the political can therefore be read in reference 
to the political past of civil war.  While we have already seen how the concept of anarchy 
can be understood as designating an alternative principle from which the political might 
be fundamentally rethought, here we can additionally see how the concept of anarchy in 
the Leviathan is revealed as pertaining to an alternative conception of politics as civil 
war.  
In Tiqqun’s understanding of Hobbes the history of the political is attested to by 
the state’s struggle with the condition of anarchy, noticeable not as an essential 
exteriority, but politically in terms of civil war against the state.  The history of the 
domain of the political is not then simply the history of the state’s monopolization on 
politics, but more fundamentally, the history of, on the one hand, the politics of the state 
which seek to eradicate anarchy from the field of the political, and the politics of civil 
war which seek to undermine the state on the other.  Thus, “the point of view of civil 
war,” Tiqqun maintains, “is the point of view of the political.”437  For Tiqqun, then, the 
point of view of the political is not simply the historical elaboration of the paradigm of 
government and the primacy of the state.  Instead, rather, it is the concept of civil war that 
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forms the critical locus from which to read the domain of the political within the 
condition of anarchy.  
 In their unorthodox reading of Hobbes, Tiqqun at once reveals a radically new 
perspective from which to read the history of the political, as well as an alternative 
perspective of the political in which the critical question of resistance is rendered more 
acute.  In highlighting how the concept of “civil war” acts as the historical principle from 
which we can reread the history of the political, Tiqqun therefore radically denies the 
Schmittian paradigm of sovereignty, while retaining (albeit in a radically different 
manner) a fundamental theory of agonism as the key component of the political as such.  
Tiqqun therefore accepts Hobbes’s thesis regarding the “state of nature” while 
fundamentally reversing its principle position; the state of nature as a condition of 
anarchy is not simply a violent war of all against all, but an irreconcilable struggle 
between on the one hand, the paradigm of sovereignty and the state’s attempted 
monopolization of the field of the political, and on the other the condition of anarchy or 
civil war manifest in the struggle against the state form.  Despite their unorthodox 
reading of Hobbes, Tiqqun is not alone, and variations of this reading can be found 
amongst various anarchist theorists, as well as other critical theorists and philosophers 
such as Pierre Clastres,438 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari,439 and Michel Foucault.440  
Thus in their critical inquiry into the anarchist anthropologist Pierre Clastres’ 
ethnographic work into non-state societies and the coinciding historical problematic of 
war, Deleuze and Guattari argue, in a manner that invokes the basic premises of Hobbes 
that “the state was against war, so war is against the state, and makes it impossible.”441  
Like Tiqqun, Deleuze and Guattari understand the history of the state as the simultaneous 
history of its own impossibility—that is, the struggle between the politics of the state, 
which attempt to put an end to civil war, and the struggle against the state, which finds its 
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historical elaboration in the concept of civil war.  However, Deleuze and Guattari 
additionally argue that the concept of civil war describes a radical position of praxis in 
contrast to the politics of the state: Deleuze and Guattari write: “it should not be 
concluded that war is a state of nature, but rather that it is the mode of a social state that 
wards off and prevents the state.”442  In this sense, civil war is not simply a state of nature 
prior to the state’s existence, but also a specific mode of praxis in which the politics 
arising out of the condition of anarchy, develop as strategic tactics of resistance against 
the state.  For Tiqqun and Deleuze, and Guattari, the concept of anarchy, which is 
historically expressed in terms of civil war, is the very grid from which we can read the 
history of the political.  At the same time, however, this alternative framework for 
understanding the domain of the political, which in its essence asserts that anarchy is 
primary with the state, additionally locates a fundamental dimension of agonism with the 
concept of civil war that lies at the heart of the domain of the political.  To put it 
differently, anarchy—as opposed to the first principle of government—gives us an 
alternative way to conceive of the domain of the political situated at the horizon of the 
state, a conceptualization that locates a fundamental agonism between the state and 
anarchy as the substance of the political, and finds its expression in the concept of civil 
war.  Such a theory of the political is not, however, set to exclude or deny the existence 
of the state, but more fundamentally to describe the irreconcilable conflict between the 
political as archē and the political as anarchy.  
While anarchists have traditionally refused Hobbes’s description of the “state of 
nature,” they have nevertheless affirmed an alternative, critical understanding of the 
concept of anarchy, and have often sought to elaborate a theory of the political that 
begins with this alternate conception.  Pointing toward the way in which anarchists have 
traditionally attempted to distinguish a critical concept of anarchy from Hobbes’s usage, 
Newman maintains that whereas sovereign “law bases its claim to our obedience on its 
supposed ability to put a stop to the violent anarchy of the state of nature, anarchists 
refuse this artifice of social contract theory, affirming instead a different vision of 
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anarchy.”443  Yet, for Newman this affirmation of a theory of anarchy in Hobbes invokes 
a philosophical aporia in which the historical concept of anarchy is inherently intertwined 
with the historical logic of the state and the advent of sovereignty.  Newman therefore 
criticizes that “the anarchy that forms the ontological basis of social contract theory, and 
that the law and sovereignty are supposed to eliminate, provides for anarchists the 
ontological foundation for the possibility of life beyond the law.”444  At stake in 
Newman’s critique is the way in which the concept of anarchy as discussed by Hobbes in 
the Leviathan, has been misinterpreted by certain anarchists as indicating a transcendental 
position of pure exteriority outside of the state.  Understood in this sense, “anarchy” as 
Newman maintains simply designates the transcendental condition of possibility from 
which anarchists might be able to justify the potentiality for life without government.  
Yet, Newman neglects to notice how the concept of anarchy, even as used by Hobbes in 
the Leviathan, does not simply refer to a “state of nature” prior to the advent of the state 
and the discourse of sovereignty, but more specifically toward an alternative conception 
of politics as resistance, a form of politics against which Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty 
is set to eradicate from the field of the political.  Thus, by critiquing the idea of anarchy 
as pure place of exteriority, Newman neglects the way in which this “place” of anarchy is 
not an essential condition, either transcendent or prior to state sovereignty, but that which 
becomes manifest in the exercise of resistance against the formation of the state and the 
exercise of government.  If we assume, as has been suggested by one commentator, that 
“at the center of Hobbes’s political theory lies the concept of the state of nature,”445 then 
we might further suggest that the condition of anarchy is not only that what is 
presupposed by Hobbes through the concept of the “state of nature,” but also that which 
reveals an agonistic theory of the political that is effectively masked by the theory of 
sovereignty.   
Furthermore, while we have seen how the condition of anarchy as manifest in the 
praxis of civil war points toward and alternative principle from which the political can be 
understood anarchically, anarchists have often invoked the notion of civil war as the basis 
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from which politics as such can be understood agonistically.  In this regard, certain 
anarchists have located a specific dimension of agonism at the heart of political relations, 
and have, despite their differences, often invoked the concept of civil war to designate a 
fundamental struggle with sovereign power and the exercise of government.  Anarchist 
journalist, Anselme Bellegarrigue, links the idea of civil war to the notion of government, 
and centralizes the idea of agonism as the inherent consequence of government. “Who 
says antagonism, says civil war,” writes Bellegarrigue, “from which it follows that who 
says government, says civil war.”446  Reversing the logic of Hobbes, anarchist historian 
and theorist, Rudolph Rocker argues that the paradigm of government inherently leads to 
“a constant war of each against all.”447  At the same time, Rocker centralizes the war 
against relations of power as the basis of anarchist politics: “anarchists represent the 
viewpoint that the war against capitalism must at the same time be a war against all 
institutions of political power.”448  Indeed, according to Rocker, the anarchist’s war 
against the state is what opens up the possibility for life without government: “[n]ew 
worlds are not born in the vacuum of abstract ideas, but in…ceaseless struggle…constant 
warfare against the already-existing.”449  Anarchist Emile Armand highlights how this 
dimension of agonism is what unifies anarchist theory.  Armand writes:  
As the word “anarchy” etymologically signifies the negation of governmental 
authority, the absence of government, it follows that one indissoluble bond unites 
the anarchists.  This is antagonism to all situations regulated by imposition, 
constraint, violence, governmental oppression, whether these are a product of all, 
a group, or of one person.450    
Furthermore, Voltairine de Cleyre maintains that while “[a]narchism seeks to arouse 
consciousness of oppression,” the agonism that lies at the heart of political relations 
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refers to the “sense of the necessity for unceasing warfare against capitalism and the 
state.”451    
In each of the above examples, it is clear that anarchism conceives of politics 
agonistically—that is as a permanent and irreconcilable struggle between the techniques 
of government exercised within the state and critical conception of politics as resistance, 
a “constant warfare against the already-existing.”  Additionally, while Kropotkin believes 
that the very basic tenets of political theory might be rethought according to the 
principles of anarchy, he additionally demonstrates that this philosophical principle turns 
upon an alternative conceptualization of political praxis that places resistance as the 
central component of anarchist politics.  According to Kropotkin, the principle of anarchy 
is distinct, politically and philosophically, because it “is a principle of the daily 
struggle…a principle distorted by statist science…vital and active, always forging new 
progress in spite of and in opposition to all oppressors.”452  As a principle of struggle 
which, as we for will see for anarchist theorists, finds its consistency in the concept of 
resistance, anarchist political theory situates politics outside and in opposition to the state, 
and in this way prefigures the core idea of meta-political theory.  Furthermore, by 
defining anarchism in relation to the principle of struggle, Kropotkin additionally 
centralizes resistance as the key component from which to rethink the domain of the 
political against the primacy of the state.  The antagonism inherent to the political theory 
of anarchism is, according to Kropotkin, not represented by a “struggle against rulers, as 
was once the case, nor is it simply a struggle against an employer, a judge, or a police 
officer.”453  Instead what lies at the heart of anarchist theory is according to Kropotkin: 
The struggle between two principles that, from time immemorial, have been at 
war with one another within society: the principle of liberty, and the principle of 
coercion.  These two principles are once more engaged in a monumental struggle 
which must, of necessity, result in the triumph of the libertarian principle.454 
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As the ongoing struggle between the “principle of coercion” which is historically 
elaborated through framework of government and “the principle of liberty,” resistance is 
not only the defining character of anarchist political theory, but also the critical grid from 
which we can understand the domain of the political.  Despite the postanarchist claim that 
“classical” anarchism presupposes a radical outside to the state in order to justify 
resistance against power, the concept of anarchy as opposed to archē does not presuppose 
a pure, uncontaminated place for resistance.  Instead, rather, as we find in Kropotkin’s 
analysis above, a critical conception of anarchy at once designates the means by which 
certain historical popular forces resist the state, as well as the historical principle of 
intelligibility from which to read the history of the political as such.       
What is crucial is that the resurgence of anarchist philosophy ought to be 
understood as an attempt to rethink the history of the political—that is, anarchism 
constructs a different set of relations of the political whereby politics can be situated 
outside of the state, and as such reinvigorates the philosophical focus on the counter-
history to the paradigm of government.  Thus, in a more recent work, Tiqqun amplifies 
Kropotkin’s logic and elevates the analysis of the counter-history of the paradigm of 
government as the central task for political theory.  According to Tiqqun: “[w]e have, 
then, the official history of the modern State, namely the grand juridico-formal narrative 
of sovereignty: centralization, unification, rationalization.  And also there is a counter-
history, which is the history of its impossibility.”455  “You have to look into this other 
history,” Tiqqun concludes, in order to begin to rethink the political at the horizon of the 
state.456  Thus, for Tiqqun: 
There is an official history of the state in which the State seems to be the one and 
only actor, in which the advances of the state monopolization on the political are 
so many battles chalked up against an enemy who is invisible, imaginary, and 
precisely without history.  And then there is a counter history written from the 
perspective of civil war…This counter history reveals a political monopoly that is 
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constantly threatened by the recomposition of autonomous worlds, of non-state 
collectivities (original emphasis).457 
Like Kropotkin, Tiqqun understands the history of the political in terms of a permanent 
struggle between the state and “non-state collectivities”—that is, a struggle between 
history of the state and the parallel, yet heterogeneous, counter-historical impossibility of 
the state manifest through the logic of civil war.  Following Tiqqun it is my contention 
that an analysis of this counter-history to the state reveals the specificity of the political in 
a radically new way that is irreducible to the logic of the archē.  Furthermore, insofar as 
this counter-history of the state is historically manifest as a politics of civil war, it also 
my contention in what follows that the politics of resistance might become the new basis 
from which the political can be conceived within the topology of anarchy.  
2.6 Anarchy as a Historical Paradigm of Resistance 
 
Let us always remember that the oppression of governments has no other limit than the 
resistance offered to it.458 
--Errico Malatesta 
 
Compared with the amount of texts and space afforded to the political theorists working 
within the paradigms of government and state sovereignty, the history of works focusing 
on the counter-history of government as manifest through resistance have been quite 
scarce.  Nevertheless, as outlined in the previous section, there have been a few notable 
readings of the history of the political in which the basic theses of Hobbes can be 
reversed in order to demonstrate a counter-history of the political as told through the 
perspective of anarchy and the paradigm of civil war.  While Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the “war machine” is invoked to account for (via Clastres) the presence of 
“counter-State societies,” or the historical movements “directed against the State-form, 
actual or virtual,”459 Tiqqun reverses the basic premises of Hobbes in order to 
demonstrate how the history of the political is itself the history of “civil war” attested to 
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by a permanent agonistic struggle with the modern state.  It is my assertion, however, that 
what is ultimately at stake in these alternative readings, is that this counter-history of the 
political turns upon a certain continuity between an elaboration of the political from the 
perspective of anarchy and a corresponding politics that assumes the praxis of resistance 
in its most paradigmatic form, not only in terms of the principle from which to read the 
political, but as a historical paradigm of struggle, a form of politics as resistance.  We 
have already seen how anarchism ultimately turns upon a different historical conception 
of struggle opposed to the Marxist notion of “class struggle,” and further that this notion 
is supported as an alternative manner from which to read the history of the political as the 
history of resistance manifest in the paradigm of civil war.  It is now important to look at 
a more in depth exploration of the relationship anarchism poses between the history of 
the political and a critical conceptualization of a form of politics as resistance.  To do so, 
it is necessary to turn to a reading of several of Kropotkin’s works in which he traces the 
history of the political as expressed through an permanent agonistic struggle between the 
principle of government and the counter-historical movements of resistance.  Through 
Kropotkin, anarchism is defined as the paradigmatic expression of these forms of 
resistance.  Yet, as I will ultimately suggest, Kropotkin’s reading of history as the 
historical struggle between the exercise of government and the counter-historical 
movements of resistance coincides with a theory of civil war and is animated by it.      
Aside from being one of Russia’s leading revolutionaries during the late 19th 
century, as both philosopher and geographer Kropotkin is one of the more 
philosophically systematic and profound thinkers involved in the early development of 
anarchist political theory.  Indeed, as the historian Peter Marshall claims, Kropotkin gave 
anarchism “a philosophical respectability at a time when it was increasingly being 
associated in the popular press with mindless terrorism.”460  It is in this way that George 
Woodcock maintains that Kropotkin was one of the “great figures of the anarchist 
tradition, the equal of Godwin, Proudhon, and Bakunin.”461  It is often noted that 
Kropotkin is perhaps best known for his work Mutual Aid, in which he attempts to 
provide a scientific ground for anarchist philosophy by arguing that the political theory of 
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anarchism finds its ultimate expression and is further developed through an analysis of 
the existing tendencies in both nature and society. 462   Like Godwin and Proudhon before 
him, Kropotkin bases the development of anarchism in Mutual Aid upon a particular view 
of nature and an analysis of certain existing tendencies within human societies.  For 
Kropotkin, then: 
Anarchism represents more than a mere mode of action and a mere conception of 
a free society; that it is part of a philosophy, natural and social, which must be 
developed in a quite different way from the metaphysical or dialectical methods 
which have been employed in the sciences dealing with men.463 
Here we can see how Kropotkin sought to prove that anarchist theory finds its 
confirmation in an analysis of the existing tendencies within both nature and society.  
While Kropotkin’s view that anarchism is firmly based in a naïve view of human nature 
is often critiqued for grounding anarchism within an essentialist framework,464 Marshall 
points to how what Kropotkin refers to in terms of the natural basis that underpins 
anarchist thought, more correctly “demonstrate[s] that anarchism represents existing 
tendencies in society.”465  In other words, what gives anarchism its basis for Kropotkin is 
not a reliance on a benign understanding of human nature, but rather an analysis of 
certain tendencies within history that represent a struggle toward achieving a condition of 
anarchy.  It is therefore my argument that what is generally posited as a form of 
essentialism inherent to Kropotkin’s thought is not to be found in a benign humanism, but 
is historically expressed in movements of resistance.  More specifically by providing an 
alternative grid from which to understand the history of the political as the ongoing 
struggle between the state and the counter-historical movements of resistance, it is my 
contention that Kropotkin’s value as a philosopher arises through the way in which he 
attempts to rethink anarchism in a way that coincides with an interpretation of history as 
a movement animated by the politics of resistance. 
Like many anarchist theorists, Kropotkin formulates a general critique of the state 
and the exercise of government as the critical axiom from which to locate the basic tenets 
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of anarchist political theory.  In analyzing the origin and basis of the state Kropotkin 
stresses that the governmental principle has remained the dominant starting point for 
critical conceptualization of the political in the history of political theory.  In several 
works, particularly The State: Its Historic Role and Modern Science and Anarchism, 
Kropotkin provides a significant analysis of the origins of the state as a historically 
specific, albeit contingent, form of political organization which evolves to ensure the 
monopolization of the political within the framework of government.  Nonetheless, 
despite the ways in which the critique of the state is often taken for theorists and 
historians as the very basis from which anarchist political theory stems, and hence the 
basis from which an anarchist conception of society might arise, Kropotkin argues to the 
contrary that the critique of state composes only one part of the principal tenets of 
anarchist theory.  As Kropotkin writes in Modern Science and Anarchism: 
When we look into the origin of the anarchist conception of society, we see that it 
has a double origin: the criticism, on the one side, of the hierarchical 
organizations and the authoritarian conceptions of society; and on the other side, 
the analysis of the tendencies that are seen in the progressive movements of 
mankind, both in the past, and still more so at the present time.466  
Despite the way in which anarchism is often reduced to a radical critique of the state, 
what is significant about Kropotkin’s conceptualization regarding the “origins” of 
anarchism, is that the critique of the state is paired with the “analysis of the tendencies” 
in society—tendencies which, for Kropotkin, develop as movements of historical 
resistance to the principle of governance.  As he writes elsewhere, the anarchist 
“conception” of society is fundamentally different than the statist framework because it is 
not “constructed on the a priori method;” instead anarchism is derived “from an analysis 
of tendencies that are at work already…reinforcing the no-government tendency” 
(original emphasis).467  Indeed, while anarchist historians and theorists tend to emphasize 
Mutual Aid as Kropotkin’s contribution to anarchism insofar as it attempts to provide a 
scientific basis supporting his theory of anarchism, it is my contention that the 
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importance of Kropotkin resides more specifically in the way that he rethinks the political 
on condition of a theory of resistance, a permanent and ongoing struggle in which the 
tendency toward non-governance is historically manifest as a form of politics as 
resistance against the techniques of government and the logic of the state. 468    
In The State: Its Historic Role, the “double origin” Kropotkin locates at the 
beginnings of anarchist thought is further elaborated as an alternative theory of the 
political corresponding with a historical theory of resistance that animates an agonistic 
conception of the political.  According to Kropotkin, a radical critique of the state “not 
only includes the existence of a power situated above society, but also…a whole 
mechanism of legislation and policing [which] has to be developed in order to subject 
some classes to the domination of others.”469  Here, on the side of critique, Kropotkin 
directly locates the state within the paradigm of government: the concept of the state is 
invoked in order to describe the existence of a sovereign power and mechanisms of 
“legislation and policing,” which assumes the form of a government, and hence the 
“domination of others,” as its principal domain.  Regardless of the importance and 
attention he often attaches to the state, Kropotkin’s focus, as he often reiterates 
throughout several of his works, is not so much to develop a critique of the state—radical 
critiques of the state for Kropotkin have existed since its inception.  Rather than taking 
the state and the paradigm of government as the ultimate horizon for the domain of the 
political, this is why in The State: Its Historical Role Kropotkin first defines the state not 
only to trace the way in which the political assumes the form of a state, but in order to 
demonstrate that the history of the state—indeed its historic role—reveals a political 
monopoly that is constantly threatened by another historical tendency toward non-
governance.  As we will see, by tracing the origins of the state, Kropotkin uncovers 
something fundamental regarding the logic of the development and manifestation of 
sovereign power, which dislocates the state’s claim to a monopolization on the political.  
                                                          
468 For examples of these common readings of Kropotkin, see: George Woodcock, Anarchism and 
Anarchists (Canada: Quarry Press, 1992), 191; Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of 
Anarchism (California: PM Press, 2010), 309.   
469 Peter Kropotkin. “The State: Its Historic Role.” In Direct Struggle Against Capital: A Peter Kropotkin 
Anthology, ed. Lain McKay (Oakland: AK Press, 2014), 254. 
161 
 
In addition to tracing the way in which the domain of the political is shaped by the 
paradigm of government, which in the 16th century assumed the form of the modern state, 
Kropotkin maintains that the historic role of the state as such: 
developed in the history of human societies to prevent the direct association of 
men to shackle the development of local and individual initiative, to crush 
existing liberties, to prevent their new blossoming—all this in order to subject the 
masses to the will of minorities.470   
Like Hobbes, Kropotkin presupposes a radical outside to the state, not a state of nature, 
but as alternative political possibilities that are crushed by the appearance of the state.  As 
Kropotkin maintains, the state is therefore an entity which “in its very essence” appears 
as the “greatest hindrance to the birth of a society based upon equality and liberty, as well 
as the historic means designed to prevent this blossoming.”471  The historical 
development of the state is born, according to Kropotkin, in order to eradicate the 
existence of alternative forms of political associations and to further prevent new forms 
from arising; in short, the state, is according to Kropotkin, “an obstacle to the social 
revolution.”472  Precisely because the state develops in such a manner that crushes 
alternative forms of political and social association which, as Kropotkin claims, are 
always “existing,” as well as to prevent the possibility of future non-state forms of 
association, what is at stake is to demonstrate the logic of how the state obtained and 
retained its monopolization of the political in the Schmittian sense.  Yet, this 
monopolization of the political, which Kropotkin claims is the very role of the state, 
reveals the history of the political is the history of the of the state’s ongoing struggle with 
its own outside; the appearance of the state simultaneously reveals the appearance of non-
state political realities and possibilities.  In other words, Kropotkin traces not just the 
primacy of government through its historical incarnation in the modern state, but also that 
this history is paired and arises with its own counter-history—a counter-history which, as 
we will see, becomes manifest in history through resistance.  Rather than beginning with 
what Kropotkin refers to as “an almost childish argument,” or the implicit assumption 
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that the “state exists and represents a powerful ready-made organization,”473 the history 
of the political is better understood according to Kropotkin in terms of the expression that 
“throughout the history of our civilization, two traditions, two opposing tendencies have 
confronted each other…the authoritarian and the libertarian.”474  To be sure, by 
conceiving of the domain of the political as a permanent struggle between the principle of 
government and the principle of anarchy, Kropotkin radically inscribes the concept of 
resistance into the very basis of his understanding of the history of politics.    
Although the state and the paradigm of government have remained the dominant 
philosophical model for social and political organization this history, according to 
Kropotkin, is simultaneously the history of another tendency that arises in opposition to 
the “dominating, governing tendency that found its expression in the Church, the State, 
and Authoritarian Socialism.”475  In this regard, Kropotkin claims that within the “history 
of human society there has always been found in it two currents of thought and action—
two different tendencies.”476  It is by paying close attention to these two differing 
tendencies that we can begin to distinguish a new critical framework from which to 
rethink the political at the horizon of the state.  For Kropotkin, then, the history of 
political is at once the expression of an “authoritarian tendency, represented by [those] 
who maintained that society must be organized by a central authority, and that this 
authority must make laws and be obeyed,” and “in opposition to this authoritarian current 
[a] popular current, which worked at organizing society…on a basis of equality, without 
authority,” which as Kropotkin claims “is represented now by the Anarchists.”477  
Kropotkin thus locates a new way from which to read the history of the political through 
the vital, agonistic struggle between these two principles.  If the history of the political is, 
according to Kropotkin the struggle between these two currents, then Kropotkin radically 
denies the state’s claim to primacy, and gives us a new grid from which to reread the 
history of the political as a history of struggle and civil war.   
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Although Kropotkin’s pamphlet Modern Science and Anarchism can be credited, 
like his text Mutual Aid, with a critical attempt to give anarchist philosophy a scientific 
foundation, much of the pamphlet instead traces the history of the political through an 
analysis of the tendency toward governance and the tendency toward non-governance; as 
such the text is better read as a fundamental statement on the history of the political.  In 
this text, Kropotkin argues that the political cannot be reduced to the politics of the state 
because “side by side with this authoritarian current, another current asserted 
itself…[and] rose against the principle of governance, against the supporters of the 
state.”478  Rather than taking government as an implicit starting point for a critical theory 
of politics, the domain of the political is, according to Kropotkin, better expressed in 
terms of an ongoing and permanent dimension of agonism between the “principle of 
governance” and the “anarchist principle,” which arises historically against and outside of 
the state.  For Kropotkin, then, the history of the political is neither identical with the 
exercise of the power of the state, nor analogous to the terms of economic class struggle; 
instead, rather “it is the struggle between two great principles that, from time 
immemorial, have been at war with one another within society.”479  Albeit in a much 
different manner Kropotkin, like Hobbes before him, locates the concept of war as the 
very grid that makes the political appear as such.  By positing that the history of the 
political as an ongoing struggle between the history of governmentality and the anarchist 
tendency toward non-governance, Kropotkin’s goal is not to reduce the history of politics 
to a weak dialectic between the principle of governance and anarchy; instead, rather, 
what is at stake for Kropotkin is to demonstrate that the historical manifestation of 
government, which has traditionally been privileged as the dominant model for human 
social relations, is simultaneously parallel with its own heterogeneous counter-history of 
resistance.  To be sure, Kropotkin’s value as a political theorist arises from his endeavor 
to demonstrate that paired with history of the state, regardless of its dominance, is 
simultaneously the history of a dynamic expression of an alternative tendency in 
opposition to the paradigm of government.        
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Taking these two tendencies as the critical axiom on which to read the history of 
politics, Kropotkin expands upon the logic of Marx and Engel’s thesis that human history 
develops in terms of class struggle, and asserts the history of politics is better expressed 
in terms of a permanent struggle between the principle of government manifest in the 
state and the movements of resistance against this very principle.  Kropotkin’s counter-
thesis posed against the traditional understanding of class struggle reads as follows: 
“From the earliest times these two currents were found struggling against each other.  
They continue to do so, and the history of mankind is the history of their struggles.”480  
Here Kropotkin not only offers an alternative critical framework from which to read the 
history of politics, he locates a fundamental theory of agonism at the heart of the history 
of the political.  Unlike Schmitt, however, who locates the substance of the political in 
the antagonism between friend and enemy, or the Marxist antagonism between classes, in 
Kropotkin’s thought the substance of the political is located in fundamental and 
permanent antagonism between the principle of governance and the anarchist principle; it 
is this agonistic struggle between the principle of government and the expression of 
resistance that makes the political visible as such according to Kropotkin. 
The distinction Kropotkin proposes between anarchist and governmental 
conceptions of the political—between the state and non-state—is therefore vital not only 
to the anarchist critique of the archipolitical, but also to understanding the way in which a 
new philosophy of politics arise from the interpretation of the permanent conflict between 
these two conceptions of the political.   If the politics of the state are made manifest 
through the elaboration of government, “anarchism” Kropotkin writes “owes its origins” 
To the constructive, creative energy activity of the people, by which all 
institutions of communal life were developed in the past, and to a protest—a 
revolt against the external force which had thrust itself upon these institutions.481  
By understanding history as the continual struggle between anarchy and government, 
Kropotkin argues that anarchism can be seen as developing alongside (albeit in conflict 
with) the history of archipolitical.  Two ideas are of immediate importance here.  First, 
anarchism is according to Kropotkin always in existence in the very histories of 
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individual and popular movements of resistance.  Precisely because anarchism 
historically originates in movements of resistance, Kropotkin’s point is to demonstrate 
how an anarchist theory of politics does not arise by means of an essentialist universal 
worldview, nor that it is tied to a few major thinkers or texts, but that the complexities of 
anarchist theory are born in many different currents, thoughts, and strategies which 
assume the form of resistance to the principle of governance.  Similar to the way in which 
anarchist historian Rudolph Rocker observes how “anarchism…is a definite trend in the 
history of mankind…in contrast [to] governmental institutions,”  Kropotkin argues that 
anarchism a recognizable tendency in history, a tendency that historically develops in 
opposition to the principle of governance. 482  In this way, anarchism is born and 
continuously renewed throughout history in the “creative, constructive force of the 
masses…in opposition to those who put their hope in governing minorities.”483  
According to Kropotkin, then, the history of anarchism is therefore attested to by the 
history of the “revolts of both individuals and the nations against the representatives of 
force.”484  It is these movements of revolt that Kropotkin claims “were imbued with the 
anarchist spirit,”485 and several of Kropotkin’s works are set to trace the appearance of 
the anarchist tendency throughout history.   
Taking Kropotkin’s lead, we can point toward the ways in which the existence of 
the historical movements from which anarchism originates are marked by a fundamental 
revolt with the principle of governance, and not an a priori essence of human nature in 
the sense critiqued by the postanarchists; anarchism owes its historical origins to the 
manifestation of a form of politics as resistance.  What is particularly distinctive 
regarding the turn toward anarchism is therefore not only the formation of politics 
beyond the framework of the state, but a form of politics that is centered on, and arises 
out of, the manifestation of resistance to the archipolitical.  Like the way in which 
Rancière once described the necessity of a critical transition from archipolitics to 
metapolitics, we can now begin to point to the transition from a metapolitics to an 
anarchist politics of resistance.  Kropotkin’s conceptualization of the history of politics as 
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the ongoing struggle between two differing currents provides us with a preliminary 
framework for a new theory regarding the domain of the political, which transcends what 
I previously outlined in terms of the primacy of government.  It is precisely by 
understanding the conflict between the principle of governance and the figure of anarchy 
which resists and revolts against the archipolitical that anarchists claim calls for a 
redefinition of politics as that which exposes itself as an ongoing war between the state 
and the non-state.  At the same time, however, insofar as the political cannot be reduced 
to the paradigm of government, what is equally important for Kropotkin is how the 
historical substance which composes and makes possible the anarchist tendency that lies  
“in opposition to the governing hierarchic conception and tendency.”486  If the 
authoritarian current is manifest in terms of the historical appearance of the state and the 
paradigm of government, what then composes the anarchist tendency is animated and 
made possible, as Kropotkin importantly argues, “by the means of which the masses 
resisted the encroachments of the conquerors and the power-seeking minorities” (my 
emphasis).487   
Resistance for Kropotkin is the substance inherent to the historical tendency 
toward the principle of non-governance, and is therefore one of the central components of 
anarchist theory attempts to elaborate at its very basis.  Thus when Kropotkin claims that 
anarchism begins with an analysis of tendencies in opposition to that state, he writes that 
these tendencies are born in the tendencies that “enabled” the popular movements “to 
resist the encroachments upon their life [from those] who conquered them” (my 
emphasis).488  Furthermore in tracing the further history of revolt against the principle of 
governance, Kropotkin maintains that the historical tendencies toward non-governance 
“were all the outcome of the same resistance to the growing power of the few” (my 
emphasis).489  In other words, if the authoritarian tendency is made manifest by the 
historical appearance of the state and the paradigm of government, the opposing tendency 
finds its ultimate expression in movements of resistance against the primacy of 
government.  Kropotkin’s analysis not only centralizes the concept of resistance as a key 
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component of the political, but in doing so also maintains that the analysis of resistance 
gives us a new way to rethink the very basis of political philosophy.  It is with the 
distinction between the political as archē and the political as a paradigm of resistance that 
anarchist theory proposes an entirely different terrain from which to rethink the history of 
the political.    
The way in which Kropotkin centralizes the concept of resistance as the basis for 
an anarchist philosophy of the political is not isolated to his own works.  In a fascinating 
passage from The Individual, Society, and the State, Benjamin Tucker amplifies 
Kropotkin’s logic to suggest that the defining feature of the political lies in formulating a 
key distinction between the principle of governance and anarchy, whereby the possibility 
of developing a new philosophy of politics hinges upon the question of resistance.  What 
is of key importance, however, is that by articulating a clear distinction between two 
conflicting political spheres Tucker begins to redefine both anarchism and the question of 
politics in terms of a critical theory of resistance.  For Tucker, the political sphere of 
governance is characterised through a dual essence of aggression and invasion; 
“[a]ggression, invasion, government,” Tucker claims, are “inter-convertible terms.”490  
Thus for Tucker,  
the essence of government is control, or the attempt to control.  He who attempts 
to control another is a governor, and aggressor, and invader…On the other hand, 
he who resists another’s attempt to control is not an aggressor, an invader, a 
governor, but simply a defender, a protector, and the nature of such resistance is 
not changed whether…one declines to obey an oppressive law, or by one man by 
all men, as when a subject people rises against a despot…The distinction between 
invasion and resistance, between government and defense is vital.  Without it 
there can be no valid philosophy of politics.491 
Like Kropotkin, Tucker understands the history of the political in terms of an ongoing 
and irreducible struggle between the principle of government and the historical paradigm 
of resistance.  Yet, Tucker’s work makes another important contribution that is in every 
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way essential to rethinking an anarchist theory of the political.  As found in the passage 
above, Tucker posits a vital distinction between “government” and “resistance” as itself 
the condition of possibility for a critical philosophy of politics as such.  Given, as we 
have seen, that the political cannot be reduced to the history of the archipolitical, the 
“vital” distinction Tucker posits between the principle of “government” and the paradigm 
of “resistance” is itself what makes possible an anarchist hypothesis of the political.  
Anarchism, according to Tucker, can thus be distinguished philosophically from other 
political theories, not simply as the rejection of the orthodox claims made for the 
legitimacy of state power, but as a historical theory of resistance to the principle of 
government.  Crucially, however, by redefining politics from the point of view of 
resistance to the archipolitical, Tucker additionally defines anarchism in relation to the 
fundamental political paradigm of resistance. 
It is precisely because Kropotkin and Tucker take up the analysis of movements 
of resistance that reinforce the tendency toward non-governance as the critical turning 
point from which to develop the primary philosophical basis of anarchist political theory, 
that he can be seen as gesturing toward a fundamentally different theory of the political—
indeed, an anarchist hypothesis of the political from which the concept of resistance is its 
locus.  In outlining the historical origins of the state, what is at stake for anarchists is the 
analysis of the tendencies in history which become manifest in movements of resistance 
against the state and the exercise of government.  In this way, resistance, for anarchists, 
acts as the critical axiom from which to reread the history of the political; resistance is 
inscribed into the history of the political, and its permanence is attested to by the ongoing 
struggle between two dominant tendencies that compose the antagonistic substance of the 
political—the authoritarian principle which assumes the form of government as its 
domain and culminates in the modern sovereign state, and the anti-authoritarian 
anarchist principle toward non-governance.  In other words, resistance is the critical 
framework, or principle of intelligibility which reveals the domain of the political as a 
topology of agonistic struggle.  It is precisely because anarchist political theorists posit 
resistance to the principle of governance as both the basis from which anarchist 
philosophy begins, as well as the central component from which to reread the history of 
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politics, that the political theory of anarchism fundamentally gestures toward a new 
understanding of the political situated at the horizon of the state.    
Taking Kropotkin’s interpretation of history of politics as the critical turning point 
from which we might begin to transcend not just the Aristotelian and Schmittian 
paradigms of government and state sovereignty, but also the Marxist paradigm of class 
struggle, I have outlined preliminary anarchist approach to the political, in which the 
concept of resistance is inextricably bound and gives meaning to the possibility 
rethinking the political at the horizon of the state and the exercise of power as 
government.  Furthermore, as a central component within the history of anarchist 
thought, resistance is not only that which makes possible a form of politics situated 
outside of the state, but also that which makes possible a vital transformation in one’s life 
and conditions.  It is in this regard that Emma Goldman, like Kropotkin and Tucker, 
seeks to further develop anarchism in relation to the elaboration of a form of politics as 
resistance.  Anarchism, according to Goldman, should not be understood as an ideal view 
of a future stateless and classless society to come, but as the development of movements 
of resistance manifest at the horizon of the state.  “Anarchism,” Goldman therefore 
writes, 
is not a theory of the future to be realized through divine inspiration.  It is a living 
force in the affairs of our life, constantly creating new conditions…Anarchism 
therefore stands for direct action, the open defiance of, and resistance to, all laws 
and restrictions, economic, social, and moral.  But defiance and resistance are 
illegal.  Therein lies the salvation of man.492  
Here, Goldman importantly defines anarchism in relation to the critical question of 
resistance.  For Goldman, then, rather than defining and outlining the principles for the 
possibility of an anarchist society to come, anarchism is instead first and foremost a 
theory of resistance wherein the praxis revolt is the condition of possibility for a 
transformation in life.  As a theory of living resistance, anarchism is what opens the space 
of politics beyond and against the history of governmentality.  Indeed, a core problem 
central to the terrain of the postanarchist and metapolitical turns is thinking through a 
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redefinition of the political from the point of view of resistance rather than from the 
perspective of political power.  Yet, in Goldman’s definition we also find that resistance 
opens a real political possibility; resistance is not only the central component from which 
to rethink politics outside of the paradigm of government, but also that which makes 
possible the creation of “new conditions”—that is resistance is the form of politics that 
renders transformation possible.  This is why in a separate work, Goldman elevates and 
centralizes the concept of resistance as the ultimate horizon of anarchist politics: 
“resistance to tyranny” according to Goldman “is man’s highest ideal.”493  Following 
Goldman in this way, we can conclude that resistance to the exercise of government not 
only forms the basis of an anarchist politics, but also an anarchist hypothesis of the 
political animated by the history of resistance as such. 
1.6 Conclusion: Towards an Anarchist Hypothesis of the 
Political 
 
Although the paradigm of government has retained a certain privileged sense of primacy 
within the history of political theory, the goal of this chapter has been to reintroduce 
anarchist political theory in terms of that which posits and turns upon a unique hypothesis 
of the political from the perspective of resistance.  If political theory is to escape the 
paradigm of archē, which has hitherto remained the dominant critical framework and 
condition of possibility for political theory as such, what was ultimately at stake was to 
outline the ways in which anarchist political theory requires, and even demands, an 
alternative hypothesis, or critical framework for a theory of the political that transcends 
the dominance of the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms of the political.  Unlike the 
political theories of Aristotle and Schmitt, where politics is both derived and determined 
by the first principle and logic of the archē, it is my contention that a critical 
conceptualization of anarchy designates an opposing theory of the political in which 
politics disorders the order, logic, and sovereign authority of the archē; anarchy 
designates a radical disordering or rupture with the logic of the archē.  In this regard, I 
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maintained that with a critical conception of anarchy—as the principle that makes 
possible the disturbance of the logic of the archē, as well as the historical principle of 
intelligibility of the political as such—anarchist political theory posits a more consistent 
way of rethinking the domain of the political and the question of politics as proposed in 
the postanarchist and meta-political traditions.  Furthermore, with reference to Tiqqun, 
Kropotkin, and others I demonstrated through an unorthodox reading of the concept of 
anarchy in Hobbes that history of the state is simultaneously parallel with the history of 
anarchy—the counter-historical tendency toward non-governance as manifest in the 
politics of civil war.  Here we have seen how the permanence of civil war amongst the 
domain to which the political refers and consists means that the history of the political 
can be interpreted as an agonistic dimension of struggle in which resistance comes to 
mark the constituent component of the political as such.  We can now add that both 
critical conceptions of anarchy ultimately turn upon a unique theory of resistance that 
motivates and animates an anarchist conception of the political as such.  Following 
Tucker, we have seen how an anarchist theory of the political turns upon a vital 
distinction between the exercise of government and the counter-historical movements of 
resistance, and in Kropotkin how this distinction means that the term politics designates 
an irreconcilable struggle, or permanent war between the techniques of government 
exercised within a state and the counter-historical movements of resistance.  In other 
words, if the goal of radical political thought is to affirm politics against the history of the 
archipolitical, the question of resistance as invoked and utilized within anarchism can be 
seen, I maintain, as an effective way of engaging with this problem—that is, a 
retheorization of a form of politics situated at a distance from the state, hinges upon the 
question of resistance as uniquely posed within the anarchist tradition.      
With the critical question of resistance designating the horizon from which to 
rethink the political in radically new ways, this chapter was set to characterize the turn 
toward anarchism in political theory in order to create the critical framework from which 
to orient and situate Foucault’s work within the history of anarchist thought in a way that 
still needs to be explored today.  While Foucault is often credited for developing an 
analytic of power, it is this very persistence of power that not only pushes Foucault 
toward rethinking the conditions, origins and principles of legitimacy of political power, 
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but also a theory of resistance that informs his analytics of power and the political as 
such.  As we will see, through the technical vocabulary of a critical conceptualization of 
resistance, Foucault’s project works toward reversing the general tenets of political 
theory in a distinct manner that is consistent with the history of anarchist political theory 
as outlined throughout this chapter.  Posing the problem of resistance against the history 
of governmentality not only seeks to expose, for Foucault, the ontological and political 
principles that continue to sustain Western political practices but, more importantly, 
attempts to open a space for political praxis in which the very notion of resistance 
becomes central as an operative force of politics.  Although the concept of resistance 
enters Foucault’s critical lexicon later than the concept of power, it nonetheless forms the 
framework from which he begins to think through the general problematics of power, the 
political, and the exercise of governmentality.  Rather than crediting Foucault with 
developing a philosophical concept of power, what is crucial about Foucault’s work is 
that he introduces the concept of resistance into the field of politics and political 
philosophy in radically new ways consistent with the turn toward anarchism.   
As I will demonstrate in the following chapter, it is with Foucault that we can 
begin to more thoroughly engage with the task of rethinking an anarchist hypothesis of 
the political on condition of resistance in a more consistent manner.  What is at stake in 
such a line of thought is not simply the affirmation of an anarchist politics beyond the 
state and the exercise of government, but the affirmation of a theory of resistance central 
to formulating an alternative hypothesis of the political situated at the horizon of the state 
and the exercise of government.  While Foucault explicitly situates his work in relation to 
the complexities of governmentality as the site for political and philosophical problems, 
what is crucial in Foucault’s work is how he simultaneously reveals and posits an 
alternative theory of politics in which the permanence of resistance is what designates the 
specificity of the political.  In reconceptualising the political as a space marked by the 
permanent presence of resistance, Foucault reveals that resistance exceeds the operability 
of power, thus opening it up to a horizon beyond itself.  As I hope to articulate, this 
conception of resistance provides a framework that allows me to further explore the 
terrain between Foucault, the politics of resistance, and anarchism in the chapters that 
follow.  Taking Foucault’s philosophy as exemplary of the attempt to affirm a theory of 
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the political which takes resistance as its constituent component, I argue in the following 
chapter that this alternative view of politics and the political as elaborated by Foucault 
through the unique concept of what he refers to as “critique,” corresponds with a different 
conceptualization of both the terms of the political and of transformative resistance, 
which, in turn, redefines the spacing of the political as the spacing where power coincides 
with the fundamental truth of its own resistance, a form of resistance outlined by 
Foucault as an “art of not being governed.”494    
  
                                                          
494 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 45. 
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Chapter 3 
3 An Anarchist Hypothesis of the Political: Foucault, Critique 
and the Art of Not Being Governed 
 
If it is true that the set of relations of force in a given society constitutes the domain of the 
political… To say that ‘everything is political’ is to affirm this ubiquity of relations of 
force and their immanence in a political field; but this is to give oneself a task, which as 
yet has scarcely even been outlined, of disentangling this indefinite knot…Political 
Analysis and criticism have in large measure still to be invented—so too have the 
strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them 
in such a way that such a modification is possible and can be inscribed into reality.  That 
is to say, the problem is not so much that of defining a political ‘position’ (which is to 
choose from a pre-existing set of possibilities) but to imagine and bring into being new 
schemas of politicization.  If ‘politicization’ means falling back on ready-made choices 
and institutions, then the effort of analysis involved in uncovering the relations of force 
and mechanisms of power is not worthwhile.  To the vast new techniques of power 
correlated with multinational economies and bureaucratic States, one must oppose a 
politicization which will take new forms.495 
--Michel Foucault 
 
The previous chapter sought to reintroduce anarchism as a distinct political theory that 
turns upon an alternative theory of the political through the concept of resistance.  
Focusing on a critical theory of anarchism, the previous chapter gestured toward taking 
the concept of anarchy as the central component from which a new theory of the political 
might begin, but also how this retheorization of the political turns upon the unique 
question of resistance.  One of the central problems, then, essential to anarchism is not 
only a theory of the political situated at the horizon of the state and the paradigm of 
government, but also a reconceptualization of a corresponding theory of politics in which 
resistance to the archipolitical designates the central component of an anarchic 
conception of the political as such.  In other words, it is my contention that in anarchism 
it is a theory of resistance, and not that of an oikonomia, that forms the principle from 
which the history of politics can be reread as an agonistic field of struggle with power 
exercised as government.  What is thus at stake in this trajectory is not simply the 
                                                          
495 Michel Foucault, “The History of Sexuality, an Interview with Lucette Fins,” in Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings: 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 
189-190. 
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affirmation of an anarchist politics outside and against the state, but the affirmation of a 
critical theory of resistance essential to rethinking the political anarchically.  Together, 
these two ideas—that is, an anarchic conception of the political and the elaboration of a 
corresponding form of politics as resistance—form the locus of what I hold to be the 
essential task for political theory consequent upon the return of anarchism.  If political 
philosophy is to escape the paradigm of government, which has hitherto remained the 
dominant critical framework and condition of possibility for political theory as such, 
what is required, and even demanded, is first an anarchist hypothesis of the political in 
which the unique question of resistance designates the principle of intelligibility from 
which to reread the history of politics.  As I will argue throughout this chapter, this is 
precisely the position Foucault continuously elaborates throughout his work.  In this 
regard, it is my contention in this chapter that such contemporary developments in 
political theory not only open unexplored possibilities for a continued retheorization of 
anarchism, but also the critical framework from which to rethink and orient Foucault’s 
often contested theory of resistance within this tradition.    
Throughout his collected works, Foucault consistently argues that it is 
inefficacious and unproductive to reduce a study of the political and the coinciding 
question of politics to a theory of political power.  Consequent, or turning upon, a critical 
reevaluation of the problem of government, this is why in the first epigraph above 
Foucault claims that political theory is therefore faced with a “task” that has “scarcely 
even been outlined.”  Situated amongst what was elucidated in chapter one as the core 
crisis of political philosophy—that is, the synthesis between the domain of the political 
and the first principle of an originary archē—Foucault importantly suggests that what 
must be at stake is “disentangling this indefinite knot.”  Indeed, the critical task Foucault 
assigns to political theory in 1976, is precisely what is currently being elaborated in the 
metapolitical and anarchist turns in political theory.  Anticipating, then, several of the 
debates in political theory outlined in chapter one, Foucault importantly suggests two 
ways in which to “bring into being new schemas of politicization”—indeed two general 
problematics—which both align his thought with anarchism, while formulating a unique, 
yet unthought, critical theory of resistance that will be the focus of this chapter.     
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First, “political analysis and criticism,” Foucault argues, must be reinvented: “to 
the vast techniques of power…one must oppose a politicization that will take new 
forms.”496  This is to say that political theory, according to Foucault, must be redesigned 
in such a way that it cannot be reduced to the logic of the archē—a specific rationale of 
government traditionally considered primary with respect to the domain of the political.  
For Foucault, then, against the theories and practices which locate the political at the 
intersection between power exercised as government and state sovereignty, what must be 
at stake is the development of a new, opposing theoretical framework of the political.  
Indeed, as I will argue throughout this chapter, it is this fundamental retheorization of the 
political that underlies Foucault’s methodological approach to philosophy and the history 
of political thought, and as such creates the critical framework from which to situate the 
trajectory of his collected works within the tradition of anarchism.  Additionally, 
alongside this reinvention of political analysis, Foucault claims that what must be equally 
rethought is the question of resistance, or the “strategies which will make it possible to 
modify the relations of force,” and inscribe these transformations into reality.  It is 
exactly within this critical framework—this double move which at once invokes a 
rethinking of the political situated at the horizon of the state, as well as the question of a 
form of politics elaborated as resistance—that this chapter will demonstrate the ways in 
which Foucault intervenes in the history of political theory by radically rethinking the 
history of politics in such a way that resistance designates the constituent principle of the 
political.   
Traditionally, the history of archic political thought and practice has had the effect 
of neutralizing and minimizing the character of resistance within the history of the 
political.497  Foucault, however, begins from the opposite position; rather than taking 
                                                          
496 Ibid, 190. 
497 For an early example regarding the ways in which the notion of resistance has been traditionally 
overlooked or excluded from political theory see: book 5, chapters 1-12 of Aristotle’s Politics.  Here 
Aristotle outlines both the cause and prevention of revolutions under democracies, oligarchies, 
aristocracies and tyranny.  Indeed, in chapters 5-12 Aristotle goes to great lengths in order to 
demonstrate how each of the differing typologies of governments and states might overcome and 
prevent resistance.  Additionally, in chapter 21 of The Leviathan, Hobbes argues that resistance is what 
disrupts the unity of sovereign power and therefore must be avoided at all costs.  According to Hobbes 
“to resist the Sword of the Common-wealth…no man hath liberty…because such liberty takes away from 
the Sovereign, the means of protecting us…and is therefore destructive to the very essence of 
government” (152). 
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resistance as a minor term within the history of political theory, Foucault valorizes it as 
the key concept that reveals the specificity of power, politics, and the political as such.  
Turning to Foucault, then, I want to suggest that a rethinking of the question of anarchism 
can, in part, be accomplished through a study of how his theory of resistance reveals a 
radically new perspective from which the history of the political can be interpreted 
anarchically.  Yet, at the same time as Foucault reformulates the terms of the political on 
condition of the question of resistance, he does so not simply to argue that the political 
might be rethought in terms of a reductive dialectic that takes the form of 
government/resistance, but that a rethinking of the terms of the political requires a 
radically different framework that affords primacy to the question of resistance.  If as we 
have seen, that one of the central tasks of contemporary political theory is to reconsider 
the domain of the political in such a way that it cannot be reduced to the problematic of 
government, then what is needed vitally is an altogether different analytic framework and 
methodology for the terms of the political which not only include resistance as a key 
component but, in doing so, also reframes the political from the point of view of 
resistance.    
It is at the cusp—indeed the precise intersection—of these two problematics that I 
suggest a fundamental rereading of Foucault’s thought in order to demonstrate the ways 
in which his work increasingly gestures towards new “schemas of politicization” situated 
in the trajectory between the question of resistance and the history of anarchism.  
Utilizing the critical space afforded by the anarchist turn in contemporary political 
thought, this chapter will begin to discuss Foucault’s contributions to anarchism and the 
politics of resistance, while at the same time demonstrating the ways in which it is 
through the questions of anarchism and resistance that help facilitate a new reading of 
Foucault’s oeuvre traditionally overlooked by scholars.  More specifically, this chapter 
introduces the significance of the question of resistance to Foucault’s thought by 
outlining its intersection with the coinciding concept of what he refers to as “critique,” a 
methodological praxis underlying his studies of philosophy and politics.  In this regard, it 
is my contention in this chapter that the idea of “critique” reveals a new perspective from 
which the concept of resistance can be highlighted as the key term around which 
Foucault’s project revolves.  At the same time, however, it is this concept of “critique” 
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and its relation to the question of resistance that reveals for Foucault what I refer as an 
anarchist hypothesis of the political, in which the concept and practice of resistance 
comes to designate the agonistic dimension specific to politics.  Although the concept of 
“critique” is often invoked in several of Foucault’s texts, lectures and interviews, it is 
most clearly elaborated in three key texts.  The concept of “critique” is first developed in 
a posthumously published transcript of a lecture given at the Société de Philosophie 
Française in 1978 titled “What is Critique?”.  In this lecture, what Foucault takes as the 
basis of “critique” is shown to originate in the counter-historical practices of resistance to 
governmentality.  Second, Foucault addresses the importance of “critique” in the first 
lecture from The Government of Self and Others, and outlines how the idea accounts for 
his own methodological approach to both political theory and philosophy.498  Finally, in 
“What is Enlightenment,” first published in 1984, Foucault conceptualizes “critique” in 
terms of an ethos of resistance developed in response to the political problematics of 
authority and obedience.499  What is crucial is not simply the thematic overlap between 
these texts, but rather how each situates the notion of “critique” in relation to Foucault’s 
genealogical histories of governmentality, while further elaborating the ways in which the 
concept also designates the active component from which to rethink the history of the 
political from the perspective of resistance.  
 Several critics and scholars have offered extensive studies regarding the 
significance and use of the concept of “critique” as it is developed over the course of 
Foucault’s thought.  The significance of the concept of “critique” in Foucault’s thought 
has not gone unnoticed by his biographers, and both James Miller500 and Didier Eribon501 
have dedicated thorough discussions pertaining to the concept of “critique” as it develops 
throughout his collected works.  Highlighting the importance of this concept, Christopher 
Penfield more recently writes that “critique is the philosophical mode of reflection that 
                                                          
498 Michel Foucault, The Government of the Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983, 
trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1-40. 
499 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, trans. Catherine Porter and ed. 
Paul Rabinow. (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 32-50. 
500 James Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993), 302-305. 
501 Didier Eribon, Michel Foucault, trans. Betsy Wing (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1991), 221. 
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best characterizes Foucault’s thought.”502  Since “critique” exemplifies Foucault’s 
approach to philosophy, scholars and critical commentators have sought to engage with 
and draw connections between the notion of “critique” and several other key concepts or 
general thematics spread throughout his works.  Drawing a certain correspondence 
between “critique” and other critical concepts such as “subjectivity,”503 “practices of the 
self,”504 and “ethics,”505 scholars of Foucault have sought to demonstrate the importance 
of the concept of “critique” across the wide, diverse spectrum of his thought and work.  
Furthermore, theorists as diverse as Jon Simons,506 David Ingram,507 Todd May,508 David 
Couzens-Hoy,509 and Edward McGushin510 have invoked the concept of “critique” as way 
to reveal how Foucault’s work should be understood within the critical and philosophical 
tradition initially arising with Kant and the Enlightenment.  At stake for these writers is 
how the relation Foucault stages between “critique” and the critical tradition of Kant 
helps to locate a certain thematic link between the differing periods of his collected 
thought.  Others such as McGrusin,511 Diana Taylor,512 and Thomas Lemke513 further 
                                                          
502 Christopher Penfield, “Critique,” in The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon, eds. Leonard Lawlor and John 
Nale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 87. 
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argue that the concept of “critique” ought to be understood in relation and response to the 
rise of governmentalization and Foucault’s studies of “governmentality.”  Additionally, 
focusing on the problematic of government and the coinciding emancipatory aspects of 
Foucault’s genealogy of “critique,” theorists such as Johanna Oksala514 and Couzens-Hoy 
have sought to draw connections between the elaboration of “critique” and the 
development of a theory of emancipatory freedom in Foucault’s thought and work, 
whereby the concept of “critique” comes to mark “a crucial condition of freedom.”515  In 
this regard, while scholars have highlighted the importance of the concept of “critique” in 
Foucault, while further tracing the ways in which the notion of “critique” helps form 
connections between other critical concepts, it is my contention that the concept most 
directly helps to introduce and elaborate a specific correspondence with the theory of 
resistance underlying his respective studies of power, politics, and governmentality.   
 Taking the specific correspondence between governmentality and the concept of 
“critique” as one of the key turning points in Foucault’s thought, the fundamental relation 
established between “critique” and resistance has not gone unnoticed, and several 
theorists have additionally outlined certain connecting point between the two terms.  
Ingram, for example, writes that “critique” in Foucault “is nothing more than an 
embodied exemplification of virtuous resistance.”516  Similarly, Judith Butler argues that 
with the notion of “critique,” the question of resistance is retheorized by Foucault in 
terms of an ethical “practice of virtue.”517  In his text The Political Philosophy of Michel 
Foucault, Kelly contends that “Foucault depicts critique as a specific counter-part to the 
modern art of government,” and as such that “critique” functions as a theoretical 
continuation of the problem of resistance as developed in his thought.518  Furthermore, 
Andrew Cutrofello’s text Discipline and Critique and David Couzens-Hoy’s Critical 
Resistance are both indispensable references for working out the relation between the 
general problematic of governmentality, the rise of “critique” and the turn toward the 
study of resistance in Foucault’s thought and work.  With the concept of “critique” acting 
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as the theoretical locus from which Foucault attempts to transcend the problematic of 
governmentality, Couzens-Hoy maintains that his thought turns upon the development of 
a “social ontology of resistance” that is “made manifest through a genealogical 
critique.”519  In this regard, Couzens-Hoy further argues that with the concept of critique 
“Foucault recognizes that he has to explain the conditions for the possibility of resistance, 
and he does so by building resistance into power relations from the start.”520  In outlining 
a unique relationship between Kant, Foucault, and the problem of resistance, Cutrofello 
further suggests that it is with the notion of critique that Foucault begins to think through 
the relation between resistance and ethics, and thus maintains that Foucault’s 
retheorization of Kant’s “categorical imperative could provide Foucauldian critique with 
an ethical basis for a politics of resistance.”521  As we will see in a later chapter, 
Foucault’s engagement with the critical tradition of Kant and the coinciding problematic 
of “critique” helps to determine a specific connection between the problematic of 
resistance initially sketched in The History of Sexuality and his turn toward ethics in his 
final works.  What is particularly insightful about these accounts is that each locates the 
concept of “critique” within the context of an extended discussion of Foucault’s often 
contested theory of resistance, while also suggesting how “critique” might designate a 
unique basis that allows for the elusive character of Foucauldian resistance to be 
attenuated.   While these theorists have made significant contributions to the study of 
resistance in Foucault through its relation to the concept of “critique,” the fundamental 
relation Foucault establishes not only between critique and resistance, but also the 
question of politics has nevertheless only been scarcely outlined.  In other words, what 
requires further exploration is the precise manner by which Foucault locates the question 
of politics at the intersection between his concept of “critique” and his theory of 
resistance.  
In situating the question of politics between the notions of “critique” and 
resistance, my own approach is set to demonstrate the ways in which the elaboration of 
the concept of “critique” and its relation to the general problematic of resistance develops 
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a fundamental affinity with anarchism, and as such ought to be situated more firmly 
within an anarchist framework in order to fully appreciate its political and philosophical 
importance.  While the above theorists have highlighted a fundamental relation between 
“critique” and resistance, several of these theorists nevertheless tend to deny a possible 
relation between Foucault’s concept of critique and the history of anarchism.  In this 
regard, while I affirm an essential nexus between the concepts of “critique” and 
resistance, I argue that with the concept of “critique” Foucault locates a theory of 
resistance at the basis of his distinct understanding of politics, while simultaneously 
developing a unique affinity with anarchism.  More specifically, it is my contention in 
this chapter that the relation Foucault stages between “critique” and resistance ultimately 
reveals the basis for an anarchist hypothesis of the political in which resistance designates 
the constituent component of a form of politics irreducible to the logic of the archē.  In 
other words, what is crucial in the relation between “critique” and resistance is an 
alternative basis from which to rethink the question of politics anarchically. 
In what follows, what is at stake in staging an intersection between Foucault and 
anarchist political theory is first to demonstrate how with the concept of “critique” his 
work increasingly builds upon and develops an alternative theory of the political that 
turns upon the question of resistance.  Rather than beginning with the question of power 
or governmentality (neither of which can be neglected in Foucault’s thought), by turning 
toward the concept of “critique” I want to suggest an alternative way of thinking through 
what it might mean to “cut off the king’s head” in political theory, as Foucault was often 
apt to suggest.522  As we will see, what Foucault elaborates in terms of “critique” has 
serious implications for both philosophy and political theory; philosophically the concept 
of “critique” begins to develop in regard to a permanent struggle against the problem of 
authority, while politically the term designates a form of politics animated by movements 
of resistance to governmentality.  Although the 1978 lecture is often overlooked by 
scholars in comparison to the 1984 lecture, between the two Foucault begins to 
incorporate the concept of “critique” into his general lexicon in such a way that both 
provides a rare overview of the development of his thought in relation to the question of 
resistance, as well as a critical commentary regarding the development of a new critical 
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framework from which the terms of the political are rethought anarchically.  Indeed, with 
the notion of “critique” both philosophy and politics, as Foucault importantly suggests in 
the 1978 lecture, develop in relation to, and are linked by, what he refers to as the “art of 
not being governed,” or a fundamental “decision not to be governed.”523  Inasmuch as 
Foucault takes this “art of not being governed” as the very basis for what he refers to as 
“critique,” I argue that his genealogical study of the critical attitude forms a direct 
alliance with anarchist political theory that ought not to be overlooked in Foucauldian 
scholarship.  If the notion of “critique” in Foucault’s thought can be understood, as one 
commentator suggests, in terms of a general “lens for viewing the coherence, stakes, and 
trajectory of his work as whole,”524 it is my contention that between the concept of 
“critique” and the coinciding form of politics expressed as an “art of not being governed” 
Foucault formulates a hidden critical locus from which to redefine the terms of the 
political not from the point of view of political power, but from the complexities of the 
movements of resistance parallel, yet heterogeneous, to the historical manifestation of 
governmentality.  At the same time, as I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, the 
notion of “critique” functions in Foucault’s thought as an internal methodological 
framework that binds together the larger trajectory of his collected works in relation to 
the question of resistance.  With these two ideas in mind, this chapter argues that within 
the critical and methodological approaches to the fundamental reanalysis of power and 
genealogical approach to the history of politics and governmentality, Foucault begins to 
develop and posit an anarchist theory of the political through the concept of “critique” 
that turns upon the question of resistance instead of the paradigm of government, and as 
such allows for a critical transcendence of the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms.   
3.1 Anarchaeology: Foucault’s Critical Anarchist Methodology 
 
Let us, therefore, start with an outline of an anarchistic methodology… 
--Paul Feyerabend525 
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Before attending to an analysis of the concept of “critique,” it is first necessary to briefly 
outline a preliminary connection between anarchism and Foucault’s methodology that 
will act as the turning point from which to stage a fundamental intersection between the 
concept of “critique” and the politics of resistance.  In terms of his methodological 
approach to the study of the political, what Foucault shares with anarchism is the refusal 
to presuppose the primacy of government or sovereign power as the principle from which 
to either understand the question of power or to read the history of politics.  This is why 
Foucault famously criticizes the history of political theory insofar as it “has never had 
another system of representation, of formulation, and of analysis of power than that of the 
law, the system of law.”526  At stake here for Foucault is the idea that the state and 
sovereign power can no longer act as the theoretical framework for a critical analysis of 
power and the activity of politics.  Thus, as Foucault maintains in the January fourteenth 
lecture from Society Must Be Defended, “[w]e have to study power outside of the model 
of Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the institution of 
the state.”527  Since the mid 1970s, many of Foucault’s major texts, interviews and 
lectures are critical responses to this conceptual impasse.  In studying the question of 
politics and the analysis of power against its basis in the juridical form of state sovereign 
power, Foucault highlights an important way to detach ourselves from the traditional 
discourses that locate the question of politics within the domain of the state—that is, like 
many anarchists Foucault attempts to rethink the political at the horizon of the state and 
the paradigm of government, and as such reveals a form of politics that is genuinely 
without an archē.  
  As we will see, while Foucault begins to rethink an alternative basis for political 
theory irreducible to both government and sovereignty, what is particularly significant is 
the specific correspondence he develops between the attempt to affirm an anarchic 
politics that does not culminate in the practice of government and the historico-political 
                                                          
526 Qtd. in Arnold Davidson, introduction to Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the College De France, 
1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), xvii.   This passage is taken from a lecture 
Foucault gave in Brazil in 1976, originally published as Michel Foucault, “Les Mailles du Pouvoir,” in Dits et 
écrits, vol. 4, p. 186. 
527 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 34. 
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question of resistance.  In other words, the essential thrust of Foucault’s project is that the 
search for a politics irreducible to governmentality cannot be divorced from the critical 
question of resistance, and yet, precisely because of this, what is required by Foucault is a 
new political methodology that takes resistance as its constituent component.  Indeed, 
insofar as the “set of force relations” as Foucault suggests “constitutes the domain of the 
political” what must be fundamentally rethought is the way in which these force relations 
necessarily include resistance as a central, although historically neglected, feature of 
politics.528  This is why in his study of Foucault, Deleuze specifically traces how power 
relations are to be necessarily paired with the concept of resistance.  In Foucault, Deleuze 
therefore writes:  
There is no diagram (of power) that does not also include, besides the points 
which it connects up, certain relatively free or unbound points, points of 
creativity, change and resistance, and it is perhaps with these that we ought to 
begin in order to understand the whole picture.529 
At stake for Deleuze is how the notion of resistance at once acts as the precondition of 
relations of power in Foucault, as well as how this analytic of power begins with a theory 
of resistance as its divisive focal point.  Indeed, one of the points Foucault consistently 
emphasizes throughout his work is that his methodological approach to the study of 
politics and the political is not simply to be understood in terms of an alternative analytic 
of power, but rather as a critical theory that begins with the question of resistance as the 
primary focal point from which the questions of power and politics can be rethought.530  
In this regard, it is my contention that this reconceptualization of the political from the 
perspective of resistance reveals a unique alliance between Foucault’s thought and 
anarchist political theory.  Thus, although Foucault often took pride in remaining 
politically unclassifiable,531 and while he does often characterize his thought in relation to 
                                                          
528 Michel Foucault, “The History of Sexuality, an Interview with Lucette Fins,” 189. 
529 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault trans. Sean Hand (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 44. 
530 Throughout his work, Foucault often reiterates the importance of the question of methodology in his 
thought. Crucially, in several of these instances, Foucault emphasizes the way in which his approach to the 
study of power, politics and governmentality all turn upon the question of resistance as the key focal 
point from which such analytics of power might arise.  For example, see: The History of Sexuality, 92-102; 
“Omnes es Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” 324-325; “Questions of Method,”223-238; 
On the Government of the Living, 72-80; Society Must Be Defended, 5-39.   
531 See: David Macey, The Lives of Foucault (London: Hutchington Press, 1993), 432. 
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certain problematics located within specific philosophical and political traditions as much 
as he often seeks to disqualify and overturn others, I want to suggest that Foucault’s work 
not only develops an internal solidarity with anarchism through his theory of resistance, 
but also that anarchism marks the critical threshold from which to locate the political 
possibilities offered in his study of the politics of resistance as such. 
Although Foucault often draws upon examples from anarchist movements as 
historical support for his unique approach to the studies of power, politics and 
governmentality, it is my contention that a preliminary outline between Foucault and the 
history of anarchist thought can first be made in terms of a critical methodology that 
takes a theory of resistance as the primary focal point required for a critical inquiry into 
the questions of power and politics.  Perhaps the most unique and direct way Foucault 
formulates an affinity with anarchism in this manner arises in On the Government of the 
Living when he coins the neologism “anarchaeology” rather than “archaeology” to 
describe his general methodology and approach to the analytics of governmentality and 
politics.532  As outlined in extensive detail in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault 
uses the term “archaeology” to describe the ways in which his general research method is 
characterized by the suspension of established discourses for thinking about history and 
the presupposition that the typical conventions for thinking about history of ideas as such 
                                                          
532 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 79.  To my knowledge, Foucault only invokes uses 
the term “anarchaeology” in the January 30, 1980 lecture from On the Government of the Living.  Foucault 
draws inspiration for the term “anarchaeology” from Paul Feyerabend’s text Against Method: Outline of 
an Anarchist theory of Knowledge (London: Verso, 1988), which posits a sort of epistemological anarchism 
as the basic methodological framework for science and knowledge.  Commenting on Feyerabend’s text, 
Foucault claims there is “something interesting on the problem of anarchy and knowledge” within 
Feyerabend’s work (On the Government of the Living, 79).  While taking seriously the clarification of 
Foucault’s methodological approach, Michel Sellenart claims in the “Course Context” following the 
lectures that the term “anarchaeology” should be understood “with humor” (On the Government of the 
Living, 330).  Yet, given the serious manner in which Foucault attempts not only to defend the position of 
‘anarchy’ from its detractors, but also the lengths at which he goes to describe the alliance between his 
own methodology and anarchism, the term ought not to be taken lightly, and further helps to outline a 
unique relation between Foucault and the history of anarchist political thought in new ways that has yet 
to be full understood.  As I will argue, the position posited by the term “anarchaeology,” is redeveloped 
under the concept of “critique” in Foucault’s thought.  Additionally, Feyerabend’s text has more recently 
come to influence the anarchist turn in contemporary theory.  On the recent use of Feyerabend’s text and 
anarchist theory see: Jeff Ferrell, “Against Method, Against Authority…For Anarchy,” in Contemporary 
Anarchist Studies: An Introduction to Anarchy in the Academy, eds. Randall Amster, et al. (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 73-81. 
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should also be subject to archaeological analysis.533  For Foucault, “archaeology” shifts 
the critical objective of historical analysis away from what has been done in the histories 
of systems of thought to the set of conditions, or “discursive formations” enabling certain 
practices to emerge in history as such.534  While maintaining this critical gesture 
“anarchaeology,” in contrast, differs from the former term insofar as it is a philosophical 
attitude or way of being, distinguished from skepticism, that begins with “the non-
necessity of all power of whatever kind.”535  Similar to his archaeological method, then, 
by beginning with the “non-necessity of power,” what Foucault refers to as 
“anarchaeology” can be understood as designating a critical methodology that suspends 
the established conventions for thinking about politics and the political.  An 
anarchaeological understanding of the history of politics as such cannot therefore begin 
by presupposing a theory of power as the principle that gives the political its form.     
In coining the term “anarchaeology,” Foucault draws inspiration from Paul 
Feyerabend’s 1975 text Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge in 
which the author argues for an epistemological or “theoretical anarchism” that acts as the 
basic methodological approach to both “epistemology and the philosophy of science.”536  
While Foucault’s focus is not on the problem of knowledge and epistemology, but rather 
on the questions of power and politics we might, following the subtitle of Feyerabend’s 
text, suggest that what Foucault develops under the term “anarchaeology” can better be 
understood as forming the basic outline for an anarchist theory of politics and the 
political.  Yet, given that Foucault’s work in Discipline and Punish and The History of 
Sexuality is generally understood by scholars as turning upon the very question and 
historical analysis of “power,” his statement in 1980 regarding the “non-necessity of 
power” appears at odds with the general thematic focus of several of his works.  Yet, by 
taking “the non-necessity of power as a principle of intelligibility” of politics, Foucault 
                                                          
533 On Foucault’s use of the term archaeology and its relation to Foucault’s methodology, see: The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, 135-149. 
534 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Vintage, 2010).  As used by Foucault, the term “discursive formations” suggests a historically 
specific rationality underpinning a system of rules of a particular society in a specific historical moment 
(21-78). 
535 Michel Foucault, Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 78. 
536 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge, 9. 
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not only radically reframes the study of politics from a perspective that invokes 
anarchism as a hidden conceptual framework, but also offers a new way to read the 
problematic of resistance as the conceptual key to fully understanding what is at stake in 
a critical analytic of power and politics.537  Anticipating that his audience will claim that 
any political methodology beginning with a “non-necessity of power” necessarily invokes 
the concept of “anarchy,” or “anarchism,” Foucault quickly responds by affirming a 
possible relation between anarchism and his own methodological approach to the study of 
political theory.538  Against his potential interlocutors, Foucault maintains that: “I don’t 
see why the words ‘anarchy’ and ‘anarchism’ are so pejorative that the mere fact of 
employing them counts as triumphant discourse.”539  In other words, rather than 
immediately discounting anarchism, Foucault instead refuses to exclude a possible 
connection between the political implications of his work and anarchist theory.  With the 
term “anarchaeology,” then, Foucault importantly refuses to reduce the questions of 
“anarchy” or “anarchism” to the pejorative sense given to the terms by most theorists, 
and in doing so begins to provide a rare insight into the affinity he draws between 
anarchism and his own thought.   
After affirming a critical conception of “anarchy” (albeit hesitantly) as the basis 
of his own methodology, Foucault further elaborates what he means to suggest by 
invoking the term “anarchaeology.” 540  With the method of “anarchaeology” Foucault’s 
first point is to demonstrate that it is not of matter of putting “non-power” or the “non-
acceptability of power” at “the end of the enterprise, but rather at the beginning of the 
work, in the form of questioning all of the ways that power is in fact accepted.”541  Rather 
than presupposing the primacy of the state, sovereignty, and political power as the grid 
                                                          
537 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 78. 
538 Ibid, 78. 
539 Ibid, 78. 
540 Ibid, 78-79.  Anticipating that members of his audience might interpret and reduce his thought to a 
common misunderstanding of anarchism, Foucault is hesitant to outright affirm this connection between 
his own thought and anarchism, and writes that although there is an explicit relation, that there is also a 
“certain difference” (78).  Furthermore, while Foucault writes that the position he proposes “does not 
exclude anarchy,” but that “it does not cover the same field, and is not identified with it” (78).  While 
Foucault is hesitant to fully affirm the connection between his work and anarchist thought, the position 
he adopts through the concept of “critique” is strikingly similar to what he briefly refers to here as 
“anarchaeology.” 
541 Ibid, 78. 
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from which to read the history of politics and political theory, Foucault argues instead for 
a critical framework which begins with the “non-acceptability of power” as the “principle 
of intelligibility” of a historical knowledge of politics.542  In other words, 
“anarchaeology” designates a critical methodology from which the political can be 
rethought anarchically.  Furthermore, instead of beginning with an a priori conception of 
power, Foucault instead argues that “[p]ower has no intrinsic legitimacy” and, as such, 
that it cannot therefore function as the historical condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the political.543  Foucault’s point here is that one cannot fully understand 
the history of politics simply by assuming the primacy of power over other determining 
factors.  In other words, “anarchaeology” in this sense designates a strategic refusal to 
presuppose a theory of power in any form other than its own fundamental contingency.   
Second, Foucault maintains that “anarchaeology” does not begin with the thesis 
that “all power is bad, but instead from the point that no power whatsoever is acceptable 
by right and absolutely and definitely inevitable.”544  Here, Foucault’s claim is that a 
historical knowledge of politics cannot begin with the a priori assumption that there must 
always be something akin to an inevitable, essential and acceptable form of power from 
which a historical knowledge of politics is made possible.  In other words, it is not a 
theory of power, according to Foucault, that designates the principle of intelligibility for 
politics, but instead a position that begins from the opposite hypothesis, an opposing 
theory whereby an ongoing struggle with power signifies the principle from which to 
reread the history of political theory from the perspective of resistance.  Finally, whereas 
Foucault is often criticized for the way in which his theory of power overrides the 
possibility of resistance and denies the possibility of agency,545 “anarchaeology” begins 
with the idea that “[i]t is the movement of freeing oneself from power,” and not that of 
subjection to power, “that should serve as the revealer in the transformations of the 
                                                          
542 Ibid, 78. 
543 Ibid, 77. 
544 Ibid, 78. 
545 One of the major issues at stake in the Foucault/Habermas debate from the 1980’s is over the question 
of agency.  According to Habermas, since Foucault’s primary focus throughout several of his texts is the 
question of power, what he ultimately ends up producing is a history of the processes of subjection, 
rather than a critical conception of an agential subject.  For a collection of essays organized around the 
Foucault/Habermas debate see: Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate, ed. 
Michael Kelly (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994). 
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subject.”546  In this final instance, “anarchaeology” reveals a real political possibility for 
Foucault; rather than a theory of politics that traces subjection to the varying practices of 
power, Foucault suggests to the contrary that it is through a study of resistance, or a 
critical inquiry into the “movement of freeing oneself from power,” that we should direct 
our gaze in order to understand what is ultimately at stake in the questions of power and 
politics.  With these positions acting as the basic methodological approach to Foucault’s 
study of politics and the problem of governmentality, it is clear that Foucault directly 
draws a rare parallel between his own thought, methodology, and the political theory of 
anarchism.  Indeed, given that Foucault often refuses to affiliate his work with any 
specific political positions, the way in which he aligns his thought with anarchism he 
should not be overlooked by his readers.  As Foucault comments in On the Government 
of the Living: 
You can see therefore that there is certainly some kind of relation between what is 
roughly called anarchy or anarchism and the methods I employ…in other words 
the position I adopt does not absolutely exclude anarchy—after all, once again, 
why would anarchy be so condemnable?   Maybe it is automatically condemned 
only by those who assume that there must always, inevitably, essentially be 
something like acceptable power.  So the position I am proposing does not 
exclude anarchy.547 
Although we have seen how Foucault’s critics often invoke the concept of “anarchism” in 
the pejorative sense to point toward what they find as certain fundamental weaknesses in 
his thought, Foucault self-affirms this alliance.548  In addition to affirming anarchy as the 
basic methodological framework employed in his analytics of power and politics, he also 
points toward the way in which the concept of “anarchy” has been historically denounced 
by political theorists.  Indeed “anarchy,” as Foucault suggests above, is most commonly 
condemned by those philosophers who presuppose the inevitability and acceptability of 
power as the proper characteristic inherent to the field of the political.  Foucault, 
however, denies this presupposition and maintains that his own position cannot therefore 
                                                          
546 Ibid, 77. 
547 Ibid, 78. 
548 For example, see: Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. 
D. Couzens Hoy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 61. 
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exclude the possibility of anarchy inasmuch as it begins with the “non-necessity of 
power.”  By affirming the place of “anarchy” within his own work, Foucault significantly 
begins with a critical position that offers a preliminary to transcend the Aristotelian and 
Schmittian paradigms of the political, thus providing a preliminary basis of an anarchist 
theory of politics.  As Foucault importantly suggests, then: 
The approach [of anarchaeology] consists in wondering…what of the subject and 
relations of knowledge do we dispense with when we consider no power to be 
founded either by right or necessity, that all power only rests on the contingency 
and fragility of a history, that the social contract is a bluff…and that there is no 
universal, immediate, and obvious right that can everywhere and always support 
any kind of relation of power.549 
Here Foucault provides a preliminary outline of an alternative way to study the history of 
political theory and the coinciding problem of politics from the perspective of anarchy.  
Rather than beginning with an analysis of power as the key term from which to 
understand the political, Foucault argues that he wants to begin on the “opposite track” 
which, in taking the non-necessity of power as the starting point of his political theory, 
transcends the orthodox paradigms of political theory.550  It is this “non-necessity” of 
power that acts as the beginning point from which Foucault begins to posit what I will 
refer to throughout this chapter as an anarchist hypothesis of the political—a hypothesis 
that at once rethinks the domain of the political at the limit of the governmentalization of 
the state, and in doing so, requires a specific engagement with the question of resistance.   
Although in On the Government of the Living Foucault draws clear connections 
between his work and anarchist thought, given the way in which the term 
“anarchaeology” makes a limited appearance in his collected thought it would 
nevertheless be difficult to trace Foucault’s philosophical lineage immediately to 
anarchism simply through this term alone, without directly ignoring or bracketing the 
larger critical and philosophical tradition from within which he works.  Thus, in order to 
pinpoint and highlight what I have just outlined as a preliminary alliance between 
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Foucault and anarchist thought based upon his own methodological approach to the 
questions of power and politics, I argue that this critical framework invoked in 1980 as 
the method of “anarchaeology” is further developed and finds its articulation between the 
lectures “What is Critique?” and “What is Enlightenment?” wherein Foucault attributes 
the possibility of a new theory of the political beginning with the non-necessity of power 
to a reactivation of the concept of “critique.”  Indeed, as we will see the concept of 
“critique” bears strikingly similar qualities to the notion of “anarchaeology” and, as such, 
marks an important way from which to locate Foucault’s thought within the anarchist 
tradition.  In outlining what I find to be a key component of Foucault’s thought, what is 
crucial in regard to these two lectures is the way in which Foucault provides a rare self-
reflexive analysis of the critical arc of his collected works in relation to the problematic 
of resistance, while at the same time situating his thought amongst a central political and 
philosophical tradition that invokes a rethinking of anarchism as the basis from which a 
new theory of the political might arise.   As we will see, what Foucault elaborates under 
the notion of “critique” is best exemplified in a position that begins at the intersection 
between the “non-acceptability of power” and the counter-historical movements of 
resistance parallel to the history of governmentality.      
What is at stake, therefore, in formulating a critical link between an anarchist 
hypothesis of the political and Foucault’s lectures “What is Critique?” and “What is 
Enlightenment?” is neither to ascribe a political identity to Foucault, nor to classify what 
is often intentionally unclassifiable.  Instead, rather, what is at stake arises in the way in 
which what Foucault outlines in these lectures as “critique,” invokes, contributes to, and 
even forms an alliance with the history of anarchist theory, while at the same time 
helping to introduce and centralize the concept of resistance to the whole of his thought.  
Against, then, certain critics such as Senellart551 who deny any real connection between 
Foucault’s methodology and anarchism, it is my contention that such a connection is 
indeed elaborated between the two lectures “What is Critique?” and “What is 
Enlightenment?”  Taking note of the importance of both these texts, I argue that the 
framework Foucault adapts from the critical tradition of Kant and the Enlightenment 
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begins to posit an anarchist hypothesis of the political that can account for the question of 
resistance amongst its dynamic.  Focusing, then, on the ways in which the notion of 
“critique”—like the concept of “anarchaeology”—is vital to the ways in which Foucault 
hopes to rethink the history of the political from a radically new perspective, the overall 
goal in what follows is twofold: to first reveal the ways in which Foucault’s thought 
formulates a radically new methodological approach to the study of the political that 
elevates the notion of resistance as the vital component of the being-political of politics, 
while at the same time demonstrating how resistance functions, for Foucault, as the 
critical axis upon which his collected works turn.  In this regard, rather than 
superimposing a pre-existing school of thought or grafting a philosophy of anarchism 
upon Foucault’s work, it is instead better to attend to the way in which he directly locates 
his general trajectory within a specific critical tradition, and then to show how this critical 
tradition of resistance forms the basis from which an anarchist hypothesis of the political 
can be elaborated.       
3.2 Essays in Refusal: Critique and the Struggle Against 
Authority 
 
Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is what 
needs to be done.”  It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and 
refuse what is.  Its use should be in the processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in 
refusal.  It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law.  It isn’t a stage in programming.  
It is a challenge to what is.552 
 
After all, we are all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to 
show mutual solidarity…The suffering of men must never be a silent residue of 
policy…The will of individuals must make a place for itself in a reality of which 
governments have attempted to reserve a monopoly for themselves, that monopoly which 
we need to wrest from them little by little and day by day.553   
--Michel Foucault 
 
                                                          
552 Michel Foucault, “Question of Method,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. James D. 
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1997), 236. 
553 Michel Foucault, “Confronting Governments: Human Rights,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault 
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194 
 
In the opening epigraph above, Foucault offers a preliminary definition of the concept of 
“critique” and highlights its divisive characteristics.  Being critical, according to 
Foucault, is not a prescriptive form of philosophical thinking, but instead an instrument 
of resistance, a strategic confrontation with and “challenge to what is;” being critical as 
such is none other than the elaboration of “essays in refusal.”  Indeed, it is my contention 
that Foucault’s work as a whole should be understood as a collection of texts written 
within the context of these “essays in refusal.”  Yet, in order to understand the 
significance of the concept of “critique” as it is developed in Foucault’s thought it is 
necessary to turn toward the philosophical tradition from which his use of the term is 
most extensively developed.  In each of the texts where Foucault most directly engages 
with the concept of “critique,” he invokes the figure of philosopher, Immanuel Kant, as 
the genesis of a larger critical tradition from which Foucault self-reflexively views his 
own work as participating.  Indeed, although writing pseudonymously for entry on his 
own work in the Dictionnaire des Philosophes, Foucault identifies and situates his work 
in relation to a larger philosophical framework of “critique” as it develops out of Kant 
and the critical tradition of the Enlightenment. 554  Thus, in Foucault’s entry to the second 
edition of the Dictionnaire des Philosophes, he maintains the following: “[t]o the extent 
that Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant.”555  
While posing Foucault’s philosophical thought in relation to Kant might appear 
“ambivalent” to some, it has also been noted that “[a]side perhaps from Nietzsche, Kant 
figures more prominently that any other philosopher” in Foucault’s thought.556  Although 
his reading of Kant is often contested by orthodox philosophers, Kant’s importance to 
Foucault cannot be underestimated, and the use of Kant as a key referent stretches the 
entirety of Foucault’s career.557  As Foucault writes in a lecture delivered at Stanford 
                                                          
554 In the early eighties, Foucault’s assistant at the Collège de France, François Ewald, was asked to reedit 
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557 Supervised by Jean Hyypolite, in 1961 Foucault submitted his secondary PhD (thèse complémentaire) 
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University in 1979, the importance of Kant in relation to his thought and methodology 
can be understood in two primary manners.  “Since Kant,” Foucault writes: 
the role of philosophy has been to prevent reason from going beyond the limits of 
what is given in experience; but from the same moment—that is, from the 
development of modern states and political management of society—the role of 
philosophy has also been to keep watch over the excessive powers of political 
rationality.558 
While Dreyfus and Rabinow observe how “Foucault reinterprets Kant’s linking of the 
historical moment, critical reason, and society as a challenge to develop a radically new 
version of what it means to lead a philosophical life,” in the passage above Foucault also 
makes it clear that his interest in Kant also appears in regard to a political register.559   
Given that both Kant’s original publication and Foucault’s 1984 lecture share 
similar titles, it is clear that Foucault hopes to frame and situate his own thought in 
relation to the same critical tradition in which this problematic arises. 560  Indeed, as Marc 
Djaballah notes, the critical tradition beginning with Kant’s essay on the enlightenment 
designates Foucault’s “most direct point of reference” for the development of his own 
theory of “critique.”561  Regardless of the influence Kant had on Foucault’s work as a 
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philosopher, he nevertheless does not identify as a Kantian—that is, Foucault does not 
view his work as a continuation of Kant’s project.  Instead, rather, Foucault claims that 
his work, insofar as it pertains to the tradition of philosophy, participates in the critical 
tradition arising out of Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment.  It is this critical tradition, and 
not an orthodox reading of Kant’s texts, from which Foucault begins rethink the question 
of politics through the concept of “critique.”  Thus, while Dreyfus and Rabinow 
demonstrate that Foucault’s relation to Kant helped to reshape the basis of his 
philosophical thought, the relation of Kant to Foucault additionally helps to develop a 
radically new way to engage with the history of political thought and the problematic of 
governmentality.  For John Ransom, then, “[w]hat Foucault gives us” through the 
concept of critique “is a different way of looking at and responding to the myriad ways of 
being governed that surround us—in short, a new depiction of the political world.”562  At 
stake in Ransom’s reading of Foucault’s relation to Kant, however, is more specifically 
how Foucault begins to rethink the notion of “critique” within the context of his own 
studies of power and governmentality.  For Djaballah, then, the continuity between Kant 
and Foucault more correctly arises in the way that the latter politicizes the former: “[t]he 
attitude defined by Kant as that of enlightenment is a theoretical formulation of the 
attitude of being critical that Foucault identifies in the context of the political arts of 
governing.”563  Yet, in tracing the political development of Foucault’s use of the term 
“critique,” Djaballah reveals how the notion of “critique” comes to exemplify what 
Foucault theorizes in terms of the politics of resistance.564  While Djaballah is correct to 
locate the concept of “critique” as a potential historical source of Foucault’s theory of 
resistance, it is my contention that this relation between “critique” and resistance is first 
elaborated in terms of a philosophical problematization of the question of authority and, 
more fundamentally, that this struggle against authority reveals an alternative foundation 
in philosophy and political theory from which the structure of the political and the 
question of politics is rethought by Foucault anarchically.     
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In the 1984 lecture, Foucault situates his study of “critique” within the context of 
the philosopher’s struggle against the condition of authority.  In this regard, Foucault first 
emphasizes how Kant defines the Enlightenment as the critical process by which 
humanity might come to leave its state of minority.565  In other words, the essay is framed 
in terms of a critical theory of emancipation; it is this potential condition of emancipation 
that Foucault’s locates at the basis of the concept of “critique.”  According to Foucault, 
then, Kant’s understanding of the Enlightenment does not refer to a specific historical 
era, but is instead conceived “in an almost entirely negative way…an exit, a way out.”566  
Taking the general problematic regarding the possibility of attaining a “way out” from 
one’s “state of minority,” in the 1984 lecture, Foucault outlines three distinctive 
characteristics of Kant’s project which form the basis of his analysis of “critique” and its 
relation to the question of authority.  First, the minoritorian condition in which humanity 
is maintained refers to a “certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s 
authority;”567 second, in relation to the problem of authority, this minoritorian condition 
is further characterized by the incapacity to use one’s own reasoning without the 
guidance of others;568 finally, this incapacity to use one’s own reason designates the 
simultaneity between an excess of authority and a lack of “courage” to use one’s own 
reason without the guidance of others.569  Following these three general problematics—
which all focus around the problem of authority for Foucault—the 1984 lecture begins by 
emphasizing the relation between Kant’s brief essay and the three Critiques.  For 
Foucault, what is crucial in outlining the connection between Kant’s minor essay and his 
major works is the way in which Kant describes the Enlightenment as the moment when 
humanity puts its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any form of authority.  
As Foucault begins to argue here, the notion of “critique” develops as a way to rethink 
the politico-philosophical problem of authority and obedience.  In other words, the 
concept of “critique” is initially posed by Foucault within the context of a position of 
philosophical anti-authoritarianism.  It is through the development of the notion of 
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“critique” and the coinciding problematic of authority that Kant’s text, Foucault argues, 
can be read as marking out a “discreet entrance into the history of thought of a question 
that modern philosophy has not been capable of answering.”570  In other words, what is at 
stake for Foucault is that the basic goal of critical philosophy is to think through the 
question of authority in its specificity.  If, therefore, as Foucault claims that “modern 
philosophy is the philosophy that is attempting to answer the question of the 
Enlightenment,” and furthermore that the “Enlightenment is the age of the critique,” then 
philosophy’s relation to the concept of “critique” emerges as a fundamental confrontation 
with the question of authority.571   
In Foucault’s reading of Kant, the Enlightenment is therefore not understood in 
terms of a historical era lasting from the mid seventeenth century until the end of the 
eighteenth framed by a rationalist-humanist discourse, but an ongoing and continuous 
process in which “philosophical thought” begins to critically “reflect on its own 
present.”572  Indeed, this is what Foucault holds to be the crucial philosophical change 
insinuated in Kant’s work.  As Foucault writes in The Government of Self and Others, 
with Kant’s “text a new type of question appears in the field of philosophical 
reflection…the question of the present, of present reality.”573  Yet this philosophical 
reflection regarding one’s own historical situation is additionally coupled with the 
problem of authority for Foucault.  Foucault writes: “[i]t seems to me that the question of 
modernity arose with the question of what authority was to be accepted.” 574  Similar to 
the method of “anarchaeology,” the concept of “critique” takes the non-acceptability of 
authority as its starting point.  It is precisely within the context this critical tradition—
which at once changes the focus of philosophy to a critical engagement with the 
intersection between one’s own present conditions and the problematic of authority—in 
                                                          
570 Ibid, 32. 
571 Ibid, 32; 38. 
572 Ibid, 33.  By characterizing the Enlightenment as an ongoing process rather than a historical era or set 
of texts and ideas, Foucault seems to have in mind a key distinction Kant makes in his essay.   As Kant 
writes in 1784, “If it is now asked, whether we at present live in an enlightened age?” the answer is, “No, 
but we do live in an age of enlightenment” (21, original italics).  Kant’s slight change between an 
“enlightened age” and the “age of enlightenment” demonstrates one of the key focal points Foucault 
derives from this text in relation to the critical task of philosophy.   
573 Michel Foucault, The Government of the Self and Others. Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983, 
trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11. 
574 Ibid, 13. 
199 
 
which Foucault attempts to redevelop the concept of “critique” as the basis of his own 
approach to the study of philosophy.  As Foucault further maintains in the 1984 lecture: 
“the thread that may connect us to the Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal 
elements, but rather the permanent reactivation of an attitude—that is, of a philosophical 
ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era.”575  
Consequently, this critical relation to one’s own present condition arises, for Foucault, 
with a struggle against authority, or a new critical attitude that resists the problem of 
excessive authority.  By invoking drawing an explicit connection between critique and 
the reactivation of a permanent critical attitude, or ethos, Foucault seeks to describe the 
problematic of the Enlightenment in terms of the development of a new critical ethics 
which takes as its turning point the problem of authority and obedience.  Thus, in the 
second section of “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault outlines three features distinctive 
to the historical development of “critique,” all of which ultimately turn upon elaboration 
of an anti-authoritarian ethos.  
 First by “critical attitude” Foucault means to suggest a specific “mode of relating 
to contemporary reality,” whereby the attitude of critique constitutes a specific relation to 
one’s own present conditions.576  Here “critique” is a state of philosophical reflection that 
renders one’s own historical conditions visible as such.  Second, this critical attitude is, 
according to Foucault, “a voluntary choice made by certain people”—that is, “critique” 
contrasts a position of voluntary agency against Étienne De La Boétie’s notion of 
“voluntary servitude.”577  Third, the critical attitude is “a way of thinking and feeling” 
about one’s own historical situation, and thus a “way of acting and behaving that at one 
and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.”578  
Inasmuch as Foucault self-identifies his thought within this critical tradition, the larger 
trajectory of his works must be understood in relation to the ongoing and “permanent 
critique of our historical era” made possible in the reactivation of an anti-authoritarian 
attitude and ethos of existence Foucault calls “critique.”  Yet while Foucault seeks to 
locate the trajectory of his work within the critical tradition of the Enlightenment, what is 
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absolutely essential is that the reactivation of the critical attitude itself develops in 
relation to an ongoing struggle with the problem of authority, in which the turn toward 
ethical transformation must be understood on the cusp of the problematic of authority and 
the governing of others.  Indeed, it is against the problematic of authority that Foucault 
both begins to develop his use of the notion of “critique” while at the same time utilizing 
the tradition of this critical attitude as the anchoring point from which to locate the 
general problematic of resistance as it develops in his thought.  
With the concept of “critique,” we have seen how Foucault introduces the 
problematic of the Enlightenment through Kant in order to outline what he holds to be the 
key challenge and coinciding critical task for philosophy.  Yet Foucault radicalizes Kant’s 
thought in order to demonstrate that the key problem philosophy has been incapable of 
solving are the problematics of authority and political obedience.  In its critical reflection 
on one’s present conditions, philosophy, for Foucault, begins in the struggle against the 
general problem of authority.  In other words, at the moment when philosophical thought 
begins to critically reflect on its own present, the problem of authority is made visible, and 
it is this fundamental struggle with the question of authority is what Foucault labels as the 
basic task of philosophy.  In his unorthodox reading of Kant, Foucault argues that the key 
philosophical problematic developed out of the Enlightenment ought to therefore be 
understood as a “modification of the pre-existing relation linking will, authority, and the 
use of reason.”579  In response to Kant’s essay, then, Foucault asserts the claim that what a 
philosophical engagement with the problematic of the Enlightenment offers, is a radical 
reflection on our current situation—or what he refers to as a “permanent critique of our 
historical era” in which the task of philosophy appears as an ongoing modification of the 
present through the struggle with relations of authority.   
It is within this philosophical and critical tradition involved in a permanent critique 
of the present that Foucault (albeit late in his career) outlines as the basic analytic and 
methodological framework for his thought that begins to align his thought with anarchism.  
To be sure, although Foucault’s major works and their respective thematics might appear 
as fundamentally disparate to some of his harsher critics, they can all be seen as 
participating in and elaborating a perpetual critique of our historical era.  Yet, at the same 
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time, the thread that connects Foucault’s thought and work to the critical tradition of the 
Enlightenment is not simply a retheorization of philosophy’s relationship to the present, 
but the “reactivation of an attitude,” or, “philosophical ethos” that develops as a 
“permanent critique” of authority.580  In other words, a critical reflection on one’s own 
present, necessitates for Foucault an ongoing critique of authority and a coinciding social 
ontology of critique as the condition of possibility for critical philosophy as such.  By 
analyzing the problem of the Enlightenment in terms of an ongoing relation to one’s 
present, Foucault’s central claim is that Kant reactivates the concept of “critique”—
characterized here as both attitude and ethos—under which the very task of philosophy 
changes and begins to turn upon a radical critique of authority.  In its most preliminary 
form, it is through the introduction of the concept of “critique” into his thought that 
Foucault begins to radically rework the philosophical framework from which to understand 
the structure of the political and the history of politics.  If the history of philosophy, as 
Foucault suggests in this lecture, has traditionally been incapable of overcoming the 
problem of authority, then what he takes as the very basis of his critical thought additionally 
helps to point toward an alternative philosophical position from which to understand the 
domain of the political.  The force relations that constitute the domain of the political 
cannot simply be reduced to the questions which presuppose the necessity of authority—
of the archē—as the principle from which politics emerges.  Instead, rather, Foucault 
argues that there is a corresponding critical attitude that resists the manifestation of 
authority, and it is the very possibility of this critical attitude of resistance that indicates a 
new analytic framework for the study of the political.   
For Foucault, then, the problem of the Enlightenment—which, is defined as the 
key problem for philosophy—is therefore posed “in relation to a certain minority 
condition in which humanity was maintained and maintained in an authoritative way.”581  
The basic philosophical problem—indeed its most fundamental question—according to 
Foucault, is to critique not simply the basis of authority, but its multifarious and continual 
manifestation, and to challenge the subordinate position in which a “minority” is 
maintained.  In the first lecture from The Government of Self and Others, Foucault 
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extensively focuses on the problem of “tutelage” or minoritorian condition.582  Through a 
critical reflection on what Kant means by a state of tutelage, Foucault argues that the 
minoritorian state is not defined as a condition in which individuals are forcibly deprived 
of their “means and possibilities of autonomy.”583  Instead, rather, the minoritorian 
condition is brought about through a voluntary dependence on authority.  Foucault thus 
writes:  
If men are in this condition of tutelage, if they are subject to the direction of 
others, it is not because these others have seized power, or that it has been handed 
over to them in an essential, founding and instituting act…it is because men are 
unable or do not wish to conduct themselves, and others have obligingly come 
forward to conduct them.584 
This condition of tutelage is itself a condition of governmentality—that is, the problem of 
tutelage for Foucault is characterized by a “vitiated relationship between government of 
self and government of others.”585  Yet what is at stake, is that the critical attitude that 
develops from the Enlightenment is set to modify this problem of government; the task of 
the Enlightenment is according to Foucault “precisely to redistribute the relationships 
between government of self and government of others.”586  As Foucault suggests in the 
1983 lecture the very position and critical function of the notion of “critique” is faced 
with the task of leaving the condition of tutelage through the reactivation of a “critical 
attitude” that arises historically in terms of an ongoing struggle with the problem of 
authority and government.  Thus, for Foucault the task inherent in the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment is to exit from one’s minoritorian position through the exercise of critical 
activity.  As we will see in the analysis of the 1978 lecture, Foucault contributes to this 
problem by inscribing the practice of resistance into the very basis of “critique”—that is, 
resistance is what makes possible the critical exiting from one’s condition of tutelage.   
In this regard, Judith Butler has drawn an important connection between the 
discovery of the critical attitude and the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought.  As 
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Butler importantly remarks “resistance to authority…constitutes the hallmark of the 
Enlightenment for Foucault.”587  Here Butler importantly points toward a direct 
connection between what Foucault analyses through “critique” and the question of 
resistance.  Inasmuch as the concept of “critique” marks the critical axis from which to 
understand the breadth of his work, then this concept cannot itself be separated from the 
concept of resistance; “critique” is fundamentally an extended discussion of the problem 
of resistance in Foucault’s thought.  Since, as we have seen, that Foucault directly 
situates his work within the critical tradition of the Enlightenment, what Butler points to 
here is of vital importance for uncovering two preliminary ways in which we can begin to 
point toward the ways in which Foucault’s thought begins to develop and turn upon an 
anarchist hypothesis of the political.  First, the critical tradition of the Enlightenment is 
fundamentally characterized and marked, according to Foucault, by resistance to 
authority; this is, according to Foucault, the founding act of critical philosophy as it 
develops out of the Enlightenment itself arises as a condition of resistance.  In this way, 
insofar as Foucault’s work can be seen as reactivating the tradition of the Enlightenment 
as the very basic framework for his thought, he additionally establishes the concept of 
resistance as the central basis from which the critical tradition of the Enlightenment 
might continue.  Through the development of the notion of “critique,” Foucault thus 
inscribes resistance into the very basic framework for his philosophical thought.  
Additionally, at the same time as resistance constitutes the hallmark of Foucault’s work, 
resistance to authority also establishes the way in which Foucault begins to rethink the 
question of politics in a radically new way.  Insofar as the Enlightenment is what is 
counter-posed to, and continuously resists, the problem of authority, what Foucault 
therefore outlines and centralizes to the trajectory of his work in terms of a radical and 
permanent critique of ourselves begins with an anti-authoritarian ethic that radically 
begins to reframe the position of philosophy and the domain of the political from the 
perspective of resistance.  Taken together, the above two points invoke a preliminary, yet 
conceptually vital, relation between Foucault’s philosophical project and the history of 
anarchism through the reactivation of the critical attitude of the Enlightenment.  
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 Although there is no single locus for the historical origin of anarchism, several 
anarchist historians have pointed toward the way in which, as both movement and 
philosophy, anarchism derives “directly from the ideas of the eighteenth century 
Enlightenment.”588  While anarchism might be seen as developing, at least in part, 
through a relation with the ideas of the Enlightenment, the way in which Foucault poses 
the Enlightenment not as a doctrine, but as a continual anti-authoritarian critique of the 
present, reinvigorates the relation between anarchism and the Enlightenment, and 
likewise the relation between anarchism and Foucault in a way that anticipates current 
debates in political theory, while at the same time centralizing the concept of resistance to 
his project.  In other words, both Foucault and anarchists take the critique of authority as 
the basis from which critical philosophy begins.  In this way, as anarchist philosopher 
Paul McLaughlin argues in a position similar to Foucault, that anarchism ought to be 
defined “in relation to the fundamental ethico-political problem of authority.”589  
Crucially, for McLaughlin, “anarchists” both “take as their starting point the open 
question of authority,” while alongside the “philosophes, they assert their right to raise 
this question” (original emphasis).590  In asserting that anarchism takes, at its very basis, a 
fundamental critique of authority, and that this very critique is what helps to form an 
alliance between anarchism and the history of critical philosophy, what McLaughlin 
points to here as a key component of philosophical anarchism, also uncovers a key link 
between anarchism and Foucault’s general project through the notion of critique. 
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With the notion of “critique” acting as the basic philosophical framework that 
underpins his thought, Foucault invokes the history of anarchism not as a fundamental 
foundation, but as an alternative methodology for the rethinking the perspective of 
philosophy and the domain of the political from the point of view of resistance and an 
open questioning of authority.  Thus, as we will see in the following section, while 
several theorists deny the connection between Foucault’s thought and anarchism, the way 
he shapes an anti-authoritarian critique into the basis of his philosophical approach to the 
question of politics invokes and continues the tradition of anarchist thought by building 
its most basic tenet into the core of his work.  This, then, is the first way in which we can 
begin to understand the ways in which Foucault’s methodology begins to develop and 
posit I refer as the anarchist hypothesis of the political.  Rather than beginning, as 
traditional philosophers often do, with the archē as the historical a priori or transcendental 
condition of possibility for thinking through the terms of the political and the social 
context of politics, Foucault suggests instead an alternative possibility beginning with 
what he begins to develop under the heading of “critique.”  As an instrument for those 
who “fight,” “resist,” and “refuse what is,” the very task of the critical attitude takes as 
its starting point an irreducible critique of authority—that is, critical philosophy, for 
Foucault, is none other than the elaboration of “essays in refusal” beginning from the 
position of autonomy rather than the first principle of the archē; critique, as such, is the 
philosophical position that begins with a fundamental “challenge to what is.”591     
With the notion of “critique” acting as the general structure for the philosophical 
tradition in which Foucault participates, what I point toward here as the key connection 
between Foucault and the anarchist tradition in terms of an ongoing struggle with the 
problem of authority, also informs the analytic framework from which Foucault’s oeuvre 
might be reread.  It is in this way that postanarchist Todd May demonstrates how the 
alleged elusiveness of Foucault’s thought might be attenuated if it can be tied to a “single 
question” which appears and finds its elaboration around the intersection between  
“critique” and the Enlightenment.592  For May, the most basic philosophical question—
the question regarding “who we are?” is the guiding thread of Foucault’s work, and is 
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thus “never far from the surface of any of his works.”593  May points out that the critical 
question that asks “who we are?” finds its elaboration in the celebrated lecture from 1984 
when Foucault begins to explain the task of philosophy and his work in relation to what 
he refers to as the “critical ontology of ourselves.”594  Indeed, in an interview from 1977 
Foucault argues that “philosophy’s question…is the question as to what we ourselves 
are.”595  If as May suggests, that the “critical ontology of ourselves” marks the principal 
guiding thread of Foucault’s general project, then we can additionally point toward the 
ways in which the notion of “critique” and its coinciding anti-authoritarian ethic traverses 
Foucault’s work as well.  At the same time, however, the critical reflection on who we 
ourselves are necessitates, for Foucault, a coinciding political dimension of critique that 
can ultimately never be divorced from the permanent critique of authority.  Precisely 
because the task of philosophy takes as its starting point the irreducible critique of 
authority, this is why Foucault argues that “contemporary philosophy is entirely political 
and historical.”596  It is in posing a critical relation between the historical question 
regarding who we are and the anti-authoritarian ethic of “critique” that we can begin to 
develop a stronger connecting thread between the different periods of Foucault’s thought.  
Nonetheless, what is at stake for Foucault is that the philosophical dimension of critique 
consequently requires a direct engagement with the study of the political, and as such, 
what can be identified as the guiding thread of Foucault’s thought under analytic 
framework of the “critical ontology of ourselves,” turns upon both the philosophical and 
political axes of critique.    
Paying close attention to the interplay between the philosophical and political 
dimensions of critique, Foucault suggests in “What is Enlightenment?” that what can be 
understood as “the critical ontology of ourselves” is not essential foundation, but rather 
an anti-authoritarian “attitude or, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of 
what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are 
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”597  Thus, 
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whereas May argues that Foucault’s thought can be understood in relation to the question 
pertaining to who we are, this question always turns upon, according to Foucault, another 
coinciding problem regarding the possibility of becoming otherwise, or a radical 
transformation in one’s own condition of subjectivity.  In this way, the ethos, or “critical 
attitude” Foucault seeks to reactivate through Kant and the Enlightenment turns upon 
both negation and affirmation.  As Foucault outlines in the 1984 lecture, the critical 
ontology of ourselves implies a theory of negation culminating in the affirmation of a 
possible political transformation.  “Critique” first implies a “refusal” of what Foucault 
refers to as the “blackmail of the Enlightenment,” wherein “one has to refuse everything 
that might present itself in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian manner.”598  
Secondly, such an analytic framework for Foucault, “has to avoid the always facile 
confusions between humanism and Enlightenment,” and thus the task is not to posit an 
essential humanist foundation that gives rise to the “critical attitude,” but rather to 
“imagine it [the current historical situation] otherwise than it is, and to transform it.”599  
With the development of this “critical attitude” Foucault does not invoke a premodern or 
essential foundation from which the critique of authority arises; instead, rather, the 
critique of authority is directed at and takes place at the limits imposed on us in order to 
transform them.  Crucially, then, in a similar manner to the way in which resistance to 
authority underpins what Foucault identifies as the task of philosophical critique, the 
analysis of the authoritarian limits imposed on us is significantly paired with the 
affirmative possibility of political transformation.   
Thus, for Foucault, the radical critique of authority is not simply a pure move of 
negation, but that which, in its negation of authority, leads to and culminates in a critical 
transformation with that which maintains humanity in its minoritorian condition.  Indeed, 
as Foucault argues, it is not simply enough to renounce authority; instead, rather, “the 
critical question has to be turned back into a positive one.”600  The point of critique is not 
therefore launched as an anti-authoritarian “gesture of rejection;” the “point.” Foucault 
maintains is instead “to transform the critique conducted in the necessary limitation into a 
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practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.”601  To be sure, as 
Foucault suggests in an interview from 1981, the notion of critique and its coinciding 
ethic of anti-authoritarianism, is what makes radical transformation possible: “criticism 
(and radical criticism),” Foucault writes, “is absolutely indispensable for any 
transformation.”602  Situating the radical critique of authority, which as we seen for 
Foucault radically reframes the basis for political thought, as “indispensable” for the very 
possibility of transformation, Foucault demonstrates that the negation of authority 
culminates and finds its expression in the potentiality of transforming the limit points at 
which critique is directed.    
Through the radicalization of a critical “attitude” and “ethos” derived from Kant, 
Foucault indeed suggests that what has always remained central to his work is a 
continuation of the project of the Enlightenment, in which the concept of critique 
suggests a philosophical coupling between historical analysis of ourselves—that is the 
analysis of the conditions of possibility of our own ontology—and the possibility to 
become otherwise.  Here it is easy to see that any study of Foucault which attends to the 
first part of this coupling at the expense of the latter, necessarily misses what is 
fundamentally at stake in the project of Foucault’s work.  While May and others are thus 
correct to point to the way in which the concept of “critique” might help to locate a 
general trajectory in Foucault’s philosophy as the simultaneous study of “who we are” 
and “who we might be,”603 this same trajectory, I claim, acts as the basis for a 
preliminary outline of a new approach to the domains of philosophy and politics which, 
in turn, requires a more serious engagement with the question of resistance.  Indeed, on 
the one hand Foucault defines the critical attitude of the Enlightenment as an attitude or 
ethos situated at the horizon of the historical problematic of authority, and as such his 
thought prefigures the meta-political and anarchist turns in political theory by rethinking 
the task of philosophy at the limit or horizon of the state.  Yet, the importance of the idea 
of “critique” can only be fully understood in relation to the coinciding problematic of 
resistance, a concept which is significantly reintroduced into Foucault’s work at the same 
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time when he begins to situate his thought in relation to a larger critical framework of the 
Enlightenment. 
Faced not simply with the philosophical problem of authority, then, but with its 
material manifestation as well, what initially appears as a principal problem for 
philosophy is itself coupled with a political context.  The Enlightenment, according to 
Foucault, “now appears as a political problem.”604  By coupling a political dimension 
with the philosophical framework of the Enlightenment, what is at stake for Foucault is to 
demonstrate how “the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself 
struggling with attitudes of countermodernity.”605  This is to say that alongside—indeed 
coupled with—the history of political power and government, are the historical 
movements running counter and outside of the manifestation of authority.  Focusing on 
the way in which Kant defines the Enlightenment in terms of a radical escape—an “exit” 
or “way out”— we can now better understand the way in which Foucault suggests that 
the task of philosophy which “characterizes the Enlightenment” is the development of the 
critical attitude “that releases us from the status of our immaturity.”606  If as Foucault 
maintains in the 1984 lecture that the key problem developed through Kant’s project 
finds its critical impetus as an exiting from “man’s self-incurred tutelage,” then in a much 
more radical way, Foucault raises the stakes in order to suggest that the task of 
philosophy is to begin with and think through a certain “exiting” or “way out,” not only 
from the problem of authority but, more specifically, from the ontological condition in 
which human beings are maintained in a minoritorian manner.  At the same time, 
however, what is crucial in the relation between the movements of modernity and 
movement of counter-modernity are, as we will see in the following section, the ways in 
which Foucault begins to reread the history of politics through the question of resistance 
and revolt.   
It is within this political dimension of critique that we can uncover another 
manner in which Foucault’s concept of critique invokes another crucial affinity with 
anarchism.  Insofar as anarchism can be tied (at least in part) to the history of the 
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Enlightenment it has always existed, as Jun recently argues, not only as a philosophical 
critique of authority, but also as a movement of what Foucault refers to as the “attitudes 
of countermodernity.”607  In this regard, Jun maintains that “anarchism has from the 
beginning defined itself against modernity—not by stealing Romantic glances at a 
premodern past, but by looking for something new, something that stands apart from, 
exists outside of, or altogether moves beyond, modernity.”608  The history of anarchism 
is, according to Jun, itself a movement of Foucault’s theory of “countermodernity.”  
Whereas we have seen that task of the critical attitude of philosophical takes as its 
starting point the irreducible critique of authority, and in this way forms an alliance with 
the philosophical basis of anarchism, we can now assert a second coinciding axis along 
which the critique of authority becomes manifest as the movement of politics.  As such, 
with the concept of “critique” Foucault invokes not only the unconditional critique of 
authority that has always remained the basic tenet of the position of philosophical 
anarchism, but also calls forth a rethinking of the question and practice of resistance—a 
practice that has always remained a key component of anarchist theory—as the very grid 
from which to rethink the history of politics.  Although Foucault does not use the 
language of resistance in the 1984 lecture, the 1978 lecture makes the relation between 
resistance, and anarchism and “critique” more clear.   
In order to demonstrate more fully the way in which the concept of “critique” in 
Foucault’s thought develops and turns upon what I have preliminarily outlined as the 
anarchist hypothesis of the political, in which the philosophical critique of authority 
prefigures the possibility of transformation, and as such necessitates an engagement with 
the domain of the political through the concept of resistance, it is necessary to now turn 
to the corresponding 1978 lecture.  The foundational authority that maintains humanity in 
its minoritorian condition and defines the modern condition since the Enlightenment, is 
alternatively developed in the 1978 lecture in relation to the larger context of Foucault’s 
study of governmentality.  For Foucault, the general problematic of authority that 
maintains subordinate positions is itself a form of governmentalization and yet at the 
same time—and even consequently according to Foucault—alongside the history of 
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governmentality is the political and critical attitude that resists it.  Whereas the 
philosophical dimension of critique in the 1984 lecture invokes resistance to authority as 
the very basis for philosophy, in the 1978 lecture, Foucault additionally asserts resistance 
to governmentality as the very basis for politics and the study of the political. 
  If the general problematic of the Enlightenment, as Foucault suggests in the 
1984 lecture, is the thinking through of our “exit” from the problem of authority in terms 
of a philosophical critique, then what makes the earlier lecture “What is Critique?” 
significant is the way this problematic is coupled with a historico-political dimension that 
invokes the key concept of resistance in order to understand the manner in which critique 
becomes realized as an “art of not being governed”—or the struggle between the rise of 
governmentalization and counter-historical movements of resistance.   Indeed, it is my 
contention that the transformation made possible through the radical critique of authority 
is best exemplified in the concept of resistance, or the critical ethos developed as a 
specific “art of not being governed.”  By analyzing the notion of “critique as an ongoing 
withdrawal from the problem of government, in addition to the anti-authoritarian critical 
attitude discussed above, we can more clearly see how Foucault builds an anarchist 
hypothesis of the political into the whole of his thought.  
3.3 Critique and the Art of Not Being Governed  
 
In conclusion…might it not now be necessary to follow the other route…And if it is 
necessary to ask the question about knowledge in its relation to domination, it would be, 
first and foremost, from a certain decision-making will not to be governed, the decision 
making will, both an individual and collective attitude which meant, as Kant said, to get 
out of one’s minority.609 
--Michel Foucault 
 
Although Foucault situates his work within the critical tradition of Kant in order to 
reintroduce the question of authority to philosophy, his understanding of “critique” as it 
develops in the political context differs from Kant in one key aspect that cannot be 
overlooked.  In Kantian political theory, the state and the a priori character of law are 
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presupposed as the universal terms through which the political can be articulated.610  
Foucault, however, denies this artifice and suggests how the concept of “critique” reveals 
an alternative foundation of politics irreducible to the state.  While the concept of 
“critique” in the 1984 lecture acts as the basic theoretical and methodological framework 
from which Foucault begins to rethink the critical task of philosophy, this same concept 
is additionally invoked in the 1978 lecture as a way to inform an alternative analytic 
theory of the political opposed to and outside a theory of the state.  In order to account for 
this alternative understanding of “critique,” the 1978 lecture undertakes a genealogical 
account of being critical in terms of a socio-political practice arising in response to the 
growth of Foucault refers to as “pastoral power.”611  Rather than simply tracing the 
history of the political to the emergence of governmentality, in “What is Critique?” 
Foucault claims that what is required is a theory of the political opposed to the history of 
government.  As outlined in this lecture, it is with the concept of “critique” that Foucault 
begins to rethink the possibility of an alternative theory of the political opposed to 
governmentality.  As we will see, this alternative approach to the study of politics begins 
with, according to Foucault, a “certain decision-making will not to be governed.”612  It is 
by beginning with this critical will not to be governed that Foucault begins to 
fundamentally rethink the domain of the political in such a way that it cannot be reduced 
or simplified to the problematic of governmentality.  Given that the problematic of 
governmentality is more thoroughly developed in Foucault’s lexicon than the concept of 
authority, what Foucault outlines in the 1978 lecture as the permanent interplay between 
governmentality and the “art of not being governed” is essential in tracing how the 
concept of “critique” ultimately turns upon an anarchist hypothesis of the political as 
continuously developed throughout his thought.   
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Since the position Foucault takes in the 1978 lecture is directly related to the 
problematic of government, it is necessary to briefly outline what Foucault means by 
“governmentality.”  Published in the same year as “What is Critique?” was a lecture that 
eventually became part of the lecture series collected as Security, Territory, Population, 
titled “Governmentality” in which Foucault begins to situate his work in relation to the 
general “problematic of government” and at the same time introduces the concept of 
“governmentality” into his critical lexicon.613  Taken together, these two lectures (“What 
is Critique?” and “Governmentality” along with the lectures comprising Security, 
Territory, Population) mark the entrance of the problem of government into the wider 
scope of Foucault’s thought which, as we will see, is subsequently coupled with, by 
necessity, the general problematic of resistance.  Although the term governmentality 
appears somewhat late in Foucault’s lexicon, the introduction of the general problematic 
of government into Foucault’s thought marks a key conceptual intervention in his 
thought, and is central to the lectures he gave at the Collège de France from 1977 until 
1984 as well as the final two volumes of the History of Sexuality.  Rather than attempting 
to understand Foucault’s work in relation to an analytic of power, as Foucault suggests in 
The Government of Self and Others, the goal is to “analyze power as a field of procedures 
of government.”614  As initially defined in the lecture “Governmentality,” Foucault first 
uses this term in order to restructure the analytic framework from which to understand the 
problem of politics and political philosophy; that is, for Foucault the analytics of power 
needs to take into account the problem of governmentality rather than sovereignty in 
order to fully understand the domain of the political.615  Yet at the same time, it is 
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precisely by engaging with the general problematic of governmentality that Foucault 
uncovers a new framework for understanding the domain of the political that begins 
anarchically—which is to say with the question of resistance rather that of power. 
Understood as both analytically and practically different from the questions 
pertaining to sovereignty, the term governmentality is utilized by Foucault in such a way 
so as to establish a historical break in the general framework for political theory.  “[T]he 
art of government” Foucault writes must be “defined in a way that differentiates it from a 
certain capacity of the prince.”616  For Foucault, then, within the history of political 
thought, the term governmentality suggests a historical change in political rationality 
from treatises regarding “advice to the prince” to treatises on the “art of government.”617  
Citing an early definition of the term “government” from the French emblem book writer, 
Gillaume de la Perrière’s 1555 text, Le Miroir Polique, Foucault argues that the problem 
of government has “a finality of its own,” and in this respect, “it [government] can be 
clearly distinguished from sovereignty.”618  As clearly differentiated from political 
sovereignty, Foucault initially defines “government” as the “right manner of disposing 
things so as to lead not to the form of common good, as the jurists would have said, but to 
an end that is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed.”619  The turn 
toward the study of government as an analytic framework for political thought begins, for 
Foucault, by understanding governmentality in terms of both a rationality and series of 
multiform tactics utilized to achieve a specific end—that is, the problem of government is 
neither that of establishing legitimate sovereignty, nor of imposing laws, but of ordering 
and managing the relations between things.  Thus, the problematic concerning the crisis 
of government is itself an enigma regarding (to use Foucault’s own phrasing) the order of 
things.   
It is within the framework of governmentality (particularly as developed in “What 
is Critique?) that the philosophical questions posed by Foucault in “What is 
Enlightenment?” are made more transparent in relation to the anarchist hypothesis of the 
political that underpins his thought.  Indeed, in “What is Critique?” Foucault importantly 
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begins to discuss how the task of political philosophy is to develop a perpetual “critical 
attitude” in relation to the problem of government, and in doing so provides a lens for 
viewing the importance and coherence of the idea of resistance in his works as a 
whole.620  In the 1978 lecture, Foucault begins by outlining the ways in which the general 
thematics and questions of political theory historically change with the introduction of 
government as the basic problem in which philosophers must engage.  According to 
Foucault, beginning in the 15th century, “there was a veritable explosion of the art of 
governing men,” which begins by developing the idea “quite foreign to ancient culture—
that each individual, whatever his age or status, from the beginning to the end of his life 
and in his every action, had to be governed and had to let himself be governed.”621 
Indeed, if as Foucault suggests that the question “how to govern was…one of the 
fundamental questions about what was happening in the 15th or 16th centuries” (original 
emphasis), it is at this time that the problem of government becomes one of the crucial 
anchoring points in his thought.622    
Yet, at the same time, however, (and this is what makes this lecture so essential) 
as the problem of government becomes a key focus for Foucault’s work, the question of 
government in the 1978 lecture is paired with and develops in relation to another key 
question which Foucault revitalizes and revises under the concept of the “critique.”  As 
Taylor points out, the concept of “critique…emerges in response and is inextricably 
linked to the spread of governmentalizing techniques.”623  In this way, what Foucault 
traces under the heading of “critique” must be understood directly in relation to the study 
of governmentality; however, as it develops in relation to the problematic of government, 
the concept of “critique” acts as a way to radically introduce the notion of resistance as 
the key concept through which this notion of “critique” can be elaborated.  Thus, in a key 
passage, Foucault writes “[s]o, this governmentalization, which seems to me to be rather 
characteristic of these societies in Western Europe in the 16th century, cannot apparently 
be dissociated from the question ‘how not to be governed?’.”624  It is this political 
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dimension of “critique” directed toward the question “how not to be governed,” in which 
Foucault claims gives rise a specific “historical dimension” of politics traditionally 
overlooked by philosophers and political theorists.625  Furthermore, it is within this 
critical question—referred to here as the “perpetual question—of “how not to be 
governed” that Foucault importantly suggests that “one could approximately locate 
therein what we would call the critical attitude.”626  Crucially, then, the location of the 
“critical attitude”—which as we have seen marks a key concept in Foucault’s thought—is 
to be found and situated in the historical expressions of the “art of not being governed.”   
As developed nearly six years prior to the Enlightenment lecture, what Foucault defines 
here as the “critical attitude” becomes manifest and is elaborated not in terms of struggle 
against authority but, more specifically, as an “adversary to the arts of governing”—that 
is, “critique,” which as we have seen is the very task of philosophy for Foucault, now 
finds its political context within a critical ethos elaborated in terms of an “art of not being 
governed.”627  By locating the ethos of “critique” within the “art of not being governed,” 
Foucault begins to radically reframe history of the political in a vastly different manner 
that begins to afford primacy to the question of resistance.  
 In this way, if as Colin Gordon argues that the “governmental theme has a focal 
point in Foucault’s later philosophy,” then at the same time, this “focal point” ought not 
to be divorced from another series of questions located within the space he reserves for 
the “critical attitude.”628   To be sure, any reconsideration of the political possibilities 
afforded in Foucault’s thought necessarily requires not simply the consideration of the 
political problem of governmentality, but also the parallel counter-history of the “the art 
of not being governed.”  Against, then, the context of more traditional understandings of 
politics Foucault poses a counter-historical “political and moral attitude, a way of 
thinking” which, as a “first definition of critique,” assumes the following “general 
characterization: the art of not being governed quite so much.”629  Here, it is clear that 
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Foucault affirms a direct link between “critique” and resistance, wherein the notion of 
“critique” is accordingly defined as a specific art of not being governed.  Similar to the 
ways in which the methodology of “anarchaeology” takes as its starting point the “non-
necessity of power,” we can see here that “critique” begins with the non-necessity of 
government as the explicit starting point for a critical theory of politics.  Despite the 
importance Foucault ascribes to the relation between “critique” and the “art of not being 
governed,” critics engaging with the 1978 lecture often tend to discount the possible 
connection to anarchism in Foucault’s discussion of “critique.”630  Yet, while Foucault 
indeed remarks that the critical attitude does not mean that “governmentalization would 
be opposed in a kind of face-off by the opposite affirmation he does provide a general 
outline of what he means here by defining critique in terms of a specific “art of not being 
governed.”631  The critical attitude of the art of not being governed is, as Foucault 
maintains, a permanent “adversary to the arts of governing”—that is, it is characterized in 
terms of “an act of defiance…a challenge…a way of limiting these arts of governing and 
sizing them up, transforming them… [or] finding a way to escape from them.”632  As a 
permanent “adversary” to the art of governing, what Foucault outlines under “critique” 
can never be divorced from the very structure of the political; instead, rather the critical 
attitude of the art of not being governed—that is, the very historicity of revolt—is a 
constituent component of the domain of the political.     
With this preliminary definition acting as the locus from which to understand the 
political context of “critique,” Foucault additionally employs three “historical anchoring 
points” as examples of what he refers to as the art of not being governed.633  Foucault 
first traces the birth of the critical attitude in relation to the arts of governing that were 
still grounded in the authority of the church: “not wanting to be governed was a certain 
way of refusing, challenging, limiting ecclesiastical rule.”634  Second, the counter-
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practice of being governed is for Foucault a struggle against judicial and sovereign power 
rather than ecclesiastical rule.  Hence, “not to want to be governed like that also means 
not wanting to accept these laws because they are unjust, because, by virtue of their 
antiquity or the more or less threatening ascendancy given them by today’s sovereign, 
they hide a fundamental legitimacy.”635  Yet precisely because the art of not being 
governed is “confronted with government and the obedience it stipulates,” then the 
attitude of being critical raises the question, according to Foucault, of “natural law” in 
which “critique means putting forth universal and indefeasible rights to which every 
government…will have to submit.”636  Finally, “to not want to be governed” is as 
Foucault maintains “not accepting as true…what an authority tells you is true…but rather 
accepting it only if one considers valid the reasons for doing so” (original emphasis).637  
Thus, in its third anchoring point, the art of not being governed “finds its anchoring point 
in the problem of certainty in its confrontation with authority.”638  It is with these three 
“historical anchoring points”—the ecclesiastical, the juridical and the epistemic, or the 
triadic problematic of the “sovereign, the law, [and] the authority of dogmatism”—that 
Foucault elevates the art of not being governed as something of “capital importance in the 
history of Western culture.”639 
It is with this discussion of critique in relation to the general problematic of 
governmentality in which Foucault’s thought can be seen as formulating a new critical 
depth with regard to the ways in which to rethink both philosophy’s relationship to the 
question of politics and the very terms of the political.  The struggle between, or what 
Foucault refers to, as the historical “interplay of governmentalization and critique” is 
what he takes as the basic model of the domain of the political and politics insofar as it is 
tied to the development of the “critical attitude.”640  Situated amongst the current task to 
think through the postanarchist and metapolitical possibilities of a politics located at a 
distance from the state, Foucault’s thought prefigures these critical turns with the advent 
of a simple, yet nonetheless highly consequential, hypothesis that reframes the general 
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task of what might be developed into a philosophy of politics.  Against the history, both 
political and philosophical, which sought to elaborate the question of politics in terms of 
regimes of government, advice to the prince, or the problem of sovereignty—in short 
against the arts of governing, which have always been the history of the archipolitical—
Foucault asks if there might not be another way to think through the problem of politics 
and the domain of the political beginning with the art of not being governed.  Indeed, 
with the development of this concept of “critique,” Foucault unmasks a certain agonistic 
logic of struggle hidden beneath the problematic governmentality which allows him to 
offer a fundamental reinterpretation of the structure of the political.  The historical 
elaboration of the problem of government is both consequently and simultaneously the 
history of its impossibility—or the perpetual manifestation of the art of not being 
governed, which reveals, animates and gives presence to the perpetual “critical attitude” 
that haunts the historical problematic of governmentality.   
 In addition to beginning to rethink the terms of the political and the question of 
politics from the space of the art of not being governed, the struggle between 
governmentality and critique also marks an important synthesis or critical nexus binding 
together the three general problematics of Foucault’s thought to the question of 
resistance.  If as Foucault suggests in a 1982 essay titled “The Subject and Power” that 
the goal of his work has not simply been to analyze the problem of power, but instead to 
“create the history of the different modes by which, in our culture, beings are made 
subjects,” then the classification of his thought into three successive periods might be 
understood to correspond, as Foucault suggests here, with “three modes of objectification 
that transform human beings into subjects.”641  As outlined in “The Subject and Power,” 
Foucault discusses the way in which the problem of his archaeological period is to 
demonstrate the way in which the subject of discourse becomes a subject as such in 
relation to a problem of truth and discursive practices; the problem of his genealogical 
works focuses on the problem of subjectivity and power; and his final ethical periods 
focus on the problem of subjectivity, its relation to the self, and its possible 
transformation.  Truth, power, and the subject—with these three general thematics, 
Foucault provides a useful analytic tool for drawing connections amongst the different 
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periods of his thought.  At the same time, however, what is crucial is that it is these three 
problems which characterize the wide breadth of Foucault’s work are all rearticulated in 
relation to the coinciding problematics of governmentality and critique.   
Turning to a crucial passage from “What is Critique?,” Foucault suggests not only 
that the problem of government helps to elaborate the questions of truth, power, and the 
subject, but also that the question of critique—that is, of the “art of not being 
governed”—is additionally posed in relation to these three general problematics 
comprising the whole of his work.  For Foucault, then: 
the core of critique is basically made of the bundle of relationships that are tied to 
one another…power, truth and the subject.  And if governmentalization is indeed 
this movement through which individuals are subjected in the reality of a social 
practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say 
that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to 
question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of 
truth.  Well, then! critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of 
reflected intractability.  Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the 
subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.642 
The ethical relation between critique and “desubjugation of the subject” will be dealt with 
in chapter six.  Yet, it is essential here to point towards the ways in which Foucault 
frames the trajectory of his collected works, as well as the coinciding thematic problems 
associated with the differing periods of his work, not only to the movement of 
governmentalization (as is often the focal point), but also the counter-movement of 
“critique,” or what is interestingly referred to here as the movement of “voluntary 
insubordination.”  Crucially, while critics tend to focus on the ways in which Foucault’s 
analytics of power tend to override the possibility of agency and transformation, here we 
see that Foucault inscribes the possibility of radical agency into the heart of his work with 
the concept of “critique.”643  With “critique,” acting as the continuous thread throughout 
his work, Foucault importantly inscribes the art of not being governed as a key focal 
point for his thought; it is through the concept of “critique” and the coinciding question 
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643 See note 628 above.   
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of “how not to be governed” that one can begin to reread the general focus of Foucault’s 
collected works.  Furthermore, while Foucault is often criticized for understanding the 
subject as socially constructed by, and thus structurally bound, to the very forms of power 
he criticizes, with the notion of “critique” he provides an alternative framework from 
which to understand the problem of subjectivity, in which what is at stake is not the 
subject of power, but the “desubjugation of the subject” made possible through the 
position of “voluntary insubordination.”644  Here, rather than focusing on the ways in 
which relations of power create subjects, Foucault interestingly demonstrates that radical 
transformations in subjectivity are made possible not through power, but through 
resistance, or a unique form of political praxis as “voluntary insubordination.”     
As we saw in the 1984 lecture, Foucault’s poses a general problematic in relation 
to one’s voluntary submission to authority, and his counter-concept of “voluntary 
insubordination” as invoked here revisits this idea.  Foucault’s choice of words here 
importantly invokes the political problem of “voluntary servitude”—first articulated by 
one of the founders of modern political philosophy in France, Étienne De La Boétie.645  
                                                          
644 Foucault often makes claims that one of the key ramifications of power is the way in which it 
individualizes, and thus constitutes the subject as its vital effect.  Thus, as Foucault writes in Society Must 
Be Defended, “the individual is in fact a power-effect”—that is for Foucault, “power passes through the 
individuals it has constituted” (30).  Orthodox critics of Foucault often criticize him for this very 
construction, arguing that if the subject is in fact that which is created by and through power that 
Foucault revokes any possible agency.  Yet given that Foucault builds resistance and the possibility of 
freedom into power relations from the start, one can also point toward, as Foucault does, that resistance 
to power is also what forms the basis of subjectivity.   
645 See: Étienne De La Boétie, “The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude,” in The Politics of Obedience and 
Étienne De La Boétie, trans. Harry Kurz (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2007), 109-150.   Although Foucault 
does not cite La Boétie directly, it is clear that he is attempting to engage with and invoke an alternative 
political tradition from which he might be able to locate a basis to situate the “critical attitude” of the “art 
of not being governed.”  Furthermore, given the way in which Foucault historically locates the 
development of the critical attitude of the “art of not being governed” as arising with particular emphasis 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, La Boétie’s text can be seen as directly intervening and 
participating in the tradition Foucault hopes to reinvigorate.  Often overlooked by traditional political 
philosophers, La Boétie’s text, Discourse on Voluntary Servitude importantly presents a central problem 
for political theory that inverts the traditional manner in which the political is theorized.  La Boétie’s 
problematic of “voluntary servitude” cuts to the heart of and fundamentally reworks the tradition of 
political theory based on either advice to political leaders or theories seeking to legitimate sovereignty.  
With the notion of “voluntary servitude” La Boétie argues that the central problem of political philosophy 
must be elaborated around the problematic of political obedience—that is, for La Boétie, the principal 
problem that haunts political philosophy is why people willingly obey the commands of government.   In 
his investigations to the problematic of authoritarian governance and our voluntary submission to it, La 
Boétie radically rethinks the domain of the political in such a way that it begins with the position of 
disobedience.  The call for mass disobedience that frames La Boétie’s text, has often been recognized as 
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Written in the middle of the sixteenth century, la Boétie’s short text, Discourse of 
Voluntary Servitude (1550) is often considered a seminal text in the historical 
development of anarchist thought, and Foucault’s reference to this text is helpful in 
further outlining the ways in which the development of the critical attitude begins to posit 
an anarchist hypothesis of the political.646  La Boétie’s treatise utilizes the notion of 
“voluntary servitude” in order to preliminarily rethink the domain of the political from 
the opposite position to the problematic of sovereignty and archipolitical governmentality 
as later elaborated in the works of traditional philosophers such as Bodin and Hobbes.  
The treatise is coherently structured around a single problematic that inverts the entire 
tradition of Western political theory: according to La Boétie, the principle question 
political theory must engage with—a question that is still essential to contemporary 
thought, and one that Foucault directly attempts to reinvigorate—is why people willingly 
allow themselves to be governed.647   
As a key problematic posed in the Discourse of Voluntary Servitude, La Boétie 
addresses the voluntary subjective bond which ties us to that which dominates us.  In 
thinking through the problem of “voluntary servitude,” what is stake for La Boétie is that 
political power and coinciding question of government does not simply rely on coercion 
as a tactic oriented toward obedience but, more fundamentally, on our voluntary 
                                                          
an early example of anarchist political philosophy, and insofar as Foucault invokes this tradition in order 
to situate the critical attitude of the “art of not being governed,” the reference is helpful in articulating 
the way in which he builds the anarchist hypothesis into his work.       
646 It is not surprising that the call for mass disobedience which frames La Boétie’s text, has been 
considered integral and seminal to the historical development of anarchist thought, and several 
prominent anarchist thinkers such as Thoreau, Tolstoy and Tucker, amongst others, have utilized La 
Boétie’s analysis as a focal point for their own works.  Regarding the influence of La Boétie’s work in 
relation to anarchist theory see: Murray Rothbard’s introductory essay, “The Political Thought of Etienne 
De La Boëtie” in The Politics of Obedience and Etienne De La Boétie, ed. Paul Boonefon (New York: Black 
Rose Books, 2007), 10-12.  Indeed, given the influence La Boëtie has had on the development of anarchist 
thought, several anarchist historians have additionally pointed toward the ways in which La Boétie’s 
treatise prefigures what later would be developed as the philosophical and ethical basis of anarchism.  For 
the historical influence of La Boétie’s text in regard to anarchism see: Peter Marshall, Demanding the 
Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 109-112.  Postanarchist Saul Newman 
has more recently revisited La Boétie’s text in order to suggest that the problem of voluntary servitude 
still haunts political theory, and as such must be addressed in contemporary currents of anarchist theory.  
See: Saul Newman, “Voluntary Servitude Reconsidered.” In Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies, 1. 
(2010): 31-47.   
647 Etienne De La Boétie, Discourse on Voluntary Servitude, 116.  Here, La Boétie writes that “it is therefore 
the inhabitants themselves who permit, or, rather, bring about, their own subjection, since by ceasing to 
submit they would put an end to their servitude.”   
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submission to power.  In other words, our agential voluntary submission to power is, at 
the same time, precisely what constitutes the basis for the continuation of political power 
as such.  Thus, rather than reducing the question of the political and politics to the agency 
of political power, La Boétie redistributes agency to the people who allow themselves to 
be governed.  According to La Boétie, “[i]t is therefore the inhabitants themselves who 
permit, or, rather, bring about, their own subjection, since by ceasing to submit they 
would put an end to their servitude.”648   For La Boétie, then, if power depends upon our 
submission to it in order to constitute itself as such, then in order to resist the 
continuation of political power, what is required is the active withdrawal of our 
submission to political authority.  Through the development of what Foucault refers to as 
“voluntary insubordination” which begins with the proposition “[r]esolve to serve no 
more, and you are at once freed,”649 La Boétie radically inverts the political tradition 
based upon the primacy of the archipolitical.  Indeed, rather than assuming the necessity 
of obedience to governments, which for theorists like Hobbes, is a necessary component 
for the continuation of sovereignty, La Boétie begins from the position directly opposed 
to the history of the archipolitical, starting with primacy of freedom which, as he suggests 
“we are not only in possession of” but also “have urge to defend.”650  Although La 
Boétie’s treatise is set to investigate what he considers to be a vital problem traditionally 
ignored by political theorists, his analysis offers only a preliminary outline from which a 
thought of the political might emerge in line with Foucault.  Nonetheless, it is with 
reference to both the idea that the questions pertaining to the domain of the political 
might alternatively be rethought beginning from position of freedom and the will to 
defend it that Foucault takes as the basis for a fundamental reevaluation of the political.   
Through asserting the problematic of “voluntary insubordination” as a vital core 
to the elaboration of the “critical attitude,” it is clear that Foucault directly attempts to 
invoke and continue in the tradition initially articulated by La Boétie.  Given that 
                                                          
648 Ibid, 116.   
649 Ibid, 118-119.   
650 Ibid, 120. According to La Boétie, liberty is primary with regard to the problem of government.  Thus La 
Boétie writes: “it is therefore fruitless to argue whether or not liberty is natural, since none can be held in 
slavery without being wronged, and in a world governed by a nature, which is reasonable, there is nothing 
so contrary as an injustice.  Since freedom is our natural state, we are not only in possession of it but have 
the urge to defend it” 120.     
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Foucault builds the notion of “voluntary insubordination” as a vital element of the notion 
of critique—wherein what is insured is the space in which the problematic of 
governmentality can be both questioned and undermined—into the core of his thought, 
the critical problem of the “art of not being governed,” I suggest, constitutes not only the 
hidden locus of his thought, but a radical reframing of the terms of the political 
anarchically.  To recreate a theory of the political—which, as we have seen, is the 
fundamental task Foucault ascribes to the elaboration of the “critical attitude”—requires, 
then, with regard to La Boétie, a different topology of the political that begins in a radical 
condition of freedom on the one hand, and a voluntary agential will to resist—indeed to 
withdrawal from—the manifestation of government on the other.  Indeed, by turning, 
once again, to the essay “The Subject and Power” we can directly see how Foucault 
invokes La Boétie’s problematic in order to reframe the political from the point of view 
resistance.  If, for La Boétie, “voluntary servitude” marks the fundamental condition of 
government, Foucault suggests to the contrary that we ought to begin with the problem of 
resistance in order to avoid the condition of voluntary servitude.  In this regard, Foucault 
writes:     
The power relationship and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore be 
separated.  The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how 
could we seek to be slaves?).  At the very heart of the power relationship, and 
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of 
freedom.  Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to 
speak of an agonism of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement 
and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a 
permanent provocation.651 
In a similar manner to how the art of government can never be divorced from the critical 
question pertaining to “how not to be governed,” we see here that the question of power 
cannot be separated from “freedom’s refusal to submit.”  This is to suggest that, 
according to Foucault, the manifestation of power always meets with the potential of its 
own resistance, or the refusal to willingly submit to power.  Insofar as freedom is itself 
the precondition for both power and government, this means for Foucault that “power is 
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exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free.”652  In other words, if 
as Foucault maintains that power must be understood as the “government of men by other 
men,” then the very problematic of government necessarily “includes an important 
element: freedom.”653  Yet, consequently, insofar as freedom’s refusal to submit is itself a 
precondition of government, the domain of the political cannot therefore be reduced 
simply to the primacy of government; the precondition of power and the manifestation of 
government is itself marked by the permanent potential of resistance within the field of 
freedom.  This means for Foucault that the very permanence of the political is attested to 
by the ongoing struggle between relations of power and governmentality and the art of 
not being governed which, insofar as it acts as the very precondition of power and 
government attains a position of primacy in relation to the field of the political.    
Precisely because of this, the problem of the political is, as Foucault suggests 
here, not therefore simply a problem of “voluntary servitude”—which overemphasizes 
the role of power at the expense of resistance.  Instead, rather, what is at stake for 
Foucault—indeed, what lies at the “very heart of the power relationship”—is the 
problematic of resistance, or the simultaneity between the “recalcitrance of the will and 
the intransigence of freedom” which, when taken together, invert La Boétie’s critique of 
“voluntary servitude” to what Foucault’s theory of “voluntary insubordination.”  It is 
from this alternative position that Foucault begins to reframe the domain of the political 
not as an “essential antagonism,” but in terms of an ongoing “agonism,” or, “permanent 
provocation” which begins with, and takes as its very basis, the problematic of resistance 
as the referent for reframing the substance of the political.  It is this retheorization of the 
political that Foucault places as one of the central tasks for political theory.  Foucault 
writes: “I would say that the analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question of power 
relations and the ‘agonism’ between power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is 
an increasingly political task—even, the political task that is inherent in all social 
existence.”654       
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 If according to Foucault, the task in which political theorists must engage not only 
revolves around the question of power, but also an analysis of the fundamental agonism 
between power and resistance, then the elaboration of the “art of not being governed”—
which as he suggests in the 1978 lecture “has nothing to do with philosophy of history or 
the history of philosophy,” but is instead grounded in the framework of “historical-
philosophical practice”—is one of the key problems with which philosophy must attempt 
to engage.655  For Foucault, rather than a philosophical “investigation into the legitimacy 
of the historical modes of knowing,” or the political investigation into the effects of 
political power understood as “unique principle” and “domination,” what is at stake in the 
“historical-philosophical” element of “critique” is that the question of both philosophy 
and politics ought to be understood in terms of a strategic reversal, a reversal which 
begins as an art of not being governed.656  In this way, Foucault suggests that in order to 
adequately engage in the question of the political, “[o]ne always has to think about it [the 
political] in such a way as to see how it is associated with a domain of possibility and 
consequently, of reversibility, of possible reversal.”657  By rethinking the question of 
politics in terms of a “domain of possibility” in which the problem of government 
continuously comes into contact with its “possible reversal,” Foucault’s thought affirms 
the meta-political search for a theory of the political that cannot simply be reduced to the 
problem of governmentality and the state.  Indeed, the historical-philosophical practice of 
critique for Foucault is what makes possible and reframes the terms of the political as the 
movement of resistance; critique is the political theory which turns on a critical 
conception of resistance as the precondition for power relations as such.  For Foucault, 
what is at stake in the questions regarding both philosophy and politics is not the search 
for “transcendental or semi-transcendental” conditions of possibility that give primacy to 
the history of the archipolitical, but instead the critical topology in which the problems of 
authority and governmentality might be reversed.658  Foucault thus writes that the 
question posed for politics is: 
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[n]o longer through what error, illusion, or illegitimacy has knowledge come to 
induce effects of domination manifested in the modern world…but how can they 
instead be reversed or released from within a concrete strategic field, this concrete 
strategic field that induced them, starting with this decision not to be governed 
(my emphasis).659  
By reframing the basis of political philosophy in terms of a strategic “decision not to be 
governed,” Foucault crucially builds what I refer to as the anarchist hypothesis of the 
political into the core of his collected works, while simultaneously invoking what I will 
trace in the following chapter as the primacy of resistance.  What I refer to here as the 
anarchist hypothesis of the political does not simply mean that Foucault argues that the 
concept of the political cannot be reduced to the question of governmentality, but that in 
its non-reducibility to the problem of government, the political is itself that which starts 
with the critical “decision not to be governed.”  In other words, the domain of the 
political, for Foucault, is itself, what pivots not only on the question, but the permanent 
potentiality of resistance, a perpetual agonism between governmentalization and the 
counter-history of the art of not being governed which makes visible the domain of the 
political as such.  At the same time as Foucault locates a structure of permanent agonism 
at the heart of the political, he additionally posits an alternative methodological 
framework from which to reread the history of the political in such a way that places the 
art of not being governed in a primary relation with the history of governmentalization.    
With “What is Critique?” it is my contention that the ways in which Foucault 
suggests how the questions of politics and the political might be rethought from a 
position starting with a decisive will not to be governed, designates a unique political 
rationality opposed to the traditional logic of the archē.  Whereas, the notion of critique 
outlined in “What is Enlightenment?” is utilized in order to invoke a radical task for 
philosophy that, takes as its starting point, the irreducible critique of authority, in “What 
is Critique?” this “critical attitude” is coupled with and turns upon a “decisive will not to 
be governed.”  Indeed, with the concept of critique, it is my contention that Foucault at 
once invokes the concept of resistance as the critical agent that binds together his critical 
inquiries in to power, politics, and governmentality, as well as the key problematic to be 
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developed throughout his work.  Taken together, then, the element of “critique” in 
Foucault’s thought functions so as to anchor resistance not only as the central—indeed 
vital—component of his studies of power and governmentality, but also to his thought as 
a whole.  Furthermore, with the concept of “critique,” Foucault builds an anarchist 
hypothesis of the political in to the very core of his thought, not in terms of a fundamental 
anarchism, but rather in terms of a critical methodology, or “anarchaeology” which, in 
beginning with the non-necessity of power, refuses the traditional logic of the archē.  In 
addition, then, to the philosophical component of “critique,” which as I argued in the 
previous section begins with a radical critique of authority, this then is the other way in 
which we can now begin to posit a second element of the anarchist hypothesis that 
underpins Foucault’s thought.  Arising from the intersection between an irreducible 
critique of authority and a decisive will not to be governed, the domain of the political 
can be redefined as the field pertaining to and marked by the permanence of resistance; 
as a permanent an ongoing sphere of agonism between the art of governing and the art of 
not being governed, resistance composes the substance of the political, and is therefore 
the condition of possibility for the political as such.  This means, however, both that 
resistance is primary in relation to the history of the political and is that which makes 
visible the political as such.     
In chapter one, I cited a passage from Benjamin Tucker’s text, Individual, Society, 
and the State in which he claims that a philosophy of politics is made possible only upon 
articulating a key distinction between government and resistance.  A reconsideration of 
this passage can now be posed in light of the intervention I think Foucault makes in 
regard to this tradition.  Tucker writes: “the distinction between invasion and resistance, 
between government and defense is vital.  Without it there can be no valid philosophy of 
politics.”660  It is now clear that Foucault’s critical thought attempts to rethink the 
possibility of a philosophy of politics in terms of vital distinction between government 
and resistance, and as such can be understood as contributing to the anarchist tradition 
invoked by Tucker.  The distinction between governmentality and the critical attitude 
generated around the question “how not to be governed” acts as both the framework and 
referent from which a new political theory that does not culminate in the problematic of 
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governmentality might emerge.  Yet, while Tucker and Foucault collide in rethinking the 
possibility of a philosophy of politics derived from a key distinction between 
governmentality and resistance—that is, between the art of governing and the art of not 
being governed—what makes Foucault’s theory particularly significant is not simply the 
distinction between government and resistance, but how the question of politics can be 
released from the tradition of the archē starting with a decisive will not to be governed.  
In other words, Foucault redefines the political not simply in terms of a distinction 
between archipolitical and the an-archipolitical, but from the perspective that affords 
primacy to the question of resistance itself.  In this way, Foucault does not reframe the 
political in terms of static dualisms between the state and non-state, government and 
anarchy, or resistance and power; instead rather, starting with the decisive will not to be 
governed Foucault reveals that resistance designates the condition of possibility of power 
and politics.  Reframing the domain of the political from the point of view of resistance 
means that the potentiality for resistance is the anarchic spacing that provides the 
irreducible condition to both confront and escape the history of governmentality, and as 
such acts as the key referent from which a new thought of the political might arise that 
could never assume the form of an archē.  Precisely because Foucault rethinks the 
problem of the political through resistance, his theory also invokes and even turns upon 
anarchism; resistance as the very substance of the political invokes anarchism not in 
terms of a prescriptive outline for a future society to come, but a gesture that embodies 
the disruption of the archē that has hitherto grounded the political and the question of 
politics within the space of government.    
At the same time, however, as Foucault’s thought can be seen as directly invoking 
an affinity with anarchist political theory through the concept of “critique” and the 
coinciding problematic of the art of not being governed, I must be careful in asserting an 
immediate relationship between anarchist political theory and what Foucault develops 
through the problematic of critique and resistance.  Although a certain affinity between 
Foucault and anarchism might now appear more transparent in regard to what I have 
outlined thematically under “the art of not being governed,”—a problematic that finds its 
expression and framework within the history of anarchism—critics of Foucault have 
continuously denied the possibility of this very connection.  Noting the bewilderedness 
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and general confusion arising from the attendees of Foucault’s 1978 lecture concerning 
the critical discourse of the “art of not being governed,” biographer James Miller writes 
that “[t]he philosophers in his audience were struck by the strangeness of this conclusion, 
particularly coming from Michel Foucault.”661  Traditionally, critics have continued to be 
perplexed by Foucault’s remarks throughout this lecture, and subsequent theorists often 
discount or outright deny the possibility of a relation to anarchism that underpins 
Foucault’s work.  In particular. certain theorists have pointed out how the “unqualified 
will not to be governed” Foucault speaks of in the lecture form 1978 contradicts his 
earlier work in which “there was never an anarchistic will not to governed at all.”662  
Even those sympathetic to both anarchism and Foucault, such as Judith Butler, have 
denied the possibility of anarchist politics arising from elaboration of the “critique” and 
the “art of not being governed.”  As Butler writes in her short essay on the idea of 
“critique” in Foucault’s thought, through the framework of the “art of not being 
governed,” Foucault “is not posing the possibility of radical anarchy, and that the 
question [‘how not to be governed’] is not how to become radically ungovernable.”663  
Yet as we have seen, this is not the position Foucault takes in regard to the problem of 
“critique.”  Instead of positing an essential foundation from which the art of not being 
governed arises historically, Foucault maintains to the contrary that what is at stake is to 
rethink the very structure of power relations, governmentality, and domain of the political 
with regard to the primacy of resistance.  Nevertheless, to make her claim, Butler turns to 
the question and answer period following the lecture “What is Critique?,” where Foucault 
is asked whether or not his expression—“the art of not being governed—depends either 
on positing anarchism as a sort of essential “foundation” against the monolithic project of 
governmentality, or whether the expression culminates in resistance as a political 
practice.664  Foucault’s response is crucial in outlining precisely what he means be that art 
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662 David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance, 99.   
663 Judith Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”, 6.   
664 Butler is referring to the question posed by Jean-louis Bruch which is posed as follows: “I would like to 
ask a question about an expression which is central to your presentation, but which was formulated in 
two ways which seemed different to me.  At the end, you spoke of “the decision-making will not to be 
governed” as a foundation or a reversal of the Aufklärung which was the subject of your talk.  In the 
beginning, you spoke of “not being governed like that,” of “not being governed so much,” of “not being 
governed at such a price.”  In one case, the expression is absolute, in the other it is relative, and according 
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of not being governed and its possible relation to anarchist theory.  Strikingly, Foucault’s 
response reveals a fundamental similarity between critique and what he in 1980 refers to 
as “anarchaeology,” whereby he refuses to exclude the possible of a critical anarchism in 
his work.    
Although, Foucault’s critics typically turn to his answer at the end of his 1978 
lecture in order to deny the more radical nature of some of his claims, the way in which 
he responds to this question helps to both unpack what he means by the “decision not to 
be governed” and how his general thought does not hinge upon a fundamental anarchism, 
but rather upon the question of anarchy as manifest in the history of resistance.  Indeed, 
whereas Butler denies both the possibility of anarchism as a critical framework for 
Foucault’s thought, his response directly invokes these two positions in a way that cannot 
be overlooked.  Foucault’s response is as follows: 
I do not think that the will not to be governed at all is something that one could 
consider an originary aspiration.  I think that, in fact, the will not to be governed 
is always the will not to be governed thusly, like that, by these people, at this 
price.  As for the expression of not being governed at all, I believe it is the 
philosophical and theoretical paroxysm of something that would be this will not to 
be relatively governed…I was not referring to something that would be a 
fundamental anarchism, that would be like an originary freedom, absolutely and 
wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalization.  I did not say it, but this 
does not mean that I absolutely exclude it.665   
Similar to the way in which Foucault argues that “anarchaeology” begins with the “non-
necessity of power” as the theoretical standpoint that allows him rethink the analytics of 
power and government, here we see that the expression of the art of not being governed is 
where Foucault locates the historical specificity of this non-necessity of power, or, 
anarchaeological approach to the study of politics.  What is at stake for Foucault in 
thinking through the significance of the philosophical and political expression of “not 
                                                          
to what criteria?  Is it because of having felt the abuse of governmentalization that you come to the 
radical position, “the decision-making will not to be governed.”  I am asking this question, and finally 
doesn’t this last position need to be in turn the object of an investigation, a questioning that would in 
essence, be philosophical” (WC 75).   
665 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?”, 75. 
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being governed at all” lies not in posing a “fundamental anarchism” that invokes a 
monolithic and universal “originary freedom” against the history of governmentality.  
Instead rather, and this is crucial, what is at stake in the expression the “art of not being 
governed” first emerges in posing the question of anarchism in terms of the relative and 
historical specificity of resistance; the art of not being governed invokes an affinity with 
anarchism not as a fundamental foundation, but as the expressions manifest, in all their 
relative historical specificity, of the manifestations of resistance.  Foucault thus inscribes 
revolt into the history of politics—that is, revolt has a historicity of its own, and as such a 
theory of the political must include the principle of revolt as a vital component.  This is 
why Foucault continuously reiterates that the political will not to be governed is “always 
the will not to be governed thusly,” and yet, at the same time, this “will not to be 
governed” is according to Foucault the historical condition of politics, and as such cannot 
be divorced from the very structure of the political.   
Insofar as the art of not being governed always arises in particular historical, 
social, and political contexts, what Foucault develops through the problematic of critique 
is neither the prescription of a general political theory, nor the description of a 
fundamental essentialism “resistant to governmentalization,” but the preliminary 
elaboration of a theory of politics in which what must be explored is the political question 
of resistance.  At the same time, however, as Foucault significantly points toward here, 
the “expression of not being governed at all” is additionally demarcated as a 
“philosophical and theoretical paroxysm” which although does not necessarily rely upon 
a “fundamental anarchism,” cannot fully “exclude it” either.  As we saw in Foucault’s 
description of “anarchaeology,” his methodology does not fully exclude the possibility of 
anarchism as a critical link in his thought and work; here, in a strikingly similar manner, 
Foucault once again reiterates that his critical theory of “critique” and the ethics of “the 
art of not being governed” cannot fully exclude the possibility of anarchism.  Foucault’s 
choice of words here helps to explain what initially appears as a fundamental 
contradiction endemic to this lecture.  As a philosophical paroxysm—that is, as an 
uncontrollable emotion or attitude of “being critical”—the expression “not to be 
governed at all” invokes anarchism not as the essence of resistance, but as the “critical 
attitude” which, as we have seen, takes as its basis and starting point the decision not to 
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be governed, and as such acts as the critical turning point from the political can be 
interpreted anarchically through the permanence of resistance.             
Rather than developing an inconsistent framework for critical thought, the 
expression “not to be governed at all” has both a historical-political dimension and a 
coinciding philosophical attitude.  For Foucault, then, there are thus two dimensions 
developed through the concept of critique which required for an anarchist theory of 
politics and a radical reframing of the terms of the political.  Thus, in his concluding 
response to the question posed to Foucault at the end of the 1978 lecture, he writes: “[i]f 
we were to explore this dimension of critique”—that is, if we are to explore the critical 
question how not to be governed—“would we not then find that it is supported by 
something akin to the historical practice of revolt, the non-acceptance of a real 
government, on the one hand, or, on the other, the individual experience of the refusal of 
governmentality.”666  Rather than a “fundamental anarchism” or essential substance from 
which resistance arises, the art of not being governed is what emerges in practices of 
revolt; it is this historicity of revolt and not an essential ground for resistance, that 
Foucault urges us to take as the basic analytic framework for a new thought of the 
political.  It is at the intersection of these two axes—the critical position that begins with 
a “non-acceptance of real government” and the coinciding form of politics of resistance 
to governmentality—that what I have referred to as the anarchist hypothesis of the 
political arises in Foucault’s thought.   A politics and coinciding political theory that does 
not culminate in rationality of governmentality which, as we have seen for Foucault, is 
the task of philosophy, cannot be divorced from the historical and philosophical question 
of resistance, and it is with this logic—the logic that the political will is a will not to be 
governed—that Foucault’s thought develops and begins with an anarchist hypothesis of 
the political. 
3.4 Towards a Theory of the Primacy of Resistance 
 
That the history of political thought which, traditionally reduces the questions of politics 
and the terms of the political to the manifestation of the archipolitical, might be radically 
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rethought through the critical framework of the “art of not being governed” is one of 
Foucault’s greatest contributions to political theory.  Indeed, consequent upon, the ways 
in which the analytic and material framework for political theory traditionally affords 
primacy to the problematic of government, the importance of Foucault’s intervention 
arises in both his critical exploration of a history of politics conditioned by resistance 
while at the same time redefining and locating the basis for critical philosophy from the 
position of resistance.  Focusing on this interplay between these two ideas, David 
Couzens Hoy usefully employs the terms “critical resistance,” or the idea that “critique 
without resistance is empty and resistance without critique is blind” to suggest a guiding 
thread in Foucault’s thought. 667  Given that the general lacuna of Foucault’s thought is 
often articulated as being motivated from a critical inquiry into the problematic of power, 
we can now add that it is rather the concept of resistance that is divisive in understanding 
the complexities of his thought and his analytics of power and governmentality.  In other 
words, if “Foucault is accepted as being a theorist of power,” then as Johanna Oksala 
correctly maintains “we also have to read him as a theorist of resistance.”668  To be sure, 
the interplay between critique and resistance—that is, of “critical resistance”—marks the 
general thread connecting the different periods characterizing Foucault’s thought, while 
at the same time demarcating a different framework in order to engage with a theory of 
the political beginning with the critical position that takes resistance as the primary 
domain of the political.   
What is at stake in positing an anarchist hypothesis of the political at the base of 
Foucault’s thought is not simply that he introduces the notion of resistance as a concept 
which, although has been commonly neglected in the history of political thought, might 
be repositioned as a grand reversal to the problematic of governmentality.  Rather, what 
is at stake is that resistance itself needs to be understood, analytically and practically, as 
an altogether different phenomenon than power, and as such requires a completely 
different analytic and methodological framework from which to understand the field of 
the political consequent to the permanence of resistance amongst the very dynamic of 
politics.  It is in this way that what I have outlined as the anarchist hypothesis of the 
                                                          
667 David Couzens Hoy, Critical Resistance, 6.   
668 Johanna Oksala, “Resistance,” 432.   
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political—or that which begins with the idea that the historical possibility of government 
can never be separated from the art of not being governed—demonstrates how Foucault’s 
works and methodology turn upon the development of the concept of resistance in two 
ways essential to the development of a new framework for a theory of the political 
emancipated from the problem of governmentality.  Politically, resistance becomes 
manifest within the framework of the art of not being governed as the taking place or 
“experience of the refusal of governmentality,” while, philosophically, resistance is 
manifest in the critical attitude that takes the “non-acceptance of a real government” as 
the theoretical standpoint from which an analytic framework for the study of the political 
might begin.  In both instances, what is at stake for Foucault, is that if a reanalysis of the 
terms of the political in its irreducibility to the state is possible, then one must begin with 
the question of resistance—that is, resistance must be articulated not only as analytically 
different in kind from power, but as primary with the history of governmentality, and 
therefore as the vital component of the domain of the political.  If a redefinition of the 
terms of the political beyond the principle of governmentality is possible—that is if an 
alternative philosophy of politics is possible—it is only through the logic of the primacy 
of resistance which, in its irreducibility to the history of the archipolitical, provides the 
condition to both confront and escape the history governmental rationality and practice. 
That is, if a critical theory of politics irreducible to the logic of the archē is possible, such 
a conception begins with an analysis of the counter-historical movements of resistance 
through which politics emerges as a distinct art of not being governed. 
This chapter has attempted, through a rereading of Foucault’s thought in relation 
to the development of the general problematic of “critique,” to reformulate a radically 
alternative framework from which to understand the domain of the political.  By 
introducing the concept of resistance through the corresponding notion of “critique” I 
have argued that Foucault formulates a unique methodological framework from which 
reorient the notion of resistance as the primary component of the domain of the political.  
In doing so, I have not simply sought to draw connections between Foucault and the 
history of anarchist thought, but that Foucault builds an anarchist hypothesis of the 
political into the core of his thought.  In this regard, we have seen that rather than 
reducing the sphere of the political to the historical operability of governmentality, 
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Foucault reverses the archic principle that has hitherto structured Western political 
thought, and as such takes the notion of resistance as the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the political in its agonistic specificity.  Secondarily, I have also sought to 
elevate the notion of resistance as the crucial—indeed vital—concept that binds together 
the larger trajectory of Foucault’s thought, and therefore set forth the claim that resistance 
might subsequently allow for a new reading of Foucault’s collected works.  Utilizing the 
framework provided by the intersection between “critique” and the “art of not being 
governed” developed throughout this chapter in order to both outline a unique relation 
between anarchism and Foucault, as well as a general framework from which the notion 
resistance is understood as an internal and ineliminable aspect of political theory, the 
following chapter is set to further elucidate and situate the concept of resistance as the 
central problem elaborated in Foucault’s analytic of power.  More specifically, in the 
following chapter, it is my contention that what must be at stake in attempt to open the 
space for political theory and praxis situated at the horizon of governmentality, hinges on 
elaborating Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from the first volume of the History of 
Sexuality as the principle of intelligibility through which the questions of power and 
politics emerge as a unique paradigm of resistance. 
 Although Foucault does not explicitly draw the connection between his 
genealogy of being critical and what I will outline in the following chapter as the primacy 
of resistance, the dynamic between governmentalization and “critique” echoes the 
dynamic between power and resistance first sketched in the History of Sexuality.  As I 
argue in the following chapter, Foucault’s thesis which posits that resistance must be 
understood as primary with power, incorporates a radical claim which reverses the 
essential being-political of politics.  Taking the permanent interplay between 
governmentality and resistance as the very substance of politics, Foucault provides an 
alternative analytic grid or principle of intelligibility for a critical theory of the political 
which, in locating the question of resistance as the vital component of politics, reverses 
the paradigms of orthodox political theory.  As such, whereas this chapter was set to 
outline the ways in which Foucault creates the philosophical and political framework 
from which to situate the concept of resistance as the vital principle through which the 
political can be understood anarchically, the following chapter more directly addresses 
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Foucault’s theory of resistance—what I will elaborate as the primacy of resistance—as 
the hidden locus for political thought and politics.   
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Chapter 4 
4 The Primacy of Resistance  
 
If societies persist and live, that is, if the powers that be are not “utterly absolute,” it is 
because, behind all of the submissions and coercions, beyond the threats, the violence, 
and the intimidations, there is the possibility of that moment when life can no longer be 
bought, when the authorities can no longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows 
and the machine guns, people revolt.669 
 
In order for power relations to come into play, there must be a certain degree of freedom 
on both sides…This means that in power relations there is necessarily the possibility of 
resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, 
deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), there would be no power 
relations at all.670  
--Michel Foucault 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea of “critique” as a vital concept within 
Foucault’s critical lexicon, and argued that through this concept Foucault both introduces 
the notion of resistance as the key concept developed throughout his thought, as well as 
the constituent component from which the field of the political can be rethought 
anarchically.  More specifically, it was my contention that Foucault’s anarchaeological 
approach to the study of governmentality and the corresponding ethos of “critique” 
reveals a preliminary framework for developing what I refer to as an anarchist hypothesis 
of the political in which the history of government is simultaneously parallel with the 
counter-historical movements of resistance manifest in terms of an “art of not being 
governed.”  Against the history of political thought which traditionally reduces both 
politics and the terms of the political to the paradigm of government and the primacy of 
the state, the ways in which the political might be rethought in terms of a permanent and 
ongoing struggle between the art of governing and the art of not being governed is 
Foucault’s greatest contributions to the history of political philosophy.  With the notion 
of “critique” as such designating the philosophical framework for Foucault’s critical 
                                                          
669 Michel Foucault, “Useless to Revolt?” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. James D. 
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 1994), 449-450. 
670 Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” in Ethics, Subjectivity, 
and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 
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inquiries into the studies of power, politics, and governmentality, the corresponding 
question of resistance is what helps formulate a unique solidarity between Foucault and 
anarchist theory.  Indeed, consequent upon the ways in which the analytic and material 
framework for political theory traditionally affords primacy to the problematic of 
government, the importance of Foucault’s intervention within anarchist political theory 
arises in both his critical exploration of a history of politics conditioned by resistance 
while at the same time redefining and locating the basis for a critical inquiry into the 
domain of the political from the perspective of resistance.  Taking seriously the notion 
that an alternative theory of the political—indeed an anarchist hypothesis of the 
political—can be made in regard to the question of resistance, what is at stake in this 
chapter is that such a theory ultimately first finds its basis in Foucault’s fifth thesis on 
power as initially proposed in The History of Sexuality.   
Utilizing the theoretical space of the anarchist hypothesis of the political, this 
chapter discusses Foucault’s important contribution to the often neglected questions 
pertaining to the relationship between politics, power, and resistance.  Taking the 
permanent interplay between power and resistance as the principle of intelligibility of the 
power and politics, this chapter argues that Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of 
Sexuality posits what I refer to as the primacy of resistance, in which the question of 
politics is reinvigorated and made possible only insofar as resistance is to be understood 
as a vital, permanent characteristic of power.  In rereading Foucault’s analytic of power 
from the perspective of resistance, the approach taken in this chapter goes against much 
of the conventional literature written on the question of power in The History of 
Sexuality.  Standard interpretations generally read the text as pertaining to Foucault’s 
ongoing “process of rethinking his analysis of modern power,”671 and further that 
“Foucault’s key claim” in The History of Sexuality is that “mechanisms of power in the 
West have been profoundly transformed” into what is referred to for the first time in this 
text as “biopower.”672  Thus, in their influential reading of Foucault, Dreyfus and 
Rabinow maintain that the “two interconnected concepts around which Foucault 
                                                          
671 Richard A. Lynch, “Reading The History of Sexuality, Volume 1,” in A Companion to Foucault, eds. 
Christopher Falzon, et al. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 159. 
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organizes his writings in the 1970s are the repressive hypothesis and bio-technico-power” 
(original emphasis).673  While it is incontestable that Foucault situates his thought in The 
History of Sexuality at the intersection between these theories of power, it is my 
contention that standard interpretations often neglect to notice how his changing analytic 
of power in this text is fundamentally framed within the context of rethinking the 
question of resistance amongst this dynamic, and further how the question of resistance 
ultimately changes how power can be conceived.  Indeed, although the importance of the 
concept of “biopower” for Foucault should not be underestimated, the attention given by 
scholars to the final chapter, “The Right of Death and the Power over Life,” has 
overshadowed the importance Foucault attributes to the theory of resistance underlying 
his changing analytic of power at this time.  As I will argue, insofar as resistance is 
understood by Foucault as a constituent component of power and politics, then a critical 
theory of the political can no longer rely on the paradigms of government and sovereignty 
as the basic point of departure for the study of politics and power relations as such.  
Rather than reducing Foucault’s work in The History of Sexuality to question of 
“biopower,” the general focus of this chapter is to demonstrate, to the contrary, how 
Foucault’s radical inscription of resistance into the dynamic field of power relations 
ultimately changes the way in which power and politics can be conceived.    
Against reducing the problem of resistance to the question of power, as is often 
the case in readers of Foucault, the basic theme of this chapter is neither to simply affirm 
the place of resistance in Foucault’s thought, nor to trace the use of the concept 
chronologically throughout his work.  Instead, the central goal of this chapter is twofold: 
to demonstrate how Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of Sexuality vitally turns 
upon an alternative critical theory of resistance that acts as the conceptual nexus from 
which the question of power can be rethought agonistically, and to further explicate how 
this theory of resistance as such directly corresponds with an alternative principle of 
intelligibility for an anarchist theory of the political.  After addressing the critical 
reception of Foucauldian resistance from which my own reading intervenes, I first attend 
to the critical and theoretical context surrounding The History of Sexuality in order to 
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demonstrate how the critique of sovereignty that marks the pivotal turning point of 
Foucault’s analytic of power itself turns upon reinvigorating the question of resistance 
amongst this analytic.  Here, I maintain that Foucault’s text is itself framed not in terms 
of rethinking the general problem of power, but as a fundamental way to rethink the 
question of resistance often neglected in traditional theories of power.   
With this is mind, I then trace and explicate Foucault’s work regarding the critical 
question of resistance as initially broached in the fifth thesis on power in The History of 
Sexuality, amongst other key texts and lectures, in order to demonstrate how Foucault’s 
analytic of power ultimately reveals the logic of the primacy of resistance at its base.  As 
I will demonstrate, Foucault’s fifth thesis at once has the strategic effect of transforming 
the traditional notions of power and politics, while further offering a novel reading of the 
question of resistance.  Placing specific emphasis on Foucault’s fifth thesis, my intention 
is to outline certain theses on resistance which might act as a preliminary framework for 
beginning to transcend the Aristotelian and Schmittian theories of the political, while 
further tracing how the primacy of resistance allows for a unique connection to be drawn 
with anarchist political theory.  With the rationale of the primacy of resistance acting as 
the conceptual hinge from which to read the coinciding problematics of power and 
politics, this chapter ultimately explores how Foucault in turn offers a radically new 
perspective from which to begin to read the structure and form of the political as a 
permanent sphere of agonistic struggle between power and resistance.  As we will see, by 
beginning to rethink the general problematic of power through the question of resistance, 
Foucault discovers a new logic for political theory that can be described as the critical 
transition from the principle of an archē in which the question of politics is reduced to the 
problematic of governmentality and the logic of the state, to that of an agōn, wherein 
resistance designates the constituent component through which the fields of power and 
the political emerge. 674  A critical explanation of the primacy of resistance and its 
                                                          
674 In its broadest sense, the term, agōn, in Ancient Greek refers to a fundamental struggle or contest 
between opposing and adversarial forces.  Historically, the term has been used as a key reference in 
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Foucault’s early use of the term agōn, see: (Lectures on the Will to Know, 36; 75-76; 91; 101).  Throughout 
these lectures, Foucault often invokes the concept of agōn to describe the way in which forms of the 
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relation to the elaboration of an anarchist hypothesis of the political is therefore the 
essential task of this chapter. 
4.1 Critical Reception of Foucauldian Resistance 
 
Although I am not the first to speak of the problem of resistance in Foucault’s thought, 
the literature regarding the question of resistance is rather minute in comparison to the 
volumes of work dedicated to the problem of power.  For those critical commentators 
who have engaged with the question of resistance, even the most generous of his critics 
have never agreed upon the validity of the concept of resistance, nor have they outlined 
its significance in relation to political theory.  As one commentator points out, “any 
reasonable interpretation of Foucauldian resistance will necessarily have a large amount 
of indeterminacy.”675  To be sure, the question of resistance remains one of the more 
misunderstood, underestimated, and contested concepts in all of Foucault’s critical 
lexicon.  Some of the ambiguity derives from the ways in which Foucault appears to 
dedicate a stronger focus to the concept of “power” within his work, while only 
occasionally engaging with the problem of resistance as an afterthought to his analytics 
of power and governmentality.  Thus, the most common conviction held by his critics is 
that “Foucault’s conceptualization of resistance is truncated compared to his work on 
power because he did not study resistance historically in as much detail as power.”676  In 
his study of Foucault’s place in the history of political theory, Kelly similarly indicates 
that “if Foucault’s remarks on power are schematic, his remarks on resistance are merely 
suggestive.”677  To be sure, a large portion of the literature regarding Foucauldian 
resistance and the subsequent theory that surrounds it have regularly continued to reduce 
                                                          
assertion of truth arises from a struggle between adversaries.  “Truth,” according to Foucault, is therefore 
“a phase of the agōn, one of the faces of struggle” (75).  While to my knowledge Foucault ceases to use 
the term agōn explicitly, instead often preferring the term “agonism” to describe the struggles between 
forces, it is my contention that Foucault’s analytic of power and critical inquiries into the question of 
politics invoke the notion of an agōn as the basis from which to describe how the field of power always 
coincides with the space of resistance.  To be sure, what is crucial about Foucault’s intervention into the 
history of political thought arises in the way that the very questions of power and politics is situated 
within a domain of an agōn instead of an archē.   
675 Brett Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance,” 461. 
676 Jon Simons, “Power, Resistance, and Freedom,” 310. 
677 Mark G. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 105. 
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the question of resistance in Foucault’s work to a theoretical flaw inconsistent with his 
general analytic of power and governmentality.    
While it is true (at least to a certain extent) that Foucault does not undertake a full 
study of the question of resistance in the same way that he does for power, the general 
problematic of resistance, however, traverses the core of Foucault’s thought.  A close 
reading of Foucault’s texts, lectures, and interviews throughout the 1970s and early 1980s 
reveals a strong engagement with the question of resistance, as well as a rich history 
regarding the ways in which these forms of resistance are expressed as an art of not being 
governed.  To be sure, as I will argue throughout this chapter, resistance designates the 
conceptual hinge required for a full understanding of Foucault’s analytic of power.  In 
this way, arguments pertaining to the way in which Foucault’s theory of power truncates 
his discussion of resistance, as discussed by critics such as Simons, tend to neglect a 
critical dimension of Foucault’s thought.678  In light of these concerns, one of the goals of 
this chapter is to demonstrate the possibility of a novel reading of the question of 
resistance in Foucault’s thought.  Rather than failing to account for its possibility 
amongst his analytic of power, resistance, I maintain, is itself a necessary component of 
Foucault’s analytics of power and governmentality without which the latter would not be 
possible.  
Although Foucault often emphasizes the significance of the concept and practice 
of resistance as vital conceptual component to his political and ethical thought, the theory 
of resistance that lies at the heart of his work is, as to be expected, one of the more 
criticized and disputed areas of his thought.  As feminist and Foucauldian philosopher 
Johanna Oksala suggests, the concept of “resistance is one of the most contested and 
divisive” concepts in Foucault’s critical thought.679   At once controversial and decisive, 
the concept of resistance, it seems, appears as a theoretical impasse internal to Foucault’s 
analytics of power and governmentality.  On the one hand, the concept of “resistance” is 
often contested on the ground that Foucault’s analytic of power is so pervasive that no 
resistance to relations of power are possible, even conceptually.  More generously, the 
                                                          
678 See: Jon Simons, “Power, Resistance, and Freedom,” 310.  While Simons affirms the importance of 
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concept of resistance, as Oksala argues, ought to be understood as a central component of 
Foucault’s thought and is therefore decisive insofar as it is the very “key to understanding 
what power is about.”680  While Foucault’s critics tend to focus on the question of power 
while disregarding an genuine credit to his theory of resistance, this chapter explores and 
affirms the idea that Foucault’s analytics of power can only be understood on condition 
of resistance.   
Given that much of the literature on Foucault’s theory of resistance often repeats 
(albeit with slight variations) similar shared concerns, the most commonly emphasized 
areas of concern can be placed into three common criticisms.  The first, and most 
frequently reiterated, criticism directed at the question of Foucauldian resistance argues 
that, given the analytic of power as developed in both Discipline and Punish and The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault cannot explain (either conceptually or practically) how it is 
possible to engage in resistance to the very forms of power outlined in his genealogical 
studies.  Taking what Foucault refers to in The History of the Sexuality in terms of the 
“omnipresence of power”681 as an example of his failure to account for the possibility of 
resistance, critics such as Habermas682 and Thomas McCarthy683 traditionally argue that 
Foucault’s conception of theory of resistance is both theoretically and practically self-
refuting.  Furthermore, following in the wake of Habermas, more recent critics such as 
Kevin Anderson,684 John Holloway,685 and Slavoj Žižek686 claim that Foucault’s theory 
of resistance therefore lacks a critical conception of emancipation whereby a subject 
might be able to escape a certain relation of power, and subsequently maintain that his 
account of resistance cannot, under pain of contradiction, allow for a critical 
                                                          
680 Ibid, 432.   
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possibility” of a critical emancipation “is an endlessly shifting constellation of power and resistance,” 40.     
686 See: Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 1999), 255.  Here Žižek argues that insofar as 
Foucault’s work designates the “absolute inherence of resistance to power” then Foucault appears to 
“draw the conclusion that resistance is co-opted in advance, that it cannot seriously undermine the 
system,” 255.   
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conceptualization of freedom.  The second traditional area of criticism problematizing the 
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought claims that his theory deceptively lacks a 
normative framework to describe why resistance is to be preferred over submission.  
Here, theorists such as Fraser,687 Hartstock,688 and Pickett689 argue that Foucault comes 
close to positing the absolute necessity of resistance without regard to any normative or 
ethical basis from which resistance as such might be justified, and furthermore that he 
cannot provide an answer pertaining to the question of why one might choose to resist in 
a given circumstance.  Finally, despite Foucault’s consistent arguments against an 
underlying essentialism hidden in his analytics of power and resistance, Colin Gordon 
maintains that Foucault’s conception of resistance implicitly relies upon a transcendental 
substance of being-resistance, or agonal subjectivity that always underlies relations of 
power.690       
While these areas often form the general locus from which Foucault’s theory of 
resistance is found to be critically inadequate, the work engaged in outlining a critical 
analysis of a Foucauldian theory of resistance has nevertheless only scarcely been 
outlined.  There have been, however, a few notably affirmative readings of the concept of 
resistance in Foucault’s thought.  Briefly exploring these alternative readings is useful in 
providing the critical framework for my own affirmation of Foucauldian resistance, while 
further outlining a theoretical basis from which to overcome the core concerns 
traditionally invoked to disprove the possibilities afforded by a Foucauldian theory of 
resistance.  Perhaps the first reading that directly engages with and affirms the question 
of resistance in Foucault’s thought can be found in Gilles Deleuze’s text Foucault 
                                                          
687 Nancy Fraser, “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions,” in Unruly 
Practices: Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (Minnesota: Polity Press, 1989). 
688 See: N. Hartstock, “Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?” in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. L. 
Nicholson (Routledge: New York, 1990), 157-175.   
689 Pickett, “Foucault and the Politics of Resistance,” 445-466.  Given that Foucault does not supply an 
ethical framework for differing forms of resistance Pickett argues that Foucault’s theory of resistance is 
fundamentally faced with a theoretical impasse, or “double-bind,” in which Foucault is either forced to 
“remain trapped in modern power,” or forced to “celebrate a resistance without limits,” 445.   
690 Colin Gordon, “Afterword” in Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980), 229-259.  In Gordon’s analysis, inasmuch as “the facts of resistance are 
nevertheless assigned an irreducible role within the analysis,” Foucault’s theory seems to implicitly imply 
a “resistant material,” or essential substance hidden beneath power and that makes resistance to power 
possible (255).     
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originally published just a few short years after his friend and colleague’s death in 1984.  
Organized around the guiding theme of Foucault’s philosophy—that is, of “thinking 
otherwise”691—the strength of Deleuze’s text arises in the way that he highlights how 
each of the three major themes (knowledge, power and subjectivation) in Foucault’s work 
all appear to turn upon the question of resistance.  In Deleuze’s reading, particularly the 
second section of his study, the notion of resistance is found to be a central component of 
Foucault’s triadic problematization of knowledge, power and subjectivation, and is one of 
the more continuously cited concepts developed throughout the text.692  It should come as 
no surprise, then, that Deleuze reads Foucault’s work as extended critical commentary 
regarding the practical and conceptual problem of resistance in the history of political 
theory.  For Deleuze, a critical reading of Foucault’s collected works appears to turn on 
the following set of critical questions: 
[w]hat is our light and what is our language, that is to say, our ‘truth’ today?  
What powers must we confront, and what is our capacity for resistance, today 
when we can no longer be content to say that the old struggles are no longer worth 
anything?  And do we not perhaps above all bear witness to and even participate 
in the ‘production of a new subjectivity’?  Do not the changes in capitalism find 
an unexpected ‘encounter’ in the slow emergence of the Self (sic) as a center of 
resistance?693  
In a manner that invokes the core logic of Foucault’s fifth thesis on power, Deleuze views 
Foucault’s work as being critically centered upon the dual question that at once asks 
                                                          
691 See: Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Seán Hand (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 47-
124.  
692 Although he is not generally cited as such, Deleuze’s text ought to be understood as making an early 
contribution to the general theme of resistance in Foucault’s thought.  In the second part of the text, 
Deleuze dedicates a significant amount of space to drawing explicit connections between several different 
concepts in Foucault’s thought and the theme of resistance.  Indeed, for Deleuze it is on the basis of the 
possibility of resistance that one must begin to understand Foucault’s thought.  In this way, Deleuze 
maintains that in Foucault’s thought “there is no diagram that does not also include…points of creativity, 
change and resistance, and it is perhaps with these that we ought to begin in order to understand the 
whole picture” (44).  With this point in mind, Deleuze thus reads certain major themes in Foucault’s 
thought as simultaneously problems of resistance.  On the problem of power and resistance see: 71, 73, 
82; on the body and resistance see: 82; on the “thought of the outside” and resistance see: 89, 117, 122; 
on the primacy of resistance see: 89, 90, 94; on the role of the intellectual and resistance see: 91; on 
biopower and resistance see: 92, 94; on truth and resistance see: 95; on subjectivation and resistance see: 
103, 105, 115.   
693 Ibid, 115. 
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“[w]hat powers must we confront, and what is our capacity for resistance?”694  Indeed, 
Deleuze’s text is notable in that it offers one of the first preliminary statements that 
begins to reveal the logic of the primacy of resistance.  Attested to by its permanence 
within the field of force relations to which power refers, Deleuze maintains that the 
following conclusion can be drawn from Foucault’s analytic of power: in its irreducibility 
to the field of power, “the final word on power is that resistance comes first” (original 
emphasis).695  Indeed, it is in Deleuze that the logic of the primacy of resistance is first 
understood as a key focal point in Foucault’s thought, and the intention of this chapter to 
further explore this gesture toward the primacy of resistance.        
As a corollary to the above, Jon Simons provides a brief outline of the 
fundamental dependence of power on resistance, ultimately suggesting that “power 
relations do not exist when the struggle ceases, when there is no resistance to the strategy 
of government from the actions of others.”696  Indeed, Simons highlights what can be 
referred to as the agonistic specificity inherent to Foucault’s analytic of power; relations 
of power can only be conceptualized as such in relation to the forms of struggle animated 
in movements of resistance against power.  To address this question of how power 
depends on the permanence of resistance requires invoking the logic of the primacy of 
resistance as the conceptual nexus key to Foucault’s agonistic conception of power.  
More recently, in his text The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, Kelly dedicates a 
rare full chapter to the question and general problematic of resistance, and offers one of 
the more definitive and comprehensive readings affirming its place in Foucault’s 
thought.697  What is particularly significant about Kelly’s chapter is that it is effectively 
                                                          
694 Ibid, 115. 
695 Ibid, 89. 
696 Jon Simons, “Power, Resistance, and Freedom,” 309. 
697 See: Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 105-123.  Kelly’s work in this text is significant 
insofar as it offers one of the more extensive analyses of Foucault’s fifth thesis and its place amongst his 
overall thought.  Indeed, Kelly remarks, that although the concept of resistance is reinvigorated in relation 
to different areas of emphasis in Foucault’s thought, the fifth thesis as initially proposed in The History of 
Sexuality is the “definitive statement from Foucault about resistance,” and thus one that “he never 
abandons” (106).  While his work is useful in highlighting the importance of resistance to Foucault’s 
general analytic of power, Kelly’s focus often diverges from Foucault in order to invoke the fifth thesis as 
making a fundamental claim toward a theory of “vitalism” that is must more akin to Deleuze than 
Foucault.  Thus, Kelly writes that the “power-resistance dyad is a mutation of organic life, which is itself a 
negentropic moment in the physical history of the universe: as such, the universe itself contains the germ 
of resistance” (117).  In this way, Kelly often neglects the development of the question of resistance in 
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the first full commentary dedicated to a critical exploration of Foucault’s fifth thesis from 
The History of Sexuality.  Taking seriously the significance of the question of resistance 
Posed in The History of Sexuality, Kelly maintains that Foucault “never abandons this 
conception,” and thus that it is the “definitive statement from Foucault about 
resistance.”698  Kelly’s work ought therefore to be understood as offering key insight into 
the ways in which the fifth thesis on power continued to influence and shape Foucault’s 
thought throughout his work, as well as how the concept of resistance allows us to read 
Foucault in new ways.  Yet, although Kelly recognizes the vital importance of the 
concept of resistance in Foucault’s theory of power, his work, like many before, 
mistakenly denies that any connection can be made between this theory of resistance and 
anarchism.699               
The advent of postanarchist critical theory particularly the work of anarchist and 
philosopher, Todd May, has significantly revitalized scholarly interest in the possibilities 
afforded by Foucault’s theory of resistance, while formulating a preliminary conceptual 
nexus from which to situate his work within the broader historical and philosophical 
canon of anarchism.  In his work, Between Genealogy and Epistemology, May dedicates 
a full chapter to the question of resistance that both highlights its significance to 
Foucault’s genealogical project while also demonstrating how the concept of resistance 
allows one to theorize a radical conception of freedom and emancipation.700  For May, 
                                                          
Foucault’s thought and radically disconnects it from the political and ethical axes of which were of vital 
importance for Foucault. 
698 Ibid, 106. 
699 Mark Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 113-114; 131.  Kelly’s denial of a possible 
connection between Foucault and anarchism is less based on his reading of Foucault than it is on his 
reductive understanding of anarchism.  Anarchism, or “a priori anarchism” in Kelly’s conception simply 
refers to a total “abolition of power,” and as such is “thoroughly unachievable” (113).  Yet, while Kelly 
denies that it might be possible to situate Foucault within the history of anarchism, he nevertheless 
suggests that Foucault himself appears to affirm this connection.  According to Kelly, then, “Foucault is 
not opposed to anarchism…so long as it is an anarchism that is not utopian, but rather strategic, defining 
by its thoroughgoing criticality” (133).   
700 Todd May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought 
of Michel Foucault, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993).  Written before the advent of 
postanarchism, which May would begin to conceive of the following year, this text is significant in that it is 
one of the first to dedicate a full study of the problem of resistance in Foucault’s thought.  Several themes 
in the chapter of resistance would later inform the basis of postanarchist theory, of which the question of 
resistance lies at the forefront.  In regard to Foucauldian scholarship, however, May’s work is significant in 
that it locates the question of resistance as the core problem informing the methodology of what 
Foucault refers to via Nietzsche as “genealogy.” Furthermore, May offers a particularly keen reading of 
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“the for-the-sake-of-which of genealogical critique is resistance, a resistance whose 
contours and possibilities we must understand in order to finally grasp the genealogical 
project” central to Foucault’s thought.701  The integrity of May’s work is further found in 
the way in which he affirms Foucauldian resistance as the key concept required for 
rethinking the question of politics at the cusp of the problem of sovereignty.  “To 
understand the nature of this resistance,” May emphasizes, “will be to recognize the 
general of micropolitical intervention available to us in a world no longer governed solely 
be means of sovereign power.”702  Furthermore, May’s text The Political Philosophy of 
Poststructuralist Anarchism,703 as well as a few corresponding articles704 coupled within 
ongoing research, have usefully invoked Foucault’s analytic of power in order to 
contribute to a rethinking of the question of resistance posed in anarchist political theory.  
To be sure, “anarchism” according to May “provides the outline of a framework within 
which to understand poststructuralist political philosophy.”705  Contrastingly, however, 
May also invokes poststructuralist theory as a critical and theoretical framework from 
which to supplement what he refers to as the “twin assumptions” or twofold “a priori that 
haunts anarchist thought.”706  Common to May’s analysis, as well as the postanarchist 
                                                          
Foucault that does not gloss over the question of resistance with regard to power, and maintains that 
power is itself only “half of a two-pole relationship” of which resistance is a necessary component (114).  
For May one cannot, by pain of contradiction, understand the problem of power in Foucault’s thought 
without necessarily engaging with the question of resistance.  May thus argues that Foucault’s thought 
turns upon a unique relation between resistance and freedom, and enumerates four theses on resistance 
that turn upon the notion of freedom (119).  These theses are as follows: “freedom is not a matter of 
liberation” (119); “Freedom is not a matter of “universal necessities of human existence, but of concrete 
struggles for situated values” (120); “freedom is a matter of historical contingency” (120); “there is no 
necessary endpoint in the struggle for it; resistance may not have a Promised Land” (121).  While May 
refers to these theses as theses on resistance, they are in fact more theses on freedom whereby the 
concept of resistance is developed only secondarily, or as a precondition for freedom.  Nonetheless, 
Mays’s work has helped to open the problem of Foucauldian resistance in new ways, and has further 
aided in elevating the concept of resistance to a status that itself warrants study.   
701 May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought of 
Michel Foucault, 114. 
702 Ibid, 114. 
703 Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, (Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994). 
704 See: Todd May, “Anarchism from Foucault to Rancière,” in Contemporary Anarchist Studies: An 
Introductory Anthology to Anarchy in the Academy, eds. Randall Amster, et al. (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 11-17; and Todd May, “Is Post-Structuralist Theory Anarchist?”, in Post-Anarchism: A Reader, eds. 
Duane Rousselle and Süreyyya Evren (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 41-45. 
705 Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, 13.   
706 Ibid, 65.   
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project in general, Foucault’s analytic of power and resistance is therefore invoked in 
order to supplement the traditional anarchist “view of power as suppressive” with a 
productive model of power that corresponds with a new critical conception of political 
praxis irreducible to what May holds to be the orthodox anarchist a priori search for a 
“pure, untainted source for resistance.”707  For May, then, Foucault’s analytic of power 
can be used to supplement the fundamental question of resistance within anarchist theory 
and practice.   
While the postanarchists have made certain significant advances regarding the 
question of resistance in Foucault’s thought, and have further provided key insight into 
how we might read Foucault as a theorist of resistance, they have nevertheless only 
gestured toward the logic of the primacy of resistance and its possible connections to 
anarchism.  Indeed, while such work has made significant advances toward the question 
of resistance within studies of Foucault, a critical exploration of how the fifth thesis 
fundamentally overturns the basic assumptions of traditional political theory in such a 
way that the concept of resistance, and not that of an oikonomia, come to constitute the 
paradigm specific to politics has never been written.  Furthermore, while May’s work has 
significantly uncovered a unique way to read Foucault’s theory of resistance through 
anarchist political theory, I do not hold as May does that anarchism is haunted by either a 
repressive view of power, or a transcendental conception of resistance exterior to power.  
Instead, taking resistance as the key component of anarchist theory as outlined in chapter 
two, I argue that Foucault’s theory of resistance ought not be understood as a supplement 
to anarchist theory, but rather as the affirmation of an anarchist hypothesis of the 
political.  More specifically, it is my contention in what follows that invoking the logic of 
resistance, rather than the paradigm of government, reveals for Foucault a critical caesura 
between the political as archē and an anarchic conception of the political as agōn.   
4.2 The Analytic of Power and the Turn toward the Study of 
Resistance 
 
Power is not a substance.  Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be 
delved into.  Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals…The 
                                                          
707 Ibid, 65.  
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characteristic feature of power is that some men can more or less entirely determine 
other men’s conduct—but never exhaustively or coercively…If an individual can remain 
free, however little his freedom may be, power can subject him to government.  There is 
no power without potential refusal or revolt.708 
--Michel Foucault 
Like most political theorists, the question of power is one of the more ubiquitous 
concepts in all of Foucault’s thought, and much of his work is organized as a critical 
exploration of its general problematic.  To be sure, the critical interrogation of the 
concept of power stretches the trajectory from his early studies to his final works.  The 
question of power is first developed in The Birth of the Clinic regarding the problem of 
the “medical gaze;”709 it is developed in Madness and Civilization in relation to the birth 
of the asylum in his study of madness710—a study that is later resituated in a more 
political context under heading of “psychiatric power;”711 it is shown, throughout several 
different times in his work to exist in a position of non-exteriority with different forms of 
knowledge—hence the term “knowledge-power;”712 it is a concept that is significantly 
revamped in Discipline and Punish under what he outlines as “disciplinary power;”713 it 
is with the problem of power that Foucault frames his three volumes on the study of the 
                                                          
708 Michel Foucault, “Omnes Et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason,” 324.   
709 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Vintage, 1994), ix-xi.  Although in The Birth of the Clinic Foucault lacks the critical language he 
will later use to describe the interrelation between forms of perception, knowledge and relations of 
power, the concept of the “medical gaze” as developed in this text ought to be understood as a 
conceptual predecessor to his later work.  Indeed, Foucault also draws explicit connections between the 
gaze and the development of new forms of “political consciousness” (22-36).   
710 See: Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. 
Richard Howard (New York: Vintage, 1988), 38-64; 65-84; 241-278.   
711 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power. Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 1-18.  In these lectures Foucault revisits several of the 
earlier general themes found in The Birth of the Clinic, Madness and Civilization, and Discipline and Punish 
and re-evaluates them amongst his changing analytic of power.  As such, these lectures provide a 
theoretical bridge between Foucault’s early work and the new analytic of power that would come to 
shape his later thought.      
712 See: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 27.  Here, Foucault outlines what 
he means by “power-knowledge relations,” and maintains that “power and knowledge directly imply one 
another;” thus according to Foucault “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge” (27). 
713 See: Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 135-169.  Here, Foucault traces and outlines the microphysics of 
“disciplinary power” and differentiates its field and activity from the theory of sovereignty.  Although the 
function and scope of the problem of power is again problematized in his subsequent works, Foucault’s 
work in Discipline and Punish prefigures Foucault’s theses on power as established in The History of 
Sexuality (26-27).   
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history of sexuality, and is famously reconceived in the first volume with the neologism 
“biopower.”714  Finally, the general problematic of power is shown by Foucault to be a 
key focus in what he begins to consider as the paradigmatic nexus between “the 
government of self and the government of others.”715  It is in this way that Kelly 
determines that “[i]n a sense, all of Foucault’s work has to do with power.”716    
While Foucault’s redefinition of power remains a pivotal point of departure in 
much of his work, this same analytic can never to be separated from the critical question 
of what Foucault refers to throughout several of his works as “resistance.”  In this way, 
Kelly’s claim can be amended in order to suggest that while it is true that all of 
Foucault’s works involve a critical inquiry into the question of power, this also means 
that all of his works pertain to the question and study of resistance as well.  Thus, while 
critics tend to read The History of Sexuality as Foucault’s most “theoretically 
sophisticated understanding of…the exercise of power,” it is my contention that the way 
in which Foucault recasts the study of resistance in this text is even more revolutionary 
than his analytic of power alone.717  As we will see, although much of Foucault’s work is 
centered on the general question of power, the very force of the analytic of power in The 
History of Sexuality derives its specificity from theorizing the primacy of resistance as 
the vital component that gives the study of power its analytic force.  In this way, any 
inquiry regarding the question of power in Foucault’s thought simultaneously requires a 
critical investigation into the place and general question of resistance amongst this 
dynamic.  Indeed, it is in Foucault’s analytic of power that the very question of resistance 
is renewed with particular critical force.  At the same time, however, as Foucault 
radically rethinks the analytic of power through the question of resistance, it is precisely 
the power/resistance dynamic from which the questions of power and the political can be 
interpreted anarchically.  With this perspective in mind—that a critical inquiry into the 
question of power is simultaneously posed with the question of resistance for Foucault, 
and further that this dynamic offers a new perspective on the paradigm of the political 
consequent upon the permanence of resistance—it is important to outline the theoretical 
                                                          
714 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 135-159. 
715 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 4; 42. 
716 Mark Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 31.   
717 Richard A. Lynch, “Reading The History of Sexuality, Volume 1,” 154. 
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context surrounding Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of Sexuality to 
demonstrate how a critical theory of resistance forms the nexus upon which the critique 
of sovereignty and the coinciding analytic of power depends.     
Although Foucault previously engaged with the general problematic of power 
prior to The History of Sexuality, it is often recognized that the publication of this text 
coincides with a radically new analytic and methodological approach to the problem of 
power situated at the limit of theories of sovereignty.718  While in Discipline and Punish 
Foucault was already rethinking the basis of power against its locus in the juridical 
foundation of sovereignty, the general problematic of power is renewed with particular 
critical force in The History of Sexuality.  As Foucault reminds his reader, the aim of his 
project in The History of Sexuality is “to move less toward a “theory of power than an 
‘analytics’ of power: that is, toward a definition of the specific domain formed by 
relations of power, and toward a determination of the instruments that will make possible 
its analysis.”719  It is in the context of defining the “specific domain” of power and the 
accompanying analytic that Foucault’s project most directly intervenes in the history of 
political theory.  As Arnold Davidson contextualizes, if “Foucault’s central contribution 
to political philosophy” is to be found in the “refinement of a new conception of power,” 
this is because he puts into “question the two reigning conceptions of power.”720  First, 
Davidson claims that on one side of the critical spectrum Foucault’s analytic of power 
overturns “the juridical conception found in classical liberal theories,” while on the other 
Foucault is found to attack “the Marxist conception organized around the notions of the 
State apparatus, dominant class, mechanisms of conversion, and juridical 
superstructure.”721  Indeed, under what he refers to as the “repressive hypothesis” of 
power, one of Foucault’s central arguments in The History of Sexuality is that both 
theories of sovereignty and Marxist reductionism tend to “mask” the concrete operations 
of power in such a way that obscures “its own mechanisms.”722   
                                                          
718 Ibid, 154. 
719 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 82.   
720 Arnold Davidson, introduction to Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-1974, 
trans. Graham Burchell. (New York: Picador, 2006), xiii.  
721 Ibid, xiii.  
722 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 86.  Here Foucault writes that “power is only tolerable on 
condition that it mask substantial part of itself.  Its success is proportional to its abilities to hide its own 
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It is against, then, this critical background that Foucault’s analytic attempts to 
break free from a “certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty,” or the political 
theories which assume the “theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty.”723  In Foucault, 
any analysis “made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, 
the form of law… are given at the outset.”724  Political theories which locate the source of 
power “in the primary existence of a central point” only consider what Foucault calls the 
“terminal forms power takes.”725  For Foucault, then, in order to critically “analyze power 
within the concrete and historical framework of its operation,” what is therefore required 
is the construction “of an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a 
code.”726  In other words, against both traditional and radical political theorists who 
presuppose the primacy of the state, Foucault reveals an analytic of power and political 
rationality situated at the horizon of the state.727  Moreover, in the search for a non-
sovereign and non-juridical theory of power, Foucault additionally refuses to reduce the 
study of power to the Marxist conception of its “economic functionality,” in which the 
                                                          
mechanisms” (86).  Foucault’s point here is to demonstrate the ways in which theories of sovereign power 
and traditional notions of the state have functioned in a way that obscures the actual activity of power.  
Yet, here we also see that Foucault maintains that the very “success” of the state and sovereign power 
depends on masking its own activity.  While Foucault’s central concern in conceptualizing the “repressive 
hypothesis” of power is directed as a critical attack on theories which reduce the question of power to the 
logic of the state, his primary goal, however, is to allude to the ways in which a theory of resistance ought 
not be directed uniformly in relation to the state, but toward the actual sites of power.    
723 Ibid, 90.   
724 Ibid, 92. 
725 Ibid, 93; 92. 
726 Ibid, 90. 
727 While Foucault’s analytic of power is indeed established as a way to rethink the question of power 
against the traditional notion of the state, his goal is neither to claim that the state does not exist or come 
into play within relations of power, but that presupposing the state relies on posing the question of power 
in terms of juridical, sovereign law.  Thus, as Foucault writes in “Truth and Power,” posing the problem of 
power in terms of the “State means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to 
say in terms of law” (122).  Yet Foucault’s point is not to suggest that “the State isn’t important,” but that 
relations of power “necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State…first of all because the State, for all 
the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power 
relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power 
relations” (122).  In this way, to rethink a critical analytic of power at the horizon of the state, is not to 
suggest the ultimate disappearance of the state, but that the state cannot in itself account for the 
concrete operability of power relations.  At the same time, Foucault here alludes to a new problem in 
which radical politics must account for.  If the state, as Foucault, claims can only operate as such on 
condition of “already existing power relations,” then perhaps what ought to be at stake in radical theories 
of liberation is not the overthrow of the state as in traditional anarchist and Marxist theories, but 
precisely the relations of power that make possible the continuation of the state as such.   
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role of power acts as a support for the continuation of relations of production and the 
class relations that sustain them.728  This is why Foucault elaborates his analytic in terms 
of a “non-economic analysis of power.”729  As Foucault clarifies in an interview from 
1978, against the theories which take power as a repressive force maintained in the 
sovereign center of juridical law, as well as the Marxist reduction of power to the 
reproduction of relations of productions “power is that which must be explained.”730    
With the critical explanation regarding the traditional question of power acting as 
the basic point of departure for Foucault’s larger project in The History of Sexuality, this 
is why the second chapter of the text is directly dedicated not only as is often cited to 
outlining the alternative methodological approach to the question of power, but also, and 
more importantly, to outlining a new analytic of power that can account for the question 
of resistance amongst its dynamic.  Under the heading of the aptly titled chapter 
“Method” Foucault famously offers five theses on power set to at once rethink the 
general problem of power at the limit of the logic of the state and the problem of 
sovereignty, while simultaneously outlining the methodological framework for his 
ongoing work on power at this time.  Indeed, it is with these theses that we can begin to 
understand the way in which Foucault’s analytic of power corresponds with an alternative 
theory of the political consequent upon the primacy of resistance.  Although Foucault 
often returns to, with slight variations, the propositions initially set forth in The History of 
Sexuality, all of them nominate five central components required for a preliminary 
understanding of power relations.  Thus, while the concept of “power” remains a 
fundamental concept for Foucault, and is continuously redeveloped throughout the course 
of his work, the original theses proposed in 1976 ought to be understood as his definitive 
outline for a new methodological approach to the study of power.  As we will see, 
although Foucault’s analytic of power is developed as a critique of Marxist reductionism 
and juridical theories of sovereign law, this same analytic contains a conceptual hinge in 
which the analytic of power coincides with a critical theory of resistance which, in turn, 
allows for the question of power to be understood in its agonistic specificity.  Contrary to 
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standard readings regarding the question of power in The History of Sexuality, it is my 
contention that Foucault’s text must be read as making a fundamental claim regarding not 
just the possibility of forms of resistance amongst power relations, but also the 
preliminary elaboration of an alternative theory to account for its appearance within the 
context of politics.  In other words, what is novel in Foucault’s account is that this 
analytic of power can only be conceptualized on condition of the primacy of resistance.  
What is therefore at stake in Foucault’s analytic of power is to articulate the basis of a 
new political rationality that presupposes the permanent dynamic between power and 
resistance as the principle of intelligibility of the political. 
 The five theses composing Foucault’s analytic of power in The History of 
Sexuality can be summarized as follows: 1.) Within the dynamic field of force relations, 
power is attested to and exercised as a non-sovereign, “nonegalitarian” multiplicity of 
“mobile relations”731—that is, power is not a substance that can be acquired or 
overturned, but is instead what is exercised from a multiplicity of points corresponding 
with other social relations; 2.) Relations of power exist in a position of non-exteriority 
with other relations; in their position of non-exteriority, power relations are immanent 
within other relations such as “economic processes, knowledge relationships, sexual 
relations,” and are therefore productive—that is, mutually reinforcing—rather than 
prohibitive; 3.) Power does not presuppose an essential duality or binary division 
between the “rule and the ruled,” but instead comes from and is exercised from below; 4.) 
Power is “intentional” and implies a strategic relation exercised with certain aims and 
tactics;732 5.) “Where there is power, there is resistance.”733  In this final thesis, Foucault 
maintains that points of resistance are primary and absolutely coextensive with relations 
of power.  In other words, the appearance of power necessarily implies the potentiality of 
resistance, and is therefore attested to by the permanence of this potential revolt.  
Traditionally readers of Foucault often point to the way in which these theses mark a 
critical turning point in his collective thought, and there have been numerous texts, 
articles and collections exploring Foucault’s analytic of power.  Nevertheless, the 
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majority of these studies tend to focus on the first four propositions, while excluding, or 
discounting the importance of the fifth.  Thus, while Kelly maintains that this 
“reconceptualization of power is generally recognized as one of Foucault’s most 
important intellectual contributions,” the critical exploration of the Foucauldian analytic 
of power traditionally tends to over-emphasize the first four propositions at the expense 
of the question of resistance.734  To be sure, inasmuch as the publication of The History of 
Sexuality is understood to correspond with a significant and vital renewal of the question 
of power, it is my contention that the fifth thesis attests to a critical renewal of the 
question of resistance as well.         
As found in the above theses, a critical inquiry into the possible redefinition of 
power need not analyze, according to Foucault, what power is in terms of a sovereign 
substance, but instead examines the existence of power in terms of its strategic exercise 
within the domain in which it operates.  Analyzing the specific techniques of power 
within the domain in which they operate constitutes the basic analytic framework for a 
critical inquiry into the problematic of power for Foucault.  In order to account for the 
quotidian operations of power, this new preliminary analytics of power “must be 
understood in the first instance,” according to Foucault, “as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own 
organization.”735  Here, Foucault importantly redefines power in terms of a relation 
between forces, whereby the “domain” to which power consists designates the strategic 
field in which these force relations operate.  In this way, Foucault’s analytic of power in 
The History of Sexuality radically dislocates power from its traditional locus within the 
archic foundation of sovereignty.  Rather than arising from the foundation of sovereignty, 
“[p]ower relations” as Foucault maintains, “are rooted in the whole network of the 
social.”736  Indeed, this is the first vital difference Foucault’s analytic notes in regard to 
the traditional question of power.  Instead of locating the source of power with a 
sovereign entity or the logic of the state, Foucault maintains that the domain in which 
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power both consists and operates takes the form of a network co-extensive with the 
social.     
Furthermore, what is at stake for Foucault is to redefine the exercise of power in 
such a way that it cannot be simply reduced to the conception of a “juridico-discursive” 
exercise of law as the constitutive essence of power.737  As Foucault writes, inasmuch as 
“one schematizes power in a juridical form,” then “one defines its effects as 
obedience.”738  Such an analytic is reductive for Foucault, since it presupposes a binary 
representation of a sovereign “legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject on 
the other.”739  Distinguishable from relations of “obedience,” the general problem of 
power for Foucault is neither located within an “institution.” nor an elemental 
“structure;” instead power is redefined by Foucault in The History of Sexuality as “the 
name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.”740  
With its emphasis on redefining power as a “complex strategical situation,” Deleuze 
writes that “Foucault’s definition seems a very simple one: power is a relation between 
forces, or rather every relation between forces is a power relation.”741  As Foucault 
further insists in “The Subject and Power,” inasmuch as power is understood as a 
multiplicity of force relations spread throughout the network of the social, the “exercise 
of power is not simply a relationship between ‘partners,’ individual or collective; it is a 
way in which some act on others”—that is power is redefined by Foucault as a “set of 
actions upon actions,” or “conduct of conducts.”742  Thus, as an action of conduction, in 
1979 Foucault further clarifies that “power is only a certain type of relation between 
individuals.”743  The redefinition of power as a relation between forces, or “conduct of 
conducts”—that is as the “complex strategical situation” in which power operates— has 
immense consequences for political theory and forms, as Foucault writes in The History 
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of Sexuality, the basic possibility to “escape from the system of the Law-and-Sovereign 
which has captivated political thought for such a long time.”744  
While the first four theses on power are set to dislocate the general schematic of 
power from its sovereign, archic center by redefining power in terms of the force 
relations immanent within the domain in which the operate, this analytic requires further 
attention given to the fifth thesis in order to fully comprehend the possibility and stakes 
of a non-sovereign conception of power.  Although Foucault’s analytic of power is 
established as a fundamental critique of sovereignty, what is at stake in the fifth thesis is 
that this study of power turns upon and reveals a fundamental logic of struggle—indeed 
of permanent conflict—inherent within, and constituent of, power relation as such.  If 
power, as opposed to “obedience” can be redefined as a relation between forces, then 
what Foucault’s fifth attempts to account for is the very possibility of revolt amongst this 
relation.  Indeed, throughout his work, Foucault invokes and utilizes the term, 
“resistance,” to denote the vital manner in which power relations cannot never be fully 
stabilized into relations of obedience, but instead assume the form of an agonistic 
struggle between forces.  To be sure, this is why specific importance should be attached 
to the question of resistance in Foucault.  While the analytic of power from The History 
of Sexuality is situated within the context of a critique of sovereignty, it is my contention 
that Foucault’s fifth thesis highlights a critical caesura between the rationale of an archē 
which has always ground the question of politics within the paradigms of sovereignty or 
government and the logic of agonism, in which the concept of struggle not only 
designates the sphere in which relations of power operate but, more fundamentally, the 
nexus between the exercise of power and the permanent potentiality of resistance.  In this 
way, with reference to the fifth thesis what is at stake for Foucault is to account for a 
political rationality that describes the logic of power in terms of permanent, “ceaseless 
struggles and confrontations” between techniques of power and strategies of resistance.745  
Rethinking the question of power in its irreducibility to the logic of sovereignty and 
economic reductionism, Foucault’s point of departure from both orthodox political 
philosophy and Marxist thought is therefore to demonstrate the ways in which these 
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previous theories of power cannot adequately “account for the intrinsic intelligibility of 
conflicts” that is made possible by, and lies at the heart of, power relations.746  In other 
words, what the problem of power reveals for Foucault is a logic of historical struggle in 
which the concept of resistance is radically inscribed into the field of power relations 
reconceived as agōn.   
Thus, while Foucault’s work is to be distinguished from the rationale of 
sovereignty and Marxist theories in terms of his analytic of power, this same analytic also 
attempts to emphasize and rethink the place and subsequent theory of struggle—indeed, 
of resistance—amongst the dynamic to which power refers.  In this way, insofar as power 
is taken to refer to a strategic relation of forces “one has a much better chance,” Foucault 
argues, “than in other theoretical procedures of grasping the relation that exists between 
power and struggles.”747  What is therefore at stake in Foucault’s analytic is not simply an 
alternative grid from which power might be conceptualized, but a theory that pinpoints 
and renders discernable the conflict between power and what he continuously refers to 
throughout his work as “resistance.”  It is precisely this conflict between power and 
resistance that Foucault maintains is traditionally overlooked in previous theories, 
including revolutionary traditions such as Marxism.  As Foucault clarifies in an 
interview, “[w]hat I find striking in the majority—if not of Marx’s texts then those of the 
Marxists…is the way in they pass over in silence what is understood by struggle when 
one talks of class struggle” (original emphasis).748  If as Foucault claims that “neither the 
dialectic, as a logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, 
can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts” then his analytic of power and 
resistance ought to read as a critique of the notion of “class struggle.”749  Indeed, the text 
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itself should be understood as an attempt to account for a non-dialectic logic of conflict 
within relations of power, as well as the principle of intelligibility from which the 
concepts of struggle and conflict can be highlighted as the constitutive component 
specific to power.  It is within the context of an agonistic theory of power, that Foucault’s 
theses can be fully understood, and by which the question of resistance becomes more 
acute.    
Although it is widely recognized that Foucault’s strategic model of power 
relations and the corresponding theory of resistance is one of the key objectives in The 
History of Sexuality, the full stakes of this analytic have yet to be realized.  While one of 
Foucault’s primary objectives is indeed to trace the “regime of power-knowledge-
pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our world,” much of the 
critical literature on this text neglects to notice that Foucault’s focus is not simply to 
outline the way in which sexuality is co-extensive with relations of power/knowledge, but 
instead to complicate and rethink the possibility of a critical emancipation from this very 
nexus.750  As Foucault maintains in 1979, part of his project was to describe a new 
rationale of power in order to contribute to a rethinking of the possibility of a critical 
theory of resistance to the forms of power outlined throughout several of his works.  
“Consequently,” Foucault insists,  
those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to 
denounce violence or criticize an institution…What has to be questioned is the 
form of rationality at stake…Its inevitable effects are both individualization and 
totalization.  Liberation can only come from attacking not just one of these two 
effects but political rationality’s very roots.751   
To be sure, it is within this context of “attacking” the specific political rationality of 
power, as well as a corresponding politics of resistance that Foucault’s analytic of power 
most forcibly intervenes in the history of political theory.    
It is in this regard that The History of Sexuality ought to be read as developing an 
extended critical commentary regarding an alternative way to understand the place of 
resistance amongst this changing analytic of power.  Indeed, Foucault’s text is itself 
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framed by the very question of resistance, and one of the principle objectives of the text 
is to offer an analysis of the ways in which this alternative analytic of power more 
fundamentally corresponds with a theory of resistance.  From the opening section to the 
final sentence of The History of Sexuality, Foucault frames his argument both within the 
larger context of previous theories of liberation, as well as a corresponding theory of 
resistance consequent upon his new analytic of power.  In the opening section of the text 
Foucault extensively questions theories of liberation that assume a “repressive 
hypothesis” of power, and argues that what “sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in 
terms of repression is doubtless this opportunity to speak out against the powers that be, 
to utter truths and promise bliss, to link together enlightenment, liberation and manifold 
pleasures.”752  Presupposing the “repressive hypothesis” of power, the accompanying 
theory of liberation can only be accounted for, according to Foucault, in a simple gesture 
that binds liberation to the same logic of power it attempts to overcome.  Thus, in the 
final pages of the work, after posing the possibility of a “different economy of bodies and 
pleasures” that might one day sever its nexus the forms of power sustaining this economy 
of bodies through the deployment of sexuality, Foucault closes the text with the following 
critique: “[t]he irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our “liberation” is in 
the balance.”753  
It is because Foucault frames his text in terms of the question of possible 
emancipation, that a specific subtext referring to and regarding the question of resistance 
can be revealed as one of the central goals of this work.  Yet, while Foucault’s text is 
framed in the context of emancipatory theories of liberation, he nevertheless clarifies that 
the term, liberation is itself inadequate to account for the logic of struggle inherent 
amongst power relations.  “I have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion of 
liberation,” Foucault maintains, “because if it is not treated with precautions…one runs 
the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base…concealed, 
alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression.”754  For Foucault, then, 
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“the practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom” 
required in a theory of resistance.755  Yet, Foucault is also suspicious of the term 
revolution in a similar manner.  For Foucault, one of the problems with the concept of 
“revolution” is that it constitutes a “gigantic effort to domesticate revolts within a rational 
and controllable history.”756  With this critical framework in mind, the subtext that runs 
parallel to and stretches the entire trajectory of The History of Sexuality, is set to pose the 
critical question pertaining to the ways in which one might rethink the possibility of a 
critical emancipation from relations of power neither in terms of “liberation,” nor 
“revolution,” but as the permanent possibility of resistance amongst the dynamic field of 
power.   
It is in this way that we might read Foucault’s analytic of power as making a key 
contribution not simply to political theory in terms of an alternative analytic of power, 
but to radical political theory as well in terms of rethinking through the possibility of a 
critical theory of resistance to power.  By analyzing the question of emancipation in 
terms of resistance instead of the traditional Marxist theories of contradiction and 
dialectical class struggle, Foucault attempts to provide an alternative way to understand 
the concept of struggle without reducing it to either “class struggle,” or “revolution.”  As 
Foucault writes elsewhere, his own question of resistance ought to be distinguished from 
the ways in which “in order to think struggle, the ‘revolutionary’ thought of the 
nineteenth century adopted the logical form of contradiction” (original emphasis).757  It is 
in the context of 19th and 20th century revolutionary thought—both Marxist (and some 
anarchist thought to a lesser extent)—that Foucault asks “[a]re there no great radical 
ruptures, massive binary divisions, then?”758  While Foucault acknowledges the 
historicity of revolution, he nevertheless concludes that his focus is to be directed towards 
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that “transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in society that shift about.”759  
In other words, while Foucault’s fifth thesis is not set to deny the possibility of 
revolution, his thought does however point toward the ways in which the concept of 
resistance, and not the traditional notions of revolution or class struggle, might constitute 
the locus from which to rethink the project of radical politics.  Yet, although Foucault 
emphasizes that the project of radical politics ought to rethink its connection to the 
domain of the political and its consequent forms of political struggle in terms of 
resistance rather than revolution, this thesis is not set to radically deny the possibility of a 
total revolution.  Instead, in the passage immediately following his fifth thesis on power 
Foucault writes that “it is doubtless the strategic codification of the points of resistance 
that makes a revolution possible.”760  Nevertheless, while Foucault acknowledges that 
varying points of resistance might be coordinated to form a revolution, it is precisely in 
regard to this codification of revolt that he suggests begins to connect revolutionary 
theory to the logic of the state.  Indeed, inasmuch as points of resistance can be 
coordinated into a revolution, the revolutionary process, Foucault laments, is “somewhat 
similar to the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power 
relations.”761   
While Foucault’s critique of revolutionary logic and its similarities to the logic of 
the state will be dealt with more extensively in chapter 6, what is key for Foucault is that 
what traditional forms of radical politics tend to ignore in favor of revolutionary theory, 
are the “transitory points of resistance” effectively producing ruptures and substantial 
changes within the field of power.  This is to say that what is at stake for Foucault is that 
revolutionary theory cannot in itself account for the wide variety of forms of struggle 
dispersed amongst the dynamic field of power relations.  Indeed, rather than attempting 
to understand the question of struggle and conflict in terms of revolution, Foucault 
suggests both that the question of historical struggle can be more clearly understood in 
terms of a politics of resistance rather than revolution.  In other words, while Foucault 
does not deny the possibility of a revolutionary politics he does point toward the way in 
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which resistance, more often than revolution, is what produces radical ruptures and 
transformations within society.   
It is within the context of significantly renewing a critical theory of historical 
struggle that Foucault’s critical inquiry into the question of power in The History of 
Sexuality must be read as revitalizing the question of resistance with particular force.  To 
be sure, the subtext running the length of the text is set to demonstrate that when power is 
no longer conceived in its traditional sovereign form, then any theory of liberation from, 
or resistance to, power is found to require a corresponding reevaluation.  Indeed, it is the 
very possibility of a theory of resistance that forms the basis of what Foucault refers to as 
the “historico-political question” against the “repressive hypothesis.”762  In other words, 
the stakes of the “repressive hypothesis” Foucault uses as a critical foil for his inquiry 
into the problematic of power, is ultimately theorized in order to rethink the question of 
resistance against the traditional totalizing logic of revolutionary theory.  For Foucault, 
then, the critical question that needs to be posed in relation to this analytic of power is 
directly situated within the context of resistance: 
Did the critical discourse [read revolutionary theory] that addresses itself to 
repression come to act as a roadblock to a power mechanism that had operated 
unchallenged up to that point, or is it not in fact part of the same historical 
network as the thing it denounces (and doubtless misrepresents) by calling it 
repression?763 
Here, Foucault poses two interrelated problems pertaining to the question of resistance in 
regard to the “repressive hypothesis” of power.  First, Foucault questions the possibility 
and efficacy of a theory of liberation posed under the assumption of power acting in 
accordance with the exercise of legal prohibition.  When power is taken as that which 
represses, this gives rise to the idea that liberation can only be obtained through a struggle 
with the external forces of oppression.  Liberation from power as such remains caught 
within the representation of power it attempts to escape in as much as it does not take into 
account or criticize the archic principle that conforms power to the form of law.  Indeed, 
if as Foucault maintains that in its non-sovereign form, power is not exercised solely in 
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terms of legal rights, then resistance to power cannot invoke the same logic of legal rights 
as a platform for transformation. Without taking into account the very principle that 
reduces relations of power to its juridical foundation, previous theories of liberation, 
according to Foucault, have historically failed to form an adequate “roadblock” to power 
itself.   
Foucault’s second point of criticism is, however, even more insidious and is set to 
strike at the heart of the most radical theories of liberation throughout the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  On the one hand, Foucault has in mind the problem of revolutionary 
vanguardism, in which a revolution can only be achieved by conquering or overthrowing 
state power.  Revolutionary vanguardism and the classical Marxist project therefore 
remain bound, according to Foucault, to the “same historical network as the thing it 
denounces.”  A revolutionary project that presupposes the repressive hypothesis of power 
tends to view power as a substance that can be captured and manipulated in accordance 
with the process of revolution.  In other words, if power is understood in terms of a 
central source such as the state, then as May observes it is possible for some to form a 
vanguard or party from which to “lead the resistance against the power relationships of 
that site.”764  Yet, as May further observes, if Foucault understands power as a creative 
and not solely oppressive force, then relations of power give “rise not only to that which 
must be resisted,” but also to the “forms resistance itself often takes.”765  For May, 
insofar as “power creates its own resistance,” then one of Foucault’s central claims is that 
the “liberation from specific forms of power must take account of the kind of resistance 
that is being engaged in, on pain of repeating that which one is trying to escape.”766  As 
May points toward, here, Foucault wants to rethink the problem of resistance in such a 
way that the very possibility of “liberation” cannot ultimately turn upon the eternal return 
of the logic of the state.  Consequently, what Foucault ultimately reveals with equal and 
particular significance is a fundamental reevaluation not only of the question and theory 
of resistance, but its very possibility amongst a dynamic of forces.  In this way, while 
Foucault’s analytic of power is to be clearly distinguished from both Marxist and liberal 
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theories, this same analytic contributes to an alternative theory of resistance clearly 
distinguishable from previous revolutionary theories of liberation.  As we will see, 
against traditional conceptions of power Foucault’s analytic of power takes as its key 
component, the question of resistance, while further renewing its significance in a 
radically different manner than previous theories and discourses of revolution.   
If the question of resistance is glossed over by the study of power, this is often 
due to, as May suggests, a critical failure to acknowledge that power as found in the fifth 
thesis “is only one half of a two pole relationship, power/resistance, in which force is 
always pitted against force.”767  To be sure, insofar as the possibility of resistance 
amongst relations of power is what Foucault maintains allows for power to be 
distinguished from relations of obedience and domination, then the fifth thesis appears as 
the conceptual hinge upon which the analytic of power fundamentally depends.  For 
Kelly, then, “Foucault’s reconception of power,” simultaneously coincides with and 
“requires a reexamination of resistance.”768  In other words, insofar as Foucault uncovers 
a new analytic of power in The History of Sexuality, the very study of power renders the 
problem of resistance more acute.  A closer investigation of this two-pole relationship 
between power and resistance and the subsequent challenges this poses to both traditional 
political theory as well as theories of liberation is therefore required.  It is my contention 
that Foucault’s fifth thesis on power ought to attain a valorized position in regard to the 
other theses insofar as it is found to be required for the possibility of relations of power.  
Furthermore, Foucault’s fifth thesis is his most decisive statement regarding the problem 
of resistance and one that he never abandons, continuously modifying throughout the 
final periods of his work.  Foucault’s thesis regarding the primacy of resistance therefore 
reveals the limit of traditional theories of the political, and uncovers a new way to read 
the problem of politics in such a way that transcends the paradigms of Aristotle and 
Schmitt.  This unique relation between power and resistance has the effect of revising the 
traditional conceptions of both power and resistance, and thus offers key insight into 
formulating the basic tenets of an anarchist hypothesis of the political.   
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4.3 On the Primacy of Resistance 
 
Where there is power, there is resistance…these points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network.769 
--Michel Foucault 
 
In the above discussion regarding the critical context surrounding the analytic of power in 
The History of Sexuality, we have seen how Foucault frames the general argument not 
simply in terms of a non-sovereign theory of power, but in terms of retheorizing the 
possibility of a theory of resistance amongst this dynamic.  Instead of bracketing the 
concept of resistance to the study of power, we must now turn to a more detailed critical 
examination of Foucault’s fifth thesis in order to reveal the way in which it posits the 
logic of the primacy of resistance.  Of the five theses outlined in the second chapter of 
The History of Sexuality the final is the most copious, and Foucault dedicates a 
significant amount of space to exploring the general question of resistance, as well as its 
consequent implications.  If Foucault’s fifth thesis requires more space than the previous 
four, this is because it has the effect of rethinking the traditional concepts of both power 
and resistance in such a way that challenges the basic political rationality that lies at the 
heart of Western political theory.  Although the concept of power is commonly given a 
valorized status in political thought, Foucault’s work suggests an uncommon, opposing 
viewpoint that asserts a uniquely co-extensive dynamic relation between power and 
resistance.  A critical recognition of the primacy of resistance within the dynamic to 
which power refers and consists, allows for a new perception of the political and clarifies 
its possibility as the basis for an anarchist hypothesis of the political.  
 Given the way in which this thesis and the subsequent passage that follows 
designate Foucault’s most definitive statement regarding a critical inquiry into the 
question of resistance, as well as the amount of time Foucault spends here on exploring 
several subsequent consequences in regard to the general problematic of resistance, a full 
citation of this key passage is required in order to understand the full scope and 
complexities of the argument.  In what appears as a one of the more essential, critical 
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commentaries within the history of political philosophy, Foucault’s fifth thesis on power 
reads as follows:  
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.  Should it be 
said that one is always “inside” power, there is no “escaping” it, there is no 
absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any 
case?  This would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power 
relationships.  Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: 
these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations. 
These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network.  Hence 
there is no single locus of great Refusal (sic), no soul of revolt, source of all 
rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary.  Instead there are a plurality of 
resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, 
improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or 
violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by 
definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.  But this 
does not mean that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to 
the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to 
perpetual defeat.  Resistances do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles; 
but neither are they the lure or a promise that is necessarily betrayed.  They are 
the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible 
opposite.  Hence they too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or 
focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times 
mobilizing groups or individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain points of 
the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior.  Are there no great 
radical ruptures, massive binary divisions, then?  Occasionally, yes.  But more 
often one is dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing 
cleavages in society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, 
furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them, 
marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds.  Just as the 
network of power relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through 
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apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the 
swarm points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities.  
And it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points of resistance that 
make a revolution possible, somewhat similar to the way in which the state relies 
upon the institutional integration of power relationships.770   
As attested to in density and length there are many significant claims, factors, and 
consequences Foucault wants to point his audience toward that might act as a preliminary 
outline for an analytic of power that can account for the place of resistance amongst its 
dynamic.  It is my contention that this thesis and the subsequent passage ought to read as 
making a vital statement and critique not only of the traditional paradigms of political 
theory, but also on the condition of radical political theory.  The central claim here, of 
which the rest of this passage explores in greater depth, is “[w]here there is power, there 
is resistance,” and consequently that this resistance is therefore “never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power.”  While the first part of this thesis posits that resistance is 
primary with power, the latter affirms that this position of primacy is itself attested to by 
a principle of non-exteriority in relation to the dynamic field of power.  Taken together, 
these two components form the general logic of what I refer to as the primacy of 
resistance, a specific rationale in which the question of politics can be understood in its 
anarchic and agonistic specificity.   
In its most preliminary form, Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of strategically 
reworking the traditional concepts of both power and resistance in such a way that the 
field of the political can neither be reduced to the paradigms of government and 
sovereignty outlined in chapter one.  In regard to the question of power, the fact that 
resistance is primary with power radically disrupts the theory regarding the sovereignty 
of power as an absolute unto itself, and thus reveals an alternative paradigm opposed to 
the theories based in the political thought of Hobbes and Schmitt.  It is in this way that 
the fifth thesis can first be understood as making a vital statement on the radical 
dislocation of the place of power from its position of sovereignty in regard to the logic of 
the state—that is, the fact that resistance is primary amongst power relations radically 
modifies the way in which power has traditionally been conceptualized according to 
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Foucault.  Without the logic of an archē acting as the basis from which a critical theory of 
power can be conceptualized, Foucault’s thesis first demonstrates that relations of power 
are made possible and can only be understood on condition of resistance.  What is 
therefore first at stake within this dynamic is that resistance is situated in a position of 
primacy with respect to power—that is, “[w]here there is power, there is resistance” 
means that the domain to which power consists radically coincides with the permanence 
of resistance.  Rather than presupposing the sovereignty of the state as the archic 
foundation of power, Foucault’s thesis demonstrates that the site of power is both 
theoretically and materially coupled with the site of resistance.  Resistance is therefore 
primary with power, according to Foucault, since it designates a permanent component 
and condition of possibility for relations of power as such.  In its position of primacy, 
however, resistance is a permanent feature of relations of power, and yet is never exterior 
to this dynamic.  Foucault’s thesis thus asserts a principle of non-exteriority with regard 
to resistance.  
 Although the two parts composing this thesis are directly interrelated, each needs 
to be investigated on its own terms in order to fully understand the complexities 
regarding how the primacy of resistance forms the nexus from which the analytic of 
power and the domain of the political can be fundamentally rethought.  In this way, 
Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of fundamentally challenging the traditional 
conceptions of power and resistance, while corresponding with a new framework for 
political theory from which to rethink the problem of politics as a coinciding field of 
struggle between the two.  In order to rethink the very question of politics against the 
paradigm of government and the sovereign logic of the state, it is therefore crucial to 
understand the ways in which power as posed by Foucault in The History of Sexuality 
ought to be understood on condition of resistance.  Foucault’s thesis “[w]here there is 
power, there is resistance,” is not an isolated claim, and different variations with slight 
altercations appear at several different points throughout his thought and work.  It is by 
demonstrating the ways in which Foucault’s fifth thesis modifies traditional conceptions 
of power via resistance, that the logic of the primacy of resistance forms the pivotal point 
from which an anarchist hypothesis of the political can be found.   
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Rather than presupposing the problematic of sovereignty as the foundational 
source of power, Foucault’s fifth thesis maintains that the very possibility of power 
implies that resistance is topologically coextensive within the dynamic field to which 
power functions and arises: hence “[w]here there is power, there is resistance” (my 
emphasis).  In this way, Foucault conceives of the dynamic between power and resistance 
spatially—that is, the dynamic field to which power refers does not emerge with the 
problem of sovereignty, but is instead coupled with and necessarily includes the plane of 
resistance as a constituent element of power as such; the site of power for Foucault is 
simultaneously the site of resistance.  Indeed, this is the first way in which Foucault 
begins to reveal the vital manner in which resistance is to be situated in a fundamental 
position of primacy amongst the dynamic to which power refers.  Insofar as Foucault 
understands power as a network, coextensive with the social body, this means that the 
place for resistance is found to take on a similar structure, and is therefore simultaneously 
spread throughout this same dynamic.  This is why in the passage immediately following 
the fifth thesis Foucault writes: “[j]ust as the network of power relations ends by forming 
a dense web that passes through apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly 
localized within them, so too the swarm points of resistance traverses social 
stratifications and individual unities.”771  Rather than failing to account for the possibility 
of resistance, Foucault instead reminds us that “these points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network.”772  Inasmuch as points of resistances are “present 
everywhere” within the dynamic field to which power refers, then the very “domain” of 
power coincides with and cannot be separated from the field of resistance.  Consequent 
upon the permanent presence of “swarm points of resistance” amongst relations of power, 
this, then, is the first central claim set to rethink the problem of power parallel with the 
question of resistance as posed in Foucault’s fifth thesis. The power/resistance dynamic is 
attested to by a spatial topology; the historical presence of power directly corresponds 
with and reveals the appearance of counter-historical movements of resistance.  The field 
of power is coextensive with, and can never be divorced from, the “swarm points of 
resistance.”   
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While Foucault asserts the primacy of resistance in terms of a spatial topology, his 
thesis also points toward the ways in which resistance designates the condition of 
possibility required for the emergence of power as such.  Although the advent of politics 
in the tradition from Hobbes to Schmitt can be conceived on condition of the eradication 
of resistance, Foucault radically inverts this idea and demonstrates that the manifestation 
of power relations can only be conceived on condition of resistance.  This is why in 
certain key moments in his work, Foucault’s reiterates this idea in order to capture this 
crucial distinction.  Thus, in 1982 Foucault maintains that “if there was no resistance, 
there would be no power relations.  Because it would simply be a matter of 
obedience,”773 while elsewhere he maintains quite firmly that “there are no relations of 
power without resistances.”774  In these modifications of the fifth thesis, the concept of 
resistance is neither taken as a supplement to nor considered secondary in relation to 
power, but that which is profoundly required in terms of its condition of possibility; 
resistance is what prevents relations of power from solidifying into states of domination.  
Foucault’s claim that resistance is primary with respect to power thus demonstrates both 
the permanent dependence of power on resistance, as well as its permanence amongst the 
dynamic to which power refers.  It is in this way that Foucault’s fifth thesis can be 
understood as formulating the conceptual hinge required for both the theory and 
appearance of power.  Distinct from relations of obedience and domination, the condition 
of possibility of power is the permanence of resistance amongst the dynamic to which it 
refers and operates, without which the former could not come into being; power as such 
can only be understood on condition of the permanence of resistance.  
While Foucault’s thesis inscribes resistance into power relations as both its 
condition of possibility and constituent component, the same proposition additionally 
points toward another way that we might understand the primacy of resistance.  As 
resistance marks out a terrain that cannot be separated from the possibility of relations of 
power, the claim “[w]here there is resistance, there is power” is further set to elaborate 
the question of resistance in terms of a radical potentiality of revolt.  Thus, in a lecture 
where Foucault critiques the forms of political rationality sustaining Western political 
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thought, we find another significant variation of his fifth thesis.  Foucault writes: “[t]here 
is no power without potential refusal or revolt.”775  Here, the question of resistance is not 
posed in terms of the dynamic between power and resistance, but rather as the radical 
potentiality for revolt inherent within all relations of power.  Insofar as power cannot, 
according to Foucault, exist without the potentiality for revolt, Foucault’s point is to 
demonstrate the ways in which “[e]very power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a 
strategy of struggle.”776  In terms of this potentiality, Foucault’s fifth thesis can be 
understood as developing an agonistic understanding of power, in which the condition of 
possibility of power is not simply the permanent presence of resistance, but the 
potentiality of resistance to transform a relation of power into a relation of struggle.  In 
other words, Foucault not only demonstrates how resistance is required as a condition of 
power, but also how this condition is attested to in the way that power necessarily refers 
to the potentiality of resistance.  Resistance is primary with power insofar as the capacity 
of power necessarily implies a radical potentiality of revolt—that is, the potential to 
transform a power relation into a relation of struggle.  Because the permanence of 
resistance means that a relation of power can always be transformed into a relation of 
struggle, the primacy of resistance locates a specific dimension of agonism at the center 
of power relations.  
Finally, critical theories seeking to locate the problem of power in “the primary 
existence of a central point,” either “embodied in the state apparatus,” or in the “unique 
source of sovereignty,” all fail to recognize what Foucault refers under his fifth thesis as 
the “strictly relational character of power relationships.”777  Whereas, the relational 
character of power as outlined in the second thesis from The History of Sexuality first 
nominates the ways in which power relations do not exist in a “position of exteriority 
with respect to other types of relations (economic processes, knowledge relationships, 
sexual relations),” but are instead “immanent” within these relations, the fifth thesis 
further complicates and extends this claim to the problem of resistance.778  Inasmuch as 
Foucault speaks of a certain “knowledge/power,” the term power/resistance can be added 
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to Foucault’s lexicon in order to nominate the inherent relation between power and 
resistance.  As Foucault further clarifies, the field of power relations might be redefined 
as power/resistance since the very “existence” of relations of power “depends on a 
multiplicity of points of resistance.”779  As a critical modification of the traditional 
conception of power, what is at stake in the claim “where there is power, there is 
resistance,” is to demonstrate an inherent and corresponding relation between power and 
resistance, whereby the existence of power does not assume the principle of an archē as 
its foundational basis, but instead the permanent potentiality of resistance.  While the 
fifth thesis can be read as the conceptual hinge required for Foucault’s analytic of power, 
there is therefore a final way in which the concept of resistance is found to radically 
modify the traditional conceptualization of power.  A relation of power and the dynamic 
field to which it refers and consists is never in a position of exteriority with respect to the 
permanent potentiality of resistance; resistance is primary since it is co-extensively 
relational with power relations.  Consequently, the analytic of power and the dynamic 
field to which it refers must be discursively and materially rewritten as power/resistance.  
Yet, as a consequence to this dynamic, power relations are genuinely an-archic for 
Foucault since a relation of power always implies, “in potentia,” the permanence of its 
own impossibility.  
There are thus four preliminary ways in which Foucault’s non-sovereign and non-
economic analysis of power relations not only vitally turns upon the question of 
resistance, but also upon the unique assertion that resistance as such is situated in a 
relation of primacy with power.  Indeed, in addition to the non-sovereign economic 
analysis of power relations, Foucault’s fifth thesis invokes the concept of resistance as the 
pivotal turning point from which his analytic both begins and depends.  First and 
foremost, the proposition “[w]here there is power, there is resistance,” posits that the 
domain in which power exists and is manifest coincides with the immanent potentiality of 
resistance; resistance, in its most preliminary form, is therefore situated in a position of 
primacy with respect to power.  Secondly, insofar as resistance is taken as primary with 
power, then the permanent presence of resistance amongst this dynamic dislocates the 
sovereign, archic place of power; power does not emanate from the logic of a central 
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archē, but is instead coextensive with the permanent possibility of resistance within the 
domain in which power operates.  In the Foucauldian sense, power as such is genuinely 
an-archic since the permanent potentiality of resistance refuses the sovereign foundation 
of power and therefore designates the principle whereby power relations cannot solidify 
into pure relations of domination.  Third, insofar as it is to be differentiated from relations 
of obedience and domination, power’s condition of possibility is itself found within the 
potential for resistance that marks the terrain of power as such.  Strictly speaking, this 
means that power cannot exist or become manifest for Foucault without the potential 
condition of resistance.  Finally, relations of power and the domain in which they operate 
are never in a position of exteriority with respect to the possibility of resistance.   
In the above analysis pertaining to the way in which Foucault’s fifth thesis 
modifies the traditional conceptions of power and dislocates its place within a sovereign 
center, resistance is found to exist and is theoretically situated in a position of primacy 
with respect to the domain of power.  By referring to a much more complex dynamic in 
which resistance marks a constituent component, Foucault’s analytic of power itself 
resists the transcendental and material logic of the archē as the radical foundation for 
power, and therefore offers key insight into the formation of an alternative political 
rationality consequent of the problematic of resistance.  If resistance can be understood as 
attaining a position of primacy with power to the point where the latter cannot be 
conceived without regard to the potentiality of the former, what is at stake in Foucault’s 
fifth thesis is that the dynamic field of power relations is necessarily coupled with the 
potential field of resistance.  By placing resistance in a primary relation with power 
Foucault’s intention is to speak of a certain theoretical and material dependency of power 
on resistance; the appearance of power can only be conceived and become manifest on 
condition of the potentiality of resistance.  In other words, what is ultimately at stake in 
fifth thesis is that insofar as a relation of power can only exist at the points where there is 
the potential possibility of resistance, then what Foucault uncovers is a radically new 
basis from which to read the question of politics and the political from the perspective of 
resistance.   
By formulating a rupture in the logic of the archē, which has hitherto shaped the 
traditional discourse for political theory, Foucault’s fifth thesis redefines power on 
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condition of resistance in such a way that its position of primacy designates resistance as 
both a permanent invariant of power, as well as an alternative principle of intelligibility 
from which the dynamic field of power can be made discernible.  By designating the 
space of resistance amongst the power/resistance dynamic as a permanent invariant 
inherent to power, Foucault’s fifth thesis indicates a radical rupture in the political 
rationality that traditionally reduces the question of power to the logic of an archē.  In 
relation to the way in which the permanence of resistance radically modifies the 
traditional concept of power, Foucauldian resistance as such might be better be referred 
to as an anarchist invariant of power since the potentiality for revolt, which marks the 
condition of possibility of power, signifies the very limit of power, of archē.  
Furthermore, the question of resistance in Foucault’s thought can be understood as an 
anarchist invariant of power since the permanent potentiality of resistance amongst power 
relations is what, according to Foucault, prevents the field of power from becoming 
reduced to the effects of both domination and obedience.  By redefining the concept of 
resistance as an anarchist invariant of power, what I refer to as the primacy of resistance 
is set to elucidate the ways in which the potential for revolt that marks the condition of 
possibility of power dislocates the place of power from its sovereign center and redefines 
its domain as the agonistic field of force relations oscillating between the exercise of 
power and the counter-movements of resistance.   
While Foucault’s fifth thesis can be read as a critical modification of the more 
traditional concepts of power in terms of the way in which he radically inscribes 
resistance into its domain, this same thesis equally emphasizes a new way to rethink the 
traditional question of resistance amongst this dynamic.  That is, the way in which 
Foucault’s fifth thesis asserts the primacy of resistance radically reveals an alternative 
way to reconceive the logic of historical struggle.  With the central task of redefining a 
critical conception of resistance, it is now important to address how this thesis modifies 
the concept of resistance by ascribing a position of primacy to it.  First, despite my use of 
the term “primacy” as a critical modifier for the concept of Foucauldian resistance, this 
amendment is not set, however, to suggest that resistance predates, or is prior to, relations 
of power.  As Foucault clearly maintains, resistance “does not predate the power it 
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opposes,” but is instead “coextensive with it [power] and absolutely its contemporary.”780  
Similar to the way in which resistance is a condition of possibility for power, the co-
extensive relation Foucault draws between power and resistance means that the latter 
fundamentally relies upon the form of power it opposes in order to be characterized as 
such.  To speak of the primacy of resistance is therefore not to suggest a space for 
resistance either transcendent or prior to the existence of a relation of power, but in terms 
of a contemporaneously mutual and coextensive relation between resistance and the 
forms of power it opposes.  Commenting of this coextensive relation between power and 
resistance, Kelly suggests how the fact that resistance is primary with power “does not 
mean that resistance actually is to be found wherever there is power, but rather only 
implies that the potential for resistance is ever-present” (original emphasis).781  In other 
words, Foucault’s claim that “where there is power, there is resistance” does not mean 
that each relation of power is always and necessarily confronted by a form of resistance, 
but that the prospect for such resistance must remain an inherent and permanent 
possibility within the dynamic of power.  At the same time as the co-extensive relation 
between power and resistance designates resistance as a permanent component of power 
relations, this same relation is set to demonstrate how the manifestation of forms of 
resistance are directly tied to the forms of power with which it struggles.  Since 
resistance, as Foucault maintains, is absolutely contemporaneous with specific forms of 
power, there can be no claim for a transcendental source outside of power from which 
resistance becomes possible.  In its position of primacy, then, Foucauldian resistance is 
not to be understood as a mere reactive response to the deployment of power, but can 
instead be redefined as a vital component, co-extensive with field of power as such, 
whereby the term primacy denotes the permanent possibility and relational specificity of 
resistance amongst power relations.    
To claim that resistance is primary with power is first set designate the condition 
by which a relation of power cannot be conceived or practiced without the permanent 
possibility of resistance.  It is by designating resistance as a permanent, and therefore 
primary, component of the dynamic field of power relations, that Foucault’s fifth thesis 
                                                          
780 Michel Foucault, “Power and Sex,” 122. 
781 Mark Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 107. 
279 
 
begins to reveal an alternative critical conception of what is meant by the term 
“resistance” in the power/resistance dynamic.  Similar to the way in which the materiality 
of power within Foucault’s analytic is not conceived as a “substance,” what is at stake in 
the fifth thesis on power is not to posit a “substance of resistance versus a substance of 
power.”782  Thus, while Foucault finds resistance to be situated in a relation of primacy, 
there is “no soul of revolt” or essential substance from which this claim to primacy can be 
made, but instead a “plurality of resistances” marking the permanent potential for revolt 
coextensive with the domain of power.783  In this regard, while resistance is not to be 
understood as an essence or “substance,” May has shown that the permanent potential for 
resistance means that Foucault importantly “finds resistance to be immanent to the power 
relationship.”784  Despite the fact resistance is situated in a position of primacy in terms 
of its permanent and co-extensive relation with the field of power, this condition of 
primacy is itself attested to by virtue of the immanence of resistance to power.  To be 
sure, resistance is immanent to power, according to Foucault, since the latter’s 
“existence…depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance”—that is, resistance is 
immanent to the field of power since its permanent potentiality marks the condition of 
possibility of power as such.785  Resistance—indeed, the “plurality” of resistances—are 
immanent amongst relations of power; the multiplicity of force relations composing the 
domain of power coincides with the networks of resistance immanent within the field of 
power.   
Yet, the question of immanency amongst the power/resistance dynamic is also 
found to modify the concept of resistance since its condition of possibility fundamentally 
relies upon its struggle with power.  In other words, the materiality of resistance relies 
upon the forms of power it opposes; resistance cannot therefore be posited as a substance 
transcendent or external to power, but only that which is intimately bound to the form of 
power with which it struggles.  Foucault’s fifth thesis thus demonstrates how the capacity 
for power coincides with the immanent capacity of a counter-force realized in forms of 
resistance.  While it is possible to designate the primacy of resistance in terms of its 
                                                          
782 Michel Foucault, "Power and Sex,” 123. 
783 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 96.   
784Todd May, Between Genealogy and Epistemology, 115. 
785 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 96. 
280 
 
permanent and coextensive relation with the dynamic of power relations, it is also 
possible to understand the primacy of resistance in terms of its immanency.  Insofar as 
Foucault is understood as making a vital claim for the immanency of resistance amongst 
the dynamic field of power, his fifth thesis fundamentally reveals that the historical 
possibility of power is simultaneously the potential counter-history of its own 
impossibility.  Yet, it is precisely because Foucault finds resistance to be immanent to 
power relations that the very domain in which power operates can be redefined as a 
“relationship of confrontation,” or “strategy of struggle.”786  The immanency of resistance 
to power reveals, for Foucault, that the domain of power—now written 
power/resistance—is itself a field of agonism, of confrontations, and of forms of struggle 
with the exercise of power.  
Insofar as power can only exist on condition of resistance, the fact that resistance 
is immanent to power means for Foucault that the domain in which power refers can 
always become transformed into a strategy of struggle in which power relations might 
become reversed.  What Foucault refers to as “power” thus designates an agonistic field 
of struggle, and his fifth thesis is set to capture this important distinction.  If resistance is 
immanent to the dynamic field of power relations this is due, as Foucault claims, to the 
way in which the permanent potential of resistance implies how at “every moment, the 
relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries.”787  
Foucault’s point here is to account for the ways in which a power relation can always be 
transformed into a relation of “confrontation” or “struggle” consequent upon the primacy 
of resistance amongst this dynamic.  In other words, what makes the logic of the primacy 
of resistance so crucial for Foucault is how the permanent potentiality of resistance 
reveals as agonistic basis at the center of his analytic of power.  In its condition of 
primacy, resistance according to Foucault, is to be defined neither as a mere reactive 
counter-force deployed in response to power, nor a transcendent essence external to 
power; instead resistance defines the condition from which a relation of power comes up 
against its own limit and can be transformed into an agonistic strategy of struggle.  Since 
the permanent potential of resistance marks the condition that intensifies relations of 
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power to their limit points by transforming the field of power into a site of confrontation 
and struggle, the very dynamic of power/resistance attested to in the fifth thesis 
redesignates the field of power in its anarchic specificity—that is, as agōn. 
While Foucault’s claim regarding how a relation of power can always be 
transformed into a struggle seems to invoke a return to the adversarial model as found in 
Schmitt’s theory of the political, Foucault’s agonistic model is to be critically 
distinguished by its fundamental reference to the place of resistance amongst this 
conception.  While Schmitt’s theory rests on the presupposition of sovereign power—in 
which the distinction between adversaries is made only in reference to the state—
Foucault, however, fundamentally reverses this claim, and maintains that the permanent 
potential for revolt or primacy of resistance is what makes possible an agonistic struggle 
between adversaries.  Thus, unlike Schmitt who posits an adversarial model in terms of a 
struggle between two nation-states, Foucault’s analytic of power instead posits that a 
relation of power can only become transformed into a relation of agonism on condition of 
resistance.  Thus, when Foucault speaks of a “confrontation between two adversaries” he 
means to designate the struggle between the art of governing on one side, and “a 
confrontation with those whom one governs” on the other.788  In the previous chapter, we 
saw how the history of power exercised as government historically coincides for Foucault 
with the “art of not being governed.”  With the primacy of resistance marking the 
condition by which a relation of power can be transformed into a “confrontation with 
those whom one governs,” it is clear that the power/resistance dynamic represents the 
conceptual basis from which this “art of not being governed” becomes visible.  In other 
words, inasmuch as both power and resistance are not to be understood in terms of an 
essence or substance this means, however, for Foucault that the power/resistance 
dynamic ought to be analyzed in terms of an agonistic struggle between power exercised 
as government and the art of not being governed.   
Insofar as resistance, according to Foucault, is the agent that reveals the agonistic 
dimension specific to the field of power, his fifth thesis can be read not only as a vital 
attempt to account for the permanence of resistance amongst the network of power, but 
also the dimension of struggle inherent to power relations as such.  It is in this way that 
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Foucault begins to rethink how the domain of power refers to the dynamic field in which 
“between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a 
perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal.”789  To be sure, Foucault’s fifth thesis is set to 
highlight this “perpetual linking” or nexus between power and resistance in such a way 
that highlights how the primacy of resistance marks the principle of intelligibility from 
which power can be analyzed as an agonistic struggle between power exercised as 
government and the art of not being governed.  Against the criticism that Foucault’s 
analytic of power cannot account for the possibility of resistance, the fifth thesis clarifies 
how resistance is permanently inscribed as an immanent and vital component to the 
domain in which power operates.  Yet, Foucault takes this a step further and argues that it 
is because resistance is primary with power that the field to which power refers is 
radically reopened as an agonistic field of struggle situated at the horizon of the state and 
governmentality.  In this regard, it is my contention that Foucault’s fifth thesis and the 
subsequent logic of the primacy of resistance contained therein must be read as reopening 
the field of power in its anarchic specificity—that is as agōn.  This is to say that while 
Foucault understands power within the field of government, a specific form of power 
exercised as a “management of possibilities,” the fact that resistance marks the principle 
from which the field of power can be transformed into a relation of struggle, radically 
dislocates the field of power from its monopolization within the exercise of 
governmentality.790  Thus, insofar as the exercise of power is defined as the “government 
of men by other men—in the broadest sense of the term,” Foucault writes that one 
necessarily “includes an important element: freedom.”791  On condition of the primacy of 
resistance, the field of power exercised as government is reopened as a radical space of 
freedom in which the existence of power is parallel to its own impossibility animated in 
movements of resistance.  For Foucault, then, the site of resistance is also the site of a 
radical form of freedom.    
If the exercise of power as governmentality requires and turns upon the concept of 
“freedom,” this theory of freedom is only made possible due to the logic of the primacy 
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of resistance.  Thus, in 1984 Foucault affirms the relation between this radical condition 
of freedom and the primacy of resistance:   
In order for power relations to come into play, there must be a certain degree of 
freedom on both sides…This means that in power relations there is necessarily the 
possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance (of 
violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the situation), 
there would be no power relations at all.792  
Here, Foucault retrospectively highlights the way in which the primacy of resistance 
redesignates the field of power as a site of potential freedom—that is, on condition of the 
“possibility of resistance,” the field of power requires a conception of freedom in order to 
account for the capability of “reversing the situation.”  As Foucault reiterates, then, “as 
soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance.  We can never be 
ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and 
according to a precise strategy.”793  More fundamentally, then, the radical inscription of 
the permanent potential of revolt into the field of power relations means that resistance 
designates the point by which one is never fully “ensnared by power.”  The primacy of 
resistance is not attested to by a position, either anterior or exterior to power, but as a 
permanent and immanent possibility of freedom amongst the dynamic to which power 
consists; power is therefore not itself absolute, but coextensive with the permanent 
potential of resistance and freedom.  Consequently, however, this means that in its 
position of primacy, resistance is redefined by Foucault as that which designates a radical 
condition of freedom made possible by its permanence within the dynamic field of power 
relations.  The fact that resistance is primary with power reveals an alternative principle 
from which the exercise of governmentality can never solidify as a relations of pure 
domination, but only that which, on condition of resistance, is reopened as a potential site 
of freedom.    
Fundamentally, then, while the fifth thesis posits that resistance is necessarily co-
extensive and immanent to the field of power with which it struggles, the fact that 
question of resistance turns upon a radical condition of freedom further elucidates the 
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ways in which the place of resistance amongst this dynamic cannot ultimately be reduced 
to a reactive force truncated by power from the beginning.  Although resistance, as 
Foucault suggests, is intimately bound to the forms of power it opposes, it is a mistake to 
conceive of resistance as “only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to the basic 
domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual 
defeat.”794  Rather than simply forming the reactive, passive counter-part of power, 
Foucault maintains instead that points of resistance form “the odd term in relations of 
power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite.”795  Foucault clarifies 
here that resistance is permanently inscribed within a relation of power, and yet maintains 
that this resistance can be seen as belonging to power in such a way that it cannot be 
reduced to the techniques of power—that is, resistance is defined as an “irreducible 
opposite,” co-extensive with power relations.  Deleuze affirms this idea and argues that 
points of resistances “are not simply the ‘repercussion’ or ‘passive’ side of the former but 
are rather the ‘irreducible encounter’ between the two, especially if we understand that 
the force affected has a certain capacity for resistance.”796  Here, Deleuze affirms that 
resistance is irreducible to power, because the latter contains the capacity for the counter-
force of resistance.  This is to say that while resistance depends upon relations of power 
in a similar manner to the way in which power relies upon the potentiality for resistance, 
the capacity for resistance is nevertheless irreducible in this relation because the counter-
force of its realization marks both the condition of possibility and limit of power.   
This means, however, that what is at stake in the fifth thesis is not simply that 
power ought to be redefined in a way attested to by the permanence of resistance but, 
more fundamentally, to describe the ways in which the capacity of power directly 
corresponds and coincides with the immanent potential of its own counter-force, from 
which Foucault invokes the concept of resistance to describe this possibility.  Resistance 
as such is redefined by Foucault as the counter-force of revolt immanent within the 
deployment of power relations that wards off power as such.  Although resistance can 
never be severed from the relations of power with which it struggles, the former is 
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irreducible amongst this dynamic since it is through the immanent capacity of revolt that 
a relation of power reaches its limit and becomes intensified in terms of a confrontation 
between those who are governed and those who govern.  “Hence,” Foucault writes, “they 
too are distributed in irregular fashion: the points, knots, or focuses of resistance are 
spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals 
in definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain 
types of behavior.”797  In other words, while resistance is immanent to power and cannot 
be conceived outside of this relation, its permanent potential amongst relations of power 
designates a parallel, yet heterogeneous, networked field of resistance “spread over time 
and space.”    
It is because Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of reversing the traditional 
perception of power, that the place of resistance within the domain of power/resistance is 
reformulated as the paradigm that makes power visible as such.  Resistance, then, is 
irreducible to power since in order to view the operability of power in its quotidian form 
one has to begin, according to Foucault, by invoking points of resistance as the principle 
of intelligibility of power; points of resistance are therefore indispensable for the analysis 
of relations of power as such.  Consequently, then, as Foucault maintains, inherent within 
the power/resistance dynamic is “the ability to decipher the same events and the same 
transformations either from inside the history of struggle or from the standpoint of the 
power relationships.”798  It is important to note here the way Foucault stresses how an 
analytic of power can be interpreted either from “inside” the history of resistance or from 
the perspective of power.  In other words, the fifth thesis is not simply a commentary 
regarding how the field of power necessarily coincides with the field of resistance, but 
that the very dynamic power/resistance reveals a new perspective from which to read the 
field of power in terms of its agonistic dimension.  Yet, while Foucault maintains that the 
field of power can either be read from the perspective of power or from within the 
perspective of resistance, his own work is firmly situated within the critical perspective of 
the later.  Thus “in order to understand what power relations are about” Foucault writes, 
“perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate 
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these relations.”799  In other words, given that the history of political thought and practice 
is traditionally reduced to the paradigms of sovereign power and governmentality, 
Foucault instead maintains that the operability of power can instead be determined from 
“inside the history of struggle”—that is, from history of resistance.      
Yet, the question of resistance is additionally found to be the motor of power in 
Foucault’s thought because it marks the condition of potential transformation by which 
relations of power can become reversed as a strategy of struggle; resistance therefore 
designates the point in which relation of power can be retranslated into a radical space of 
freedom made possible in its struggle with the forms of power it opposes.  We might 
therefore consider the primacy of resistance as the motor of power relations in two 
manners: as its condition of possibility, and as that which precipitates a possible 
transformation of power.  In an interview, Foucault directly situates his fifth thesis in 
relation to these two points and further clarifies that resistance ought to be understood as 
the primary component of the dynamic between power and resistance.  Foucault writes: 
You see, if there was no resistance, there would be no power relations.  Because it 
would simply be a matter of obedience.  You have to use power relations to refer 
to the situation where you’re not doing what you want.  So resistance comes first, 
and resistance remains superior to the forces of the process; power relations are 
obliged to change with resistance.  So I think that resistance is the main word, the 
key word, in this dynamic (original emphasis).800 
Again, alluding to the primacy of resistance, Foucault maintains that what is at stake in 
this analytic is not simply a redefinition of power, but rather that resistance marks the 
“key word” amongst the dynamic to which power refers.  On one side of the question, 
resistance is to be understood as the “key word” in relations of power, because 
“resistance comes first,” and is therefore in a position of primacy with respect to the 
power dynamic.  As a consequence to the power/resistance dynamic, Foucault begins to 
indicate how points of resistance are what make possible an alternative critical 
framework from which to read the dynamic of power—that is, “resistance comes first” 
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for Foucault because it is what marks the principle of intelligibility that renders the 
concrete operability of power relations discernible as such.  
At the same time, however, resistance is also key to the dynamic of power, 
because it is what precipitates the possibility of transformation in the exercise of power as 
government, and therefore “remains superior to the process.”  In this way, while the 
primacy of resistance marks a new grid of intelligibility for relations of power, this same 
idea is what Foucault maintains allows for a possible transformation amongst the 
deployment of power.  As Deleuze notes, Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of 
demonstrating how relations of “force display potentiality [that] presents itself as the 
possibility of resistance…in such a way as to make change possible.”801  Thus, the 
potentiality for resistance within relations of power is irreducible amongst this relation 
since resistance is the condition from which the exercise of government can become 
transformed into a fundamental struggle with the ones whom one governs.  In its position 
of primacy, resistance is irreducible in that it pinpoints the limit of power and acts as the 
principle of intelligibility from which to read power relations, while at the same time 
forming the locus that reopens the field of power as a field of potential freedom. 
With the above outline regarding the vital manner in which Foucault’s fifth thesis 
radically modifies the way in which the question of resistance can be situated in a relation 
of primacy within the power/resistance dynamic, it is now possible to demonstrate what I 
hold to be one of the penultimate claims in The History of Sexuality.  Foucault’s fifth 
thesis not only acts as the conceptual nexus from which the analytic of power as found in 
The History of Sexuality depends, but also and more fundamentally that the primacy of 
resistance designates the historical motor of power as such.  By claiming that resistance 
designates the historical motor of power relations, I mean to point toward the way in 
which Foucault’s fifth thesis critically amends Marx and Engels’s famous thesis that the 
“history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle,” in which the 
substance of this struggle is defined as the “antagonism of oppressing and oppressed 
classes.”802  In Foucault’s thought, it is not simply “class struggle” that acts as the radical 
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agent that gives human history its historicity as such, but more specifically the primacy of 
resistance which, as we have seen, is the condition upon which the exercise of 
government is transformed into a fundamental confrontation with those whom one 
governs.  Thus, for Foucault: 
revolts belong to history…People do revolt; that is a fact.  And that is how 
subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, 
breathing life into it…All the disenchantments of history won’t alter the fact of 
the matter: it is because there are such voices that the time of human beings does 
not have the form of evolution but that of “history,” precisely.803  
It is in this way that rather than invoking the concept of “class struggle” as the agent of 
history, Foucault instead maintains that the “enigma of revolt” is the motivating force of 
history.  Thus, while Foucault affirms that history can indeed be read as a history of 
struggle, he maintains that the varying forms of revolt cannot, however, be reduced to the 
totalizing notion of class struggle.  In other words, Foucault’s fifth thesis not only forms 
the basis from which a non-sovereign analysis of power relations can be based, but also a 
non-Marxist approach to the history of struggle.  In light of the power/resistance 
dynamic, the fifth thesis can be read in the following manner: “[w]here there is power, 
there is resistance” posits that it is resistance, and neither the paradigm of government 
nor the theory of sovereignty, that acts as the basic motor of power relations as such.  
Instead, resistance is the fundamental motor of power relations since it is on condition of 
its position of primacy that the exercise of power as government can be transformed into 
a relation of struggle between the art of governing and the art of not being governed, 
without which the field of power could only be rendered discernible as a binary relation 
of domination and pure obedience.   
We have seen how Foucault’s fifth thesis posits a coextensive relation between 
power and resistance in such a way that resistance attains a position of primacy in regard 
to power and is therefore to be taken as a permanent component of the dynamic to which 
power refers.  The primacy of resistance not only radically modifies the traditional 
concept of power, but also the traditional conceptualizations of emancipatory struggle in 
such a way that offers an alternative manner from which to read the field of power in 
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terms of an agōn.  To be sure, Foucault’s fifth thesis has the effect of both redefining 
power on condition of resistance, as well as offering a critical redefinition of what is 
meant by the term resistance amongst this relation.  Because resistance is what is 
presupposed by power, Foucault valorizes resistance as the irreducible “key word” in the 
dynamic between the two concepts.  “[A]nd yet,” as Foucault writes in a way that 
critically modifies the first component of the fifth thesis, “or rather consequently, this 
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”804  While the primacy 
of resistance both disrupts the place of power and remains a permanent possibility within 
power itself, the consequence of this additionally demonstrates that the materiality of 
resistance derives its specificity from a relation of power and is therefore not to be 
conceived as “outside” or external to its place within this dynamic.  As Kelly notes, 
“while resistance in general ‘comes first,’ specific resistance does not come into 
existence until power appears.”805  In this way, although resistance is primary with 
power, this relation of primacy is attested to by what can be referred to through 
Foucault’s fifth thesis as the principle of non-exteriority, or the way in which resistance is 
realized in its relation to the form of power it opposes.  It is in this consequent second 
part of his fifth thesis that Foucault begins to pinpoint and elaborate a preliminary 
rationale to describe the space of the political in terms of a permanent sphere of agonism 
attested to by the power/resistance dynamic.  In its principle of non-exteriority, the 
question of resistance—indeed, its primacy—must neither be conceived in terms of a 
central source transcendent to power, nor as a material essence anterior to power, but as a 
constituent component actively bound to the power it opposes and resists.   
Without a transcendent point from which to ground a theory or praxis of 
resistance, what is ultimately at stake for Foucault is to demonstrate how the principle of 
non-exteriority reveals an alternative manner from which the materiality of resistance can 
in fact be considered without reducing the question of revolt to the Hegelian notion of 
dialectic negation, or subsuming all forms of resistance under the alleged universality of 
class struggle.  “Hence,” Foucault writes in the passage following the fifth thesis, if 
resistance is always in a position of non-exteriority with relations of power then “there is 
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no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of 
the revolutionary.”806  While, Foucault’s critics tend to take this principle as a theoretical 
impasse in which he cannot account for the possibility of resistance, I instead affirm this 
notion as a way to think through how Foucault’s fifth thesis marks out a terrain from 
which a critical caesura between the paradigm of an archē that grounds power in the 
problem of sovereignty and a fundamental agonistic dynamic that takes into account the 
primacy of resistance can be found.  In its position of non-exteriority, Foucault’s fifth 
thesis reveals the power/resistance dynamic as a permanent domain of agonism between 
forces, and thus a new way to understand the question of politics consequent upon this 
dynamic.  In its position of non-exteriority, resistance arises within, and cannot be 
separated from, the space of struggle made possible by its realization amongst power 
relations.  This space of struggle is not prior to the deployment of power relations, but 
that which is realized and animated by resistance.             
In its most preliminary form, Foucault’s assertion that the primacy of resistance is 
attested to by a position of non-exteriority, radically denies any claim for a transcendental 
source or pure law of resistance, while highlighting its agonistic specificity.  Without a 
transcendental or theoretical “source of all rebellions,” Foucault’s point is to 
problematize the place of resistance, and to subsequently reveal a new rationale that can 
account for the materiality of revolt within a permanent sphere of agonism.  In an 
interview given shortly after the publication of The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
emphasizes that while “power is co-extensive with the social body,” the consequence to 
this dynamic means that “there are no spaces of primal liberty between the meshes of its 
network.”807  Foucault’s reference to the space of “primal liberty” invokes Hobbes’s 
conception of “nature” as a space of “absolute liberty” pre-existent to and outside of the 
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advent of sovereignty.808  In other words, by “spaces of primal liberty” Foucault wants to 
designate a foundation prior to the space of power from which might act as the essential 
foundation from which resistance might arise.  If there are no primal spaces of liberty 
outside of power, Foucault’s consequent claim regarding the non-exteriority of resistance 
to power demonstrates that the logic of resistance cannot invoke a place outside of 
power—either theoretically or materially—in order to justify its existence.  Rather than a 
single source, or essence prior to and outside of power, that acts as the foundation for the 
possibility of resistance, Foucault maintains: 
there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are 
possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, 
concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, 
interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only exist in the strategic field of 
power relations.809  
Here, in regard to the principle of non-exteriority, Foucault maintains that resistance is 
itself enmeshed within the “strategic field of power relations”—that is, resistance finds its 
material basis directly within the form power with which it struggles.  Yet, at the same 
time, rather than presupposing a “pure law” of revolt in which the materiality of 
resistance could become reduced to the Marxist notion of class struggle, a critical 
conceptualization of its existence can only be posed in terms of a “plurality of 
resistances.”  Although resistance exists in a relation of primacy with power, the material 
realization of resistance can only be determined and become known in relation to the 
form of power with which it struggles.  According to Foucault, then, there can be no 
universal, all-encompassing theory from which to codify revolt, instead the plurality of 
resistances reveals the dynamic of power as a domain of agonism discernable within the 
power/resistance dynamic.  This, means, however, that while Foucault denies the 
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absolute exteriority of resistance, he simultaneously relocates its materiality within the 
dynamic of struggle from which it arises and is manifest.   
Without any “primal spaces of liberty” acting as the source of resistance, the 
consequent component of the fifth thesis ought to be read as making a critical 
commentary on traditional conceptualizations of resistance.  In its position of non-
exteriority, there is not a point of departure outside of power from which resistance 
emanates or can be justified; one does not begin to engage with the question of resistance 
by looking outside of the relation of power with which it struggles, nor by attempting to 
universally subsume all forms of resistance under a single revolutionary logic.  For 
Newman, then, instead of presupposing the “revolutionary transcendence of law, perhaps 
radical politics can be more productively thought today in terms of localized forms of 
resistance at the interstices of law and power.”810  Indeed, it is on this point that we must 
attempt to understand Foucault’s key contribution to anarchist theory.  Rather than 
searching for a transcendental ground outside and prior to power from which to premise a 
theory of resistance, Foucault maintains that the place of resistance “is not anterior to the 
power it opposes.”811  As Foucault confirms in an interview from 1982 resistance is not 
prior, but intimately bound to relations of power: “resistance is part of this strategic 
relationship of which power consists.”812  Thus “resistance,” as Foucault continues, 
therefore “really always relies upon the situation against which it struggles.”813  Just as 
Foucault demonstrates that there is a certain dependence of power on resistance, the 
question of resistance is analogously shown to rely upon the relation of power “against 
which it struggles.”  In this sense, the consequent component of the fifth thesis modifies 
the original claim in a significant way, while revealing a preliminary rationale to account 
for the material manifestation of resistance.  While resistance, in its coextensive and 
contemporaneous relation to power, this claim to primacy neither invokes nor is derived 
from a position transcendent to power, but is instead found to be located at the precise 
points in which power is exercised.  Conditioned by its principle of non-exteriority, the 
                                                          
810 Saul Newman, “Anarchism and Law: Towards a Post-Anarchist Ethics of Disobedience,” 310. 
811 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984. Edited by Sylvère Lotringer. California: 
Semiotext(e), 1996), 224.   
812 Michel Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity,” 168. 
813 Ibid, 168.   
293 
 
primacy of resistance is not attested to by a pre-existent space either prior or outside of 
power; instead the space of resistance is to be found precisely at the points of power’s 
operability against which it struggles.   
That there are no primal spaces of liberty outside of relations of power does not, 
however, foreclose the possibility of resistance, but instead renders its presence and 
existence more acute for Foucault.  To be sure, it is precisely because the space of 
resistance is located within its struggle with power, that Foucault testifies to the existence 
and effectivity of resistance as such.  In this way, when Foucault further contextualizes 
the primacy of resistance, he additionally affirms that this principle of non-exteriority is 
what allows for a new way to engage with the question of historical struggle.  Far from 
negating the possibility of resistance, Foucault maintains: 
there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real 
and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power 
are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be 
real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power.  It 
exists all the more by being in the same place as power; hence, like power, 
resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies.814   
Rather than the foreclosing the possibility of resistance, we see that the principle of non-
exteriority is what characterizes the very possibility of its existence.  Instead of invoking 
a universal theory that attests to the reality of resistance, as is often the case in radical 
political theories, resistance is according to Foucault found to be all the “more real” not 
because it comes from “elsewhere,” but because its very realization arises from, and 
corresponds with, its material struggle with power.  Hence, “it does not have to come 
from elsewhere to be real”—that is, the actuality of resistance is attested to and made 
more “effective” by its realization of a struggle with power, and neither by an exterior 
position prior to a relation of power, nor a revolutionary transcendence of power.  In this 
way, the principle of non-exteriority holds that a theory of resistance cannot be based off 
of the logic of a pure outside, but instead finds its logic in the elaboration of its struggle 
with a relation of power.  It is within the space of struggle, and not a position of 
exteriority, that resistance is animated as such; this means, however, that a theory of 
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resistance ought not to presuppose a topological or theoretical position of exteriority 
prior to its manifestation within a relation of power, but instead an internal dimension of 
agonism.   
Although Foucault’s fifth thesis reveals an alternative point of entry from which 
to account for the permanence of resistance amongst power relations, his critics tend to 
point toward how his fifth thesis and the corresponding claim regarding non-exteriority of 
resistance appears as a conceptual impasse that precludes the possibility of a critical 
emancipation though the notion of resistance.  Yet, in several key moments spread 
throughout his work, Foucault consistently refuses to acknowledge that this principle of 
non-exteriority means that one is always trapped by a relation of power.  Indeed, instead 
of presupposing a dynamic in which one is always trapped within relations of power, 
what is at stake for Foucault is to demonstrate how the power/resistance dynamic 
indicates a condition of radical freedom.  Indeed, Foucault tackles this problem in tandem 
alongside his fifth thesis.  “Should it be said” Foucault asks “that one is always ‘inside’ 
power, there is no ‘escaping’ it, there is no absolute outside where it is concerned, 
because one is subject to the law in any case?  Or that…power is the ruse of history, 
always emerging the winner?”815  To be sure, while Foucault denies the possibility of a 
transcendent position outside of power which might act as critical foundation for a theory 
of resistance, this same logic radically renews, rather than revokes, the possibility of 
emancipation.  Thus, while Foucault maintains that “power is ‘always already there,’ that 
one is never ‘outside’ it, that there are no ‘margins’ for those who break with the system 
to gambol in,” he further concludes that “this does not entail the necessity of accepting an 
inescapable form of domination or an absolute privilege on the side of the law.  To say 
that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned 
to defeat no matter what.”816   
The interdependence Foucault locates between power and the non-exteriority of 
resistance does not reduce the question of resistance to a mere reaction to power, nor does 
its position of non-exteriority disclose the possibility of reversing, escaping or moving 
outside of power.  The principle of non-exteriority according to Foucault instead reveals a 
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radical condition of freedom located in the space of struggle made possible through 
resistance.  In a manner that seems to anticipate the criticism that would later he would 
later come to face, Foucault maintains: 
I don’t think the word trapped is a correct one.  It is a struggle, but what I mean 
by power relations is the fact that we are in a strategic situation toward each 
other…we are in this struggle, and the continuation of this situation can influence 
the behavior and nonbehavior of the other.  So we are not trapped.  We are always 
in this kind of situation.  It means that we always have possibilities, there are 
always possibilities of changing the situation.  We cannot jump outside the 
situation, and there is no point where you are free from all power relations.  But 
you can always change it.  So what I’ve said does not mean that we are trapped, 
but that we are always free—well, anyway, that there is always the possibility of 
changing (original emphasis).817 
Rather than emphasizing the term “trapped” to describe a conceptual impasse inherent in 
the power/resistance dynamic, Foucault instead understands this dynamic as a “strategic 
situation,” and thus invokes a preference for the term “struggle” to describe this dynamic.  
Yet Foucault also makes an important distinction here regarding the concept of 
“freedom” within this dynamic.  Since there is no position prior or outside the form of 
power resisted, the radical freedom Foucault locates in the power/resistance dynamic is 
not set to describe the point where one is, or can ultimately become “free from all power 
relations;” Foucauldian freedom is not freedom from.  Instead, the Foucauldian notion of 
freedom is what is found in the space of struggle made possible by resistance, and refers 
to the “possibility” of changing the situation to which power consists.  It is in regard to 
the inherent interrelation between resistance and freedom—indeed the freedom arising 
from resistance—that Foucault attempts to rethink the power/resistance dynamic in a way 
that presupposes, rather than forecloses, the possibility of lines of flight from relations of 
power.  This means, however, that the agonistic space of struggle attested to and made 
possible by resistance is also the condition of radical freedom; yet, the freedom revealed 
by the power/resistance dynamic does not posit the possibility of an “outside” where one 
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is freed from power, but instead conceives of freedom as a space of struggle made 
possible in the realization of resistance.   
Insofar as the domain of power relations can be rethought as the permanent 
struggle between the power/resistance dynamic, the above analysis has been set to 
demonstrate how Foucault maintains that this very domain must therefore be analyzed in 
the form of an agōn rather than in the problem of governmentality, sovereign power and 
the state.  Indeed, what is at stake in Foucault’s fifth thesis is that the power/resistance 
dynamic means that the field of power can be analyzed in terms of permanent struggle, in 
which the notion of resistance at once designates the condition by which power relations 
can be transformed into strategies of struggle as well as a point of possible reversal, of 
potential freedom brought about through the struggle with power.  Thus, as Foucault 
writes:  
If it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a permanent condition of 
their existence there is an insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the 
part of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of power without 
the means of escape or possible flight.818 
By way of summary, Foucault here maintains that relations of power exist as such only 
on the “permanent condition” of resistance which, in its position of primacy, is both the 
motor that transforms power relations into a field of struggle as well as the principle from 
which the “means of escape” become possible.  Yet, while power designates a 
“relationship of confrontation” on condition of the primacy of resistance, Foucault 
cautions that this field can become a relation of domination “when stable mechanisms 
replace the free play of antagonistic reactions” (original emphasis).819  Consequently, 
then, what is ultimately at stake in Foucault’s fifth thesis is that the very field of force 
relations which compose the power/resistance dynamic ought to be redefined as the “free 
play of antagonistic reactions”—that is, as agōn.  Herein lies the key to Foucault’s 
analytic; it is only when the primacy of resistance is replaced with “stable mechanisms” 
that the field of power can designate a relation of domination.  Yet, if resistance is taken 
as a permanent component of the field of power, then as Foucault maintains the very 
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dynamic of power/resistance must be understood as the domain of the “free play” of 
agonistic forces.      
4.4 From Power to Politics   
 
But what makes the domination of a group, a caste, or a class, together with the 
resistance and revolts that domination comes up against, a central phenomenon in the 
history of societies is that they manifest in a massive and global form, at the level of the 
whole social body, the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and 
the results proceeding from their interaction.820 
 
This point of view of the plebs, the point of view of the underside and limit of power, is 
thus indispensable for an analysis of its apparatuses (dispositifs); this is the starting 
point for understanding its functioning and development.821 
--Michel Foucault 
 
In one of the more commonly cited passages from The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
writes that “[i]n thought and political analysis we have still not cut off the head of the 
king.”822  By studying and outlining a non-sovereign analytic of power, Foucault 
fundamentally attempts to demonstrate one way to critically detach political theory from 
the juridical foundation of sovereignty that has, in its paradigmatic form, continued to 
shape the course of Western Political philosophy.  Yet, as I have argued throughout this 
chapter, Foucault’s analytic of power as developed in The History of Sexuality itself turns 
upon, and cannot be separated from, the vital (albeit historically ignored) question of 
resistance.  While Foucault’s analytic of power radically dislocates power from its 
sovereign foundation, what is at stake in this analytic is that the characteristic feature of 
power is not that is omnipotent or absolute, but that the domain of power is itself co-
extensive with the permanent potential of resistance amongst this dynamic.  Indeed, the 
key claim from Foucault’s analytic is to suggest that power is neither omnipotent nor 
absolute, but that its condition of existence depends on the multiplicity of points of 
resistance; the key characteristic of Foucault’s analytic is therefore that resistance is 
primary with power.  Thus, while Foucault’s work in The History of Sexuality is often 
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noted for his critical attempt to account for a non-sovereign analytic of power, this 
regicide of political theory is made possible in terms of the primacy of resistance.  In 
other words, the power/resistance dynamic is what constitutes the pivotal point from 
which his regicide of political theory takes place.  Indeed, with the primacy of resistance 
marking the critical terrain from which the traditional paradigms of political theory can 
be thought, the regicide of political theory is marked by a critical caesura between the 
political as archē and the political as agōn—that is, the “free play” between power as the 
exercise of government and the counter-historical movements of resistance.  What is at 
stake, then, in Foucault’s fifth thesis is not simply a redefinition of power indicative of 
the permanent presence of resistance, but that the permanent presence of resistance 
within the dynamic field of power offers key insight into rethinking the basic paradigms 
of both traditional and radical political theory.      
In this chapter, I have argued that Foucault’s fifth thesis from The History of 
Sexuality, which radically inscribes resistance into the dynamic to which power refers, 
reveals and turns upon a new political logic that can be referred to as the primacy of 
resistance in which the exercise of power as government radically coincides with the 
immanent and permanent potential for revolt.  In this regard, the overall goal has first 
been to demonstrate how Foucault’s fifth thesis radically modifies the traditional 
conceptions of both power and resistance in such a way that the power/resistance 
dynamic might come to act as the basic principle of intelligibility for an anarchist 
hypothesis of the political in which the primacy of resistance redesignates the field of 
power as the exercise of government as itself a field of struggle.  In its most preliminary 
form, we have seen how Foucault’s thesis that resistance is primary with power forms the 
critical nexus upon which both his analytic of power depends, as well as the conceptual 
hinge required in order to understand the full complexities of this very analytic.  Rather 
than presupposing the sovereignty of power, Foucault’s fifth thesis radically inscribes 
resistance into the domain to which power refers, and maintains that the permanent 
potentiality of resistance is a condition of possibility for relations of power as such.  As 
attested to by the power/resistance dynamic, relations of power, Foucault argues, must be 
theoretically and materially understood on condition of I have referred to as the anarchist 
invariant of resistance.  In this regard it has been my contention in this chapter that 
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Foucault’s thesis “[w]here there is power, there is resistance,” redefines the field of 
power anarchically. 
At the same time, however, as the fifth thesis radically modifies the traditional 
conception of power, I have argued that the corresponding nexus between power and 
resistance reveals the agonistic dimension proper to the field of power as such.  In its 
position of non-exteriority, the permanent potentiality of resistance disrupts the sovereign 
place of power and reopens the field of power as a dynamic domain of struggle.  Yet, as 
that which finds its consistency within a field of struggle, resistance at once designates 
the motor by the exercise of government can be transformed into an agonistic 
confrontation with those whom one governs, as well as the condition of freedom made 
possible in the struggle with power.  Taken together, then, the primacy of resistance as 
broached in Foucault’s thought is at once the principle from which the domain in which 
power operates is retheorized as permanent sphere of agonistic struggle, as well as that 
which acts as the pivotal possibility for a critical politics of resistance.  Resistance can 
thus be seen as belonging to power in such a way that cannot be reduced to the 
techniques of power itself; the potentiality for resistance is the anarchic spacing that 
provides the irreducible condition to both confront and escape the history of 
governmentality.  Conversely, power, according to Foucault, can only be understood on 
condition of resistance; consequently, however, this means that resistance forms the 
pivotal point upon which the analytic of power depends in The History of Sexuality.   
Resulting from Foucault’s power/resistance dynamic, the fact that resistance is 
found to exist in a position of primacy radically denies the latter’s traditional place as an 
absolute substance born in the advent of the sovereign, and forms the first axiom of the 
anarchic terms of the political.  Indeed, it is by invoking the logic of the primacy of 
resistance that forms the basic point of departure of a radically new way to read the 
question of both power and politics in such a way that the political is shown in its 
irreducibility to the paradigm of government and the logic of the state.  While Foucault’s 
fifth thesis is established as a way to fundamentally situate and designate the primacy of 
resistance as a permanent component of the field of power, it is my contention that this 
same thesis forms the basis from which an alternative economy of power relations and 
politics can be developed from inside the history of struggle and not with the 
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presupposition of the paradigm of government and the logic of sovereignty.  As such, the 
importance of Foucault’s work lies in the way in which he reveals an alternative principle 
of intelligibility for a new economy of power relations from which to understand the 
domain of the political consequent upon the permanence of resistance.  Thus, in the 
“Subject and Power” when Foucault proclaims that “what we need is a new economy of 
power relations,” we find that the advent of this “new economy of power relations” 
requires and is made possible by a critical investigation into the question of resistance, as 
well as the agonistic struggle between the exercise of government and the counter-force 
of resistance.823  For Foucault, then, a new economy of power relations: 
Consists in taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a 
starting point.  To use another metaphor, it consists in using this resistance as a 
chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find 
out their point of application and the methods used.  Rather than analyzing power 
from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists in analyzing power 
relations through the antagonism of strategies.824  
Here, Foucault importantly confirms that the critical development of an alternative 
economy of power relations both depends on the critical question of resistance, as well as 
an analytic of power in terms of the “antagonism of strategies.”  Within the 
power/resistance dynamic, the question of politics for Foucault means that the very field 
of the political can be read in terms of an agonistic struggle: “the struggle is 
everywhere….at every moment, we move from rebellion to domination, from domination 
to rebellion, and it is all this perpetual agitation that I would like to bring out.”825  It is in 
regard to this “perpetual agitation” that Foucault’s analytic of power/resistance and its 
correspondence with the field of politics can be understood as marking a critical caesura 
between the logic of an archē and the domain of an agōn as a principle of intelligibility of 
power. 
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Indeed, it is my contention that insofar as Foucault’s fifth thesis posits that 
resistance is primary with power, then the theme of agonism arising from the dynamic 
power/resistance can be invoked as alternative basis from which to understand the 
historical domain of the political in a way that transcends the paradigms of the political as 
outlined in chapter one.  Foucault writes, “[r]ather than speaking of an essential 
antagonism,” as Schmitt does to describe the substance of the political based in the 
sovereign power of the state, “it would be better to speak of an agonism of a relationship 
that is at the same time mutual incitement and struggle; less a face to face confrontation 
that paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.”826  Here, Foucault directly 
reveals a new dynamic from which to read the structure of the political in terms of a 
permanent field of “agonism” made possible by the permanent inscription of resistance 
amongst this dynamic.  By invoking the term “agonism” instead of “antagonism,” 
Foucault means to point toward the way in which power/resistance dynamic attested to in 
his fifth thesis is redefined as the space of an agōn, and thus that the domain of the 
political can be marked as the dynamic field of a continuous and “permanent 
provocation” between relations of power and forms of resistance.   
In other words, rather than inquiring into the questions pertaining to power, 
politics and the political in terms of the historical archē, as is the case in both Aristotle 
and Schmitt, Foucault’s fifth thesis instead determines that the very question of the 
political ought to be understood in terms of a permanent sphere of an agōn in which 
resistance is permanently inscribed into the dynamic to which relations of power consist 
and operate. To be sure, the theme of agonism as developed in regard to Foucault’s fifth 
thesis reveals a fundamental point in his work in which the simultaneity between the art 
of governing and the art of not being governed can be substantiated.  Thus, when 
Foucault invokes the term “agonism” as opposed to antagonism to critically distinguish 
his thought from his predecessors, this term is set to nominate how the very field of 
power as government is necessarily counter-posed with the dynamic of field of resistance 
as both the condition of possibility of power relations as such and the material 
manifestation of the domain of agonism inherent within power relations as such.  
Crucially, however, insofar as resistance is taken to be primary with power, the question 
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of politics—indeed of the political—cannot simply be reduced to the paradigm of 
government since it is the permanent potentiality of resistance that distinguishes the field 
of power from its traditional basis in the notion of sovereignty.  The primacy of resistance 
means that the political emerges in the struggles created by movements of resistance—
that is resistance, according to Foucault, designates the topology proper to the field of the 
political, since without the permanent potential of resistance, the question of politics 
could only be posed and conceptualized in terms of domination, obedience, and the 
repressive hypothesis of juridical, sovereign law.   
Lest political theory wishes to remain within the conceptual terrain that can only 
conceive of the question of politics in terms of the state, sovereign power, and the history 
of governmentality, Foucault’s fifth thesis maintains that such a task can only be 
accomplished in regard to the question of resistance—indeed, the primacy of resistance.  
It is because Foucault maintains that a critical analysis of power relations and the domain 
of the political must be understood on condition of resistance that he valorizes the place 
of resistance in his thought and maintains that the analysis of the “agonism between 
power relations and the intransitivity of freedom is an increasingly political task—even, 
the political task inherent in all social existence.”827  Insofar as Foucault elevates the 
“agonism” between relations of power and points of resistance as the “political task 
inherent in all social existence,” then the fifth thesis from The History of Sexuality can be 
understood as marking the very basis from which such a task can be accomplished.  To 
be sure, Foucault’s radical inscription of the permanent potential of resistance amongst 
power relations demonstrates how it is with the concept of resistance and not simply the 
paradigm of government that marks the principle of intelligibility from which power 
relations are exposed as a permanent field of agonism.  
With the outline of the primacy of resistance acting as an analytic framework 
from which to rethink the paradigm of the political as a permanent co-extensive relation 
between power and resistance, the following chapter demonstrates a critical 
correspondence between the fifth thesis of The History of Sexuality and his strategic 
inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition on politics and war from Society Must Be 
Defended.  To be sure, Foucault’s fifth thesis informs the very basis of this strategic 
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reversal to the point where the structure of the political becomes indicative of a 
permanent struggle between power and resistance coded as a relation of civil war. 
Whereas this chapter was set to broach the ways in which Foucault’s analytic of power 
reveals and turns upon the rationale of the primacy of resistance, the following chapter 
traces how this thesis formulates a critical caesura in the logic that ground the question of 
politics within the first principle of an archē to the domain of a permanent agōn.  More 
specifically, in the following chapter I contend that Foucault’s preliminary problematic of 
resistance as sketched in the History of Sexuality is significantly reinvigorated and 
revised in Society Must Be Defended in such a way that the history of the political can be 
reread neither as a politics of an oikonomia nor as sovereignty, but rather as an agonistic 
politics of resistance as civil war.  
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Chapter 5 
5 From Archē to Agōn 
 
If power is indeed the implementation and deployment of a relationship of force, rather 
than analyzing it in terms of surrender, contract, and alienation, or rather than analyzing 
it in functional terms as the reproduction of the relations of production, shouldn’t we be 
analyzing it first and foremost in terms of conflict, confrontation, war?  That would give 
us an alternative to the first hypothesis—which is that the mechanism of power is 
basically or essentially repression—or a second hypothesis: Power is war, the 
continuation of war by other means.  At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition 
and say that politics is the continuation of war by other means.828 
--Michel Foucault 
 
The Modern State, which purports to put an end to civil war, is instead its continuation 
by other means.829 
--Tiqqun   
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced and examined the primacy of resistance—via 
Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality—not only in order to 
demonstrate the ways in which the notion of resistance is the key concept required for 
Foucault’s analytics of power and governmentality, but also how the primacy of 
resistance offers a radically new perspective from which to read the structure and history 
of the political anarchically.  A critical economy of power relations according to 
Foucault’s fifth thesis can only be understood on condition of the permanent potentiality 
for resistance; hence, the field in which power consists is reformulated in terms of the 
power/resistance dynamic.  At the same time, however, the concept of resistance within 
this dynamic can be seen as belonging to power in such a way that it cannot be reduced to 
the techniques of power itself.  The permanent potentiality of resistance amongst the 
dynamic field in which relations of power operate designates resistance as the anarchist 
invariant in which power relations can become transformed into a fundamental struggle 
between the exercise of government and a struggle with those whom one governs.  
Consequently, however, this means that resistance—indeed the primacy of resistance—
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forms the pivotal point in which power, politics, and the history of the political can 
neither be reduced to the advent of sovereignty nor the exercise of government; the 
political only assumes the form of an archē for Foucault “when stable mechanisms 
replace the free play of antagonistic reactions” (original emphasis).830  While we have 
seen how Foucault prefers the term “agonism” over that of “antagonism,” what is referred 
to as “free play of antagonistic reactions,” ultimately reveals an alternative paradigm for 
political thought and praxis, one that takes the form of an agonistic struggle between the 
exercise of power as government and the counter-historical movements of resistance.831  
What is at stake, then, in Foucault’s fifth thesis is not simply a redefinition of an 
economy of power relations indicative of the permanent presence of resistance, but that 
the permanent presence of resistance within the dynamic field of power offers key insight 
into rethinking the foundational tenets of orthodox political philosophy, as well as basic 
project of radical political theory.  If we refuse, as Foucault suggests, the nexus that binds 
the question of politics to its foundation in sovereign power, and take the primacy of 
resistance as the critical grid from which to read the history of the political, it is my 
contention that the history of politics can no longer be understood in terms of a project in 
pursuit of a state, sovereignty or the exercise of government, but rather as a form of 
agonistic struggle, a certain sphere of praxis in which we can glimpse the basis of what I 
hold to be an anarchist hypothesis of the political.   
In this regard, this chapter seeks to establish a theoretical continuity between the 
primacy of resistance broached in The History of Sexuality and the lecture series given 
under the provocative title Society Must Be Defended in which the power/resistance 
dynamic is directly reinvigorated by Foucault as the basic framework from which to read 
politics and the history of the political.  More specifically, while the previous chapter was 
set to reveal and explicate how Foucault’s fifth thesis posits the primacy of resistance as 
the condition of possibility and principle of intelligibility for a new economy of power 
relations, this chapter traces how Foucault invokes this same thesis as the basis from 
which to rethink the history of the political as agōn in which the power/resistance 
dynamic is recast and coded in terms of interpreting politics as a continuation of war.  
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Provided that the lectures comprising the series Society Must Be Defended were given in 
the years between the publications of Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, 
the former not only coincides chronologically with the later text, but thematically as well, 
often expanding upon and further developing several of the key concepts made possible 
in his new analytic of power.  Since the lectures composing Society Must Be Defended 
were given during the final stages of writing The History of Sexuality, the former, as 
Mark Kelly concludes, “constitutes something of a supplement to” the latter.832  Yet, 
while it has been acknowledged that certain central themes explored in The History of 
Sexuality are furthered developed in Society Must Be Defended, the continuity between 
the two texts is most commonly reduced to the question of power while bracketing the 
coinciding question of resistance. 833  In this regard, Stuart Elden has traced how the 
concept of “biopower” is the key concept developed in Society Must Be Defended.834  
Elden’s reading of the importance of the study of “biopower” in Society Must Be 
Defended is further shared by Paolo Palladino835 and Michael Dillon,836 both of whom 
analyze these lectures as extended commentaries on the term as it he develops in The 
History of Sexuality.  While these studies have helped outlined a specific continuity 
between these two texts in terms of power, it is my contention that Society Must Be 
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Society Must Be Defended introduces the themes of race and racism to Foucault’s study of power.  Yet 
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of state racism, the histories he traces in terms of “race struggles” can be distinguished from the former 
notion insofar as the theme of race is analyzed in terms of resistance rather than power.     
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Defended more directly extends the discussion of the question of resistance proposed in 
The History of Sexuality to the study of politics and political theory.    
With this in mind, I argue that insofar as a vital connection between the analytic 
of power posed in The History of Sexuality and the analytic of the political as extensively 
theorized in Society Must Be Defended can be made in terms of the primacy of resistance 
rather than biopower, that this theoretical nexus is itself made possible in Foucault’s 
strategic inversion of Carl Von Clausewitz’s proposition regarding the ways in which war 
designates the continuation of politics by other means.837  Thus, within the same chapter 
from The History of Sexuality containing the theses on power, Foucault infamously 
inverts Clausewitz’s proposition in order to begin to retheorize the political consequent 
upon the agonistic dynamic of power/resistance.  Insofar as the field of power relations 
designates the strategic struggle between power and resistance, it is in this regard that 
Foucault asks the following critical question: “[s]hould we turn the expression around, 
then, and say that politics is war pursued by other means?”838  Although Foucault’s 
strategic inversion of Clausewitz marks a significant turning point in The History of 
Sexuality, especially in terms of the relation between power/resistance dynamic and the 
domain of the political, the question pertaining to whether or not politics can be thought 
in terms of struggle, war, and resistance is what informs the eleven lectures composing 
Society Must Be Defended, and it is necessary to turn to the this text in order to 
demonstrate how Foucault’s analytic of power/resistance directly informs his theory of 
politics.   
By tracing the ways in which Foucault’s fifth thesis is recast in Society Must Be 
Defended, it is my contention in this chapter that his assertion regarding how resistance is 
                                                          
837 See: Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1984).  Clausewitz was a Prussian military theorist whose principle unfinished and 
continuously revised text, On War (posthumously published in 1832) is considered a standard text 
pertaining to the philosophy of war.  At stake in Clausewitz’s text is a certain synthesis between war and 
politics, whereby war is understood as a means to achieve a specific political goal.  The passage Foucault 
has in mind when he reverses one of the more famous maxims from On War read as follows: “war is not 
an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with 
other means” (87).  By invoking this maxim, Foucault’s goal is to fundamentally reverse the relation 
Clausewitz establishes between war and politics.  Rather than, understanding war in terms of a 
continuation of politics in order to achieve a certain goal, Foucault understands war as the very substance 
of politics—that is, war designates the key paradigm of the political.    
838 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 93.   
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primary and absolutely co-extensive with the field of power is indicative of an alternative 
hypothesis from which to interpret the political as agōn rather than archē.  At the same 
time, however, while it is my claim that Foucault’s thought fundamentally turns upon 
carving out a critical transition from the political as archē to the political as agōn, I 
further argue that the agonistic theory of struggle which underpins his political work 
additionally transcends the recent neo-Schmittian attempts to understand the political in 
terms of what political theorist Chantel Mouffe refers to as “agonistics.”839  Although in a 
series of texts organized in an attempt to reinvigorate the basic tenets of Schmitt’s theory 
of the political within the context of a “liberal, pluralist, democracy,” Mouffe maintains 
an agonistic conception of the political, her thought fundamentally relies upon the 
Aristotelian and Schmittian models of political as outlined in chapter one.840  Thus, while 
Mouffe retains a fundamental dimension of agonism as the substance and principle of 
intelligibility of the political, her model of the political simply reframes Schmitt’s 
argument that the state designates the conceptual horizon proper to the antagonistic 
dimension of the political, while simultaneously reducing the question of “agonistic 
politics” to the Aristotelian paradigm of government in which politics is that which seeks 
“to establish order and organize human co-existence.”841  To be sure, despite her 
                                                          
839 While some of Mouffe’s ideas pertaining to an agonistic theory of the political were first rehearsed in 
the text co-written with Ernesto Laclau, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (London: Verso, 1985), the term “agonistics” is the central concern of her three texts organized in 
regard to rethinking Schmittian political theory within a democratic framework.  See: Chantel Mouffe, The 
Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993); Chantel Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 
2005), 20-1, 23, 52; and Chantel Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), 5-19. 
840 Chantel Mouffe, Agonistics, 19.  A return to Foucault’s theory of the political fundamentally turns upon 
a critique of how Mouffe’s model of the political simply recasts the dual paradigms of government and 
sovereignty as agōn.  Thus, in the first chapter from Agonistics, Mouffe maintains an elemental distinction 
between politics and the political that reinvigorates the Aristotelian and Schmittian paradigms outlined in 
chapter one.  In its most basic form, Mouffe retains the Schmittian logic of an ever-present dimension of 
antagonism inherent to the political and suggests that an agonistic politics as such can be reduced to a 
theory of democratic sovereignty (2-3).  Even more problematically, however, is the way in which Mouffe 
seeks to institutionalize the agonistic dimension of the political within the Aristotelian model of politics as 
the exercise of government, wherein what is referred to as “agonistic politics” in fact designates the 
“ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions that seek to establish order and organize co-
existence” (3).  At stake in her model of the political then, is precisely the eradication of a concept of agōn 
as struggle.  Despite her attempts at developing a radical theory of politics through an agonistic 
conception of the political, there is effectively nothing “radical” at stake in her political theory.  Against, 
Mouffe’s reduction of agōn to framework of representative and institutional democracy, it is my 
contention that Foucault’s theory of the political as agōn finds its consistency within an anarchist, rather 
than democratic theoretical framework.       
841 Ibid, 3. 
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intentions at theorizing a contemporary form of “radical politics,” Mouffe’s work is set to 
“institutionalize” the agonistic dimension of the political within the framework of both 
government and sovereignty—that is, Mouffe eradicates the field of struggle from the 
theory of agonism in order to arrive at an “agonism without antagonism,” or an agōn 
without the permanence of resistance.842  As we will see, an agonistic conception of the 
political according to Foucault, can only be maintained on the permanent possibility of 
resistance and not its exclusion; to expel or eradicate resistance from the field of the 
political is to remove the condition by which power relations can be transformed into an 
agonistic struggle.  Against Mouffe’s theory of agonism, this chapter is therefore devoted 
to a critical exploration of an alternative agonistic conception of insurrectionary politics 
central to both Foucault’s project in Society Must Be Defended and anarchist politics.  My 
central claim is that an agonistic conception of the political is characterized neither by the 
antagonism inherent in the sovereign friend/enemy antithesis (Schmitt) nor by a 
hegemonic struggle over power (Mouffe), but rather by the struggle with, or resistance to, 
power exercised as government. 
Contrary, then, to the ways in which Mouffe’s theory of agonistic politics reduces 
the political as agōn to the exercise of government within a sovereign state, it is my 
contention in this chapter that a return to an agonistic theory of the political is better 
elaborated through a Foucauldian framework, in which the political as agōn retains the 
logic of a permanent struggle internal to the power/resistance dynamic outlined in the 
previous chapter.  The challenge central to this chapter is to develop an agonistic 
conception of the political which allows us to more critically reflect on the questions 
pertaining to resistance and anarchist thought today.  In this regard, this chapter traces 
how Foucault’s fifth thesis acts as the basis from which the history of the political is 
recast in Society Must Be Defended as the history of agonistic struggle in order to 
ultimately explore the implications of an anarchist hypothesis of the political as agōn in 
three interrelated ways that carve out a distinct intervention in the history of political 
theory.  After addressing some of the critical commentary and challenges surrounding 
Society Must Be Defended, the first section explicates how Foucault’s genealogical 
method ultimately reveals that the history of politics and the political can in be 
                                                          
842 Ibid, 10. 
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reinterpreted in terms of a history of struggle.  At stake here is to demonstrate how 
genealogy posits an alternative basis and approach to the question of politics in such a 
way that the political cannot be simply reduced to the history of the state.  Rather than 
beginning with the question of sovereignty as the precondition of modern politics, 
Foucault proposes to replace the “contract-oppression” paradigm of juridico-sovereignty 
with the war model of the political, “in which the pertinent opposition is not, as in the 
previous schema, that between the legitimate and the illegitimate, but that between 
submission and struggle.”843  As we will see, it is on condition of historical discourses of 
struggle and resistance, and not that of the state, that gives politics its distinctive 
character as a continuation of war for Foucault.   
Utilizing Foucault’s strategic reversal of Clausewitz as the pivotal turning point 
from which the fifth thesis is recast as the basis of the political, in the following section, I 
outline how Foucault’s war model of the political reveals an agonistic conception of 
politics historically expressed in movements of resistance.  Here, I trace the ways in 
which the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war reveals an alternative 
hypothesis from which politics and the history of the political emerge in the permanent 
struggle, or agonistic conflict between power and resistance.  Yet, as we will see, insofar 
as the domain proper to the history of the political is agōn, what is ultimately at stake for 
Foucault is that resistance is therefore primary with the history of politics as such.  My 
claim here is that just as resistance is primary with power for Foucault, the agonistic 
model of the political asserts that resistance is also primary with the history of politics.  
In the final section, I explore the ways in which Foucault’s thesis that politics can be 
interpreted as a continuation of war is invoked as a theoretical and historical counter-
narrative to the origin of sovereign power and the birth of the state as extensively 
outlined by Hobbes in his seminal political treatise the Leviathan.  While in Hobbes the 
condition of possibility of sovereign power and the modern state coincides with the 
eradication of the condition of war from the field of the political, in Foucault’s reading of 
the history of politics it is the permanence of civil war that allows for the emergence of 
politics.  As the expression that captures the field of struggle between forces within an 
agonistic conception of the political, civil war at once designates, for Foucault, the 
                                                          
843 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 15. 
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condition of possibility and principle of intelligibility in which the history of politics and 
the political can be understood as a paradigm of resistance.  Taking the outline of the 
primacy of resistance developed throughout the previous chapter as a way to demonstrate 
how Foucault’s analytic of power itself turns upon a permanent and continuous struggle 
between relations of power and forms of resistances, what is required here is to further 
elaborate how the fifth thesis on power is reinvigorated in Society Must Be Defended in a 
way that reveals an agonistic theory of the political in terms of a unique paradigm of 
resistance that Foucault refers to as “social warfare.”844  My claim here is that civil war 
designates the key paradigm from which the history of the political can be interpreted 
agonistically on condition of the primacy of resistance.  More specifically, my argument 
is that if we refuse the dual paradigms of government and sovereignty as the a priori 
foundation of both politics and the political, and take civil war as the alternative 
expression in which the history of politics is expressed in terms of a politics as resistance, 
then Society Must Be Defended reveals an agonistic model of the political that can only 
be described as anarchistic.   
5.1 Critical Reception of Society Must Be Defended and the War 
Model of the Political 
 
Society Must Be Defended designates one of Foucault’s most detailed inquiry into the 
questions pertaining to the history of political theory, and his analysis regarding the ways 
in which the history of the political can be reread in terms of the strategic model of force 
relations, struggle, and war has at once been considered “one of the major achievements 
of Foucault’s thought,”845 as well as a critical “turning point”846 in his research at this 
time.  As Julien Reid suggests, “the problem of war” in Foucault “is the problem of 
political modernity par excellance.”847  To be sure, the various themes and problematics 
                                                          
844 Ibid, 60.   
845 Arnold Davidson, introduction to Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, trans. David Macey (New 
York: Picador, 2003), xviii. 
846 Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani, “Situating the Lectures”, in Michel Foucault, Society Must Be 
Defended, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 273.  
847 Julien Reid, “Life Struggles: War, Discipline and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault,” in 
Foucault On Politics and War, eds. Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
65. 
312 
 
tackled by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended have inspired volumes of work 
dedicated to elaborating the importance of the concept of war in the whole of his work 
and thought.848  Because the lectures were given only a few months before The History of 
Sexuality, the two texts are often read together as support for Foucault’s attempt at a non-
sovereign analytic of power and politics.  Thus, in his commentary on Society Must Be 
Defended, Arnold Davidson argues that “Foucault shows us one way to detach ourselves 
from the philosophico-juridical discourses of sovereignty and the law that has so 
dominated our thought and political analysis.”849  At the same time, however, Society 
Must Be Defended is often misunderstood as a model of power and politics that Foucault 
ultimately abandons in favor of the study of governmentality in the years to follow.  
Thus, in Foucault, Governmentality, Critique Thomas Lemke views Society Must Be 
Defended as the beginning point from which Foucault begins to revise his genealogy of 
power in regard to the question of government rather than a politics of war.850  Similarly, 
while Kelly does not maintain, as does Lemke, that the concept of governmentality 
designates a distinct break with the war model of power and politics, he nevertheless 
suggests that Foucault disavows the “metaphor of war.”851  While it is true that around 
1978 Foucault ceases (although not completely) to use the language of war, he never 
abandons this agonistic conception of power and politics, and it is my contention that this 
model allows us to see how Foucault centralizes the question of resistance to his theory 
of politics and the political.   
Although the lectures comprising this text have been recognized as a crucial 
turning point in Foucault’s political thought, rereading the history of the political through 
the paradigm of war and struggle, like the concept of resistance, has been met with much 
negative critical reception.  On one side of the critical spectrum, philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas criticizes Foucault’s understanding of power relations in Society Must Be 
                                                          
848 See: Foucault On Politics and War, eds. Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); and Foucault in an Age of Terror: Essays on Biopolitics and the Defense of Society, eds. 
Stephen Morton and Stephen Bygrave (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
849 Arnold Davidson, introduction to Society Must Be Defended, xvii. 
850 Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, Critique (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2012), 2-12.  
851 Mark Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 57.  In Kelly’s analysis of the war analytic of 
power and politics, Foucault begins rethink power as war in terms of a critical conception of power as a 
“game.”  “The metaphor,” Kelly writes, that largely “displaces that of war is that of the game” (58).   
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Defended for reducing the field of power to the “interaction of warring parties,”852 thus 
neglecting other possible models.  Similarly, Charles Taylor criticizes Foucault’s 
strategic reversal of Clausewitz’s proposition on war and politics in order to claim that 
the theory of the political posited in Society Must Be Defended undermines all the 
political achievements that rest on the foundations Foucault ultimately hopes to 
overturn.853  More seriously, however, is the way in which both Habermas854 and 
Taylor855 claim that Foucault’s thought in Society Must Be Defended fundamentally relies 
upon an unacknowledged Schmittian framework, and thus that there is a sort of 
theoretical alliance between Foucault and Schmitt’s respective theories of the political.  
This position is again shared by Axel Honneth, who argues that Foucault’s refusal to 
presuppose a normative base for his theory of the political ultimately leads to an 
“unacknowledged political decisionism” in the sense of Schmitt.856  In her text Critique 
of Violence Beatrice Hansen has extensively outlined the ostensive connections between 
Foucault and Schmitt.  Hansen takes Society Must Be Defended as the critical turning 
point from which Foucault’s theory of politics can be assessed, and maintains that 
“Foucault’s theory of the warring subject risk[s] coming remarkably close to Schmitt’s 
The Concept of the Political or even his later, postwar Theory of the Partisan.”857  
Indeed, although Hansen acknowledges Foucault’s attempt to rethink politics in terms of 
an agonistic struggle, she concludes that Foucault fails in the end to theorize a certain 
reciprocity between power and resistance, instead “favoring more often than not a one-
                                                          
852 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1993), 255.  
853 Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy 
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994), 69-102.   
854 See: Neil Levy, “History as Struggle: Foucault’s Genealogy of Genealogy,” in History of the Human 
Sciences, 11:4 (1998), 376.  Here Levy outlines Habermas’ accusations of a hidden Schmittian framework 
in Foucault’s thought, and further maintains that what “concerns Habermas about Foucault’s conception 
of power is the possibility of politics as civil war.”   
855 For a discussion of Taylor’s accusations see: Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence: Between 
Poststructuralism and Critical Theory (New York: Routledge, 2000), 145-146.  Following Taylors critique, 
Hansen maintains that insofar as Foucault’s “project might seem to have more in common with Schmitt’s 
conservative critique of liberalism, thus seemingly confirming the unholy alliance between left- and right-
wing thinkers, one of whose main points of convergence has been antiliberalism” (145).   
856 Axel Honneth, Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory, trans Kenneth Baynes 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 162. 
857 Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence, 145-146.   
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sided sedimentation of force, inflicted upon subjects from the top down.”858  It is in this 
regard that Hansen maintains that the “very status of the homology power/war lack[s] 
clarity.”859 
At stake in these critiques of Society Must Be Defended is that while Foucault 
attempts to rethink the history of the political in terms of struggle, this very form of 
political historicism simply recasts the fundamental antagonism inherent in Schmitt’s 
model.  Yet, while Foucault does indeed invoke the concept of struggle as the principle 
from which to read the history of the political, the form agonism assumes within the 
history of politics for Foucault can be fundamentally differentiated from Schmitt’s 
antagonistic model of the political.  Whereas Schmitt’s thought turns upon, as we have 
seen in chapter one, reducing the dimension of antagonism proper to the political as a 
paradigm of sovereignty, in Foucault the dimension of antagonism that gives the history 
of the political its defining character as such arises and is historically manifest in a 
struggle, or war against the state and the exercise of government.  In other words, while 
both Schmitt and Foucault theorize the political as agōn, it is my contention in this 
chapter that the latter’s thought is to be critically distinguished from the former in that the 
antagonistic dimension of the political is theorized by Foucault as a paradigm of 
resistance and not that of state sovereign power.860   
Although Foucault has been criticized for the alleged similarities between his 
work in Society Must Be Defended and Schmitt’s theory of the political, others have 
sought to offer more critical readings of Foucault’s theory of politics, while further 
outlining the ways in which these lectures designate an extended discussion of the 
general problematic of resistance as set forth in The History of Sexuality.  Neil Levy 
praises Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended for outlining an alternative theory 
                                                          
858 Ibid, 98.  
859 Ibid, 137.   
860 Indeed, while Habermas, Taylor, and Hansen all attempt to read Foucault’s work within a Schmittian 
framework, these theorists neglect to notice that within the narrative arc of Society Must Be Defended 
Foucault traces how the antagonistic dimension of politics as a paradigm of civil war is itself colonized by 
and becomes the discourse of the state in the Schmittian sense.  Thus, although Schmitt is never cited in 
Society Must Be Defended, Foucault’s work accounts for a historical distinction between two ways in 
which an agonistic theory of the political has historically been elaborated—that is, as both paradigm of 
resistance and paradigm of the state.      
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of the political “in which history became the site and stake of political struggle.”861  
Indeed, Levy further maintains that “it is one of the virtues of [Society Must Be 
Defended] that its detailed descriptions of strategies employed…in the struggle over 
history provide an extended illustration of one of the ways in which Foucault envisages 
resistance as functioning.”862  It is in this regard that Society Must Be Defended can be 
read in terms of offering a distinct account of how the power/resistance dynamic is 
exemplified historically.  Furthermore, other theorists such as Andrew Neal have traced 
the ways in which Foucault’s lectures are concerned with a series of historical discourses 
of resistance linked together through the general theme of “politics as war.”863  
Accordingly, Neal maintains that what is at stake for Foucault in Society Must Be 
Defended is to demonstrate how the historical discourses of politics as war provide a 
“resistant understanding of the principles of modern politics and the modern sovereign 
state.”864  While Foucault’s critical inquiry into the how the resistant discourses of 
politics as war itself resists the orthodox, standard narratives of political theory, others 
have suggested how in Society Must Be Defended Foucault attempts to rethink the 
political as agōn in which the discourses of politics as war reveal an alternative theory of 
historical struggle that cannot be reduced to the paradigm of “class struggle.”  Thus, 
while Hansen maintains a close approximation between Schmitt and Foucault, she 
nevertheless suggests that the latter rejects an “antagonistic conception of social struggle, 
including Marx’s forceful class struggle, to unlock another agonistic playing field, one no 
longer tethered exclusively to the historical category of economic redistribution” (original 
emphasis).865  Tracing the question of war through both Foucault and Deleuze, Reid 
claims that what is ultimately at stake in their respective theories is the shared “insistence 
upon war as the condition of possibility for the expression of resistance against the state 
and its allied regimes of power.”866  Although it is widely recognized that Foucault’s 
                                                          
861 Neil Levy, “History as Struggle: Foucault’s Genealogy of Genealogy”, 159.   
862 Ibid, 167. 
863 Andrew W. Neal, “Goodbye War on Terror? Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War and 
Exceptionalism,” in Foucault On Politics and War, eds. Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 52. 
864 Ibid, 52.   
865 Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence, 101.   
866 Julien Reid, “Life Struggles,” 81. 
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theory of politics—with its emphasis on the questions of war and struggle—designates a 
key turning point for Foucault, the significance of this unique model of the political and a 
corresponding form of politics as resistance has yet to be fully explored or appreciated in 
its anarchic and agonistic specificity. 
While each of these theorists have highlighted the relation between the concept of 
war and the question of politics, while further exploring the implications of this war 
model of the political to the question of resistance in Foucault, it is my contention that the 
specific correspondence Foucault develops between the power/resistance dynamic and 
the war model of the political signifies a distinct way in which the political can be 
interpreted anarchically—that is, as agōn, a unique theory in which politics emerges not 
as a paradigm of sovereign power, but instead as resistance.  To be sure, it is my 
contention that Foucault’s strategic inversion of Clausewitz, wherein the term “politics” 
comes to be coded as a paradigm of war, designates an alternative principle in which the 
history of the political can be read from the perspective and logic of the primacy of 
resistance.  As we will see, Foucault’s agonistic model of the political in Society Must Be 
Defended at once designates an alternative theory of politics that transcends the 
Schmittian and neo-Schmittian models, as well as an alternative paradigm of historical 
resistance that transcends the Marxist model of class struggle.  While the following 
chapter will outline how a specific continuity between Foucault’s historical model of 
political struggle as posed in Society Must Be Defended and his later work on ethics 
through the concept of resistance, what is first required in this chapter is to demonstrate 
how the primacy of resistance is recast by Foucault as a key paradigm of politics, and 
further how this paradigm ultimately reveals an agonistic theory of the political that turns 
upon the primacy of resistance.  This is why in The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
describes his work as informing a critical transition from “the model based on law” to the 
“strategic model” of war, in which the question of politics is reopened through the 
power/resistance dynamic.867  While the power/resistance dynamic marks the cusp from 
which an alternative analytic of power can be based, this same co-extensive relation 
between power and resistance demonstrates for Foucault that the domain of the political 
can be analogously analyzed in terms of a permanent struggle—that is on the basis that 
                                                          
867 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 102.   
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resistance is primary with power.  In other words, by inverting Clausewitz’s proposition, 
Foucault reveals how the dynamic field of force relations constituting the 
power/resistance nexus directly corresponds with the domain of the political, and thus 
that the question of politics is marked by a similar dynamic.  Crucially then, whereas the 
primacy of resistance marks the conceptual nexus from which Foucault’s analytic of 
power is made possible, it is my contention that this thesis reappears in Society Must Be 
Defended in such a way that carves out a critical caesu6ra between the political as archē 
and the political as agōn, a caesura in which the domain of the political and the history of 
politics coincides with the agonism inherent within the power/resistance dynamic.     
5.2 Genealogy as an Analytic of Historical Struggle and 
Discourses of Resistance 
 
And so we have the outline of what might be called a genealogy…We have both a 
meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights…we can give the name 
“genealogy” to this coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories which 
allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggle and to make use of that 
knowledge in contemporary tactics.868 
--Michel Foucault  
 
In the opening lecture of Society Must Be Defended Foucault begins by tracing the ways 
in which the general thematics, points of focus, and methodologies in both philosophy 
and critical theory have, over the past two decades prior to his own work, changed in 
regard to what he refers to as the “efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives.”869  
To be sure, Foucault views his own work in Society Must Be Defended as continuing 
within this critical tradition, and the inaugural lecture in this series is set to reveal a 
specific continuity between these critical movements and his own unique methodology.  
Consistent with his other texts and lectures, the question of method is crucial for 
Foucault, and the first lecture is set to situate his work within the methodological 
framework of these “discontinuous offensives” in terms of what he refers to—via 
                                                          
868 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 8.   
869 Ibid, 5.  By the “efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives,” Foucault makes reference to 
several of the critical and philosophical contemporary to his own time including the antipsychiatry 
movement, Reich and Marcuse’s critiques of traditional forms of morality and sexual hierarchy, and the 
anarchist attacks on the penal and judicial systems.     
318 
 
Nietzsche—as “genealogy.”870  As outlined here, Foucault’s genealogical method is itself 
characterized by three distinct features that form the basic theoretical framework from 
which the critical inquiry into the history of the political comprising the remaining 
lectures is made possible.  It is important to briefly trace what Foucault employs in this 
text as his genealogical method in order to point toward the ways in which the 
power/resistance dynamic is recast as the implicit conceptual framework that makes 
possible an alternative reading of the political as a history of agonistic struggle between 
power and resistance.  While it has been noted that Foucault views his work in Society 
Must Be Defended as taking part in an ongoing struggle over a critical interpretation of 
history,871 and further that this alternative interpretation of history ultimately turns upon a 
historical critique of sovereignty,872 it is my contention that the outline of genealogy in 
the opening lecture is set to both frame the interpretation of history and critique of 
sovereignty as an extended discussion of primacy of resistance.  Indeed, genealogy is the 
methodology proper to understanding history as a history of struggle—that is, genealogy 
is the method of analysis that renders the history of politics as resistance discernible for 
Foucault. 
First at stake in Foucault’s genealogical method is a return to the concept of 
“critique” as extensively outlined in chapter three.  Indeed, in relation to the critical turns 
in philosophy contemporaneous to his own time, Foucault maintains that this return to the 
general ethos of critique is characterized by the “immense and proliferating criticizability 
                                                          
870 Foucault first begins to use the term “genealogy” in his 1971 essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in 
The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 76-100.  Here, Foucault writes 
that the key characteristic of genealogy “is that it opposes itself to the search for origins” (77).  In contrast 
to the search for “origins” as the principle task of historical analysis, Foucault maintains that history is not 
produced in a unitary or linear fashion, but is instead “always produced through a particular stage of 
forces” (83).  In order to account for an analysis of “forces” as the substance of history, Foucault proposes 
an alternative analytic of that takes “insurmountable conflict” as its basic point of inquiry (83).   As a 
critical methodology “genealogy,” Foucault writes, on the one hand “seeks to re-establish the various 
systems of subjection” in which the analysis of history “must delineate this interaction, the struggle these 
forces wage against each other or against adverse circumstances” (83-84).  What is ultimately at stake for 
Foucault is that genealogy designates the methodology by which history can be reinterpreted as a history 
of struggle, and as early as 1971 we can begin to glimpse the beginnings of Foucault’s agonistic theory of 
the political in which an “insurmountable conflict” between power and resistance, between power 
exercised as government and the art of not being governed, designates the substance of politics.     
871 Neil Levy, “History as Struggle: Foucault’s Genealogy of Genealogy,” 166. 
872 Andrew W. Neal, “Goodbye War on Terror? Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War and 
Exceptionalism,” 375. 
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of things, institutions, practices, and discourses.”873  This “immense and proliferating” 
return of the critical attitude is what Foucault poses in terms of the “local character of 
critique,” and is to be distinguished from the “tyranny of overall discourses, with their 
hierarchies and all the privileges enjoyed by theoretical vanguards.”874  At stake here is 
how the “local character of critique” distinct to genealogy reveals the “inhibiting effect 
specific” to the “all-encompassing,” or “totalizing approaches” exemplified in the 
dominant disciplines of Marxism and psychoanalysis.875  Indeed, Foucault’s own critical 
approach is set as a way to contest and replace the theoretical and political vanguardism 
of psychoanalytic and Marxist thought with an “autonomous and noncentralized” realm 
of genealogical critique.876  It is in the critical transition from the universal and totalizing 
theories to the local forms of critique, that Foucault begins to present an alternative way 
to interpret the history of the political from a critical perspective that begins in the 
analysis of local forms of resistance opposed to a universal theory of class struggle.  
Indeed, while we have seen how with the concept of critique Foucault begins to broach 
an anarchist hypothesis of the political in terms of an ongoing struggle between the 
exercise of power as government and the “art of not being governed,” Foucault reaffirms 
this connection here and maintains that the local character of critique by which the 
genealogical method is to be distinguished, develops (albeit “distantly”) in relation to the 
“anarchist thematic” of struggle.877  Distinct from an all-encompassing, universal theory, 
what Foucault posits here as the “anarchist thematic” of critique is itself made possible in 
the analysis of discourses of resistance—that is, the “anarchist thematic” of critique is 
that which begins with and is elaborated through an analysis of historical struggle 
manifest in what Foucault refers to in terms of “insurrections of subjugated 
knowledges.”878  Crucially, it is by analyzing these forms of resistance and “insurrections 
of subjugated knowledges” that Foucault begins to rethink politics and the history of the 
political agonistically.   
                                                          
873 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 6. 
874 Ibid, 6; 8. 
875 Ibid, 6. 
876 Ibid, 6. 
877 Ibid, 5. 
878 Ibid, 7. 
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With these “insurrections of subjugated knowledges” Foucault further outlines 
two interrelated ideas through which the question of resistance emerges as the basis from 
which genealogy proceeds.  First, by “subjugated knowledges,” Foucault makes reference 
to the “historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or 
formal systematizations.”879  At stake here for Foucault is how the formal systems of 
universal theories such as Marxism effectively homogenize the interpretation of history 
in a way that fundamentally excludes the “historical contents” animated in varying forms 
of struggle and resistant knowledge.  In this way, the “historical contents” revealed 
through genealogical analysis are what “allow us to see,” according to Foucault, “the 
dividing lines in the confrontations and struggles that functional arrangements or 
systematic organizations are designed to mask.”880  In other words, the genealogical 
method is established by Foucault as a way to both reveal and account for the various 
forms of historical struggle, as well as a critique of how certain forms of struggle and 
conflict are effectively hidden in other critical approaches.  Understood in this way, 
“genealogy,” according to Foucault, is “a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical 
knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle 
against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.”881  
Furthermore, by “subjugated knowledges” Foucault refers to a “whole series of 
knowledges that have been disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently 
elaborated knowledges.”882  With reference to Deleuze, Foucault refers to these 
“disqualified” forms of knowledge as “minor,” and further maintains that the project of 
genealogy is to “reactivate” these minoritorian forms of knowledge “against the scientific 
hierarchicalization of knowledge and its intrinsic power-effects.”883  It is in this way, 
                                                          
879 Ibid, 7. 
880 Ibid, 7. 
881 Ibid, 10.   
882 Ibid, 7. 
883 Ibid, 10.  The concepts of “minor,” “minority,” and “minoritorian” were first outlined by Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari in Kafka: For a Minor Literature, trans. Réda Bensmaia (Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), and further outlined and elaborated in their collaborative text A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988). 
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Foucault concludes, that these “returns of knowledge” are what make “critique 
possible.”884 
What Foucault refers to in this lecture as “insurrections of subjugated 
knowledges” offers a unique way to from which to reread history on condition of the 
question of resistance; rather than presupposing sovereign power and the state as the site 
of political and philosophical problems, Foucault instead suggests that if a critical 
interpretation of history is possible then one must begin with an analysis pertaining to the 
forms of resistance to the exercise of power.  In other words, genealogy constitutes an 
alternative critical framework from which to consider to the question of politics on 
condition of resistance.  Indeed, as Foucault suggests, “we can give the name genealogy 
to this coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories, which allows us to 
constitute a historical knowledge of struggles, and to make use of that knowledge in 
contemporary tactics.”885  Here, Foucault posits a certain continuity between genealogy 
and the history of struggle as revealed in the analysis of “subjugated knowledges,” as 
well as how this type of analysis encourages and is paired with a certain type of praxis.  
Indeed, as Levy comments, Foucault views his work in Society Must Be Defended as a 
way to “engage in political struggle by way of an interpretation of history as struggle.”886  
At stake, then, in what Foucault refers to as the “insurrection of subjugated knowledges” 
is at once how these discourses reappear as discourses of resistance, as well as how these 
insurrectionary subjugated knowledges are what make possible the critical analysis of 
history as struggle in such a way that philosophy itself begins to intervene and partake in 
this very struggle.     
While the reappearance of these insurrectionary discourses of resistance, paired 
with the local, minoritorian character of critique, are what form the theoretical framework 
of the genealogical method, what is ultimately at stake for Foucault is how these 
discourses of resistance reveal the history of politics in radically novel ways that the 
genealogical method must be able to take into account.  To be sure, it is in relation to the 
historical inquiry into forms of struggle and discourses of resistance in which the 
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322 
 
genealogical method is invoked by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended in order to 
reinterpret the history of the political and politics on condition of both the “anarchist 
thematic” of critique, as well as the insurrectionary discourses of resistance.  Thus, “what 
is at stake in both cases,” Foucault maintains, is a “historical knowledge of struggle.”887  
This is to say that “genealogy” according to Foucault, at once takes a critical inquiry into 
a “historical knowledge of struggle” as the basic locus from which its form of critique 
becomes possible.  To be sure, Foucault draws a specific continuity between the 
insurrectionary discourses of resistance and what he refers to in terms of a critical 
“memory of combats” in which genealogy comes to designate the “meticulous 
rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights.”888  Indeed, with the anarchist 
thematic of critique paired with insurrectionary discourses of resistance—indeed, a 
historical “memory of combats,” the genealogical method finds its locution and is 
elaborated within a reinterpretation of history as paradigm of struggle.  As we will see, 
what Foucault refers to as “genealogy” not only turns upon an agonistic conception of the 
history of the political in which politics emerges as a paradigm of resistance, but also a 
critical theory of these movements and discourses of resistance as such.  Indeed, it is 
because Foucault rereads the history of the political agonistically that Society Must Be 
Defended carves out a distinctly vital intervention within the history of political theory.   
While all of Foucault’s works have severe implications for the tradition of 
political theory, Society Must Be Defended designates Foucault’s most concentrated and 
sustained effort to explore his genealogical analytic of power and resistance in relation to 
the questions of politics and traditional political theory.  Similar to one of the main goals 
of The History of Sexuality, Foucault’s primary concern in Society Must Be Defended is 
to juxtapose the ways in which power is traditionally represented in political theory with 
an alternative reading of how relations of power function historically—which is to say, 
agonistically, for Foucault.889  While the genealogical method turns upon an analysis of 
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the discourses of resistance in order to reinterpret history as a history of struggle, it is my 
contention that there is a specific continuity between the analysis of these discourses of 
resistance and Foucault’s attempt to rethink the possibility of power and politics “outside 
the model of the Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the 
institution of the State.”890  Indeed, it is within the context of the “insurrections of 
subjugated knowledges,” or discourses of resistance that Foucault proposes a reversal of 
Clausewitz in order to suggest that, rather than being expelled from the field of the 
political, the continuation of war is what gives the political its agonistic form of 
permanent struggle as such.  In this regard, Foucault’s primary focus throughout these 
lectures is to elaborate a critical analytic of power and politics in terms of the model of 
war, a model that at once designates the historical operability of power relations, as well 
as the principle of intelligibility from which to reread the history of the political in terms 
of an agonistic model of war.  In order to rethink the history of the political against the 
model of the Leviathan, Foucault maintains that it is by analyzing the history of 
insurrectionary discourses of resistance, or “subjugated knowledges,” that allows for an 
inversion of Clausewitz, and ultimately that politics can be interpreted in terms of a 
continuation of war.  Similar, then, to the way in which The History of Sexuality is 
framed in terms of rethinking power relations on condition of the primacy of resistance, 
in Society Must Be Defended Foucault frames his critical inquiry into the war analytic of 
power and politics in terms of unmasking an alternative theory of historical resistance, 
and thus an anarchic theory of the political as agōn.   
5.3 Politics as the Continuation of War   
 
War is waged throughout history, and through the history that tells the history of war.  
And history, for its part, can never do anything more than interpret the war it is waging 
or that is being waged through it.891  
--Michel Foucault 
 
                                                          
distinguished from his other works in that its question is directly situated in opposition to Hobbes’s 
treatise the Leviathan.  Thus, Foucault maintains that his work has been set to accomplish the “opposite 
of what Hobbes was trying to so in Leviathan” (28).     
890 Ibid, 34. 
891 Ibid, 173.   
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In the epigraph above, Foucault posits a specific nexus between war and the 
interpretation of history; war, as Foucault suggests here, at once designates the substance 
that gives history its form as such, as well as the principle of intelligibility from which 
history can be interpreted as itself a continuation of war.  While Foucault’s genealogical 
analytic of history as the history of struggle is what makes possible his critical inquiry 
into the history of the political as such, the remaining lectures ought to be understood as 
an attempt to employ this analytic in the study of politics.  To be sure, Foucault’s 
inversion of Clausewitz designates the guiding theme by which the lectures in Society 
Must Be Defended are organized as an alternative account of how the history of politics 
and the political can be posed in reference to a historical knowledge of struggles manifest 
within the paradigm of war.  Insofar as the “insurrections of subjugated knowledges” 
fundamentally turn upon and reveal a “historical knowledge of struggle,” it is in this way 
that the general theme of Society Must Be Defended recasts the power/resistance dynamic 
as the basis of the political.  Indeed, as Neal observes the central theme established by 
Foucault in Society Must Be Defended is his concern “with a series of marginal historical 
discourses that are linked through the theme of politics as the continuation of war.”892  In 
this regard, there is a specific continuity between an analysis of insurrections of 
subjugated knowledges and the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war; that is, 
although the discourses of resistance Foucault traces throughout this text are irreducible 
to one another, what unifies these otherwise heterogeneous movements is a model of the 
political that takes war as the very basis of politics.  In its most preliminary form, then, 
we might take the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war as at once being 
informed by an analysis of discourse and movements of resistance, as well as how this 
type of analysis itself resists the standard narrative of orthodox political theory. 
It is my contention that the continuity Foucault’s establishes between history, war, 
and politics designates a critical caesura between the political as archē and the political as 
agōn.  Rather than analyzing power and politics “in terms of surrender, contract, and 
alienation,” as in Hobbes, Foucault therefore asks “shouldn’t we be analyzing it first and 
foremost in terms of conflict, confrontation and war?”893  To do so, Foucault concludes, 
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“would give us an alternative to the first hypothesis—which is that the mechanism of 
power is basically or essentially repression,” or that politics can be reduced to the genesis 
and exercise of sovereignty.894  In opposition to the repressive hypothesis of power 
(referred to in this text as “Reich’s hypothesis”), Foucault proposes “Nietzsche’s 
hypothesis,” and maintains that politics and the political can be analyzed in terms of “a 
warlike clash between forces.”895  It is in regard to this second hypothesis that Foucault 
takes as the basic model, or conceptual framework, from which Clausewitz’s initial 
proposition can be inverted as the basic principle from which to reread the history of the 
political as a genealogical history of struggle between forces—that is as agōn.  In relation 
to this agonistic conception of politics and the political, what is ultimately at stake in 
Society Must Be Defended is how Foucault’s analysis of “subjugated knowledges” and 
insurrectionary discourses are what make possible a counter-historical theory of the 
political in which the question of politics is reframed by Foucault on condition of the 
discourses and politics of resistance manifest in the continuation of war.      
Although Foucault has been criticized for conflating the condition of war with the 
exercise of politics, Foucault’s goal in Society Must Be Defended is, more fundamentally, 
to provide a critical inquiry into whether the paradigm of war can be understood as at 
once constituting the principle of intelligibility of politics, as well as how the history of 
the political as such can be interpreted agonistically—that is, in terms of an ongoing and 
permanent struggle between force and counter-force, between power and resistance. 896  
With this problematic in mind, in the third lecture Foucault suggests a preliminary set of 
three propositions derived from the thesis “politics is the continuation of war by other 
                                                          
894 Ibid, 15.   
895 Ibid, 16.  While Foucault’s attempt at a non-sovereign and non-economic analytic of power relations 
and politics, necessarily requires an alternative critical framework, or hypothesis in order to pose the 
question of politics in a radically new manner, his goal is not, however, to simply overturn the previous 
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that there “seems to be a fairly logical connection between the two” insofar as “repression is the political 
outcome of war, just as oppression was, in the classical theory of political right, the result of the abuse of 
sovereignty” (16).    
896 See: Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence, 27.  Although Hansen criticizes the way in which Foucault 
reduces politics to the paradigm of war, Foucault seems to anticipate this critique, and suggests in Society 
Must Be De that his goal is not to “confuse power relations with relations of war” (46).  Rather than 
reducing power and politics to war, Foucault responds that he is “simply taking an extreme [case] to the 
extent that war can be regarded as the point of maximum tension, or as force-relations laid bare” (46). 
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means.”  First, Foucault maintains that what can be referred to in terms of “politics” 
derives its specific political character as such from the inegalitarian and asymmetric 
relations of force manifest in the paradigm of war.  “Politics,” Foucault therefore writes, 
designates the field which “sanctions and reproduces the disequilibrium of forces 
manifested in war.”897  Here, Foucault draws an explicit continuity between power, 
politics, and war in such a way that the latter designates the key paradigm in which both 
power relations and politics are traditionally represented and historically manifest; hence, 
politics according to Foucault is historically expressed and coded as the continuation of 
war.  While the characteristic specific to “politics” is itself derived and manifest in the 
paradigm of war, this additionally means for Foucault that the history of the political as 
written “within this civil peace, these political struggles, these clashes over or with 
power, these modifications of relations of force” can all be interpreted as a continuation 
of the political paradigm of war.898  
Indeed, in Society Must Be Defended Foucault discards the orthodox narrative of 
modern political theory that begins with the state and the advent of sovereign power as 
the substance of politics in favor of an agonistic conception of history and politics that 
locates war as the key paradigm of the political.  While modern political theory since 
Hobbes899 and Locke900 relies upon the eradication of war from the field of the political, 
Foucault instead replies that interpreting politics as the continuation of war means “we 
are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of 
                                                          
897 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 16. 
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899 A significant portion of the Leviathan is dedicated to exploring the “state of nature” Hobbes 
characterizes and defines in terms of a social condition of war (See chapter 13, “Of the Natural Condition 
of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity and Misery,” (75-86).  According to Hobbes, it is this “state of 
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900 See: John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. Thomas Peardon (New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1952).  Quite similar to the position Hobbes takes in Leviathan, in his text The Second 
Treatise of Government, Locke draws an explicit connection between a “state of nature” and a “state of 
war” (See: chapter two, “Of the State of Nature,” (4-11); chapter three “Of the State of War,” (11-14).  In 
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the natural condition of war, and traces how the former is born by expelling war from the field of the 
political.  Thus in Locke’s thought we find that “where there is an authority, a power on earth from which 
relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is excluded” (14).    
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peace and its institutions.”901  Despite, then, the orthodox narratives of politics in which 
the condition of war (agōn) is replaced with the political as archē, Foucault maintains that 
the very history which purports to put an end to the condition of war is instead its 
continuation.  While Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz is set in order to rethink the 
question of politics on condition of the struggle/war paradigm, this means that the history 
of the political is not to be found in the advent of state sovereignty; instead what defines 
the history of the political and gives it its historicity as such is the continuation of politics 
as war.  Finally, Foucault claims that interpreting the history of the political in terms of 
the paradigm of war “means that the last battle would put an end to politics,” and 
effectively “suspend the exercise of power as continuous warfare.”902  In other words, the 
permanence of the political for Foucault is attested to by the permanence of war, without 
which the question of politics would lose its specificity.     
In each of these propositions, what is ultimately at stake in interpreting politics as 
a continuation of war is how the political is manifest and historically expressed as an 
agonistic domain of continuous struggle, conflict, confrontation, and ultimately 
resistance.  The history of the political and the emergence of politics does not begin with 
the advent of sovereignty according to Foucault, but in the paradigmatic condition of 
war—that is, war designates the domain proper to the history of the political; in other 
words, politics as a continuation of war turns upon an agonistic, rather than archic, 
conception of the political.  Thus, according to Foucault “[i]f we make history, the 
history of the wars that go on throughout history,” then it is the “history/war 
relationship,” and not the political as archē that forms the “precondition for the 
emergence of politics.”903  As the condition required for the emergence of “politics,” war, 
like resistance for Foucault, designates a position of primacy with respect to the questions 
of politics and the political—that is, “politics” is made possible and is historically 
elaborated in what Foucault refers to as “the primacy afforded to war.”904  While in The 
History of Sexuality Foucault asserts that resistance is primary with power, in Society 
Must Be Defended he reveals that what underlies the question of politics and gives it its 
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character as such is a “sort of primitive and permanent war.”905  By “primitive” war 
Foucault’s choice in terminology is not set to allude to the condition of war that defines 
the “state of nature” in the writings of Hobbes and Locke; instead, by “primitive” 
Foucault on the one hand refers to the way in which the paradigm of war is, more 
fundamentally, what underlies the orthodox narrative of the history of the political as told 
from the perspective of the state and the advent of sovereignty.  Thus, while Honneth 
suggests that it is on this point that Foucault’s thought is “reminiscent of Hobbes,”906 the 
term “primitive” in Foucault’s thought more fundamentally means that “beneath peace, 
order, wealth, and authority, beneath the calm order of subordinations, beneath the State 
and State apparatuses, beneath the laws”—that is, beneath the history of political power 
as archē—is the permanence of war.907  It is in this way, and not of invoking a “state of 
nature” prior to the state, that Foucault asks the critical question pertaining to whether or 
not the “phenomenon of war” can be “regarded as primary with respect to other 
relations.”908  Furthermore, in its reproduction of the permanent struggle between forces, 
politics as war can be understood as exemplifying and continuing the power/resistance 
dynamic outlined in The History of Sexuality.  Indeed, by reading the historical 
expression of politics as a continuation of war, Foucault not only reveals the problematic 
of sovereignty and political power in a radically new way that turns upon the paradigm of 
war, but also how the paradigm of war—as a history of agonistic struggle—itself turns 
upon and is made possible in posing the question of politics alongside the permanent 
possibility of resistance.   
By refusing to subordinate the condition of war to the birth of modern politics, 
Foucault reveals an alternative hypothesis of the political that takes as its basis the 
continuation of war, and it is in this way politics can be understood as assuming the form 
of an agōn.  Insofar as war is a “permanent,” and therefore primary, component of 
politics this means that for Foucault war—as the historical expression of politics—at 
once designates the general principle of intelligibility from which to interpret both the 
history of the state and sovereign power, as well as the counter-history of resistance.  
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Politics as the continuation of war is therefore established, on the one hand, by Foucault 
in order to demonstrate how the standard interpretation of the political as found in the 
advent of sovereignty, in the history of the state, and the exercise of power as government 
can in fact be reread as a continuation of the political paradigm of war.  At the same time, 
however, because war designates the historical expression of the political, “politics as the 
continuation of war by other means” is also, and more fundamentally, invoked by 
Foucault not only to account for the place of resistance amongst the dynamic of politics 
as war, but also in terms of how resistance designates the vital component from which the 
question of politics can be understood agonistically.  Similar to Foucault’s assertion 
regarding how the question of power is to be necessarily paired with the question of 
resistance, interpreting politics as the continuation of war means that the history of the 
state and of sovereignty are to be posed alongside the correlative problematic of 
“rebellion.”909  This affirmation that the substance of politics arises between the state and 
the counter-history of rebellion echoes Foucault’s insistence that “where there is power, 
there is resistance.”  Whereas the dynamic field of force relations that characterize power 
relations is, according to Foucault, to be understood as a permanent struggle between 
power and resistance, this idea is again recast in terms of what he first refers to as the 
“invasion-rebellion system.”910 
With the power/resistance dynamic designating the basis from which politics can 
be interpreted as a continuation of war, what Foucault refers to in this text as the 
“invasion-rebellion system” reveals an alternative basis from which to think through the 
question of politics agonistically.  “[I]nvasion and rebellion” Foucault therefore writes 
“were the two main elements that were introduced to rediscover the war that goes on 
within societies.”911  As we will see, although Foucault prefers the term “government” 
above that of “invasion” in order to distinguish historical conquest from its continuation 
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910 Ibid, 160.  Foucault’s “invasion-rebellion” distinction recalls a similar distinction made by the anarchist 
Benjamin Tucker.  As cited in chapter two, Tucker writes: “the distinction between invasion and 
resistance, between government and defense is vital.  Without it there can be no valid philosophy of 
politics” (“The Individual, Society, and the State,” 22).  In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault appears to 
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as an exercise of government, what is crucial is that resistance and the history of 
“rebellion” designate a permanent component of the interpretation of politics as a 
continuation of war.  While resistance, as a condition of possibility of power, in 
Foucault’s thought is at once primary with respect to field of force relations, as well as 
that which designates the permanent potential to transform a power relation into an 
agonistic struggle between forces, by reading the political as a historical continuation of 
war, Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended is set to invoke this same dynamic as 
the constituent component of politics.  Indeed, the term “politics”—as both political 
paradigm and historical continuation—does not simply refer to the history of the state, 
but more fundamentally toward the struggle between the state and the history of 
rebellion.  As Neal observes, insofar as politics can be interpreted as a continuation of 
war, this means that politics as war can either be “deployed in the nationalist myths of 
historical defeat of victory” (invasion)—that is, in terms of the politics of the state, “or 
inverted into discourses of class war, race war, religious war” (rebellion).912  Interpreting 
politics as a continuation of war, thus subverts the sovereign/political nexus, and reframes 
the very question of politics in terms of an agonistic struggle between the history of the 
state and the counter-history of resistance. 
Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz ultimately turns upon the elaboration of 
politics within the historical discourses of war and resistance in which the political as 
such assumes the agonistic form of power/resistance.  By invoking the paradigm of war 
as both the principle of intelligibility of the political, as well as the defining characteristic 
of politics as such, Foucault reveals how an agonistic theory of the political turns upon a 
struggle between the exercise of sovereign government and movements of resistance.  In 
other words, the war paradigm of politics is an agonistic model of the political in which 
resistance nominates the key component through which the politics assumes the form of 
permanent sphere of struggle between adversarial forces.  Consequently, however, 
insofar as politics is to be understood as the continuation of war, this reveals what 
Foucault refers to in terms of a “historical paradox” in which politics as the continuous 
exercise of warfare is at once the object of the state, as well as the movements of 
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resistance against the state.913  As an object of the state, Foucault first traces how, 
alongside the development of the state from the Middle Ages to the modern era, the 
discourses and practices of war underwent a distinct change characterized by the ways in 
which “only State powers could wage wars and manipulate the instruments of war.”914  
Indeed, Foucault argues that the historical expression of politics as war predates its 
colonization by the state, and thus traces how “the State acquired a monopoly on war.”915  
By outlining how the state gradually obtained a monopolization on the discourses of war, 
Foucault’s point is to first demonstrate how what he refers to as the practice of “day-to-
day warfare” was increasingly “eradicated from the social body.”916  Rather than defining 
the state as Max Weber does in terms of the monopolization of legitimate violence, 
Foucault shifts the focus toward the question of politics as war, and demonstrates that 
what defines the state and makes possible its existence as such is, contra Hobbes, its 
colonization and eventual monopolization of the political paradigm of war. 917  By 
locating the existence of a condition of war prior to the advent of sovereignty, Foucault 
appears to affirm the condition of war that characterizes the “state of nature” as described 
by Hobbes and Locke.  Yet, while Foucault does indeed retain the notion of a social 
condition of “day-to-day warfare” prior to the state, what is at stake for Foucault is not to 
suggest a condition or essence of war that must necessarily be overcome in contractual 
sovereignty, but rather that another form of “politics”—indeed, a politics as resistance 
expressed in the continuation of war—predates the politics of the state.  In other words, 
the history of politics neither begins with the eradication of war from the field of the 
political nor the advent of sovereign power; instead, rather, the advent and continuation 
of sovereign power is only an episode in the continuation of politics as war.   
At the same time, however, while the state increasingly acquired a 
monopolization on the discourses and practices of war, Foucault’s penultimate claim in 
Society Must Be Defended is to suggest that alongside and parallel to the state’s 
monopolization of war is the appearance of heterogeneous, critical discourse of resistance 
                                                          
913 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 48.  
914 Ibid, 48.   
915 Ibid, 48. 
916 Ibid, 48.   
917 See: Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” 78.  In the often cited passage from this influential text, Weber 
defines the state as that which “claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” (original italics).   
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that radically denied and opposed the state’s eradication of war as a permanent social 
relation.  This oppositional discourse of resistance is what Foucault refers to as the “first 
historico-political discourse on society.”918  Distinct from the philosophico-juridical 
discourses” of sovereignty, Foucault is clear that these “historico-political” discourses of 
resistance are exemplary of what he refers to as “subjugated knowledges.”919  It is in 
regard to these “historico-political” discourses of resistance that Foucault begins to posit 
an agonistic theory of the political in a novel form.  In tracing the advent of these 
resistant discourses, what is first at stake for Foucault is how the discourse opposed to the 
state is “also a discourse on war,” wherein the reappearance of the general paradigm of 
war was “understood to be a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all 
relations and institutions of power.”920  In “historico-political” discourse, then, the 
concept of politics as war takes on an entirely different meaning than in that of the state.  
As Reid suggests, insofar as the examples Foucault invokes in Society Must Be Defended 
refer to the “increasingly autonomous, decentralized, and anarchistic character” of 
political struggles, then what is at stake in the “historico-political” discourses on society 
is “not so much the wars of the state as wars against the state.”921  Here, the critical 
question of war, as revealed in these “historico-political” discourses, at once designates a 
permanent social condition, as well as that which is inscribed into and makes possible 
political power—that is, the concept of warfare within historico-political discourse 
describes both the exercise of sovereignty and a position a position of resistance, a praxis 
against the state.  Indeed, Foucault’s thesis that politics designates the continuation of 
war is set to capture the struggle between these opposing critical positions.  
Consequently, however, this means that Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended 
reveals a vital way in which the question of politics and the history of the political can be 
understood not as archē, but as agōn, as a field in which the permanence of resistance 
represents the condition by which politics assumes the war/struggle model.   
 Further at stake for Foucault is how these discourses of resistance fundamentally 
disrupt the standard, orthodox narrative of political theory.  Against Hobbes’s theory that 
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posits the advent of sovereign power through the eradication of the condition of war from 
the field of the political, Foucault maintains that the key characteristic common amongst 
these “historico-political” discourses of resistance begins with the claim that “political 
power does not begin when the war ends”—that is, political power is none other than the 
continuation of politics as war.922  While the politics of war is revealed by these 
“historico-political” discourses of resistance as basic motor behind political power and its 
exercise, Foucault additionally demonstrates how these critical discourses fundamentally 
give rise to, and turn upon, a distinct form of politics as resistance.  “Historico-political 
discourse is not, and cannot be,” Foucault argues “that of the Prince’s politics or, 
obviously, that of absolute power.”923  Instead “historico-political discourse,” as Foucault 
maintains, is a “discourse that cuts off the king’s head, or which at least does without a 
sovereign and denounces him.”924  As a critical discourse that decapitates the theory and 
practice of sovereignty, Foucault’s inquiry into the “historico-political” discourses should 
be understood as exemplary of his oft cited attempt to behead the sovereign in political 
theory.  Taking the Levellers as an early historical example of the appearance of this 
critical discourse of resistance, Foucault maintains that the historico-political discourse 
on war is therefore a “discourse of a struggle against the king.”925  As a distinct form of 
politics irreducible to the sovereign politics of the state, these “historico-political” 
discourses of politics as war and resistance are genuinely anarchic in both its struggle 
against and without a king—which is to say without archē.  Finally, insofar the 
“historico-political” discourses on war posits and turns upon the elaboration of a distinct 
understanding of the political in which politics cannot be reduced to the exercise of state 
sovereignty, these discourses reveal what Foucault refers to as a “counter-historical 
function” made possible in the concept and practice of politics as resistance.926  As that 
which designates the appearance of an alternative history parallel, yet counter to the 
history of the state, the “historico-political” discourses of resistance are what reveal for 
Foucault the very possibility of an alternative history of the political as agōn.    
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Interpreting politics as the continuation of war unmasks a counter-narrative that 
resists the standard, orthodox history of political theory.  Rather than presupposing the 
eradication of the condition of war from the domain of the political, Foucault takes the 
paradigm of war as the constituent component of both politics and the political.  The war 
analytic of politics as such is irreducible to the political as archē—that is, politics as the 
continuation of war is therefore an agonistic model of the political.  As agōn, the history 
of the political for Foucault is manifest and defined by a permanent struggle between 
forces.  More specifically, the term “politics”—as the historical continuation of war 
manifest in the “invasion-rebellion system”—designates for Foucault a permanent 
struggle between the politics of the state and the politics of resistance.  “The State,” 
Foucault therefore maintains “is nothing more than the way that the war between the two 
groups in question continues to be waged in apparently peaceful forms.”927  While the 
state according to Foucault exists only as the continuation of war waged through peace, 
rethinking the political in terms of an agōn ultimately turns upon conceptualizing the 
political on condition of the permanent possibility of resistance and rebellion.  In this 
way, having established an alternative reading of the political, Foucault importantly 
maintains “how an analysis of this type is obviously articulated with revolutionary hopes, 
an urgent call for rebellion, and also a politics of rebellion or revolution.”928  Here, 
Foucault reveals that what is at stake in the elaboration of an agonistic conception of the 
political is the question of resistance—indeed a form of politics as resistance.  To be sure, 
the thesis “politics is the continuation of war by other means” is made possible according 
to Foucault not simply by the permanent possibility of resistance within the field of the 
political, but the elaboration of a certain praxis, a certain notion of politics as resistance.  
It is with these two ideas—that is, that the permanent presence of resistance 
within the field of the political reveals a counter-historical narrative to orthodox history 
of the state and sovereign power, and further that this counter-history is elaborated in 
terms of conceiving politics as resistance—that Society Must Be Defended reinvigorates 
the power/resistance dynamic through interpreting politics as a continuation of war.  
While resistance is primary amongst the dynamic field of power relations both in terms of 
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the condition of possibility of power relations as such, as well as the permanent 
potentiality to transform a power relation into a relation of struggle, Foucault reworks this 
dynamic into his understanding of politics in order to demonstrate how parallel to the 
history of the state, of sovereign power, of the exercise of government, is the counter-
history of the state’s own impossibility manifest in the politics of resistance.  Foucault’s 
rereading of the history of the political as the continuation of war, has been affirmed by 
the French collective, Tiqqun, whose text Introduction to Civil War attempts to rethink 
the history of the political from the perspective of resistance expressed in the paradigm of 
what they refer to as “civil war.”  In a manner akin to Foucault’s writing, Tiqqun writes 
that interpreting politics from the perspective of civil war means on the one hand that 
“the modern State, which purports to put an end to civil war, is instead its continuation by 
other means.”929  Yet, because of this, Tiqqun further maintains that the “history of the 
modern State is the history of the struggle against its own impossibility…We have, then, 
the official history of the modern State…And also there is a counter-history, which is the 
history of its impossibility.”930  It is this “counter-history,” in which politics emerges in 
the war against the possibility of the state, that directs Foucault’s general focus in Society 
Must Be Defended.  As a consequence, however, what is ultimately at stake for Foucault 
is that the history of politics as such can no longer be reduced to the history of the state.  
As a continuation of war, politics according to Foucault takes place within an agonistic 
dynamic, a fundamental struggle or relation of war between the history of the state and 
the counter-history of resistance.   
Interpreting politics agonistically—as a continuation of war—therefore means 
that the historical possibility of the state, of sovereignty, and of government is 
simultaneously the counter-history of resistance, or that which makes the state 
impossible.  At the same time, however, the war model of the political not only posits the 
historical necessity of interpreting the politics as the continuation of struggle between 
forces, but also an alternative way from which to understand the historical question of 
politics on condition of resistance.  In relation to the interpretation of war as a paradigm 
of resistance, both Pierre Clastres’ ethnographic research into stateless societies, as well 
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as Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “war-machine” add further leverage to 
Foucault’s argument.931  In Clastres’ text Societies Against the State (a text Foucault 
surprisingly neglects to reference) the concept of “war” is understood historically as a 
mechanism of resistance to the formation of the state.932  Indeed, in Clastres’ work, the 
concept and practice of war designates an alternative perspective from which history can 
be reinterpreted as an agonistic struggle between the state and the non-state.  For Clastres, 
then, insofar as it is said that the “history of peoples who have a history is the history of 
class struggle,” one could equally posit “with at least as much truthfulness, that the 
history of peoples without history is the history of their struggle against the state.”933  
Yet, this alternative interpretation of history as the ongoing struggle with the state 
additionally turns upon the elaboration of an alternative form of politics as resistance.  
With explicit reference Societies Against the State, Deleuze and Guattari affirm Clastres’ 
understanding of war as a form of resistance with their concept of the “war-machine.”  
Insofar as the paradigm of war can be understood as a political form of resistance, 
Deleuze and Guattari reverse the logic of Hobbes and maintain that since “the state was 
against war, so war is against the state and is what makes it impossible.”934  As a form of 
resistance, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the “war-machine” cannot be defined, as is 
the case for Hobbes and Locke, in terms of a “state of nature,” but instead as a “mode of 
a social state that wards off and prevents the state.”935  Thus while the orthodox tradition 
of political theory takes the concept, condition, and practice of war as the inverse of the 
modern politics, in Foucault, Tiqqun, Clastres, and Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of 
war not only designates an alternative grid or principle of intelligibility from which to 
understand the history of politics agonistically, but also an alternative paradigm of 
politics found in the movements of resistance and rebellion.     
                                                          
931 On the concept of the “war machine” see: Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
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Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz ultimately turns upon the elaboration of 
politics within the historical discourses of war in which the political as such assumes the 
form of an agōn as opposed to archē.  More specifically, Foucault’s primary focus 
throughout Society Must Be Defended is at once a detailed account of how the history of 
the political refers not simply to the history of the state, but instead to the permanent 
struggle between the state and the counter-history of its own impossibility, and 
furthermore that this interpretation of politics ultimately turns upon the analysis and 
elaboration of a politics of resistance as the key component that gives the political its 
form as such.  Society Must Be Defended therefore turns upon an agonistic conception of 
the political.  Crucially, however, while Schmitt’s agonistic conception of the political, as 
well as Mouffe’s more recent attempt to recast Schmitt’s theory within a contemporary 
framework, effectively reduces the condition of agōn to that of archic sovereignty, in 
Foucault’s thought the notion of an agōn attested to in the paradigm of war is retained in 
an altogether different manner.  With the paradigm of war designating the materiality and 
principle of intelligibility of politics, the political as agōn cannot simply be reduced, 
according to Foucault, to the politics of the state; instead, rather, an agonistic theory of 
politics coded in the form of a permanent war ultimately turns upon a struggle between 
the state and the movements of resistance against the state.  To be sure, although in 
Agonistics Mouffe maintains that a permanent “dimension of antagonism” is what defines 
the nature of the political, her agonistic model of politics fundamentally turns upon the 
eradication of resistance from the field of agonism as such. 936  This eradication of 
resistance from the field of the political is what Mouffe refers to as an “agonism without 
antagonism”937 whereby a “radical disobedience that puts the state at bay” is to be 
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338 
 
replaced or overcome by an “engagement with institutions.”938  In contrast to Mouffe’s 
theory of the political, Foucault’s conceptualization of politics as the continuation of war 
offers an alternative theory through which the agonistic dimension of the political is 
retained on condition of the primacy of resistance and the paradigm of war.  Similar, 
then, to the way in which resistance, as we saw in the previous chapter, designates the 
condition of possibility in which a power relation can be transformed into a relation of 
struggle, resistance as manifest in the paradigm of war is what transforms the political as 
archē into the political as agōn.     
5.4 Against Leviathan: Civil War as a Paradigm of Resistance 
 
The people have in a sense never ceased to denounce property as pillage, laws as 
extractions, and governments as domination.  The proof is that they have never stopped 
rebelling…rebellion is nothing but the obverse of war.  Laws, power, government, are the 
obverse of the war they are waging against us.  Rebellion is therefore not the destruction 
of a peaceful system of laws for some reason.  Rebellion is a response to a war that the 
government never stops waging.  Government means their war against us, rebellion is 
our war against them.939 
--Michel Foucault  
 
By interpreting politics as the continuation of war by other means, Foucault reveals how 
an agonistic conception of the political is made possible by the permanent presence of 
resistance within the field of politics as such.  As a domain of agōn, the historical 
expression of politics as war cannot be reduced, according to Foucault, to the histories of 
government, sovereignty, and the state; instead, “politics” designates the domain of a 
                                                          
“adversaries” and “enemies.”  In her earlier text On the Political, Mouffe discusses this distinction with 
reference to the friend/enemy antithesis established in Schmitt’s theory of the political, and maintains 
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who share a common political ideology.  According to Mouffe, then, this means that although adversaries 
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as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place” (20).  In this way, Mouffe’s 
agonistic theory of the political fundamentally situates the notion of struggle between adversaries within 
the logic of the state.    
938 Ibid, 70. 
939 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 108. 
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permanent dynamic of struggle between the history of the state and the counter-history of 
resistance, a permanent war between government and movements of rebellion.  In chapter 
three, we have seen how with the concept of “critique” Foucault maintains that the 
political questions pertaining to the exercise of government and its history is to be 
simultaneously posed alongside the counter-history of the “art of not being governed.”  
Furthermore, in chapter four, we have seen how the primacy of resistance as found in the 
fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality means, as Foucault writes that “[o]ne 
cannot, therefore, write either the history of kings or the history of peoples.”940  On 
condition of the permanence of resistance, Foucault therefore maintains that “one can 
write the history of what constitutes those opposing terms”—that is, the history of the 
permanent struggle “between the people and those who govern.”941  In Society Must Be 
Defended, Foucault reaffirms these critical positions and subsequently posits that the 
political designates the historical struggle between the paradigm of government on the 
one hand, and the paradigm of resistance on the other.  As Levy confirms, the 
“affirmation that in the relation between king and people, power is never fully 
concentrated on one side, echoes Foucault’s insistence that where there is power there is 
resistance.”942  Crucially, it is in this way that Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz can be 
understood as recasting the primacy of resistance as the basic principle from which to 
read the history of politics and the political.  This is to say that the war model of the 
political, in which politics is historically manifest in terms of a continuation of war, not 
only finds its consistency within the power/resistance dynamic, but also on condition of 
the primacy of resistance.   
With the history of struggle between the exercise of power as government and the 
counter-movements of resistance designating the field proper to the domain of the 
political, it is my contention that Society Must Be Defended at once invokes the 
power/resistance dynamic as the principle intelligibility of the political, as well as the 
historical manifestation of politics as such.  In other words, there is a specific continuity 
between Foucault’s conception of power and politics, whereby the power/resistance 
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dynamic is reframed in terms of the politics/war model of the history of political struggle.  
Indeed, Foucault’s fifth thesis, “where there is power, there is resistance”—means that 
politics and the history of the political can be interpreted in terms of the continuation of 
warfare.  Yet, as a consequence to the war analytic of politics and the political, Foucault 
not only reveals how resistance is primary with respect to the history of the political—its 
historical manifestation continuously transforming the field of politics into an agonistic 
struggle between those who govern and those who resist—but, more fundamentally, how 
resistance is the key term that reveals the political in its agonistic form as such.  Foucault 
therefore posits that resistance designates the principle of intelligibility from which the 
historical emergence of “politics” can be observed in its specificity—that is, the 
permanence of resistance designates the political in its most paradigmatic form.  “The 
proof,” that resistance designates a constituent component of the political as agōn arises, 
according to Foucault in the epigraph above with the fact that the “people have in a sense 
never ceased to denounce property as pillage, laws as extractions, and governments as 
domination…they have never stopped rebelling”—that is, rebellion must be understood 
as a permanent component of the field of the political.943  Thus, while we have seen how 
the war model of politics and the political ultimately finds its basis in the 
power/resistance dynamic, Foucault more directly recasts basis the political in terms of 
what can be referred to in terms of a government/rebellion dynamic.  In other words, 
insofar as politics can be interpreted as a continuation of war, the field of the political is 
historically expressed for Foucault as the history of struggle; in such a system, the term 
“politics” in the Foucauldian sense comes to designates the free play of agonistic struggle 
between the exercise of power as government and the counter-historical movements of 
resistance.    
Although, as we have seen, Foucault’s war analytic of politics ultimately turns 
upon the struggle between the exercise of government and the counter-historical 
movements of resistance, what is at stake for Foucault in the government/rebellion war 
model of the political is how resistance, and neither sovereign power nor the history of 
the state acts as the historical motor of politics interpreted as a continuation of war.  Thus, 
in Society Must Be Defended Foucault redefines the paradigm of rebellion in a way that 
                                                          
943 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 108.  
341 
 
captures this motive.  “Rebellion,” Foucault writes, “is therefore not the destruction of a 
peaceful system of laws for some reason;” instead, rather, “rebellion is nothing but the 
obverse of war.944  As the “obverse” of politics as war, rebellion is the constituent 
counter-part to the history of politics interpreted as a continuation of war, without which 
the political could only assume the form of an archē.  According to Foucault, however, 
this means that the war model of the political necessarily includes resistance as a 
permanent feature of politics—that is, rebellion is a permanent “response to the war the 
government never stops waging.”945  As Foucault writes, then, while the history of the 
political as “government means their war against us,” the permanent possibility of 
“rebellion is our war against them.”946  While Foucault’s agonistic conception of the 
political, in which politics is expressed in the interplay between the war of government 
waged against its own impossibility, and the movements of resistance launched against 
the continuation of government appears to reproduce the we/they antithesis in Schmitt’s 
theory of the political, Foucault’s agonistic theory of politics refuses the basic 
presuppositions required by Schmitt.  Although the political as agōn is indeed inherently 
partisan according to Foucault, the agonistic dimension of politics that assumes the form 
of a struggle between adversaries cannot be reduced, as is the case in Schmitt’s work, to 
the sovereign state.  Whereas in Schmitt, the primacy of the state is presupposed in such a 
way so that the we/they antithesis which designates the criteria proper to the domain of 
the political is bound to the permanence of sovereign power, in Foucault’s model it is the 
permanence of resistance that makes possible not simply the distinction, but the struggle 
between adversaries that gives the political its constituent logic.947    
While in Foucault’s work the history of the state, of sovereignty, and of the 
exercise of power as government all still hold an elemental place in his theory of politics, 
the agonistic conception of politics as explored in Society Must Be Defended reveals 
resistance as the vital (albeit historically neglected) concept in the history of political 
theory.  In contrast to Mouffe’s neo-Schmittian model which expels resistance from the 
field of the political in order to arrive at an liberal democratic politics without 
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antagonism, it is my contention that the narrative arc of Society Must Be Defended, in 
which politics is interpreted as a continuation of war, must be understood as an attempt to 
reintroduce the general problematic of resistance into the field of the political as agōn, 
and furthermore that this strategic inclusion of resistance within the field to which 
politics refers invokes a theory of anarchism as its very basis.  In order to substantiate the 
claim that the history of the political can be read from the perspective of war instead of 
the advent of sovereignty, Foucault offers an alternative reading of the Leviathan in order 
to both account for the question of resistance within the history of political theory, as well 
as to rethink the history of politics of resistance as itself of a paradigm of what Foucault 
will refer to as “civil war” or “social war.”948  As we will see, while both Schmitt and 
Mouffe presuppose a specific continuity between the state and politics, in Foucault’s 
reading of Hobbes the concept of “civil war” designates the key concept by which the 
political can be understood as agōn.  Thus although, Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz is 
established as an agonistic conception of the political in which politics designates the 
struggle between the history of government and the counter-history of resistance, his 
rereading of Hobbes asserts a unique understanding of the political from the perspective 
of resistance, in which the concept and practice of civil war reflects a conscious decision 
to reframe the political agonistically.     
 Within the history of political theory, Foucault turns to Hobbes as the political 
philosopher whose understanding of politics begins by positing a distinct relationship 
between war and political power.949  In this way, it is necessary to read Hobbes, 
according to Foucault, in order to understand how war first emerges as the principle of 
intelligibility of power relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  More 
specifically, however, despite more orthodox readings of the question of politics in the 
Leviathan, Foucault reads Hobbes’s text as a critical exploration into the possibility of 
interpreting politics as a continuation of war.  It is well known amongst political theorists 
that Hobbes takes the condition of war as the inverse of the sovereign state; the 
eradication of the condition of war prior to the existence of the state is the ontological 
foundation that makes possible the birth of sovereign power and the state.  In this regard, 
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Foucault reads Hobbes’s text as being centered around two seminal questions in which 
the war/politics relation is at once understood as the very basis of the political, as well as 
that which allows for the advent of sovereignty and the birth of the state.  Foucault first 
maintains that the initial question that drives Hobbes’s theory of politics and the political 
asks “what is this war that exists before the State, and which the State is, in theory, 
destined to end?”950  Second, Foucault claims that while the first question forms the 
critical background from which Hobbes’s theory of politics begins, what is ultimately at 
stake in the Leviathan is to theorize how this condition of war, prior to the existence of 
the state, is invoked in order to ask how this “war give[s] birth to the state.”951  Here, the 
concept of “war” in Foucault’s reading of the Leviathan at once designates a social 
condition prior to the state, as well as that which is to be eradicated from the field of the 
political in order to make the sovereign state possible.  Importantly, in each of these 
questions, Foucault suggests that it is the concept of war and not that of the state that is 
invoked by Hobbes as the vital concept from which his theory regarding the emergence 
of modern politics is based.  As we will see, because the condition of war is that which is 
presupposed by Hobbes, it is with the concepts of civil war and anarchy, and not that of 
sovereignty, that designate the key paradigm for an agonistic conception of the 
political.952  
                                                          
950 Ibid, 90.   
951 Ibid, 89. 
952 In order to affirm this position, Foucault returns to the way in which Hobbes defines the “state of 
nature” and offers an alternative reading pertaining to how the condition of war that characterizes the 
state of nature as such is to be understood.  First, Foucault maintains that, by Hobbes own admission, 
what is referred to as the “state of nature” does not designate an actually existing condition of war as 
manifest in a real battle.  Thus, Foucault writes that “in Hobbes’s state of primitive war, the encounter, 
the confrontation, the clash, is not one between weapons or fists…there are no battles in Hobbes’ 
primitive war, there is no blood and there are no corpses” (92).  Accordingly, Foucault writes that within a 
state of nature, “[w]e are not at war; we are in what Hobbes specifically calls a state of war” (92).  The 
state of war according to Foucault does not designate a fundamental battle between adversaries, but a 
social condition—that is a certain way of being in the world.  “What does characterize the state of war,” 
according to Foucault is “a sort of unending diplomacy between rivals who are naturally equal” (92).  
Understood as such, “war is born of equality and takes place in the element of that equality.” (92).  The 
condition of war that constitutes the existence of a state of nature prior to the state, does not therefore 
designate a condition of battle between adversaries; instead rather the domain proper to the state of 
war, and that which gives it its defining characteristic as such, is a condition of equality—that is war, 
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Because Foucault takes the paradigm of war, and not its elimination, as the 
constituent component of the political, what is at stake in Society Must Be Defended is 
not only a strategic reversal of Clausewitz’s thesis on politics and war, but also an 
inversion of the general narrative arc of Hobbes’s political treatise.  Thus, while Hobbes 
traces the ways in which the condition of war that characterizes the state of nature is 
overcome in the advent of sovereignty, Foucault inverts this thesis and suggests that the 
condition of war is irreducible to the advent of sovereignty.  Against traditional readings 
regarding the relation between the state of war and the advent of political power, 
Foucault importantly maintains to the contrary: 
Hobbes turns war, the fact of war and the relationship of force that is actually 
manifested in the battle, into something that has nothing to do with constitution of 
sovereignty.  The establishment of sovereignty has nothing to do with war.  
Basically, Hobbes’s discourse is a certain “no” to war.953  
While in Hobbes’s theory of the political, the eradication of the state of war is both what 
is required and that which makes possible the emergence of modern politics in the form 
of sovereignty, in Foucault’s reading of Hobbes, the condition of war is irreducible to the 
constitution of sovereignty.  This is to say that sovereignty—indeed the emergence of 
sovereign power—has a history, according to Foucault, distinct from the political 
paradigm of war.  Rather than a linear history of the political in which the condition of 
war prior to the state is fully eliminated by sovereign power, Foucault reads the 
Leviathan as a treatise on two conflicting understandings of political history, one from 
the perspective of the state and sovereign power, and the other told from the counter-
historical condition of war.  What is unique about Foucault’s reading of Leviathan in the 
above passage lies in his claim that “Hobbes turns war…into something that has nothing 
to do with the constitution of sovereignty.”  In other words, while the Leviathan is 
primarily read as a historical theory pertaining to the constitution of sovereign power, 
Foucault maintains that the text ought to be understood as making a fundamental 
statement on the political paradigm of war.  “Hence the problem,” Foucault asks, “to 
                                                          
953 Ibid, 97.   
345 
 
whom, to what, is the elimination of war addressed, given that no previous theory of 
power had given war the role that Hobbes so stubbornly denies it?”954  
By asking to whom Hobbes’s text attempts to address by eliminating the 
condition of war from the field of the political, Foucault strategically shifts the focus of 
Leviathan from the question of sovereignty to the politics of resistance.  Indeed, insofar 
as the question of war in Hobbes is irreducible to the state and the advent of sovereign 
power, Foucault reads the general problematic of war in the Leviathan as pointing toward 
a completely separate history of politics and the political in which resistance is its key 
component.  In this way, rather than reading the elimination of war in Hobbes as being 
posed against a “specific or determinate theory, or something that could be defined as his 
adversary,” Foucault maintains that “[a]t the time Hobbes was writing, there was in fact 
something that could be described not as his partner in polemic, but as his strategic 
opposite number.”955  The “strategic opposite” Foucault refers to here reveals an 
alternative principle of intelligibility from which to read the political not simply in terms 
of the history of sovereignty, but rather as a form of politics expressed as war in the 
struggle between the exercise of government and counter-historical movement of 
resistance.  Indeed, in Foucault’s unorthodox reading of the Leviathan what Hobbes 
attempts to eliminate through the advent of sovereignty are the discourses and politics of 
struggle, conflict and resistance.  More specifically, by “strategic opposite” Foucault 
clarifies that it is a “certain theoretical and political strategy that Hobbes specifically 
wanted to eliminate and render impossible.”956  Two ideas are of key importance here.  
First, Foucault reads Leviathan as a strategic discourse that attempts to expel the forms of 
the insurrectionary historico-political discourse of politics as war from the field of the 
political.  Additionally, Foucault maintains that Hobbes attempts to eliminate not only the 
historical knowledge of struggle, but the “political strategy” of resistance as well.  With 
Foucault, then, we have an alternative reading of Hobbes in which what is at stake in is a 
political history of resistance rather than the advent of sovereignty.  What is to be 
eradicated from the field of the political in the advent of sovereignty is thus both a 
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knowledge of history of struggle and the use of this knowledge as a political strategy of 
resistance.  In other words, what the politics of sovereignty attempts to mask and 
overcome is the politics of resistance manifest as a socio-political condition of war.   
By reading Leviathan from the perspective of war and resistance instead of 
sovereignty, Foucault reveals that what motivates Hobbes’s text, and makes his argument 
possible, is to be found in his attempt to expel the historical knowledge of the history of 
politics as war.  This is to say that in Foucault’s reading of the question of politics posed 
in the Leviathan, what Hobbes attempts to render obsolete is the historical knowledge of 
the political as agōn; the advent of sovereignty theorized by Hobbes in the Leviathan is 
established to disrupt and discount the continuation of politics as war.  In a manner that 
fundamentally reverses the general trajectory of the history of the political as told in the 
Leviathan, Foucault therefore maintains: 
What Hobbes is trying, then, not to refute, but to eliminate and render 
impossible—his strategic opposite number—is a certain way of making historical 
knowledge work within the political struggle.  To be more specific, Leviathan’s 
strategic opposite number is, I think, the political use that was being made in 
political struggles of a certain historical knowledge pertaining to…all these acts 
of war, all these feats of battle, and the real struggles that go on in the laws and 
institutions that apparently regulate power.957  
Understood in this way, the question of sovereignty—indeed its institution—in the 
thought of Hobbes is established in order to “render impossible” the discourses and 
politics of resistance.  Despite Hobbes’s intentions, the history of the political does not 
therefore trace a linear progression from the state of nature and condition of war to the 
institution of sovereign power, but instead the fundamental struggle between the 
historical conception of politics as agōn and politics as archē.  Thus, the “enemy” 
Foucault writes, “or rather the enemy discourse Hobbes is addressing—is the discourse 
that could be heard in the civil struggles that were tearing the state apart.958  What 
Hobbes attempts to ward off with the turn toward sovereignty are the discourses of 
struggles against the state.  Yet, in this way what is ultimately at stake in Foucault’s 
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reading of Leviathan is how the problem of war—indeed its continuation—renders both 
the discourses of and politics as resistance more acute.    
In order to rethink the history of the political in a way that is irreducible to the 
standard history of the state, of sovereignty, and of government Foucault reads Hobbes’s 
text as itself fundamentally turning upon an agonistic, rather than archic conception of 
politics.  Yet, the interpretation of politics as the continuation of an agonistic struggle 
manifest in the politics of war necessarily turns upon a theory of resistance as the vital 
and central component of an agonistic conception of politics as such.  Indeed, although 
Hobbes attempts to expel the condition of warfare from the history of the political, in 
Foucault’s strategic reading of the Leviathan the political question of resistance is 
reintroduced into the field of politics as both a continuation of war as well as a paradigm 
of politics as war.  It is with this interpretation of politics as the continuation of war, that 
Foucault is able to begin to both rethink the political in terms in terms of an agonistic 
history of struggle, as well as how resistance designates the key paradigm of the political 
as such.  In order to both explore an agonistic history of the political, and further how this 
theory of the political ultimately turns upon the politics of resistance, Foucault invokes 
the concept of civil war as unique paradigm of the political.  Thus, in a letter written four 
years prior to the lectures comprising Society Must Be Defended Foucault affirms this 
position and writes that the question of power, politics, and the political ought to be 
analyzed in the form of the “most disparaged of all wars: neither Hobbes, nor Clausewitz, 
nor the class struggle: civil war.”959  It is with the concept of civil war that the specific 
continuity between Foucault’s theory of resistance and his theory politics can be fully 
understood; indeed, with the paradigm of civil war, Foucault not only seeks to rethink 
politics outside of the model of the Leviathan, but also against the Marxist reduction of 
resistance to the struggle between classes.       
 Throughout Society Must Be Defended, Foucault importantly invokes the term 
“civil war” to designate the topology of the political in its most paradigmatic form, as 
well as alternate paradigm for the politics of resistance.  As a paradigm of the political, 
Foucault suggests that politics as the continuation of war refuses the logic of the history 
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of politics as told by Hobbes, whereby it is with the term “civil war” instead of the state 
or the advent of sovereignty can be understood as the key term within the history of 
political thought.  In Foucault’s interpretation of Hobbes, the historical continuity 
between the state and politics is disrupted to the point where the basic thesis of Leviathan 
is fundamentally reversed; rather than assuming the advent of sovereignty as the 
precondition of politics, Foucault suggests that the question of politics finds its 
consistency and is historically elaborated within the paradigm of civil war.  At the same 
time, however, it is not just the standard narrative of Hobbes that Foucault’s concept of 
“civil war” resists, but also that of Marx’s theory of “class struggle.”  Indeed, while 
others have noted that Society Must Be Defended criticizes Marxism for reducing power 
relations to the state and class, the concept of civil war is established, in part, by Foucault 
as a critique of the Marxist notion of class struggle.960  The question of “civil war” as set 
forth in Society Must Be Defended is therefore not simply an alternative paradigm of the 
political and politics but, more importantly, a paradigm of the general form resistance 
takes within this alternative conception of politics.  Because the concept and praxis of 
civil war is that which is to be expelled from the field of the political, Foucault reads 
Hobbes as revealing a way in which the political concept of civil war can be redefined as 
a paradigm of resistance.  In Foucault, then, the concept of civil war at once designates an 
alternative political paradigm in which the history of the political can be understood 
agonistically—that is as a history of permanent struggle and conflict—as well as how this 
conception of the political necessarily turns upon the politics of resistance as its defining 
characteristic.   
 In his unorthodox reading of the history of politics in the Leviathan, Foucault 
first reveals that what Hobbes attempts to ward off with the advent of sovereignty is not a 
mythical condition of a fundamental war of all against all, but an entirely different 
conception of the political in which politics as the continuation of war is conditioned by 
the permanence of resistance.  It is not a state of nature that is overcome by the birth of 
the sovereign Leviathan; instead, rather, Foucault asserts that it is the “discourse of 
struggle and permanent civil war that Hobbes wards off by making all wars and 
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conquests depend upon a contract, and by thus rescuing the theory of the state.”961  As 
both concept and practice, “civil war” for Foucault is first and foremost a counter-
historical discourse of struggle and resistance, or what is referred to throughout Society 
Must Be Defended as the historico-political discourses on society.  As an example of 
these types of political historicism, Foucault turns to the discourses of resistance as found 
in the writings and practices of the Diggers, a seventeenth century group of Protestant 
radicals and historical forerunner of modern anarchism.  By turning to the Diggers as an 
example of the forms of political historicism excluded by Hobbes, what is at stake for 
Foucault is how the writings of the Diggers invoke the discourse of “civil war” to 
describe the field of the political as a fundamental struggle between the exercise of 
government and the counter-historical necessity of rebellion.  “Civil war” in this context 
“functions,” according to Foucault, “in both a political and historical mode, both as 
program for political action and search for historical knowledge.”962  It is therefore not a 
mythical war of all against all that Hobbes invokes as his opponent in the Leviathan, but 
the politics of resistance, of resistance as civil war.  For Foucault, then, “Hobbes’s 
philosophical-juridical discourse was a way of blocking this political historicism, which 
was the discourse and the knowledge that was actually active in the political struggles of 
the seventeenth century.”963    
While the concept of civil war at one designates a discourse and praxis of struggle 
and resistance, this same term for Foucault is makes possible the inversion of Clausewitz 
in which the history of politics can be interpreted as a continuation of war.  Indeed, what 
Foucault refers to in terms of “permanent warfare” designates the domain proper to 
history of the political; as a paradigm of the political civil war means for Foucault that the 
political more correctly assumes the form of agōn instead of archē.964  As agōn, the 
permanence of civil war is what gives the political its defining characteristic as such, and 
it is the permanent possibility of civil war amongst the history of the political in which 
politics can ultimately be interpreted as a history of struggle.  With the concept of civil 
war constituting the nexus between history and politics, Foucault remarks that “[h]istory 
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thus becomes a knowledge of struggles that is deployed and that functions within a field 
of struggles; there is now a link between the political fight and historical knowledge.”965  
Here, civil war is the concept that designates, for Foucault, the way in which the history 
of the political can be interpreted as a history of agonistic struggle.  Yet, because civil 
war implies that the history of the political can be interpreted as a history of struggle, this 
means that politics is retheorized by Foucault as a mode of praxis defined by the 
permanent possibility of resistance: “[r]ebellion is therefore inscribed within a whole 
historical analysis that reveals war to be a permanent feature of social relations.”966  In 
Foucault’s unorthodox reading of the Leviathan, “civil war” is revealed as the key term 
by which the political can be shown in its paradigmatic form as agōn.    
 With the concept of “civil war” designating the key paradigm from which to read 
the history of the political, Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended reveals a 
radically alternative hypothesis or theory of the political that cannot be reduced to the 
dual paradigms of the exercise of government and the sovereign state.  Although 
unorthodox within the history of political theory, Foucault’s reading of the question of 
politics and the history of the political from the view point of civil war has been affirmed 
by other theorists.  Inspired in part by Foucault’s rereading of Hobbes in Society Must Be 
Defended, Tiqqun’s Introduction to Civil War has been seminal in this regard, and is 
importantly established as a critical attempt to rewrite the political from the perspective 
of civil war.  To be sure, there is a specific continuity between Foucault and Tiqqun in 
regard to the way in which the term “civil war,” and not that of the state, designates the 
principle of intelligibility of the political.  Thus, while in Society Must Be Defended 
Foucault maintains that “war is the historical principle behind the working of power,” and 
hence that it is “possible to analyze political power as war,”967 Tiqqun radicalizes this 
thesis and claims that “the point of view of civil war is the point of view of the 
political.”968  Insofar as the domain of the political can be understood as a history of civil 
war, Tiqqun furthermore affirms, as does Foucault, that civil war is primary with respect 
to the political.   For Tiqqun, then, insofar as the “modern State came into being in order 
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to put an end to civil war,” this means that “both historically and by its own admission, it 
is secondary vis-à-vis civil war” (original emphasis).969  It is in this way that civil war 
can be understood as key term within the history of political theory.  In Foucault we find 
that civil war forms the basic principle from which to read the history of the political 
situated at the horizon of the state—that is, civil war is not only that which designates the 
principle of intelligibility of the political, but that which in its position of primacy allows 
for the history of the political to assume the form of an agonistic history of struggle, a 
uniquely anarchic paradigm of resistance that designates the characteristic specific to 
politics.   
While the standard history of political theory from Aristotle, Hobbes, and Schmitt 
presupposes the state and the exercise of government as the permanent component that 
distinguishes the domain of the political from other domains, Society Must Be Defended 
reverses the orthodox narrative of Western political theory and suggests that the history 
of politics and the political is a history of agonistic struggle—that is, a history through 
which resistance marks the permanent component in which politics assumes the 
paradigmatic form of civil war.  Indeed, the key intervention made by Foucault in Society 
Must Be Defended is that the history of the political can be understood on condition of 
what Hobbes attempts to eradicate with the advent of sovereign power; rather than being 
overcome by sovereignty, civil war reveals the field of the political in its most 
paradigmatic form.  As an agonistic domain of struggle, what is therefore at stake in 
Foucault’s rereading of Hobbes is that the permanence of the political is attested to by the 
permanence of “civil war.”  It is in this way that Tiqqun—via Foucault’s reading of 
Hobbes—writes that “it is civil war—stasis in Greek—that is permanence, and the 
modern state will have been a mere reaction process to this permanence” (original 
emphasis).970  As agōn, it is resistance and the paradigm of civil war—what Tiqqun refers 
to as “stasis”—rather than the state, that gives the political its historicity and form.  To be 
sure, Society Must Be Defended ought to read not only as a fundamental statement on the 
historical politics of resistance, but also an alternative hypothesis of the political that 
finds its basis in the permanence of civil war, a certain theory of stasiology.  The 
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permanence of stasis, of civil war within the field of the political designates a specific 
rupture with the logic of the archē that has hitherto shaped the narrative of Western 
political theory; stasis, as an agonistic paradigm of the political, means that the history 
of politics is made possible and emerges as civil war, a permanent struggle between the 
history of the state and the exercise of government and the counter-history of resistance.  
In a recently published text that continues his ongoing project to rethink the basic 
tenets of Western political theory titled, Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm, 
Agamben like Tiqqun traces how the concept of “stasis” designates the key paradigm by 
which the history of politics and the political can be rethought in terms of civil war.  
According to Agamben, stasis translated from the Greek oikeios polemos can be defined 
as a “war within the household,” and is (albeit historically neglected) “an integral part of 
the political life of the Greeks.”971  Because stasis is an inherent and coextensive 
component to the Greek’s notion of politics, Agamben writes that “stasis acts as its 
revealer; it attests to its irreducible presence in the polis”—that is, in its permanent and 
“irreducible presence” within the field of the political, civil war according to Agamben 
reveals the specificity of the political as such (original emphasis).972  Indeed, because 
stasis acts as the revealer of the political, what is at stake in Agamben’s text is that 
politics must be redefined on condition of this paradigm of civil war.  In Foucauldian 
language, Agamben therefore writes that “[w]e must therefore conceive of politics as a 
field of forces…between them, civil war.”973  Consistent, then, with Foucault’s theory 
regarding how the dynamic field of forces manifest in the relationship between power 
and resistance ought to be analyzed as a relation of struggle instead of a theory of 
sovereignty, Agamben suggests that politics, which reproduces the force relations 
between power and resistance, must therefore be analyzed in terms of civil war.  Stasis, 
or civil war, not only reframes the political agonistically, but in doing so further redefines 
politics as a movement of resistance.  Indeed, insofar as Agamben defines stasis as a “war 
within the home (oikos),” civil war redefines the politics of resistance as a permanent and 
ongoing struggle with what was outlined in chapter one as the Aristotelian notion of 
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“oikonomia” (government of men).  Indeed, the stasis that acts as the revealer of the 
political simultaneously reveals politics as a paradigm of resistance; within its 
irreducibility to the field of the political, stasis means that politics is that which becomes 
manifest in the struggle against the exercise of government as a form of power—that is, 
stasis designates the way in which the primacy of resistance is expressed politically as 
civil war.      
5.5 An Anarchist Hypothesis of the Political Emerges as a 
Theory of Stasiology 
 
The lectures comprising Society Must Be Defended represent Foucault’s most detailed 
analysis and historical examination into the question of politics and the history of the 
political.  By analyzing the paradigmatic condition of war in terms of the principle of 
intelligibility from which to understand the history of politics, as well as the correlative 
historico-political discourses of civil war and resistance, Foucault’s work throughout 
these lectures exemplifies the critical attempt to detach political theory from the 
discourses of sovereignty that have hitherto conditioned the narrative history of the 
political.  In other words, Society Must Be Defended represents Foucault’s most 
concentrated effort to cut off the head of the king in political theory.  Although some 
commentators have suggested that Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended simply 
pluralizes history, and as such fails in his attempted regicide of political theory, it is my 
contention that the agonistic war model of the political is an effective way to rethink the 
history of the political against its history as a continuation of the political as archē. 974  
While many of Foucault’s writings and lectures throughout the 1970’s are established in 
order to think through this conceptual impasse in relation to the question of power, the 
general focus of Society Must Be Defended is not simply to analyze relations of power in 
terms of the historical continuation of war but, more specifically, to draw a 
correspondence between his theory of power and the war model of politics; it is in this 
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critical equivalence between the analytic of power and the war analytic of politics that 
Foucault effectively cuts off the king’s head in political theory.   
While the previous chapter addressed—via the fifth thesis on power from The 
History of Sexuality—the way in which resistance is primary with power relations, and 
hence that the very nexus between power and resistance ought to be analyzed in terms of 
a permanent struggle, this chapter outlined the ways in which the question of resistance 
reappears as the very basis from which Foucault begins to interpret politics as a 
continuation of war—that is as a history of struggle, and thus as a domain of agōn.  
Insofar as resistance is primary with power, its permanent presence continuously 
transforming relations of power into relations of struggle, Foucault recasts this thesis as 
the criteria that gives the political its historicity as such; resistance according to Foucault 
is what gives the history of the political its form as a continuation of war.  Indeed, this is 
what I hold to be the penultimate claim made by Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: 
in its irreducibility to state sovereignty and the exercise of power as government, the war 
model of politics ultimately reveals an agonistic conception of the political made possible 
by the permanent possibility of resistance.  Politics therefore reproduces the relationship 
between power and resistance and takes the paradigmatic form of “civil war” in which 
stasis designates the principle through which the history of the political can be 
retheorized as a history of struggle, as well as how this theory of the political ultimately 
reveals an alternative theory of politics that begins with the question of resistance.   
In Foucault’s reading of the history of the political, it is the continuation of the 
condition of war, of stasis that marks the condition of possibility of politics, and it is this 
history of politics that Foucault views Hobbes as attempting to eradicate from the field of 
the political.  Nevertheless, Foucault’s theory of the political has been criticized for 
celebrating a return to the condition of war prior the advent of the state.  In this regard 
Hansen writes that “[b]y reducing power to strategic action, by rejecting contract theory, 
and by neglecting the politics of democratic consent, Foucault is said to fall back behind 
the insights of contractarianism, serving up an unpalpable spectacle of the struggle of all 
against all.”975  While it might appear that Foucault advocates for a return to a state of 
existence prior to the advent of the modern sovereign state, what is at stake in Foucault’s 
                                                          
975 Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence, 36.   
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theory of the political is not a return to condition of war prior to the state as described by 
Hobbes, Locke and others.  Instead Foucault’s goal is more adequately to trace the 
continuation of an alternative history of the political in terms of a counter-history of 
agonistic struggle manifest in the political paradigm of war.  By warding off the political 
as agōn, what is ultimately at stake in Foucault’s reading of the Leviathan is that Hobbes 
attempts to eradicate the politics of resistance from the field of the political.  
Consequently, however, this means for Foucault that Hobbes’s text ultimately reveals the 
very possibility of an alternative theory of the political in which the condition of 
possibility of politics is made possible when civil war designates a permanent component 
through which the political is expressed historically.  As agōn, civil war forms the 
paradigm in which the political is historically elaborated, and the permanence of the 
political is itself attested to by the permanence of civil war amongst the dynamic field to 
which politics refers.  Yet, because civil war designates the way in which politics 
assumes the form of an agōn rather than archē, the political paradigm of civil war 
simultaneously designates for Foucault a political paradigm of resistance as the 
constituent criteria of politics.  With Foucault’s work in Society Must Be Defended, it is 
my contention that it is possible to think of the political no longer as a project in pursuit 
of, and determined by, the state, sovereignty and the exercise of government, but rather as 
a form of agonistic struggle, a domain conditioned by the permanence of civil war and 
the primacy of resistance.      
Taking the primacy of resistance as the basic foundation from which Foucault 
begins to rethink the history of politics as a continuation of war, the overall goal of this 
chapter has been to demonstrate how Foucault’s interpretation of politics and the history 
of the political in Society Must Be Defended not only reveals an agonistic model of the 
political, but an anarchist hypothesis of the political in which resistance designates the 
key criteria through which politics assume the form of an agōn as such.  In chapter two 
we saw how for anarchist philosopher Benjamin Tucker an anarchist theory of the 
political relies upon a fundamental distinction between government and resistance in 
order to account for an alternative history for interpreting politics on the basis of a history 
of struggle.976  Insofar as the distinctions between government and resistance designates 
                                                          
976 Benjamin Tucker, “The Individual, Society and the State,” 22.   
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that which is proper to the domain of the political, I further outlined how Kropotkin 
invokes this distinction as the basis from which to interpret the history of politics as an 
ongoing and permanent civil war between the principle of government and the principle 
of anarchy. 977  It is my contention in this regard that Foucault’s work in Society Must Be 
Defended both mirrors the distinction between government and resistance as the central 
criteria for a critical theory of the political, as well as how this distinction is that which 
gives the political its form as an agonistic continuation of war.  Rather than beginning 
with the advent of sovereignty as the precondition of modern politics, we have seen how 
Foucault’s genealogical methodology first begins with an analysis of “subjugated 
knowledges,” or discourses of resistance in order to interpret history as the history of 
struggle.  For Foucault, it is these discourses of resistance, and not the history of the 
archē, that reveal the nature of the political as a continuation of war.  Furthermore, we 
have seen how the hallmark statement of Society Must Be Defended—that is, that politics 
is the continuation of war by other means—redefines the term politics on condition of 
resistance.  As a continuation of war, the agonistic conception of politics necessarily 
refers to and is made possible by the permanent potentiality of resistance amongst the 
domain to which politics refers; the political as a continuation of war is thus irreducible 
to the history of the state according to Foucault.  Finally, in his rereading of Hobbes, 
Foucault reverses the orthodox narrative of Western political theory and suggests that 
rather than reading the history of the political through the eradication of the condition of 
war as is the case in the Leviathan, it is instead the permanence of civil war (stasis) that 
defines the key paradigm of the political as such.  By tracing the history of politics and 
the political not simply as a continuation of war, but in terms of the paradigm of civil 
war, Foucault reveals how the political is historically manifest as a permanent domain of 
struggle between the history of the state and the counter-historical movements of 
resistance, revolt, and rebellion.   
                                                          
977 Peter Kropotkin, “A few Thoughts About the Essence of Anarchism,” 201.  Here Kropotkin contests the 
Marxist notion of class struggle as the principle motor of history, and suggests that “[f]rom the earliest 
times these two currents were found struggling against each other.  They continue to do so, and the 
history of mankind is the history of their struggles.”  Indeed, as I maintained in chapter two, history 
according to Kropotkin is itself manifest in the permanent war between the authoritarian principle as 
manifest in the state, sovereignty, and the exercise of government and the principle of anarchy manifest 
in counter-historical movements of resistance.   
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With the paradigm of civil war designating an agonistic theory of the political that 
turns upon the primacy of resistance, it is my claim that Foucault war model of the 
political transcends Schmitt and Mouffe’s theories of the political, and better finds its 
consistency in the framework of anarchism.  In a manner akin to Kropotkin, Foucault’s 
agonistic model of the political can be vitally distinguished from Mouffe’s recent 
attempts to reframe Schmitt’s model of the political in the context of what she refers to as 
“radical politics today.”978  While Mouffe maintains that the field of the political is to be 
defined as the “antagonistic dimension which is inherent to all human societies,” what 
she refers to as agonistic dimension of politics is set to effectively eradicate resistance 
from the domain of the political as such.979  In doing so, however, what Mouffe refers to 
as politics effectively reduces the permanent dimension of agonism inherent to the 
political to a politics of archē, insofar as politics is defined as an engagement with the 
exercise of governmental institutions.980  Indeed, what is ultimately at stake for Mouffe is 
to eradicate an agonistic conception of politics that “refuses to become government.”981  
Similar to the position of Hobbes, in eradicating from the field of the political the 
dissident forms of politics as resistance—a form of politics that refuses government—
Mouffe’s work can be understood as a polemic against an anarchist theory of the 
political.  While Mouffe’s agonistic theory of the political posits a liberal, democratic 
pluralism as the ultimate horizon for agonistic politics, it is my contention that Foucault 
affirms an alternative and dissenting theory of the political that finds its basis in 
anarchism and not that of liberal democratic state.  In other words, what is at stake in 
Foucault’s conception (contra Mouffe) is precisely a form of politics of resistance that 
                                                          
978 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics, 65-84.  
979 Ibid, 2. Although she neglects a discussion of Foucault, Mouffe takes Paulo Virno, Michael Hardt, and 
Antonio Negri as opponents in the debate over the contemporary form radical politics ought to take, and 
proposes a direct contrast between the “strategy of withdrawal” as found in the works of the former 
theorists with “a different conception of radical politics envisaged in terms of ‘engagement’ with 
institutions, with the aim of bringing about a different hegemony” (66).  For Mouffe’s discussion of Hardt, 
Negri, and Virno’s understanding of radical politics, see section titled “Critique as Withdrawal From” (66-
71).  Here Mouffe takes concern with Virno’s concept of “exodus” (69) and Hardt and Negri’s concept of 
“desertion” (70), and characterizes the radical politics of these theorists in terms of developing a form of 
resistance that “refuses to become government” (70).  Against these forms of critique, Mouffe proposes 
what she refers to as “critique as hegemonic engagement with” (71). 
980 Ibid, 71-77. 
981 Ibid, 70. 
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refuses to become government—that is, in Foucault’s agonistic conception of the 
political, politics is what is animated as an art of not being governed.  What is therefore 
required by Foucault is not the eradication of anarchy from the field of the political, but 
rather its return in the political movements of resistance, a specific movement in politics 
that could never assume the form of an oikonomia.  Indeed, through Foucault we might 
take this further and suggest that an anarchist hypothesis of the political emerges as a 
theory of stasiology.  While the power/resistance dynamic directly informs Foucault’s 
theory of politics, civil war—itself a paradigm of resistance—is what reveals the field of 
the political in its anarchic specificity—that is, civil war designates the point in which the 
field of the political can never be fully solidified as archē.       
Yet while the interpretation of politics as a continuation of war ultimately turns 
upon, as we have seen, an agonistic theory of politics and resistance, Foucault warns his 
audience that such discourses of politics as war are always in danger of either being co-
opted by the state or, even more insidiously, as tending toward the totalitarian logic of 
“social racism.”982  Thus in the final lecture of Society Must Be Defended, Foucault 
claims that “no matter whether it is Fourier at the beginning of the century or the 
anarchists at the end of it, you will always find a racist component of socialism.”983  
Given that anarchism traditionally maintains a commitment to the eradication of all forms 
oppression, Foucault’s critique in the final pages of Society Must Be Defended strikes at 
the heart of the tradition fundamentally premised upon anti-racism.  Indeed, since 
Foucault defines “social racism” in terms of a “socialist state which must exercise the 
right to kill or the right to eliminate, or the right to disqualify,” his critique of anarchism 
initially appears unfounded insofar as anarchists traditionally argue that the state 
(socialist or otherwise) is inherently inconsistent with anarchist principles.984  More 
seriously, however, what is at stake in Foucault’s critique of anarchism is certain 
biopolitical rationale that connects the politics of revolutionary socialisms to the logic of 
                                                          
982 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 261.  What Foucault refers to as “social racism” is a 
consequence to the ways in which various forms of socialism including anarchism, Marxism, the 
Commune, Blanquism, all neglected a “critique of the theme of biopower” (261).  For Foucault, then, the 
“most racist forms of socialism were therefore, Blanquism of course, and then the Commune, and then 
anarchism” (262).    
983 Ibid, 261.   
984 Ibid, 261.   
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state sovereignty.  Indeed, while the final lecture of Society Must Be Defended is often 
taken by Foucault’s readers as introducing the concept of “biopower” into his wider 
critical lexicon, the term itself is introduced not only to designate a specific form of state 
power directed at the management of populations, but rather as the nexus that connects 
revolutionary discourse and practice to the logic of state sovereignty.  Revolutionary 
discourse and the logic of state sovereignty first collide according to Foucault with the 
“idea that the essential function of society [that which replaces the state in revolutionary 
discourse] or the state [sovereignty], or whatever it is that must replace the state, is to 
control life, to manage it.”985  Understood as such, revolutionary discourses ultimately 
collide with the logic of sovereignty and tend toward a rationale of “social racism” 
inasmuch as they both seek to manage life in the constitution of political order.  In other 
words, both revolutionary discourse and sovereign theory reproduce what Foucault refers 
to as biopower—that is, with or without the state, they both attempt to manage—which is 
to say govern—the life of a population in regard to specific ends.  Insofar as 
revolutionary discourse reproduces the logic of the state, Foucault seems to be suggesting 
that this is because 20th century forms of socialism never solved the problem of 
government; in seeking to overthrow the power of the state, the idea of revolution 
produces and constitutes the founding of another political order. 
  If anarchism and other socialist discourses from the nineteenth century contain a 
racist component according to Foucault, this is because these discourses often tend 
toward a form of totalitarianism by presupposing a certain universality of how life ought 
to managed.  Thus, rather than eradicating the problem of power through the destruction 
of the state, revolutionary theory and praxis reproduce power as “social racism,” which is 
to say biopolitically in the management, or government of life.  Even more insidiously, 
Foucault additionally locates a racist component to traditional forms of struggle 
employed in revolutionary praxis.  “Whenever,” Foucault laments: 
socialism has been forced to stress the problem of struggle, the struggle against 
the enemy, of the elimination of the enemy in capitalist society, racism does raise 
its head, because it is the only way in which socialist thought, which is after all 
                                                          
985 Ibid, 261. 
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very much bound up with the themes of biopower, can rationalize the murder of 
its enemies.986  
While Foucault admits that not all forms of revolutionary praxis turn upon the 
“elimination of the enemy” in the sense suggested above, revolutionary praxis is 
biopolitical insofar as the concept of struggle can only be conceived in terms of the 
elimination of one’s enemy. 987  While Foucault’s examples of “social racism” are taken 
from the movements that sought to control state power as a means towards achieving 
revolution, his critique nevertheless points to certain continuity between revolutionary 
theory and what he refers to as the sovereign “power to foster life or disallow it to the 
point of death the sovereign right let live” (original emphasis).988  Thus, although social 
racism appears in the failure to adequately deal with the question of government, it also     
appears in the failure to rethink the possibility of a form of politics distinct from the logic 
of sovereignty.  In attempting to overcome the violence of the state with revolutionary 
violence, revolutionary praxis as such is simply a politics of sovereignty without a state.   
The forms of “social racism” Foucault describes are not endemic to anarchism 
necessarily, but rather to revolutionary socialism, and perhaps even the concept of 
revolution itself.  Nevertheless, anarchist theory ought to take seriously the nexus that 
connects revolutionary praxis to the logic of both government and sovereignty.  Although 
Foucault’s critique is quite damning to the tradition of radical politics, especially 
anarchism, his point is not to discount the possibility of a radical political theory, but 
instead to call form a non-universalizing form of politics as resistance that refuses the 
logics of government and sovereign power.  If the logic of revolution coincides with and 
reproduces biopower, we might read the final pages of Society Must Be Defended as 
Foucault asserting a new basis for radical politics in the transition from revolution to a 
politics as resistance.  Indeed, if as Foucault suggests that the war model of the political 
and the revolutionary project that sustains it, have the potentiality to develop into “social 
racism,” what is at stake for Foucault is that the question of revolution might have to be 
significantly modified or even abandoned as the key focal point of radical politics.  In this 
                                                          
986 Ibid, 262.   
987 By way of qualification, Foucault writes: “[w]hen it is simply a matter of eliminating the adversary in 
economic terms, or of taking away his privileges, there is no need for racism” (262).   
988 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 138.   
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regard, it is my contention that the very possibility of an anarchist politics of resistance 
can no longer be elaborated in terms of the revolutionary overthrow of power leading to a 
future classless and stateless society, but instead as an art of not being governed.  In this 
regard, the following and final chapter seeks to establish a specific continuity between 
Foucault’s agonistic conception of the political and his turn toward the study of ethics in 
order to outline a unique way to conceive of an anarchic, insurrectionary politics of 
resistance that could never assume the form of an archē.  My claim will be that what 
Foucault refers to in the lectures series that follows the 1975-1976 courses titled Security, 
Territory, Population as “revolts of conduct” and “resistances of conduct” offers a unique 
way to think about resistance neither as struggle for or over power, nor as a revolutionary 
overthrow of existing power relations, but in terms of a permanent ethos of revolt, an 
insurrectionary struggle towards ungovernable forms-of-life.989  Reconceiving an 
anarchist politics of resistance as such, also necessitates a fundamental reconsideration of 
anarchy as well. 
  
                                                          
989 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 196. 
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Chapter 6 
6 The First Revolt: Politics as an Ethics of Resistance to 
Government 
 
Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on 
which to base the elaboration of a new ethics.  They need an ethics, but they cannot find 
any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self 
is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on.990 
Ethics is a practice; ethos a manner of being…we have to raise the problem of…a 
nonacceptance of the passivity of our own governments…this attitude is an ethical one, 
but it is also political.991 
--Michel Foucault 
 
The previous three chapters have sought to advance a specific continuity within 
Foucault’s works around the concept of resistance, while simultaneously highlighting the 
ways in which the emphasis on a critical conceptualization of resistance reveals a vitally 
new way to understand Foucault’s critical inquiries into power, governmentality, and the 
history of politics.  In chapter three I outlined how what Foucault refers to throughout 
various periods in his work as “critique,” or the “critical attitude” that underlies the basis 
of philosophy since Kant, allows for a new way to interpret Foucault’s larger project and 
draw connections between the differing periods of his thought with respect to the general 
question of resistance.  With reference to the unique methodological approach to the 
study of power and politics invoked by in On the Government of the Living under the 
portmanteau “anarchaeology”— a critical methodology that begins anarchically, or on 
condition of what Foucault refers to as the “non-necessity of all power of whatever 
kind”—I maintained that such approach to the field of power ultimately reveals for 
Foucault a new way to read the history of the political.992  Rather than beginning with the 
first principle of the archē, and thus that politics can be reducible to the techniques of 
                                                          
990 Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” in Ethics. Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. 
Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1994), 256. 
991 Michel Foucault, “Politics and Ethics: An Interview,” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York: Vintage, 2010), 377. 
992 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 79; 78. 
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government exercised within the domain of a state, Foucault instead maintains that the 
history of the “art of being governed” is simultaneously the counter-historical movement 
of resistance manifest in terms of the “art of not being governed.”  In the following 
chapter, which should be taken as the center piece around which this study is based, I 
took Foucault’s fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality as the critical locus 
that reveals what I refer to as the primacy of resistance, and maintained that the logic of 
the primacy of resistance forms the conceptual nexus through which Foucault’s study of 
power, politics, and the history of the political can be understood in their specificity.  
With the primacy of resistance designating the conceptual key required for a full 
understanding of Foucault’s work, I argued that the condition of possibility of power 
relations and the field of the political turn upon the permanent potentiality of resistance, 
and further that this permanent potentiality of resistance is what allows for a relation of 
power to be transformed into a form of agonistic struggle.  In chapter five I further 
maintained that a specific continuity between Foucault’s analytic of power and his theory 
of politics and the political as explored in Society Must Be Defended can be drawn 
through the primacy of resistance.  Herein I argued that Foucault’s unorthodox reading of 
Hobbes, as well as the “historical-political” discourses of resistance that sustain this 
reading, offer a radically new principle of intelligibility from which to read the history of 
the political.993  By taking the condition of war instead of the advent of sovereign power 
as the historical motor of politics, Foucault reveals a fundamental caesura between the 
political as archē and the political as agōn, in which politics comes to designate an 
agonistic struggle or permanent war between the history of power exercised as techniques 
of government within a state, and the parallel yet heterogeneous counter-historical 
movements of resistance.   
While Foucault’s works are traditionally read as contributing to an innovative and 
often controversial critical theory of how power relations function in society, as well as 
the distinct rationalities of government that sustain them, it has been my general 
contention throughout this project not only that Foucault’s respective studies of power, 
governmentality and politics all fundamentally turn upon a unique theory of resistance 
that forms the conceptual key from which his larger project is based, but also that 
                                                          
993 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 49.   
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Foucault must be read in terms of a philosopher of resistance as such.  More specifically, 
I have not only sought to demonstrate how Foucault’s studies of power, governmentality 
and politics all turn upon revealing the permanent potentiality of resistance amongst these 
relations, but also how the primary goal of Foucault’s general project can be read as a 
critical attempt to unmask the primacy of resistance as such.  In this regard, the overall 
goal of the previous chapters has been two-fold.  By highlighting the importance Foucault 
attaches to the concept of resistance throughout his work, my intention has at once been 
to demonstrate how the primacy of resistance forms the critical locus from which 
Foucault bases his inquiries into power, politics, and governmentality, while 
simultaneously exploring how each of these inquiries ultimately turn upon elaborating a 
critical theory of resistance as the central component to Foucault’s philosophy.  
Additionally, however, my intention has been to demonstrate how the primacy of 
resistance as broached by Foucault reveals an alternative basis from which the history of 
politics and the political can be interpreted anarchically—that is, without the first 
principle and logic of the archē.  In this way, the logic of the primacy of resistance forms 
the basis of what I refer to as an anarchist hypothesis of the political in which the political 
as archē is unfounded by taking the primacy of resistance as the constituent component of 
politics, and from which the political can be redefined as a domain of permanent 
agonistic struggle.   
While the previous chapters have sought to situate Foucault’s work in relation to 
the history of political philosophy and anarchist thought, it is my contention in this final 
chapter that this anarchist hypothesis of the political which takes the primacy of 
resistance as its constituent component, also turns upon an ethics of revolt that animates 
and makes possible Foucault’s analytics of power and politics.  It is therefore necessary 
to turn toward some of his later works, thematics and key concepts not only in order to 
understand the full implications of how Foucault’s theory of resistance corresponds and 
coincides with a particular theory of ethics, but more specifically how this inquiry into 
the question of ethics additionally reveals a vital dimension of his theory of resistance 
that cannot be ignored.  It is widely recognized that Foucault’s final works, particularly 
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, as well as the final series of lectures given 
at the Collège De France in the period from 1979 to 1984, signify a direct change in focus 
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from questions pertaining to power and politics to those posed in relation to the field of 
ethics.994  The ways in which Foucault’s later thought can be fundamentally distinguished 
from the themes and points of focus of his earlier works has led some to refer to this 
period as “Foucault’s ethical turn.”995  To be sure, scholars996 and biographers997 alike 
consistently argue that following the publication of The History of Sexuality in 1976, 
Foucault begins to rethink his work in terms of a shift from the general question of power 
to the ethical problematization of subjectivity and how human beings are constituted as 
subjects as such.  As Simons acknowledges, during the final period of his work, 
“Foucault discerns ways in which people participate in their own subjectification by 
exercising power over themselves, tying themselves to scientific or moral definitions of 
who they are.”998  Thus, as Simons concludes, Foucault “refers to this relationship to the 
self as ethics.”999  Indeed, in the 1982 essay “The Subject and Power” Foucault 
retrospectively maintains that the problem of the subject has always been at the forefront 
of his works since the beginning.  As Foucault recognizes in hindsight, the general 
objective of his collected works “has been to create a history of the different modes by 
which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,” and furthermore that his works 
therefore correspond with “three modes of objectification that transform human beings 
into subjects.”1000  As we will see, similar to the ways in which Foucault maintains that 
                                                          
994 See: Lisa Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Foucault (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 87. 
995 Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenburg, “Michel Foucault: An Ethical Politics of Care of the Self and 
Others,” in Political Philosophy in the 20th Century: Authors and Arguments, ed. Catherine Zuchert 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 228. 
996 See: Paul Rabinow, “Introduction” to Michel Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow 
(New York: The New Press, 1994), xvii.  Here Rabinow maintains that “over the next four years” following 
the publication of The History of Sexuality “Foucault carried out a major recasting and consolidation of his 
core conceptual tools.”  At stake for Rabinow is that it is crucial to understand the ways in which Foucault 
began to reconceive his theory of power in order to fully understand the questions posed in his later 
works.  Thus Rabinow argues that “it is crucial to underline a central shift in in his views on power 
relations, for it situates the problems his later thought sought to address” (xvii). 
997 David Macey, Michel Foucault, (London: Reaktion Books, 2004), 135. 
998 Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, 2. 
999 Ibid, 2.   
1000 Michel Foucault, “Subject and Power,” 326.  As a retrospective inquiry pertaining to the ways in which 
his work can be distinguished by three different periods in relation to the question of how humans are 
made into subjects, Foucault provides a useful afterthought from which a certain continuity between the 
differing periods of his thought can be drawn.  First, Foucault maintains that his early texts, particularly 
The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge, the goal of his work was to analyze the 
“objectivizing of the speaking subject” in relation to the discourses of the human sciences; second 
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power relations correspond with the primacy of resistance, the forms of power that take 
as their object the transformation of human beings into subjects directly correspond with 
a movement of desubjectification, a movement of resistance against the individualizing 
techniques of government.  It is this movement of resistance as desubjectification that 
Foucault understands as the ethical component corresponding with a form of politics 
conceived as resistance.    
For Foucault’s readers and critics there has been some serious contention 
pertaining to how Foucault’s ethical turn can be read not only in light of the three 
volumes of The History of Sexuality, but also more broadly in terms of his larger 
project.1001  While some critics and scholars argue that Foucault’s turn toward the study 
of governmentality and eventually of the question of ethics employs an entirely new set 
of concepts, problems, and themes, and therefore that his ethical period constitutes a 
decisive break with his earlier thought,1002 others argue that Foucault maintains a specific 
continuity between the political and ethical axes of his thought,1003 and further that each 
axis can be read as critically complementing the other.  For some, the decisive break 
between the analytic of power and the turn toward the study of ethics is often attributed to 
Foucault’s transition to the study of governmentality in the years following the 
publication of The History of Sexuality, wherein critics claim that Foucault ultimately 
                                                          
Foucault maintains that his inquiry into the question of power as posed in Discipline and Punish and The 
History of Sexuality “studied the objectivizing of the subject” in terms of “dividing practices;” finally, 
Foucault maintains with respect to his current work in 1982 that he has sought to study “the way a human 
being turns him—or herself into a subject” (326-327).  With this retrospective outline of his work, 
Foucault there writes that “it is not power, but the subject, that is the general theme of my research” 
(327).   
1001 See: Lisa Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Foucault, 87.  Here Downing notes how “volumes 
two and three deviated from his original conception of how the completed History would look.” 
1002 See: Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, Critique, 3.  In this text, Lemke takes the turn toward 
the study of governmentality as the decisive turning point from which Foucault abandons his initial 
analytic of power and moves toward an engagement with inquiry into the intersection between 
subjectivity and ethics (3).   
1003 See: Colin Koopman, “The Formation and Self-Transformation of the Subject in Foucault’s Ethics,” in A 
Companion to Foucault, eds. Christopher Falzon, et al. (United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell Publications, 
2013), 527-529.  Despite orthodox interpretation of Foucault’s ethical turn, Koopman here maintains that 
“there is no deep break between” the differing periods, and instead maintains that “Foucault’s writings on 
ethics in antiquity pick up right where his prior writings on power and knowledge in modernity left off” 
(527).  According to Koopman, this continuation between periods can be maintained in two ways: first as 
an “expanded historical inquiry” into how modern ethics emerges out of the problematization of previous 
forms of ethics, and secondly the problematization of the ethics of antiquity might constitute the basis for 
an ethical response to our own modern condition (527).   
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abandons his previous analytics of power, war, and politics.1004  With note of Foucault’s 
claim in the first lecture from Society Must Be Defended regarding how the “twin notions 
of “repression” and “war” have to be considerably modified and ultimately, perhaps, 
abandoned,”1005 readers of Foucault maintain that he ultimately “managed to abandon the 
burdensome ballast of the war matrix.”1006  In his text, Foucault, Governmentality and 
Critique, Thomas Lemke designates Society Must Be Defended as a key turning point in 
which Foucault begins to radically change the trajectory of his work.  Thus according to 
Lemke while “Foucault replaces the focus on legitimacy and consent in political theory 
by accentuating war and struggle” this model is itself replaced by the way in which 
“power relations for Foucault, have become governmentalized.”1007  Similarly, in the 
introduction to the English translation of Society Must Be Defended Arnold Davidson 
suggests that “by 1976, just after this course, Foucault had subtly but significantly 
modified his own attitude” not only regarding his analytic of power, but also his 
conception of war and politics.1008  More critically, others have suggested that the turn 
toward the study of governmentality can be understood in terms of how Foucault 
ultimately fails to succeed in attempting a non-sovereign theory of power and politics.  In 
this regard, Andrew Neal maintains that in the wake of his lectures on the questions of 
politics, war, and historical struggle Foucault “quickly subsumed into a different path,” 
and consequently that he “does not succeed in cutting off the King’s head.”1009   
While it is true that Foucault began to focus on the general problematic of 
governmentality in the years following the 1976-1977 lectures, the theoretical break or 
disjuncture Lemke and others posit between the study of governmentality and his earlier 
analytics of power and politics is not entirely accurate.  Hence, the claim that the turn to 
                                                          
1004 See: Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, Critique, 10-11. 
1005 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 17. 
1006 Beatrice Hansen, Critique of Violence, 147.  Hansen invokes Foucault’s later essay “The Subject and 
Power” in order to demonstrate how Foucault ultimately abandons the war analysis of power relations in 
favor of the study of governmentality.  In this way, Hansen maintains that if “in Society Must Be Defended, 
he had focused on power/war/struggle, now [in “The Subject and Power”] his concern was with the 
constellation power/governing (153).    
1007 Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, Critique, 11;31. 
1008 Arnold I. Davidson, introduction to Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège 
De France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), xviii.  
1009 Andrew W. Neal, “Cutting Off the King’s Head: Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended and the Problem 
of Sovereignty,” 379, 380.   
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the study of governmentality ought to be understood as turning point in which Foucault 
abandons his previous studies in favor of completely new project has been equally 
discounted by several theorists.  While Kelly acknowledges that “Foucault drops his talk 
of war by around 1978,” he further concludes “that there is no break” in the form of a 
total abandonment of previous ideas, concepts, and points of focus.1010  Along this 
trajectory, other critics have sought to establish a continuity between Foucault’s work on 
power and politics through the 1970’s and his study of ethics in the early 1980’s, and 
have more correctly explored how the two periods are not exclusive, but rather mutually 
complementary of one another.  Rather than asserting a fundamental distinction between 
the analytic of politics and the study of ethics, Milchman and Rosenburg have therefore 
suggested that we might read the later works in view of how “Foucault came to see 
politics as an ethics.”1011  Against the claim that Foucault’s inquiry into the question of 
ethics turns him away from the study of politics, the ethical turn can therefore be read “in 
the direction of a reconceptualization of politics as an ethical politics.”1012  Expanding 
upon the idea that Foucault’s turn toward ethics itself turns upon the elaboration of a 
form of politics conceived as ethics, Kelly reads the ethical turn as a vital attempt to 
understand what types of ethical practices might coincide with Foucault’s theory of 
power, politics, and the political, and argues that “ethics is for Foucault a logical outcome 
of his political thought.1013  As a form of ethics that corresponds with his theory of 
politics, Colin Koopman suggests that Foucault’s late writings ought to be understood as 
a distinctly unique way to think through the actual “possibility of the future 
transformation of the subject” instead of how the subject is formed through relations of 
power.1014  Indeed if, as I have argued in the three previous chapters, that Foucault’s 
analytics of power and politics are inseparable from the primacy and permanent presence 
                                                          
1010 Mark G. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 55; 57.  Taking Lemke’s argument as his 
critical foil, Kelly argues persuasively that a specific continuity can be found between Foucault’s work in 
Society Must Be Defended and his subsequent study of governmentality and the exercise of power as 
government.  Although Kelly acknowledges that Foucault eventually “goes on largely to abandon the 
analogy” of war, he explains that “the metaphor that in Foucault’s later works largely displaces that of 
war is that of the game” (58, original emphasis).  
1011 Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenburg, “Michel Foucault: An Ethical Politics of Care of the Self and 
Others,” 228. 
1012 Ibid, 228.   
1013 See: Mark G. Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault, 157. 
1014 Colin Koopman, “The Formation and Self-Transformation of the Subject in Foucault’s Ethics,” 526. 
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of resistance as the constituent component that redefines the political as a field of 
agonistic struggle, then following Kelly and Koopman’s readings we can suggest that the 
turn toward ethics can be understood as both a “logical outcome” to his political theory as 
well as a critical attempt to theorize what types of ethical praxis might coincide with his 
theory of politics as resistance. 
Although it has been noted that readers of Foucault ought to be careful when he 
retrospectively reads his early texts and problematics in view of his current projects,1015 if 
we follow the claim made in “The Subject and Power” wherein Foucault maintains that 
the goal of his general project has been to trace the ways in which humans are made into 
subjects, it is my contention, then, that the ethical turn can be read as a critical attempt to 
expand upon his theory of resistance and propose an ethics of resistance and possible 
transformation against the forms of subjectification traced in the works leading to his 
final projects.  Rather than taking the turn toward the study of governmentality as found 
in Security, Territory, Population in terms of a conceptual bridge through which Foucault 
abandons his analytics of power and politics in favor of the study of governmentality and 
ethics, this why Arnold Davidson in his introduction to the English translation of these 
same lectures argues that the key concept “that allows us to link together the political and 
ethical axes of Foucault’s thought” is not found in the problematic of governmentality, 
but rather arises in the practices of revolt, or forms of “counter-conduct” directed against 
the exercise of government.1016  Affirming that Foucault’s theory of ethics ultimately 
turns upon a radical transformation of the subject, others have more directly outlined how 
a specific continuity between his political and ethical periods can be maintained in terms 
of an expanded discussion of the question of resistance Foucault poses throughout his 
work.  In this regard, Johanna Oksala argues that “Foucault’s later work on ethics is an 
inquiry into resistance.”1017  Furthermore, while Bernauer and Mahon maintain that what 
is ultimately at stake in his turn toward the study of ethics is how “Foucault called for a 
clear attitude of protest, of ethical rejection that could itself become a political force,”1018 
                                                          
1015 See: Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), 104. 
1016 Arnold Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” 26. 
1017Johanna Oksala, Foucault on Freedom, 167-168. 
1018 James Bernauer and Michael Mahon, “Foucault’s Ethical Imagination,” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Foucault, ed. Gary Cutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 153. 
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Simons argues that Foucault’s search for a form of ethics that can be transformed into a 
political force led him to develop “an ethic of permanent resistance.”1019  Thus while 
Foucault understands the history of the political as a history made visible by the primacy 
of resistance, and further that a conception of politics as resistance is what allows 
relations of power to be both confronted and transformed, a continuity can be drawn 
between Foucault’s conceptions of politics and ethics in that the latter is an expanded 
historical inquiry into which types of ethical practices might be invoked in order resist the 
techniques of governmentality outlined in his later works.   
In light of the way in which a continuity between the political and ethical axes of 
Foucault’s thought can be drawn through the concept of resistance, it is at once my 
contention in this chapter that there is an explicitly political dimension of Foucault’s 
theory of ethics that itself turns upon the question of resistance, as well as how this turn 
toward the study of ethics reveals an important way through which the relation between 
politics and resistance can be rethought in terms of a critically resistant ethos, not as a 
prescriptive set of moral codes and normative rules, but ethos defined as a mode of 
resistance to the exercise of power as government.  More specifically, it is my claim that 
Foucault’s ethical turn ought to be understood as an attempt to locate a continuity 
between a form of ethics that animates his theory of resistance, and a form of politics as 
resistance that coincides with a radical, permanent ethics of revolt, a distinct way of being 
in the world through resistance—that is, specific art of not being governed.  To do so, I 
first turn to the lecture series titled Security, Territory, Population, particularly the eighth 
lecture, in order to demonstrate how a unique bridge between the study of politics and the 
turn toward ethics can be maintained through what Foucault designates as movements of 
“counter-conduct,” “revolts of conduct,” or insurrections of conduct.”1020  While the 
importance of Security, Territory, Population is often attributed to the introduction of the 
concept and study of governmentality, it is my contention here that the majority of 
Foucault’s critics have neglected to notice how Foucault’s outline pertaining to the ways 
in which power is exercised as a technique of government is fundamentally paired with a 
historical outline of movements of resistance against these same practices.  Although 
                                                          
1019 Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, 87. 
1020 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 191-216. 
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Davidson has pointed toward a certain correspondence between the concept of resistance 
and what Foucault refers to as “counter-conduct,” it is my contention here that what is at 
stake in this relation lies in the way in which Foucault begins to redefine politics as a 
specific ethics of resistance to the exercise if governmentality.1021  As we will see, 
however, while several critics have asserted a specific continuity between the turn toward 
governmentality and the study of ethics, it is my argument that the turn toward ethics can 
more correctly be understood in relation to Foucault’s theory of resistance to 
governmentality, and thus a continuation of his study of power and politics.  Indeed, with 
the notion of “counter-conduct” Foucault enhances his theory of politics by adding a 
distinct ethical component to the concept and practice of resistance in which these 
movements of revolt are at once characterized by a form of resistance directed against the 
exercise of government as well as a movement whose objective is not simply to counter 
the techniques of governmentality, but also to carve out a radical space of freedom in 
which one is able to form one’s own subjectivity autonomously as an art of not being 
governed.   
After outlining the ways in which Foucault’s analysis of the “revolts of conduct” 
against governmentality ultimately reveals a fundamental redefinition of politics from the 
perspective of resistance, I then trace how the concept of “counter-conduct” also reveals 
an ethical dimension of the politics of resistance.  Herein I invoke the notion of “counter-
conduct” as a key referent from which Foucault begins to problematize the question of 
politics as ethics, as well as the conceptual basis that animates other concepts vital to his 
study of ethics such as “the care of the self” and “askēsis.”  Ultimately at stake here is to 
demonstrate how Foucault begins to rethink ethics in terms of a practice of resistance, a 
permanent ethos of revolt against the logic of governmentality.  Expanding upon the idea 
that the politics of resistance appears in Foucault’s work as the conceptual basis required 
                                                          
1021 See: Arnold Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct), 26-28.  Herein Davidson adequately outlines a 
specific connection between Foucault’s use of the term “resistance” and the practice of “counter-
conduct,” and further that this connection helps in moving between Foucault’s writings on politics and his 
later writings on ethics. Nevertheless, while Davidson concludes that “political and ethically, counter-
conduct is the invention of a new philosophical concept,” he nevertheless tends to gloss over the question 
of politics, focusing instead on how the concept of “counter-conduct” more directly develops in tandem 
with the question of ethics (39).  It is my contention, however, that with the notion of “counter-conduct” 
Foucault does not bracket the question of politics in favor of ethics, but rather that the concept of 
“counter-conduct” renders the question of politics more acute for Foucault.    
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for a critical inquiry into the problematic of ethics, in the final section, I situate 
Foucault’s work on the ethical politics of resistance in relation to anarchist thought in 
order to explore how the anarchist hypothesis of the political I have been tracing 
simultaneously corresponds with an ethics of revolt that animates this conception of the 
political.  Staging an intersection between two of Foucault’s later works—“The Subject 
and Power” and an interview titled “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of 
Freedom”—I not only argue that anarchism forms a key referent from which Foucault 
begins to rethink ethics as a practice of resistance, but also how these two texts develop a 
unique definition of resistance in which the radical ethos of struggle against the 
techniques of government is simultaneously paired with the affirmation of autonomous, 
ungovernable forms of subjectivity.  By placing Foucault’s ethics of revolt in dialogue 
with anarchist thought, it is my contention that it is possible to rethink an anarchist 
politics of struggle not simply in terms of a revolutionary project determined by the 
teleological goal of a future classless and stateless society.  Rather than taking the project 
of social revolution as the paradigmatic form of anarchist struggle, I suggest that an 
anarchist theory of resistance might be rethought as a distinct form of agonistic ethos, an 
insurrectionary politics of revolt in which what is at stake in resistance is neither a 
struggle with or over state power, but instead a struggle at once directed against the forms 
of governable subjectivities that connect individuals to the state, as well as a struggle for 
the invention of autonomous forms-of-life, a struggle that begins with anarchy instead of 
ending with it.   
6.1 Counter-Conduct: Politics as Resistance to Governmentality  
 
To be GOVERNED is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, 
numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured, 
commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do 
so…To be GOVERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, 
registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, 
authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished…then, at the slightest 
resistance…to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, 
disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, 
betrayed…That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.1022 
                                                          
1022 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, “General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century,” in Property is 
Theft: A Pierre-Joseph Proudhon Anthology, ed. Lain McKay (California: AK Press, 2011), 598. 
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--Pierre-Joseph Proudhon 
 
Politics is no more or less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the 
first uprising, the first revolt.1023 
--Michel Foucault 
 
Following the publication of The History of Sexuality in 1976, Foucault abandoned what 
he initially proposed as a six volume set of texts connected through the theme of 
sexuality, and quickly set about rethinking the general focus and trajectory of his 
project.1024  Although Foucault produced no new texts aside from several essays, 
interviews and lectures for the following eight years, the fundamentally revision of his 
initial project ultimately resulted in the second and third volumes of The History of 
Sexuality, respectively titled The Use of Pleasures and The Care of the Self, both 
published in 1984.  While a fourth volume titled The Confessions of the Flesh was nearly 
finished before Foucault’s death, it has never been published.1025   For many of 
Foucault’s critics it is not necessarily the eight-year gap separating the publication of 
volume one from volumes two and three that is difficult to explain, but rather the change 
in theme from the analysis of the ways in which relations of power intersect with modern 
discourses of sexuality to an analytic of the “practices of the self” through which one 
constitutes oneself as a subject of sexual conduct.1026  Indeed, although in the 
introduction to The Use of Pleasure Foucault reintroduces the aim of his project and 
further establishes a new set of concepts and themes from which the later volumes can be 
distinguished from the first, critics have often pointed out how the transition from the 
analytic of power to the ethical dimension of sexuality and the formation of the subject 
seemed “sudden and inexplicable.”1027  Furthermore, as Davidson notes, Foucault’s 
                                                          
1023 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 217, n.5. 
1024 The back cover of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, announced five forthcoming volumes 
that were to complete Foucault’s study of the history of sexuality.  Following the publication of the first 
volume, the projected titles of the five texts to come were tentatively order and titled as follows:  The 
Flesh and the Body (vol. 2), The Children’s Crusade (vol. 3), Woman, Mother, Hysteric (vol. 4), Perverts (vol. 
5), and Populations and Races (vol. 6).    
1025 See: Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 12.  Here, after outlining the changing focus of his new 
project, Foucault maintains that The Confessions of the Flesh would effectively complete his historical 
study of sexuality.   
1026 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality, volume 2, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York: Vintage, 1985), 13.  
1027 Arnold Davidson, “Introduction” to Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, xviiii. 
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passage from the political to the ethical is even more complex given how “this 
displacement of focus had consequences far beyond the specific domain of the history of 
sexuality.”1028  Indeed, Foucault’s turn toward the study of ethics is by no means limited 
to the final two volumes of The History of Sexuality, and several essays, interviews, and 
lectures between 1977 and 1984 situate the question of ethics in relation to other concepts 
of interest to Foucault such as resistance, power, politics, governmentality, and the 
relation between the subject and truth.   
 After the wide-spread publication of Foucault’s lecture’s given at the Collège De 
France, scholars typically pinpoint Security, Territory, Population as a key turning point 
from which Foucault begins to transition from the analytics of power and politics to the 
general problematic of governmentality.1029  Thus, according to Oksala “government 
becomes Foucault’s preferred term for power, while governmentality functions as his 
main theoretical tool for analyzing its rationality, techniques, and procedures in 
modernity.”1030  While acknowledging that Foucault does indeed valorize the term 
“government” over the term “power,” Lemke, however, understands the turn toward 
governmentality as representing a distinct break and disqualification of Foucault’s model 
of power, politics, and war as outlined in Society Must Be Defended.1031  For Lemke, by 
abandoning the analytic of power and the theory of politics as war, the term 
“governmentality” comes to represent the hidden link between the political and ethical 
axes of Foucault’s thought insofar as it mediates between the “genealogy of the state” 
outlined in the fourth lecture of Security, Territory, Population and the genealogy of the 
subject occupying Foucault’s thought in the following years.1032  While Lemke is correct 
that with the turn toward government Foucault indeed navigates between the study of 
politics and the question of ethics, the way in which he posits a distinct break between the 
analytic of power and study of governmentality rationality fundamentally neglects, as we 
                                                          
1028 Ibid, xviiii. 
1029 See: Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” 1. Also see: Johanna Oksala, “From 
Biopower to Governmentality,” 323.  
1030 Ibid, 325.   
1031 Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, Critique (New York: Routledge, 2012), 3. 
1032 Ibid, 17.  Here, Lemke maintains that governmentality mediates between the political and ethical axes 
of Foucault’s thought since he reconstructs the history of government from a “double perspective of state 
formation and subjectivation.”  
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will see, how the analysis of governmentality significantly continues and expands upon 
the models of power and politics, found in the first volume of The History of Sexuality 
and Society Must Be Defended.1033  More specifically, Lemke fails to consider the ways 
in which Foucault’s theory of resistance, which is inherently tied to his theory of power, 
directly reappears and coincides with the notion of governmentality, and further that it is 
this reappearance of the question of resistance that allows for a specific continuity to be 
established between the political and ethical periods of Foucault’s work.  In this respect, 
Davidson has more correctly outlined how the turn toward the study of governmentality 
is fundamentally paired with the corresponding movements of resistance as “counter-
conduct,” and further that it is with these movements of “counter-conduct” and not 
simply that of governmentality from which a “conceptual hinge” that links together the 
political and ethical periods of Foucault’s thought can be found.1034    
To fully understand how the political and ethical axes of Foucault’s thought can 
be connected, it is first necessary to briefly outline what Foucault refers to as 
“governmentality” in order to demonstrate how the study of government corresponds, 
according to Foucault, with both a politics and ethics of revolt.  Foucault’s concept and 
study of governmentality first emerges in the fourth lecture of Security, Territory, 
Population, and is progressively developed throughout the remaining lectures of this 
series, and again in the following 1978 to 1979 lectures collected as The Birth of 
Biopolitics.  On Foucault’s study of the problem of governmentality in these lectures, 
Gordon has maintained that “Foucault understood the term ‘government’ in both a wide 
and narrow sense.”1035  Similarly, Senellart argues that Foucault’s use of the term 
governmentality “progressively shifts from a precise, historically determinate sense, to a 
more general and abstract meaning.”1036  In the narrow and precise sense, Foucault first 
                                                          
1033 Particularly problematic in Lemke’s thinking lies in the way in which he neither recognizes the 
inherent political dimensions of Foucault’s analytic of power, nor engages with the obvious connections 
Foucault makes between his notions of power, politics, and government; indeed, for Lemke the turn 
toward the study of government constitutes the political move for Foucault, whereas his previous work 
comes to represent a theory of power divorced from the question of politics.  Even more troubling is how 
Lemke neglects to consider the ways in which Foucault’s theory of resistance, which is fundamentally tied 
to his concept of power, reappears in the study of governmentality.   
1034 Arnold Davidson, “In Praise of Counter-Conduct,” 26. 
1035 Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” 2. 
1036 Michel Senellart, “Course Context,” in Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Picador, 2007), 387-388 
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maintains that the term governmentality at once designates the forms of rationality and 
techniques of government that correspond with the emergence of the modern state.  In 
this sense, governmentality refers to the “actual definition of the state, of what we would 
call…the political form of government.”1037  More generally, however, Foucault 
additionally invokes the term governmentality to describe a specific form of power 
distinct from the government of the modern administrative state, in which the techniques 
of government come to refer to “the way in which one conducts the conduct of men.”1038  
As a technique of government that conducts, or manages, the conduct of others, Foucault 
traces the history of governmentality to what he refers to as “pastoral power,” or the 
techniques of individualizing power specifically oriented at managing the conduct of 
others.1039   Yet, in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault adds a third way in which 
the term governmentality can be defined.  “Finally, by governmentality,” Foucault further 
clarifies that “we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by 
which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually governmentalized.”1040  As Foucault 
reiterates elsewhere, the inquiry into the problem of government not only designates the 
intersection between “the state” as the “political form of a centralized and centralizing 
power” and the “pastorate…individualizing power,” but more importantly “how this 
pastorate happened to combine with it opposite, the state.”1041  Although these alternate 
definitions might initially appear disparate, Foucault is clear that they together form a 
single unique rationality— what is referred to elsewhere in Latin as “omnes et 
singulatim” (all and each)—in which what is at stake in the term governmentality is not 
only how “the state has been…one of the most redoubtable, forms of human 
government,” but also how the state combines with pastoral power in such a way that its 
logic can be defined as “both individualizing and totalitarian.”1042  As we will see, this 
political rationality specific to governmentality is not only key for understanding how 
                                                          
1037 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 115. 
1038 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, trans. Graham 
Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 186.  
1039 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 115.  
1040 Ibid, 108-109. 
1041 Michel Foucault, “Omnes Et Singulatim: Towards a Critique of Political Reason,” 300. 
1042 Ibid, 325.   
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politics is traditionally manifest as a logic of the archē, but also the question of 
governmentality as such significantly modifies the stakes and practices of resistance 
exercised as an ethics of revolt.   
In chapter one, I extensively outlined two key paradigms of Western politics—the 
Aristotelian notion of oikonomia in which politics assumes the form of a government of 
men and Schmitt’s theory of the political in which the domain of the political is reduced 
the sovereign power of a state—and maintained that with these two paradigms the term 
politics tends to designate the techniques of government as exercised with the domain of 
the state.  It is now clear that what Foucault outlines as the historical logic, rationality, 
and practices of governmentality, a unique term that describes the ways in which the 
history of government comes to coincide with the modern state and assumes the form of 
an oikonomia, can be understood within this context.  At once an individualizing and 
totalizing form of power, what is ultimately at stake in the term governmentality for 
Foucault “is not then the state’s takeover of society, so much as…the 
governmentalization of the state.”1043  When the individualizing techniques of pastoral 
power combine with the centralizing techniques of the state, the paradigmatic form 
politics assumes in West is therefore, according to Foucault, “the political government of 
men.”1044  Yet, the importance of Foucault’s work in Security, Territory, Population lies 
not simply in the genealogy of this “political government of men,” but rather in the direct 
correlation he establishes between the governmentalization of the state and the counter-
historical movements of resistance parallel to the phenomenon of governmentality.  Thus, 
the “governmentalization of the state is a particularly contorted phenomenon” according 
to Foucault, since “the techniques of government have really become the only political 
stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation.”1045   In other words, 
when pastoral power becomes governmentalized within the domain of the state and 
assumes the political government of others, what is at stake and contested in political 
struggle is not what Foucault refers to here as the “privileged position” of the state, “the 
absolutely essential…target to be attacked,” but rather the specific techniques, tactics, 
                                                          
1043 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 109.   
1044 Ibid, 227.   
1045 Ibid, 109.   
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and exercises of government.1046  Indeed, herein lies the key for Foucault: it is not that the 
state either disappears from or is irrelevant to the forms of struggle and resistance to 
governmentality, but rather that “the survival and limits of the state should be understood 
on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.”1047  Ultimately at stake for 
Foucault is that the governmentalization of the state historically coincides with new 
forms of struggle and resistance specifically directed at the techniques of government, 
and furthermore that these forms of resistance directed at the exercise of governmentality 
are, in fact, what allow for the state to be contested and possibly overturned.  It is this 
reinvention of the logic and tactics of political struggle and resistance that designates the 
most significant and compelling parts of Security, Territory, Population.  As is often the 
case in several of his other works, Foucault here frames his inquiry into the study of 
governmentality in terms of a critical theory of resistance.  “Consequently,” Foucault 
therefore concludes in “Omnes et Singulatim:” 
those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to 
denounce violence or criticize an institution…What has to be questioned is the 
form of rationality at stake…Its inevitable effects are both individualization and 
totalization.  Liberation can come from attacking not just one of these two effects 
but political rationality’s very roots.1048  
It is at the intersection between the individualizing techniques of government and the 
totalizing aspects of the state that Foucault ultimately begins to rethink, as we will see, 
the praxis of resistance as an ethic of revolt.  To be sure, rather than a revolutionary 
overthrow of state power, it is clear in the passage above that Foucault’s critically 
couples the study of governmentality with a fundamental retheorization of the stakes of 
resistance.    
While the term governmentality is used by Foucault in the wider sense to refer to 
the governmentalization of the state, he also invokes the concept in reference to a specific 
form of power that takes the management and government of human conduct as its 
principal domain.  It is necessary to quickly outline the form of power specific to the 
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logic of government in order to full understand how Security, Territory, Population 
fundamentally turns upon a unique theory of resistance exercised against the logic and 
practices of government, as oikonomia.  Although in this text Foucault acknowledges that 
the term “oikonomia” has a history that harkens back to Aristotle, his notion of 
governmentality is to be critically distinguished from the former insofar as the concept 
and practice of oikonomia “takes on a completely different dimension and a completely 
different field of references with the pastorate.”1049  While Foucault primarily focuses on 
how the notion of pastoral power develops throughout the sixteenth century, he further 
traces the history of the pastorate to the Greek expression “oikonomia psuchōn” 
translated as “the economy of souls,” and later from the Latin phrase “regimen 
animarum,” or the “government or regimen of souls” (original emphasis).1050  While 
Aristotle’s use of the term oikonomia is often translated as an administration or 
management of a household, at stake for Foucault is how the notion of an “oikonomia 
psuchōn” adds a crucial dimension to the Aristotelian notion of politics as government.  
According to Foucault, the notion of an “oikonomia psuchōn” adds to Aristotle’s 
definition inasmuch as it directly refers the how this “political government of men” is 
understood as a form of power that at once takes the conduct of human beings as the 
object in which the techniques of government are directed.  Indeed, Foucault proposes the 
term “conduct” as the most adequate translation of “oikonomia psuchōn” since it 
indicates two ideas essential to the notion of governmentality.  “Conduct,” Foucault 
writes: 
is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like, 
but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself 
be conducted (se laisse conduire), is conducted (est conduit), and finally, in which 
one behaves (se comporter) as an effect of conduct (une conduit) as the action of 
conducting or of conduction.1051  
Foucault’s choice in translating “oikonomia psuchōn” as an activity of conducting is set 
in order to pinpoint how government is exercised at once as the technique of conducting 
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the conduct of others, as well as a relation to the self in which one is conducted by others 
or by oneself, and finally the correlative form of behavior to conducting oneself or being 
conducted by others.  When Foucault speaks of the individualizing techniques of 
governmentality, he is referring to the form of power that takes as its object the conduct 
of others—that is, the task of government is the direction and management of conduct.   
After distinguishing the form of power exercised as government in terms of the 
activity of conducting and of conduction, Foucault nevertheless quickly turns to the 
question of resistance.  Indeed, it is around the question of resistance that Foucault frames 
his critical inquiry into the question of governmentality.  This “[t]ransition from the 
pastoral of souls to the political government of men,” Foucault therefore argues, “should 
be situated in [the] context of resistances, revolts and insurrections of conduct.”1052  
Insofar as the “political government of men” designates the forms of power that take the 
conduct of others as its focal point, then what is first at stake for Foucault in the eight 
lecture of Security, Territory, Population is to outline the specificity of the correlative 
forms of resistance manifest against and in response to the exercise of government as 
such.  As Foucault importantly maintains, then, we can read the history of 
governmentality in the following way: 
from the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
generally speaking I think that inasmuch as many pastoral functions were taken 
up in the exercise of governmentality, and inasmuch as government also begins to 
want to take responsibility for people’s conduct, to conduct people, then from 
then on we see revolts of conduct arising less from the religious institution and 
much more from political institutions.  Conflicts of conduct will occur on the 
borders and edge of the political institution.1053  
In its most basic form, what is at stake here is how the history of governmentality is 
inseparable from the corresponding movements of resistance, or “revolts of conduct.”  
Furthermore, in a manner analogous to Foucault’s notion of “critique” which, as we saw 
in chapter three, begins with the premise that the art of governing is always parallel to the 
“art of not being governed,” the analysis of the fundamental struggle between conduct 
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and counter-conduct historically specifies a key example from which this logic again 
appears.  The history of government for Foucault is parallel to its own counter-history 
manifest in the movements of resistance against the exercise of government—that is, 
governmentality is itself the history of “conflicts of conduct,” or the struggle between the 
art of governing and the art of not being governed.  In this regard, despite the ways in 
which the significance of these counter-historical “revolts of conduct” are traditionally 
overshadowed by the study of governmentality, the importance of Foucault’s work in 
Security, Territory, Population arises not only in his analysis of the fundamental struggle 
between the government of conduct and the movements of resistance outlined in terms of 
“revolts of conduct,” but also how these movements of counter-conduct open up a vital 
understanding of the how politics of resistance can be conceived and practiced.   
Taking this analysis of the forms of resistance against the techniques of 
governmentality as the basic framework and critical context from which Foucault situates 
his study of the governmentalization of the state, it is my contention that the analysis of 
the revolts of conduct corresponding to the governmentalization of the state and the 
coinciding techniques of government ought to be understood as an extended critical 
discussion of what I have referred to as the primacy of resistance, not only in terms of the 
analytic of power from The History of Sexuality, but also the analytic of politics from 
Society Must Be Defended in which the political is redefined as a field of agonistic 
struggle between those who govern and those who are governed.  Thus, after briefly 
outlining the passive and active forms of resistance, or “great external blockages,” 
directed against pastoral power, Foucault claims that his goal in the March 1 lecture of 
Security, Territory, Population is more correctly to “identify some of the points of 
resistance, some of the forms of attack and counter-attack that appeared within the field 
of the pastorate” (original emphasis).1054  Indeed, it is in reference to these counter-
attacks against pastoral power that Foucault’s work in Security, Territory, Population is 
set to explore how the “specificity of refusal, revolts, and forms of resistance of conduct 
corresponded with the historical specificity of the pastorate.1055  Foucault’s emphasis here 
regarding how these points of resistance directly appear within the field of pastoral 
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power, makes reference to the latter component of the fifth thesis from the History of 
Sexuality wherein resistance is shown to exist in a position of non-exteriority with respect 
to power. Indeed, it is the logic of the primacy of resistance that Foucault takes as a key 
referent from which the notion of “counter-conduct” can be conceived.  Furthermore, 
there are some striking similarities in both form and content between Foucault’s thesis—
“where there is power, there is resistance”—and the following passage from Security, 
Territory, Population:  
Just as there have been forms of resistance to power as the exercise of political 
sovereignty, and just as there have been other, equally intentional forms of 
resistance or refusal that were directed at power in the form of economic 
exploitation, have there not been forms of resistance to conducting?1056    
Consistent with the logic of his fifth thesis, Foucault maintains a distinct correlation 
between power/resistance, and insists that resistance as “counter-conduct” is primary 
with power exercised as government.  Here, Foucault again insists that resistance is not 
only coextensive with, yet irreducible to, the exercises of power as sovereignty, as 
economic exploitation, and as government, but also that these forms of power necessarily 
exist in relation to the permanence of resistance within the domain in which they operate.  
This permanent and inseparable relation between power and resistance is what Foucault 
refers to as the “relational character of power” in which the existence of power relations 
depends upon the “multiplicity of points of resistance.”1057  Just as Foucault’s analytic of 
power fundamentally turns upon the primacy of resistance, Security, Territory, 
Population importantly extends this analytic into the study of governmentality in such a 
way that “there is an immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-
conduct.”1058  In other words, there is an “immediate and founding correlation” according 
to Foucault, between the history of government and the counter-history of resistance.   
As outlined above, Foucault’s fifth thesis reappears in the context of the study of 
governmentality.  Power exercised as government reveals a correlative form of resistance 
which Foucault designates in Security, Territory, Population as “revolts of conduct.” 
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Insofar as “the pastorate is a highly specific form of power with the object of conducting 
men,” then the history of power as government is, according to Foucault, simultaneously 
the counter-history pertaining to how “specific movements of resistance and 
insubordination appeared in correlation with this that could be called specific revolts of 
conduct.”1059  In other words, Foucault’s point is to demonstrate how these “revolts of 
conduct” are primary with respect to power exercised as government.  Because the 
power/resistance dynamic reappears in Security, Territory, Population as a key 
component corresponding to the study of governmentality, what Foucault refers to as 
“revolts of conduct” can be understood as adding a historical example in which the logic 
of the primacy of resistance and the corresponding agonistic conception of politics is, in 
fact, manifest as such.  In this regard, while the previous chapter established a certain 
continuity between Foucault’s analytic of power/resistance and Society Must Be 
Defended in terms of a critical caesura between the political as archē and the political as 
agōn, a further continuity can be established with Security, Territory, Population in terms 
of how the inseparable nexus between power exercised as government and the counter-
movements of resistances of conduct exemplifies a key way through which the political 
as agōn develops.  Indeed, as Foucault suggests there is a certain use-value in invoking 
the term “counter-conduct” to describe the forms of resistance against governmentality.  
“Using the word counter-conduct,” Foucault argues, reveals a unique principle of 
intelligibility from which to analyze “the way in which someone actually acts in the very 
general field of politics”—that is, the term counter-conduct unmasks the existence of an 
agonistic form of politics of resistance.1060   
Perhaps even more important, however, than the inseparable relation Foucault 
establishes between the analysis of governmentality and the corresponding forms of 
resistance as counter-conduct is how this founding correlation ultimately hinges upon a 
redefinition of politics conceived from the perspective of resistance to the forms of power 
exercised as government.  In this regard, it is necessary to turn to the untitled manuscripts 
on governmentality cited by Michel Senellart in the “Course Context” following the 
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English translation of Security, Territory, Population.1061  In the manuscripts on 
governmentality cited by Senellart, Foucault juxtaposes two critical positions pertaining 
to how the domain of the political has been traditionally conceived in the context of 
governmentality and the governmentalization of the state.  First, Foucault claims that the 
“analysis of governmentality…generally implies that everything is political,” and further 
suggests that this “expression is traditionally given two meanings” through which the 
political as governmentality is reduced to a theory of the state.1062  Foucault summarizes 
these two positions as follows:  
[1.] Politics is defined by the whole sphere of state intervention, (…).  To say that 
everything is political amounts to saying that, directly or indirectly, the state is 
everywhere. [2.] Politics is defined by the omnipresence of a struggle between 
two adversaries (…).  This other definition is that of K. (sic) Schmitt.1063 
In the first tradition, Foucault suggests that the analysis of governmentality is often 
reduced to the domain of the state whereby the term politics is rendered synonymous with 
the exercise of state power.  In the second, however, Foucault makes a rare reference to 
Schmitt’s theory of the political,1064 wherein the terms of the political are defined “by the 
existence of adversaries” determined within the sovereign authority of the state.1065   
Refusing these two traditional paradigms on the ground that both theories 
presuppose an originary nexus between the primacy of the state and the domain of the 
political, Foucault reveals a third way from which to read the history of governmentality 
and the corresponding field of the political neither simply in terms of the state, nor the 
exercise of government, but rather from the perspective of resistance to power.  Since the 
expression “everything is political” traditionally locates the question of politics within the 
domain of the state, Foucault fundamentally reverses this claim and suggests that: 
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it is a question of saying rather nothing is political, everything can be politicized, 
everything may become political.  Politics is no more or less than that which is 
born with resistance to governmentality. The first uprising, the first 
confrontation.1066 
Against the orthodox understanding of the political as archē, Foucault argues that politics 
can be redefined neither in terms of the state nor state power, but as “that which is born 
with resistance to governmentality.”  In other words, politics emerges as a practice of 
resistance.  Yet, without the comparison draws between his own model of the political 
and the previous two traditional theories, the precise meaning of Foucault’s claim might 
be difficult to ascertain.  First, Foucault’s claim that “nothing is political” denies the 
state’s claim of primacy—that is, if the domain of the political is traditionally reduced to 
the state as the decisive entity of politics, Foucault’s counter-claim, “nothing is political” 
fundamentally refuses this artifice.  However, Foucault’s second claim pertaining to the 
ways in which “everything may become political” is more complex than initially appears, 
and is directed towards the heart of Schmitt’s theory.  At stake, then, in Foucault’s 
statement “everything can be politicized” is not that everything might become the politics 
of the state, but rather that politics more correctly refers to the ways in which a particular 
relation of power can be transformed into a relation of struggle.  Although Foucault 
prefers the term “agonism” over “antagonism,” he nevertheless retains the fundamental 
notion of antagonism inherent in Schmitt’s model of the political, while simultaneously 
revoking the basic premise that sustains this same theory.1067  To claim, as does Schmitt, 
that the antagonistic dimension of the political only takes place within the domain of the 
state, would contradict Foucault’s counter-claim that “nothing is political,” or rather that 
politics is not inherently reducible to the state’s domain.  Indeed, herein lies the key to 
rethinking the political anarchically: in Foucault’s model it is neither the state nor the 
exercise of governmentality that is the domain proper to the political, but rather what I 
have called the primacy of resistance; resistance to the exercise of governmentality is 
what transforms relations of power into relations of struggle, and it is through these 
relations of struggle that the condition of “politics” is able to emerge as such for 
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Foucault.  Against the sovereign tradition of political philosophy, which presupposes the 
advent of the state as the condition from which the political historically emerges, it is in 
this way that Foucault importantly maintains to the contrary that “politics” is “that which 
is born with resistance to governmentality, the first uprising, the first confrontation.” 
 Furthermore, while in the trajectory that stretches from Aristotle to Hobbes and 
later culminates in Schmitt, we have seen how the domain of the political and the history 
of politics has been traditionally characterized in terms of the logic of the archē, the first 
principle from which politics comes to designate the techniques of government exercised 
within the domain of the state, Foucault instead denies the principle of the archē.  Indeed, 
rather than presupposing the principle of the archē as the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of the political, Foucault begins with what can be referred to as the anarchic 
principle of the political, whereby politics emerges with the “first uprising, the first 
confrontation,” or the first act of resistance that transforms the exercise of government 
into an agonistic relation of struggle.  Indeed, rather than taking the governmentalization 
of the state as the decisive criteria that allows the political to emerge as a distinct domain, 
Foucault’s repeated emphasis regarding how politics emerges with the “first uprising, the 
first confrontation,” is at once set to demonstrate how resistance is primary with the 
domain of the political and further that the primacy of resistance is what allows for the 
political to emerge as such.  Thus, while the concept of counter-conduct designates the 
point in which Foucault redefines politics from the perspective of resistance, its practice 
is what animates an agonistic conception of the political.  At the same time, however, 
Foucault’s claim that politics emerges with resistance to governmentality not only reveals 
an anarchist hypothesis of the political at the core of his thought, but also the beginning 
point from which to conceive an anarchist politics of resistance.    
6.2 The Ethics of Revolt: Resistance as an Ethos of Counter-
Conduct 
 
For centuries we have been convinced that between our ethics, our personal ethics, our 
everyday life, and the great political and social and economic structures, there were 
analytical relations, and that we couldn’t change anything…I think we have to get rid of 
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this idea of an analytical or necessary link between ethics and other social or economic 
or political structures.1068 
 
[T]hat ethics can be a very strong structure of existence, without any relation with the 
juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure.  All that is 
very interesting.1069 
--Michel Foucault  
 
In addition to all of these points of equivalences drawn in Security, Territory Population 
between resistance and counter-conduct, Foucault’s work on counter-conduct is not 
limited to the question of politics, and is further set to inform a conceptual and historical 
correlation with his turn to the study of ethics.  Thus, as Davidson notes, the notion of 
counter-conduct “allows one to move easily between the ethical and political, letting us 
see their many points of contact and intersection.”1070  In an interview from 1983, 
Foucault not only draws an explicit connection between his theory of politics and his turn 
toward ethics, but also that this connection is set to rethink “politics as an ethics.”1071  If 
as Foucault suggests here, that a continuity between his theories of politics and ethics can 
be maintained in terms of a critical theory of “politics as an ethics,” it is therefore my 
contention that Security, Territory, Population can be read not only as a conceptual 
bridge between the political and the ethical but, more specifically, between the 
conceptions of politics as resistance and the ethics of revolt.  While Foucault’s theory of 
power/resistance from the History of Sexuality, as well as his agonistic theory of the 
political in Society Must Be Defended ultimately culminates in redefining politics as 
“resistance to governmentality,” this form of politics as resistance is itself animated by a 
distinct form of ethics as revolt.  In this regard, Davidson has drawn an extensive 
connection between counter-conduct and resistance, while further outlining how this 
connection turns upon a unique theory of ethics.  At stake in Davidson’s work is to 
demonstrate how “politically and ethically, counter-conduct is the invention of a new 
philosophical concept” (original emphasis).1072  Focusing more directly on the 
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implications of Foucault’s turn to ethics in relation to political theory, Kelly maintains 
that what Foucault comes to refer to as ethics is defined as a specific type of praxis 
against the pervasiveness of governmentality.  Thus, for Kelly “this ethics is the 
generalized practice in response to pervasive government by which all those who are 
governed…hold government to account.”1073  In light of these readings, it is my 
contention that what Foucault refers to as counter-conduct not only adds an explicitly 
ethical component to his notion of politics as resistance, but also that this notion of ethics 
fundamentally changes the way in which the politics of resistance is both conceived and 
practiced.   
In the Western tradition, ethics is most commonly understood as a branch of 
moral philosophy concerned with systematizing and defending certain concepts of right 
and wrong, or the moral principles that might govern one’s individual or collective 
behavior.  Yet rather than defining ethics as a set of normative or prescriptive rules that 
might come to govern the conduct of others, Foucault suggests in an interview from 1983 
the following definition of ethics: “ethics is a practice; ethos is a manner of being.”1074   
As a “practice” or “manner of being” what Foucault refers to as ethics seems to exclude 
any sort of normative frameworks or regulatory principles that might come to act as the 
common basis from which such ethical practices and ways of being could be formally 
known.  Indeed, in her oft-cited critique of Foucault, Nancy Fraser argues that both 
Foucault’s theory of resistance as well as his notion of ethics ultimately suffers from a 
clear lack of norms, and thus that “Foucault’s work is normatively confused.”1075  Despite 
her intentions, however, Fraser nevertheless points toward a real possibility pertaining to 
how Foucault’s theory of resistance might inform the basis of his concept of ethics.  After 
pondering what sort of alternative normative framework Foucault might be presupposing, 
Fraser asks “[c]ould the language of domination, subjugation, struggle and resistance be 
interpreted as the skeleton of some alternative framework?”1076  Fraser’s immediate 
answer is a resolute no.1077  Indeed, Foucault refuses the idea of a “regulatory principle” 
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that might act as the basis for either politics or ethics on the ground that all political and 
ethical actions would therefore be placed under the “governance” of such a limiting 
principle.1078  Yet, while Foucault does indeed refuse any sort of regulatory principles 
that might act as the basis of his conception of resistance, he does not exclude what is 
referred to in the same interview from 1983 as “a critical principle” in which one takes 
the non-necessity of relations of power and domination as a starting point.1079  However, 
insofar as Foucault understands the domination/struggle and power/resistance as existing 
in a fundamental relationship of agonism, then as Newman more correctly suggests, the 
ethics of “resistance is not necessarily sanctioned by moral or rational standards, or by 
the promise of a better world.”1080  Against Fraser, Newman instead concludes that 
“resistance is an absolute refusal of domination—a desperate struggle, sometimes to the 
death, with a particular relation of power.”1081  Although Fraser discounts the idea that 
resistance might come to serve as the basis of Foucault’s notions of both power and 
ethics it is my contention that what Newman takes as the basis of resistance—that is, the 
“absolute refusal” or struggle with a “particular relation of power”—can be further be 
extended as the fundamental basis of Foucauldian ethics.  In this way, while we have 
seen how Foucault takes the “non-necessity of power” as the methodological approach to 
the studies of power, politics, and governmentality, this same notation forms the basis of 
what Foucault refers to as ethics—that is, ethics for Foucault takes the non-acceptance of 
power as the beginning point from which a critical ethos—or way of being-in-the-world, 
can be elaborated in life as a politics of resistance to governmentality.    
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As a practice, or way of being, ethics for Foucault at once designates a critical 
principle directed against the pervasiveness of governance, as well as a position of praxis, 
an ongoing struggle with power as government.  Similar to his notion of “critique,” ethics 
as Foucault suggests begins with a critical principle, or critical attitude, that takes the 
“nonacceptance…of our own governments” as a starting point.1082  Indeed, this 
elaboration of a critical position beginning with the nonacceptance of government is, 
Foucault maintains: 
an ethical one, but it is also political; it does not consist in saying merely, “I 
protest,” but in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as 
substantial as possible, and one which those who govern, here or there, will 
sooner or later be obliged to take into account.1083  
Foucault draws a clear connection here between politics and ethics not through an 
attitude of “protest,” but in the strategic conversion of this critical attitude into a 
“political phenomenon” that contests “those who govern.”  At the same time, however, 
this type of ethico-political and critical attitude directed against the logic of 
governmentality, ultimately turns upon a praxis of resistance—an ongoing struggle with 
power as government—which Foucault refers to in Security, Territory, Population as 
“counter conduct.”  While we have already seen how Foucault’s use of the term “counter-
conduct” is set to redefine politics in terms of resistance to governmentality, it is now 
necessary to see how Foucault distinguishes revolts of conduct as a specific form of 
resistance, as well as how these forms of counter conduct hinge upon an ethics of revolt 
in which resistance to governmentality is not simply a fundamental struggle with the 
exercise of power as government, but also a movement towards another possible form-of-
life.  In this regard, Foucault maintains that these movements of resistance as counter-
conduct are: 
movements whose objective is a different form of conduct, that is to say: wanting 
to be conducted differently…towards other objectives…through other procedures 
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and objectives.  They are movements that also seek, possibly at any rate, to escape 
the direction of others and to define the way for each to conduct himself.1084  
Here, Foucault clarifies that what he refers to as counter-conduct consists of a double 
dimension of resistance, in which the struggle against the exercise of government is 
paired with the affirmation of new forms of conduct, and ultimately as we will later see 
new forms of autonomous, ungovernable subjectivity.  One of the key characteristics of 
counter-conduct is how these revolts of conduct are distinguished as movements seeking 
to be conducted differently—that is, movements of resistance who struggle against the 
logic and practice of governmentality in order to achieve a different way of being in the 
world.  At stake here for Foucault is how the counter-movements of resistance arising 
within the field of governmentality are directed not simply at the state, but rather against 
the government of conduct.  This struggle against the logic and practice of 
governmentality designates what can be referred to as the political pole of counter 
conduct.   
At the same time, however, these revolts of conduct are also movements that seek 
to “escape the direction of others” in order to autonomously define the domain of one’s 
own conduct.  This second aspect of counter conduct in which one attempts to ultimately 
escape the direction of others designates the ethical counterpart to the politics of 
resistance against governmentality; at stake here is not simply a struggle against a form of 
power, but an affirmative struggle toward increasing one’s autonomy.  With the addition 
of this ethical component of resistance, Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct means that 
politics as resistance to governmentality is neither to be considered a mere reaction to the 
exercise of power, nor its total negation; instead resistance as counter-conduct is itself 
productive—indeed life-affirming—and has as its aim the autonomous self-
transformation of the subject.  Foucault thus confirms that these revolts of conduct are 
movements that “definitely have a productivity, forms of existence, organization, and a 
consistency and solidity that the purely negative word disobedience does not capture.”1085  
Indeed, what is produced in revolts of conduct against the exercise of power as 
government is the self-formation and production of new forms of subjectivity and forms-
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of-life.  If politics conceived as resistance necessitates a corresponding critical ethos, 
herein lies the key for Foucault: at stake in the ethical component of counter-conduct is 
not only that these forms of resistance take as their adversary a form of power exercised 
as a “political government of men,” but also how the focus of these movements of 
resistance is not directed at a revolutionary overthrow of power, but rather toward the 
transformation of one’s way of being, a movement of withdrawal from power and 
government.  This relation to the self, in which one struggles against relations of power in 
order to produce new forms of life is what Foucault refers to in The Use of Pleasure and 
The Care of the Self amongst other places as “ascesis” (askēsis) 1086 or “the care of the 
self” (epimeleia heautou).1087   
Although Foucault acknowledges that it might appear a “bit paradoxical to 
present ascesis as counter-conduct,” the idea that ascesis exemplifies a form of counter-
conduct highlights two vital characteristics that help refine the ethical component 
required in the theory of resistance to governmentality.1088  First, as Foucault maintains in 
Security, Territory, Population, askēsis, which is defined in Security, Territory, 
Population in terms of “an exercise of self on self,” designates a “sort of close combat of 
the individual…in which the authority, presence, and gaze of someone else is, if not 
impossible, at least unnecessary.”1089  Here, Foucault underlines the ways in which 
counter-conduct turns upon a practice of askēsis that attempts to render the authority of 
others “impossible”—that is, counter-conduct actively “denies access to an external 
power,” so as to transform the practices of government into an “unnecessary” relation of 
power.1090  In this way, counter-conduct designates a form of voluntary refusal to submit 
to power exercised as government.  Yet, this practice of askēsis as counter-conduct is, 
according to Foucault, coextensive with a struggle toward new forms of subjectivity.  
This struggle towards a transformation in one’s conditions is what Foucault understands 
as ethics.  Thus, as Foucault maintains in an often cited interview from 1984, an “ascetic 
practice” also designates “an exercise of the self on the self by which one attempts to 
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develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being.”1091  In this 
regard, insofar as the term “ethics” for Foucault at once refers to a “practice” and a “way 
of being,” then resistance as a form of counter-conduct—a praxis of askēsis—can be 
defined as a practice against the exercise of power as government coupled with a struggle 
toward the invention of new forms-of-life.  Ethics as such arises, according to Foucault, 
as a movement of resistance—that is a permanent ethic of revolt—that assumes the form 
of new practices of subjectivity. 
Foucault’s writings on the relation between ethics, askēsis, and the care of the self 
are numerous and develop over a wide variety of themes and historical contexts.  While 
Foucault draws several interesting connections between askēsis and resistance, I need not 
go into extensive detail into Foucault’s writings on the care of the self.  Instead my goal 
has been to demonstrate how the political and ethical periods of Foucault’s thought can 
be connected through the concept of resistance, and furthermore that these forms of 
counter-conduct, which turn upon the elaboration of a permanent ethic of revolt, add a 
vital dimension to Foucault’s theory of resistance in a way that still needs to be explored.  
In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault explains precisely how the turn toward the 
study of governmentality bridges the gap between the political and ethical periods of his 
thought.  As Foucault concludes: 
the theory of political power as an institution usually refers to a juridical 
conception of the subject of right, it seems to me that the analysis of 
governmentality—that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships—
must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to 
self…and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect 
together the question of politics and the question of ethics.1092 
Perhaps even more important, however, is how Foucault begins to rethink resistance not 
simply as a struggle against power, but in terms of an ethic of resistance located in the 
care of the self.  In this regard, Edward McGushin has argued that what is surprising 
about the turn toward ethics is how “Foucault discovered, through his research in ancient 
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philosophy, an unexpected site of resistance to power in the relationship we take up with 
ourselves.”1093  Moreover, Johanna Oksala claims that the care of the self is the ethical 
domain in which Foucault situates his theory of resistance.  Thus, Oksala maintains that 
the “focus of the government of the self by one’s self is crucial in Foucault’s elaboration 
of resistance,” and furthermore that “[e]thics is the domain in which he situates it.”1094  
Yet, while Foucault indeed understands the movements of counter-conduct and practices 
of askēsis as specific sites of resistance, he also maintains that this type of ethics, this 
ethics of revolt of insurrections of counter-conduct reveals a real political possibility from 
which relations of power might effectively be resisted.  While in The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject Foucault acknowledges that “we might have to suspect that we find it impossible 
today to constitute an ethic of the self, even though it may be an urgent, fundamental, and 
politically indispensable task,” he concludes that “after all…there is no first or final point 
of resistance to political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself.”1095  
 While Foucault’s claim regarding how an ethic of the self can come to constitute 
the first and final point of resistance to power might initially appear somewhat 
inexplicable, what is at stake is not that an ethic of the self designates the sole point from 
which one might actively engage in resistance, but rather that this ethic of revolt reveals 
an alternative paradigm from which resistance is historically manifest as a struggle 
against the logic of governmentality, and further how this allows us to rethink the 
question of politics of resistance in new ways.  In an interview from 1984 when Foucault 
is asked if the statement cited above from The Hermeneutics of the Subject designates the 
only “useful” practice from which power can be resisted, Foucault maintains that he does 
not “believe that the only possible point of resistance to political power…lies in the 
relationship of the self to itself;” instead, Foucault suggests that the ethic of revolt 
practiced as counter-conduct “makes it possible to bring out the freedom of the subject 
and its relationship to others—which constitutes the very substance of ethics.”1096  At the 
same time, however, it is this understanding of ethics that Foucault nevertheless suggests 
can be elaborated politically.  Indeed, while governmentality develops for Foucault 
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according to a specific rationality that is both individualizing and totalizing, the 
corresponding ethic of revolt directly targets this logic, and is set not simply as a 
movement that resists the state, but rather a struggle against the forms of power that 
connect individuals to the state.  Recalling that what needs to be attacked through 
resistance is the specific rationality of governmentality—that is the simultaneity between 
the individualizing techniques of government and the totalizing power of the state, 
Foucault clarifies this idea in “The Subject and Power,” and maintains:  
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we 
are.  We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind 
of political “double bind,” which is the simultaneous individualization and 
totalization of modern power structures.  The conclusion would be that the 
political, ethical, social, philosophical problems of our days is not to try to liberate 
the individual from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us 
from the state and the type of individualization linked to the state.  We have to 
promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality 
that has been imposed on us for centuries.1097 
Against more traditional notions of historical struggle that take the state as the adversary 
at which resistance is directed, Foucault specifies here that an ethic of revolt begins with 
a refusal of who we are—that is a refusal of the individualizing techniques of government 
and the forms of subjectivity that connect us to the state.  Indeed, it is in this way that 
Foucault maintains that the care of the self might designate the first point of resistance to 
power.  Importantly, then, this refusal of who we are targets the specificity of power 
exercised as government—the “political double bind” of individualizing and totalizing 
power structures—and seeks a fundamental rupture in the nexus that links individuals to 
the state and makes them governable.  At stake, then, in this ethic of revolt is not that 
resistance is exhaustively directed against the totality of the state, but instead at the “type 
of individualization linked to the state.”  At the same time, however, what is crucial for 
Foucault is that this type of resistance ultimately turns upon the affirmation of and 
promotion of “new forms of subjectivity.”  Indeed, this is the crucial point for Foucault: 
politics as resistance, as an ethics of revolt is not manifest in a struggle with the state, but 
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rather in the invention of new forms-of-life against and autonomous from the 
governmentalization of the state.    
 We have seen how Foucault’s notion of “counter-conduct” forms an interesting 
connection that bridges the political and ethical periods of his thought.  In this way, 
counter-conduct is at once the concept through which Foucault redefines politics as 
resistance to governmentality, as well as how this form of politics as resistance turns 
upon an ethics of revolt struggling toward the formation of new forms of subjectivity.  
Thus according to McGushin, the convergence between the political and ethical “allows 
Foucault to conceive of an alternative model of political ethics, or of an ethics of 
resistance to the proliferation of power.”1098  If as Foucault maintains that modern forms 
of governmentality operate by producing individualities and governable forms of 
subjectivity, “then the practices of the self would represent an experience of ethical life 
which resists those forces.”1099  Simons takes on a similar position and maintains that 
Foucault’s turn toward ethics led “his politics to…an ethic of permanent resistance.”1100  
Yet, Simons also suggests that this ethic of permanent resistance extends Foucault’s 
agonistic conception of politics.  Foucault’s “affirmation of agonism” sustains, Simons 
writes, “the active, participatory capacities of subjects required for…resisting 
domination.”1101  It is this ethical component to the politics of resistance that Foucault 
maintains is missing from traditional liberation and revolutionary movements: “[r]ecent 
liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which to 
base the elaboration of a new ethics.”1102  For Foucault, then, the problem with 
contemporary liberation movements is that they tend to seek to provide a scientific basis 
for ethics while uncritically neglecting the necessity of constructing new forms of 
subjectivity that might effectively resist power.      
6.3 Foucault’s Anarchist Ethic of Counter-Conduct 
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Government, the dominion of human conduct represent[s] the stronghold of man’s 
enslavement and all the horrors it entails…Anarchism rouses man to rebellion against 
this…monster. 
--Emma Goldman1103 
 
The need for a new life becomes apparent…The machinery of government, entrusted with 
the maintenance of the existing order, continues to function, but at every turn of its 
deteriorated gears it slips and stops…there [is] no other way out than by the road of 
insurrection. 
--Peter Kropotkin1104 
 
There is the possibility of that moment when life can no longer be bought, when the 
authorities can no longer do anything, and when, facing the gallows and machine guns, 
people revolt.1105 
--Michel Foucault 
 
Although Foucault remains skeptical of certain recent liberations movements and theories 
of revolution insofar as they lack an ethical principle from which to base the elaboration 
of a politics of resistance, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject he lists a few key historical 
examples and philosophies of counter-conduct that have attempted to find a politics based 
on a permanent ethic of revolt.  Just before Foucault claims that an ethics of the self 
designates the first point of resistance to power, he maintains that a “whole section of 
nineteenth-century thought can be read as a difficult attempt to, a series of difficult 
attempts to, to reconstitute an ethics and an aesthetics of the self.”1106  Amongst these 
attempts at constituting an ethic of the self Foucault concludes that if we look at the 
examples of 
Stirner, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, dandyism, Baudelaire, anarchy, anarchist 
thought, etcetera, then you have a series of attempts that are, of course, very 
different from each other, but which are all more or less obsessed by the question: 
is it possible to constitute, or reconstitute, an aesthetics of the self.1107    
Foucault’s mention of the German philosopher Max Stirner, as well as “anarchy” and 
“anarchist thought” as key referents of the attempt to constitute an ethic of the self should 
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not go unnoticed.  Indeed, while I have maintained throughout this project that Foucault’s 
theory of power, politics, governmentality, and ultimately resistance all develop and turn 
upon what I have referred to as anarchist hypothesis of the political, we see here that a 
further connection can be made between anarchism and Foucault’s theory of ethics.  
While Kelly has observed the connection Foucault draws between anarchist thought, 
resistance, and an ethics of the self, he just as quickly dismisses this idea as a mere after 
thought and claims that these “movements lack the asceticism necessary to the 
constitution of an ethics.”1108  Yet, rather than dismissing this correlation, it is my 
contention that the connection Foucault draws between anarchist thought and an ethic of 
the self in revolt not only adds a vital dimension to the anarchist hypothesis of the 
political that underpins his work, but also opens up a real political possibility for an 
anarchist politics of resistance in which the state and the exercise of power as government 
can be contested.  Like Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct, anarchism can be 
understood as a movement of resistance against power exercised as government coupled 
with an ethic of revolt that actively struggles toward the formation of new types of 
subjectivities.   
The way in which Foucault takes anarchism as a key referent for his 
understanding of the ethics of revolt is not an isolated instance.  Thus, in order to see how 
Foucault invokes anarchism as a possible basis from which to advance an ethical politics 
of resistance, it is necessary to turn to “The Subject and Power” wherein Foucault 
outlines several propositions on resistance so as to account for an ethical conception of 
struggle against governmentality.  While the turn toward the study of governmentality 
and the corresponding movements of counter-conduct in Security, Territory, Population 
bridge the gap between the political and the ethical in terms of elaborating a permanent 
ethic of resistance, in “The Subject and Power” Foucault reaffirms this continuity and 
outlines several propositions on resistance which help further explore how this form of 
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politics as resistance develops as an ethic of revolt toward the affirmation of new forms 
of subjectivity, while additionally drawing a key connection between this ethics of revolt 
and an anarchist politics.  Although we have seen that in The History of Sexuality 
Foucault enumerates several theses on power that form the basic methodological 
framework for an alternative economy of power relations that begins with the primacy of 
resistance, in “The Subject and Power” returns to this notion and maintains that “in order 
to understand what power relations are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of 
resistance and attempts made to dislocate these relations.”1109  It is in this way that “The 
Subject and Power” can be read as a critical and fundamental companion to the power 
resistance dynamic attested to in the fifth thesis.  Further at stake in this essay, however, 
is to account for the ethical specificity of these forms of resistance realized in the struggle 
against the logic and practice of government.  Herein, Foucault maintains that what is 
important to the elaboration of politics as resistance to governmentality is that these 
revolts are animated by a “struggle for a new subjectivity.”1110  By returning to this 
ethical component of the politics of resistance, “The Subject and Power” ought to be 
understood as a critical extension of Foucault’s notions of counter-conduct, askēsis, and 
the ethic of the self.   
While “The Subject and Power,” is often recognized as an important text in the 
context of Foucault’s larger body of work, a text in which the theory of power is recast 
within the context of governmentality, his critics tend to overlook not only how the 
question of resistance reappears in this text as an ethic of revolt, but also how anarchism 
forms a key referent for this ethical conception of the politics of struggle.  Thus, while 
Foucault has been criticized for failing to offer historical examples of his notion of 
politics, the importance of “The Subject and Power” directly lies in the way that Foucault 
accounts for the question of struggle in terms of resistance to power as government.  At 
the same time, however, the importance is further exemplified in the way Foucault 
explores the ethical component of this theory of resistance.  It is this ethics of resistance 
that forms the basic connection between anarchism and Foucault.  After briefly 
explaining how it is in regard to the question of the subject that relations of power can be 
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explored, while also outlining a “series of oppositions” developed in response to the 
“administration over the ways people live,” in “The Subject and Power” Foucault turns to 
an extended discussion pertaining to the common characteristics through which the 
movements of resistance against governmentality might be distinguished from other types 
of struggle.1111  In searching for a way to describe how these revolts against the exercise 
of governmentality might be distinguished from other forms of struggle, Foucault claims 
that it is “not enough to say that these are anti-authority struggles,” and thus that “we 
must try to define more precisely what they have in common.”1112  The common 
characteristics that can come to account for the forms of struggle against the exercise of 
power as government are organized by Foucault in “The Subject and Power” into six 
propositions.  At stake for Foucault in these propositions is to specify exactly what he 
means by defining politics as resistance to governmentality, as well as how these forms 
of resistance can be distinguished from more traditional forms of liberation such as class 
struggle or revolution.  While the first three propositions are set to outline the general 
framework that specifies certain key characteristics of the politics of resistance, the latter 
three are set to address not only what these forms of resistance are against, but also what 
they struggle toward.  First, Foucault maintains that the forms of resistance directed at the 
exercise of power as government are characterized as “transversal struggles,” in which 
the question of revolt can neither be “limited to one country,” or “confined to a particular 
political or economic form of government.”1113  By “transversal struggles,” then, 
Foucault means to suggest two ideas that help to overcome some of the ambiguity 
regarding how he conceives of an ethical politics as resistance to government.  Here, 
Foucault demonstrates the global, yet non-universal, extent of revolts of conduct—that is, 
since resistance is co-extensive and primary with power, resistance to governmentality 
necessarily takes on a global form corresponding with the field of power relations as 
government.  In other words, the global network of power relations exercised in terms of 
government correspond to and are co-extensive with the transversal character of 
resistance to governmentality.  Furthermore, Foucault clarifies that the very specificity of 
                                                          
1111 Ibid, 329. 
1112 Ibid, 329. 
1113 Ibid, 329. 
401 
 
these struggles is not confined to a single form of government; hence, although resistance 
to government takes on a global form, there is no universal law of revolt, but the 
transversality of forms of revolt against the varying exercises of governmentality.  In 
addition to the transversal characteristic of revolt, in the second proposition Foucault 
maintains that the “target of these struggles is power effects as such.”1114  What these 
forms of resistance to governmentality are directed at is not, according to Foucault, the 
abstract monolithic notions of state and capitalism, but instead the specific ways in which 
power is exercised as government.  In this way, Foucault’s point is to demonstrate how 
the primary objective of resistance to government “is to attack not so much such-or-such 
institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a technique, a form of 
power.”1115  What is at stake here is not simply a change in the objective target of 
resistance—that is a change from the macro notions of state and capital to the micro 
conception of power relations—but the way in which resistance to governmentality is 
directly enmeshed within the forms of power against which it struggles.   
Foucault’s third proposition on resistance to governmentality continues the logic 
of the first two, while highlighting an important possible connection between this 
understanding of resistance and anarchism.  Foucault points toward the way in which 
these forms of resistance against the exercise of power as government are therefore 
“immediate struggles.”1116  Practices of resistance to governmentality are “immediate” 
forms of struggle according to Foucault, because in such struggles “people criticize 
instances of power that are the closest to them”—that is, the forms of power “which 
exercise their action on individuals.”1117  Thus, while Foucault maintains that the “target” 
of resistance to governmentality is directed at the effect of power relations as such, this is 
because power as government is exercised as an “action on individuals.”  Yet, at the same 
time as these “immediate” forms of struggle are directed at power as government instead 
of the “chief enemy,” of state or capital, this means for Foucault that these “immediate” 
forms of struggle against governmentality are to be fundamentally distinguished from the 
traditional concept of liberation through either class struggle or revolution.  In this way, 
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forms of resistance to governmentality are “immediate” for Foucault because they do not 
“expect to find a solution to their problems at a future date (that is, liberations, 
revolutions, end of class struggle).”1118  Rather than understanding the question of 
struggle in terms of a future classless and stateless society realized and made manifest in 
the form of a divine, or messianic revolution, Foucault emphasizes that the immediacy of 
resistance to governmentality is itself a form of what anarchists traditionally refer to in 
terms of direct action.1119  Thus, Foucault argues that “[i]n comparison with a theoretical 
scale of explanations or a revolutionary order that polarizes the historian,” forms of 
resistance to governmentality can neither be reduced to the notion of class struggle nor a 
revolution-to-come.  Instead Foucault clarifies that “they are anarchistic struggles.”1120  
Foucault’s choice to identify the forms of resistance against governmentality as 
“anarchistic struggles” is vital to his understanding of an ethical politics of resistance to 
governmentality.  These forms of struggle are “anarchistic” since they seek an immediate 
rupture in the logic of the archē, not in terms of a future revolution that might ultimately 
end class struggle, but in terms of a permanent insurrection against the immediate effects 
of power relations.  Yet, at the same time, however, Foucault characterizes these forms of 
resistance as “anarchistic struggles” since they exemplify an immediate and permanent 
struggle toward autonomy, rather than a revolutionary struggle over power.  In other 
words, such struggles are “anarchistic,” according to Foucault, not because the seek to 
overturn state power, but because these movements of resistance struggle towards new 
forms of subjectivity.   
 While the first three propositions in “The Subject and Power” are set to outline 
how the forms of resistance to governmentality designate what Foucault refers to as 
“anarchistic struggles,” the final three are set to explore more specifically what is at stake 
in these forms of resistance, as well as how these struggles can therefore be differentiated 
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from more traditional notions of struggle.  By way of summary, Foucault reminds his 
reader exactly what the object of resistance to governmentality is directed against:  
The main objective of these struggles is to attack…this form of power that applies 
itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the individual, marks him by his own 
individuality, attaches him to his identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he 
must recognize and have others recognize in him.  It is a form of power that 
makes individuals subjects.1121 
As Foucault maintains here, the primary target of the forms of resistance to 
governmentality are the techniques of power as subjection—that is, the techniques which 
turn an individual into a subject of government.  As revolts of conduct organized against 
the techniques of subjection, Foucault’s fourth proposition argues that forms of resistance 
to the exercise of government “are struggles against the government of 
individualization.1122”  As resistance to the “government of individualization,” what is at 
stake for Foucault is not that these forms of struggle are “for or against the 
individual.”1123  Instead what is at stake is that that these forms of resistance are aimed at 
the techniques of power exercised as subjection or subjectivation (assujettissement).  In 
this sense, resistance to the exercise of power as government is directed against the “form 
of power that makes individuals subjects.”1124  In regard to this form of power, Judith 
Butler has argued that Foucault’s term “subjectivation” carries a fundamental paradox 
within itself.  “Assujetissement,” Butler writes, “denotes both the becoming of the subject 
and the process of subjection…a subjection which implies a radical dependency” 
(original italics).1125  As Butler suggests here, power exercised as government at once 
signifies a process of becoming subjected to power as well as a process of becoming a 
subject of power as such.  Because the techniques of government refer to a dual process 
of subjection, the way in which Foucault designates the struggles against these forms of 
power as “anarchistic” highlights a vital characteristic essential to his theory of 
resistance.  At stake in the politics of resistance against governmentality is not simply a 
                                                          
1121 Ibid, 331. 
1122 Ibid, 330. 
1123 Ibid, 330. 
1124 Ibid, 331. 
1125 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (California: Stanford University Press, 
1997), 83. 
404 
 
revolt against the exercise of power as such but, more specifically, a movement against 
the dual process of subjection—a fundamental revolt against the becoming subject to 
government—that is, a revolt against becoming-governable.       
In the fifth proposition on resistance Foucault maintains that these forms of 
resistance are “struggles against the privilege of knowledge,” or the ways in which 
relations of power are inherently linked with relations of knowledge.1126  According to 
Foucault, then, what is additionally at stake in these “anarchistic struggles” is the way in 
which relations of power function, circulate, and are “linked with the privileges of 
knowledge.”1127  In other words, these struggles are forms of resistance against the 
relations of power-knowledge—that is a revolt against the imposition of forms of 
knowledge bound to forms of power.  Finally, Foucault further clarifies that “all these 
present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we?”1128  Here, the notion of 
resistance designates, according to Foucault, a “refusal of these abstractions, of economic 
and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are individually, and also a refusal 
of a scientific or administrative inquisition that determines who one is.”1129  As a refusal 
of who we are—that is, a refusal of the process of becoming governable—at stake is how 
these “anarchistic struggles” attempt to carve out a terrain of life that is itself 
ungovernable.  With these components form the basis for a preliminary outline regarding 
the objective targets of the forms of resistance to government, what is ultimately at stake 
in these “anarchistic” forms of resistance to the exercise of government is, as Foucault 
importantly maintains, “a struggle for a new subjectivity.”1130  In this way, while 
Foucault designates the specificity of revolt in terms of the forms of resistance to the 
exercise of power as a form of government, he also maintains that the overall goal of 
these forms of struggle is to promote and develop new forms of radical subjectivity made 
possible in and through resistance to the individualizing techniques of governmentality—
that is, what is at stake in these struggles is the development of new forms of life against 
the techniques of government.  At the same time, however, insofar as these struggles are, 
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as Foucault suggests, struggles against the government of individuation, it is my 
contention that what is produced in these forms of resistance is what can be termed, 
following Agamben, the ungovernable.1131  As an attempt to constitute an ethic of the self 
in the ungovernable, the politics of resistance not only designates an ongoing struggle 
with power exercised as government, but a struggle toward a new ethos, or form-of-life 
that at once coincides with and is bought about through the praxis of resistance.  Through 
Foucault the ungovernable can be understood as a form-of-life obtained in a condition of 
revolt.  As Foucault suggests in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, a form of “life obtained 
thanks to a technē, does not obey a regula (a rule): its submits to a form.  It is a style of 
life, a sort of form one gives to one’s life.”1132  Here, Foucault clarifies how an ethic of 
revolt proceeds from a position of autonomy; rather than a set of prescribed rules, it is an 
ethic “one gives to one’s life.”  At the same time, the form or style of life produced in an 
ethic of revolt is the ungovernable insofar as the transformation in subjectivity is what is 
brought about through the struggle against power exercised as government.  Indeed, if 
Foucault is correct that it is through our forms of subjectivity that our behavior is 
conducted or governed, then what is ultimately at stake in these forms of resistance is the 
production of ungovernable forms of subjectivity; an ethic of revolt elaborated as a 
permanent process of becoming-ungovernable.       
 While Foucault emphasizes the significance of these “anarchistic” forms of 
resistance to the exercise of governmentality in contrast to more traditional forms of 
struggle his point is not, however, to suggest that other forms of resistance and revolt 
either do not exist or are of little importance.  Instead Foucault clarifies that there have 
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been three general forms in which forms of resistance and revolt have been historically 
elaborated: struggles against forms of ethnic, religious and social domination; struggles 
against economic forms of exploitation; and finally struggles against subjection—that is 
“against forms of subjectivity and submission.”1133  While, Foucault maintains that 
resistance against the submission of subjectivity is “becoming more and more important,” 
he also argues that the “struggles against forms of domination and exploitation have not 
disappeared.”1134  Thus, rather than directly excluding other forms of revolt, Foucault 
instead maintains that “in history you can find a lot of examples of these three kinds of 
social struggles, either isolated from each other, or mixed together.”1135  Despite, then, 
the ways in which Foucault is criticized for remaining ambiguous in regard to the 
question of resistance, in “The Subject and Power” he does indeed directly outline how 
these revolts of conduct are to be critically and practically distinguished from more 
traditional theories of liberation, while Security, Territory, Population offers a historical 
example of these forms of revolt in the notion of counter-conduct.  Furthermore, it is in 
“The Subject and Power” that Foucault again importantly locates anarchism as a key 
referent for his inquiry in the question of resistance and the ethics of revolt.  To be sure, 
the connection Foucault draws between his theory of resistance, the corresponding ethic 
of revolt, and anarchism not only opens a real possibility for a critical praxis of 
resistance, but also a vital way from which to rethink the stakes and praxis of an anarchist 
politics of resistance.   
Although Foucault maintains that forms of revolt against domination and 
exploitation have not been eradicated from the field of revolt, his inquiry into the forms 
of resistance against government nevertheless suggests an alternative framework from 
which the revolts against government as “anarchistic struggles” can be distinguished 
from traditional theories of liberation and revolution.  Forms of resistance to the exercise 
of power as government can be distinguished from a theory and praxis of revolution 
because they are firstly immediate struggles against the specific techniques of 
“subjection,” against the process of becoming governable.  To be sure, what is attacked in 
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these forms of resistance is not the state or capital, but the techniques of power that both 
subjugate and make one subject to the exercise of power as government.  This means, 
however, that the forms of resistance Foucault describes should not be understood in 
terms of a revolutionary struggle with state power; at stake in the struggle against 
government is therefore not a future end to revolutionary class struggle in which relations 
of power might be fully eradicated from the political.  Instead of invoking the term 
‘revolution’ to describe the ultimate goal and terminal point of all forms of struggle, what 
is at stake in “anarchistic struggles” is instead insurrection, the immediate elaboration of 
new forms of life made possible in the realization of resistance against governmentality.  
It is in this way we can fully understand Foucault’s claim regarding how the 
“philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, 
and from the state’s institutions, but to liberate us from both the state and from the type of 
individualization linked to the state.”1136  Indeed, herein lies the political possibility of 
Foucault’s theory of resistance, as well as the ethic of permanent revolt that animates this 
form of struggle.  If one is to resist the state, one must first revolt against the government 
of individualization; it is an insurrectionary struggle against becoming-governable that 
breaks the nexus that binds us to the state, and allows for its continuation.  Indeed, if it is 
true as Foucault suggests that the governmentalization of the state is what has allowed the 
state to survive, then it through an insurrectionary struggle with governmentality through 
which the state might in fact be abolished.   While anarchism is commonly understood, 
although by no means exclusively, as a form of politics premised on a theory and praxis 
of revolution—an ongoing struggle with the state and capital that will eventually lead to 
future classless and stateless society, it is my contention that Foucault’s notion of the 
“anarchistic struggles” against governmentality tend toward emphasizing the importance 
of insurrection rather than revolution as the paradigmatic form revolt assumes in the 
struggle against government.      
 With the critical exploration of the question of resistance and its relation to ethical 
struggle toward new forms of subjectivity designating the principal problematic of “The 
Subject and Power,” it is clear that anarchism designates a possible basis from which 
Foucault’s ethical politics of resistance might arise.  At the same time, however, 
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Foucault’s theory of a permanent ethic of resistance allows us rethink an anarchist 
politics of resistance in radically new ways.  First, politics as resistance to 
governmentality is not itself premised, yet does not exclude, the telos of revolution as the 
end-point of an ethic of revolt.  Rather than a revolutionary politics, through Foucault we 
can begin to conceive of the politics of resistance in terms of insurrection—indeed, as 
insurrections of conduct, and insurrection of the self—which, in struggling for an 
autonomous, ungovernable form-of-life, effectively creates a fundamental rupture with 
the logic and practice of the state.  In order to understand this vital differentiation 
between insurrection and revolution it is necessary to turn to an often cited passage from 
Max Stirner’s 1844 text The Ego and His Own: The Case of the Individual Against 
Authority.  Keeping in mind that Foucault mentions Stirner in The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject as an example of a philosopher who attempted to reconstitute and ethic of the 
self, or practice of askēsis, then a connection can easily be made between the former’s 
ethic of revolt and the latter’s notion of insurrection.  Indeed, Foucault’s understanding of 
the forms of resistance directed at the government of individualization appears to echo 
Stirner in the distinction maintained between revolution and insurrection.  According to 
Stirner, “[r]evolution and insurrection must not be looked upon as synonymous:” 
The former consists in an overturning of conditions, of the established condition 
or status, the state or society, and is accordingly a political or social act; the latter 
has indeed for its unavoidable consequence a transformation of circumstances, yet 
does not start from it but from men’s discontent with themselves, is not an armed 
rising, but a rising of individuals, a getting up, without regard to the arrangements 
that spring from it (original italics).1137  
Similar to Foucault’s notion of an ethic of permanent resistance, Stirner’s notion of 
insurrection begins not with a revolt against the state, but rather in individual’s 
“discontent with themselves,” a “rising up of individuals” out of the government of 
individuation.  At the same time, however, Stirner takes this a step further and maintains 
an additional distinction between revolution and insurrection that highlights what is 
ultimately at stake in Foucault’s ethics of resistance.  “The revolution,” Stirner writes, 
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aims “at new arrangements”—that is a rupture with the previous arrangement in order to 
arrive at a new set of arrangements—whereas “insurrection leads us to no longer let 
ourselves be arranged, but to arrange ourselves, and set no glittering hopes on 
institutions” (original italics).1138  What Stirner refers to as “insurrection” begins not only 
with a refusal of the self, but a refusal to be “arranged” or governed; in other words it has 
the same form as Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct.  At the same time, however, this 
refusal to be governed is radically paired with, according to Stirner, a general aim not 
toward the forms of arrangements instituted after a revolution, but instead toward a 
radical position of autonomy, a position from which we might “arrange ourselves.”  
Taken together we can, following both Foucault and Stirner, begin to understand an 
ethical politics of resistance to governmentality in terms of an insurrection of the self.  
This insurrection of the self is itself a form of what anarchists refer to as direct action 
which, in refusing to be governed, prefigures anarchy in the ungovernable, a radical 
position of autonomy in which one is able to arrange oneself.  While anarchism is most 
typically understood as a revolutionary theory that seeks the dissolution of the state, it is 
my contention that through Foucault we might amend this basic paradigm of anarchist 
theory and suggest that this ethical politics of resistance better characterizes anarchism as 
a fundamental withdrawal from the logic, practice, and domain of oikonomia. 
The thematic of an ethical politics of resistance I have been developing through 
Foucault not only demands a reconsideration of the basis of an anarchist politics of 
resistance, but also how we resist the forms of governable subjectivities that link us to the 
state.  In this way, we have seen how a Foucauldian theory of resistance refers not to a 
struggle with the state over power but, more specifically, to a struggle with the exercise 
of government; the politics of resistance as such is not characterized in terms of 
revolution, but as insurrection—an insurrection of conduct that attempts a fundamental 
rupture in the practices of government that connect us to the state.  At the same time, 
however, this politics of resistance is itself paired with an ethics of revolt, a way of being 
through resistance that ultimately seeks a withdrawal from power in order to affirm an 
ungovernable position of autonomy.  While Foucault claims that the politics of resistance 
to governmentality is itself ethical in its struggle toward new forms of subjectivity, this 
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ethical component of resistance is therefore ontological as well.  Indeed, this 
insurrectionary ethical politics of resistance is what Newman refers to “ontological 
anarchism.”1139  By “ontological anarchism,” a term developed with regard to Foucault, 
Newman argues that an insurrectionary theory of politics of resistance is “primarily a 
form of ethical and political self-transformation…which seek[s] to foster autonomous 
relations and practices of outside power.”1140  Indeed, what is fostered or produced in the 
politics of resistance directed against the logic and practices of government is not 
necessarily the dissolution of the state, but radical positions of autonomy outside of 
power.  This position of autonomy produced outside of power exercise as government is 
what Newman refers to, via Agamben, as the “ungovernable,” or the “anarchic dimension 
to life that exceeds and resists” the governable forms of subjectivity that connect 
individuals to the state.1141  Yet, these ungovernable positions of autonomy formed in 
practices of resistance, and which form the basis of anarchist politics, also reveal a radical 
condition of freedom that forms the basis of what I have outlined as a permanent ethics of 
resistance.  According to Newman, then, since “insurrection allows people to constitute 
their own freedom,” then it can further be maintained that a politics conceived as 
resistance “is the political articulation of ontological anarchy: a form of praxis which is 
not overdetermined by a project or telos, but which simply assumes and puts into practice 
the freedom we already have.”1142  It is this form of freedom obtained through the 
practice of resistance that Foucault locates as the basic principle that grounds the notion 
of the permanent ethics of revolt. 
While we have seen that a specific continuity can be drawn between the political 
and ethical through the concept of resistance, and furthermore that ethics is defined by 
Foucault as both a practice and way of being in the world, he also argues that this ethics 
of permanent resistance is itself to be conceived in terms of a radical practice of freedom.  
It is the concept of freedom, the condition proper to the domain of ethics, that Foucault 
argues has been missing from revolutionary movements.  Thus, in a crucial interview 
from 1984 titled “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom,” wherein 
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the question of politics is directly tied to the questions of ethics in terms of a theory of 
resistance, Foucault further argues that this ethical theory of resistance reveals the 
problematic of freedom in new ways.  It is in this way Foucault asks “for what is ethics, if 
not the practice of freedom, the conscious practice of freedom.”1143  In this way, the 
politics of resistance is, according to Foucault, an ethical practice of freedom.  
“Freedom,” Foucault therefore writes, “is the ontological condition of ethics.”1144  In 
Foucault’s thought, then, the practice of ethics requires a concept of freedom through 
which a critical ethos of revolt can be expressed—that is, ethics according to Foucault 
finds its basis and is expressed in the forms and practices of freedom manifest in the 
praxis of resistance.  At the same time, it is this relation between ethics and the condition 
of freedom that Foucault conceives of as an inherently political problem.  Thus “insofar 
as freedom…signifies non-slavery,” which Foucault acknowledges “is quite a different 
definition of freedom” from traditional notions, then the problem of ethics “is already 
entirely political.”1145  As a critical position of “non-slavery,” Foucauldian freedom is not 
to be conceived as freedom from but rather in terms of a condition of being-in-autonomy.   
Thus, while we have seen that politics exercised as resistance to governmentality 
at once refers to an ethical and political practice of resistance toward autonomous self-
transformation, the way in which Foucault defines freedom as a condition “non-slavery” 
adds a vital dimension to the intersection between politics, ethics, and resistance.  Politics 
as resistance to governmentality is a perpetual striving toward a condition of non-slavery, 
and it is in this way that the question of freedom is problematized by Foucault as an 
ethos—indeed, an ethics of permanent resistance.  While Foucault redefines politics as 
resistance to governmentality, with the practice of freedom as “non-slavery” forming the 
ontological precondition of ethics, he also redefines ethics in a unique manner consistent 
with his theory of the political.  Resistance is, according to Foucault, an ethical practice 
of freedom—that is, a permanent ethic of revolt perpetually striving toward a condition in 
life of non-slavery and autonomous freedom.  There is a real political possibility in this 
politics of resistance and ethics of revolt that not extends what I have referred to as 
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anarchist hypothesis of the political that underpins Foucault’s thought, but also the 
elaboration of an anarchist ethics of revolt, a permanent exercise in freedom through the 
practice of resistance, a specific art of not being governed that ruptures the logic of the 
archē.  
6.4 An Anarchist Politics of Resistance Emerges as an Art of Not 
Being Governed 
 
Facing them head on and as compensation, or rather, as both partner and adversary to 
the arts of governing, as an act of defiance, as a challenge, as a way of limiting these arts 
of governing and sizing them up, transforming them, or finding a way to escape 
them…there would have been something born…a kind of general cultural form, both a 
political and moral attitude, a way of thinking…which I would simply call the art of not 
being governed.1146 
--Michel Foucault 
 
The central challenge of this chapter has been to explore the ethical contours of 
Foucault’s theory of resistance, and to further demonstrate how this permanent ethic of 
revolt at once reveals the political as a space of agonistic contestation and a position of 
autonomy outside of the logic and practices of governmentality.  In this regard, the first 
goal of this chapter has been to trace how Foucault’s turn toward the study of 
governmentality directly corresponds with a critical inquiry into the counter-historical 
movements of “counter-conduct,” a unique form of resistance, and furthermore that it is 
through this notion of counter-conduct that Foucault redefines politics from the 
perspective of resistance.  If, as I have argued throughout this project that resistance is 
primary with power and the political, it has been my contention in this chapter that 
Foucault clarifies this position in Security, Territory, Population, ultimately arguing not 
only that politics can be redefined as resistance, but also how politics is that which 
emerges in the condition of resistance to governmentality.  By redefining politics as a 
movement of resistance against the logic and practice of governmentality, Foucault takes 
these movements of counter-conduct as a historical referent in which the political as agōn 
emerges in the form of an active resistance and open contestation with the exercise of 
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power as government.  Taking Foucault’s theory of politics as resistance as a critical 
extension of his agonistic conception of the political, the second goal of this chapter was 
to outline the ways in which the politics of resistance as such forms the conceptual and 
practical nexus that connects the political and ethical periods of Foucault’s thought.  
Indeed, as Foucault maintains in 1984, the connection between the political and ethical 
axes of his thought can be made in the following way: “the hinge point of ethical 
concerns and the political struggle” at once arises as a movement “against abusive 
techniques of government and research in ethics that seeks to ground individual 
freedom.”1147  It is at the intersection between the movements of revolt against the 
practice of government and the struggle toward an ethos of freedom that Foucault reveals 
an alternative manner from which to rethink the question of resistance in terms of an 
ethic of revolt.   
 Furthermore, it has been my contention in this chapter that Foucault’s redefinition 
of politics as a movement of resistance to governmentality corresponding with an ethics 
of revolt allows for a unique intersection to be staged between Foucault’s turn toward 
ethics and anarchism.  While I have maintained that Foucault’s critical inquiries into 
power, politics, and governmentality all reveal the specificity of the primacy of resistance 
as the basis of what can be termed an anarchist hypothesis of the political, in this chapter 
we have seen how Foucault identifies anarchism as a key referent from which an ethical 
politics of resistance might be based.  It has therefore been my contention that Foucault’s 
conceptions of the politics of resistance and corresponding ethic of revolt revitalize the 
question of an anarchist politics of resistance in vital ways.  Through Foucault we might 
suggest that anarchism—indeed anarchy—is elaborated not in terms of a revolution to 
come, but as a permanent ethos of resistance, a specific art of not being governed.  This 
critical intersection between Foucault and anarchist thought reveals a real political 
possibility, a hidden locus that not only designates an active position of praxis in which 
power exercised as government can be confronted and possibly reversed, but also the 
elaboration of an ethos of revolt inseparable from a critical affirmation toward 
autonomous, ungovernable forms-of-life.  Rather than a revolutionary struggle with or 
over state power, an insurrectionary ethos or art of not being governed is directed at what 
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Foucault refers to as the “political double bind” of power exercised as government, a 
form of revolt at once directed against the state and the government of individualization 
that connects us to the state.  While we have seen that a certain consistency can be drawn 
between Foucault and anarchism in terms of rethinking politics as resistance to 
governmentality, there is also a specific continuity between his notion of an ethics of 
revolt and anarchist thought that has yet to be fully explored.  In this regard, it has been 
my contention not only that Foucault begins to conceive politics—indeed, the politics of 
resistance—as a form of ethics, but that this ethical component to the politics of 
resistance helps to rethink an anarchist politics as a vital attempt to constitute an ethic of 
the self as an art of not being governed.   
Although the notion of an anarchist ethics of resistance is often eclipsed by the 
discourses on politics, there have been several attempts at elaborating an anarchist ethics 
in which the question of the politics of resistance is explored and elaborated as an art of 
not being governed.  In the final years of his life, Kropotkin attempted to complete a two-
volume text that sought to provide a historical account of the emergence of ethics and 
forms of morality within the tradition of Western philosophy, while simultaneously 
outlining a specific correlation between an alternative ethics and anarchism.  Although 
the Ethics was never completed, in an earlier work titled “Anarchist Morality,” Kropotkin 
sketched a preliminary outline of an ethics devoid of any normative or moral 
prescriptions imposed by authority, while further tracing a specific continuity between 
this notion of ethics and an anarchist praxis of resistance.  According to Kropotkin, an 
anarchist ethics is to be elaborated not in terms of a Kantian “categorical imperative”—
that is, a universal code that guides all action, but rather upon two mutually reinforcing 
principles: the principle of equality and the principle of non-governance.  Indeed, 
“equality,” Kropotkin writes, is “the fundamental principle of anarchism,” while further 
concluding that “equity in all things…is anarchism in very deed.”1148  Yet, while the 
principle of equality is what forms the ethical basis of anarchism, the very condition of 
equality toward which anarchism strives can only become manifest in a meaningful way, 
according to Kropotkin, as a perpetual movement toward a principle of non-governance, 
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a movement toward anarchy.  For Kropotkin, then, the principle of equality directly 
corresponds with a principle of non-governance, a refusal to govern others that 
simultaneously turns upon a refusal to be governed in turn: “we do not wish to be ruled,” 
Kropotkin writes, and “by this very fact do we not declare that we ourselves wish to rule 
nobody?”1149  It is this principle of non-governance that forms the essence of an anarchist 
ethics. At the same time, however, the principle of non-governance leading to a condition 
of equality additionally corresponds with and forms the basic foundation of an agonistic 
praxis of resistance according to Kropotkin.  Yet, instead of being premised on a theory 
of revolution, Kropotkin describes the politics of resistance as a process of becoming, a 
development of a critical ethos in which the refusal to govern and to be governed itself 
prefigures a radical condition of equality and anarchy.  An anarchist ethics can be 
elaborated by developing an inextricable nexus between the principle of non-governance 
and that of equality; thus in Kropotkin’s words: “By becoming anarchists…we declare 
war against their way of acting, against their way of thinking…It is in the name of 
equality that we are determined to have no more…exploited, deceived, and governed men 
and women.”1150  Like Foucault, Kropotkin understands the politics of resistance as a 
struggle in life against the government of conduct, an insurrectionary revolt of conduct 
struggling against “their way of acting;” yet, in Kropotkin’s understanding this struggle is 
both premised upon and leads to a condition of equality.  Crucially, however, what 
Kropotkin outlines here as the two principles that animate an anarchist politics of 
resistance is to be elaborated as an ethos, a specific process of becoming-ungovernable in 
a condition of equality.  In other words, what Kropotkin understands as ethics describes a 
form of praxis in which the principles of non-governance and equality are elaborated as 
an art of not being governed, or a process of becoming-anarchy.    
Similar to Kropotkin, Emma Goldman also recognized the importance of 
elaborating an ethical basis to the politics of resistance: “to divest one’s methods of 
ethical concepts” Goldman laments will ultimately lead to the failure of anarchist 
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thought.1151  Indeed, anarchism according to Goldman ought to be understood as a 
specific process of becoming, an ethic of revolt in which one transforms one’s self and 
one’s conditions by developing an ethos of counter-conduct.  It is in this way that 
Goldman argues strongly that an anarchist politics of resistance cannot be a “violent 
change of social conditions through which one social class, the working class, becomes 
dominant over another class,” as is the case in traditional Marxist and some anarchist 
discourses on revolution.1152  Because it is directed at the state as a physical object that 
can be overturned, traditional theories of revolution according to Goldman are only the 
“conception of a purely physical change,” and as such “involves only political scene 
shifting and institutional reaarangements.”1153  While Goldman acknowledges that 
“[r]evolution is indeed violent,” she further contends that the essential task of an 
anarchist politics of resistance is not a struggle over power, but the elaboration of an 
insurrectionary ethos of revolt, or a “fundamental transvaluation of values” (original 
italics).1154  By a “transvaluation of values,” a concept that has its origins in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy,1155 Goldman means to suggest something akin to Foucault’s notion of 
counter-conduct, in which revolt seeks a fundamental change in one’s subjectivity.   For 
Goldman, then, a “transvaluation of values” ushers in a “transformation of the basic 
relations of man to man, and of man to society”—that is, the basis of an “NEW ETHICS, 
[sic] inspiring…a new concept of life and its manifestation in social relationships.”1156  
By conceiving an anarchist politics of resistance in terms of ethical change in one’s self 
and one’s relations to others, Goldman adopts a position similar to Foucault in which the 
refusal of the self is paired with the affirmation of becoming ungovernable.  As a 
“transvaluation of values” instead of a revolutionary struggle over power, the politics of 
resistance according to Goldman is an exercise in what Foucault refers to as counter-
conduct—that is, anarchism is a movement in life that seeks to escape the logic of 
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governmentality, a revolt against the ways in which one is governed paired with a radical 
transformation in life through resistance.   
Through Kropotkin and Goldman there is a position nearly analogous to 
Foucault’s claim in “The Subject and Power” in which the politics of resistance pertains 
less to the state, but a struggle against the government of individualization linked to the 
state.  It is this art of not being governed elaborated in both Foucault and anarchism that 
opens new possibilities from which to resist the logic and practices of the 
governmentalization of the state.  Indeed, in reconceiving politics as a movement of 
resistance to governmentality paired with an ethic of revolt in which the struggle towards 
new forms of subjectivity within a space of autonomous freedom, that is, towards 
conditions of non-slavery and ungovernability, Foucault ultimately adopts a position 
quite similar to that of the German anarchist Gustav Landauer.  Like Foucault, Landauer 
criticized Marxist and anarchists alike for regarding the state as a physical object or 
“thing…that one can smash in order to destroy.”1157  Rather than conceiving the state as a 
physical object that can be overturned or destroyed, Landauer instead argues that the 
“state is a relationship between human beings, a way in which people relate to one 
another.”1158  In other words, the state according Landauer is a social relation akin to 
Foucault’s notion of the government of conduct.  It is this conception of the state as 
“relationship between human beings” that Landauer locates an alternative way from 
which to rethink the basis of an anarchist politics.  Anarchism will not destroy the state, 
as Landauer suggests, by overturning its power; instead just as Foucault maintains that 
the object of resistance is directed toward the production of new forms of subjectivity, 
Landauer argues that “one destroys the state by entering into other relationships, by 
behaving differently to one another.”1159  In this way, the object of resistance according to 
Landauer is not, in essence, manifest in a revolutionary struggle against the state, but 
rather in the attempt to “separate themselves from the state” by creating new ways of 
conduct and relations between others.1160  Herein lies the key for an anarchist politics of 
                                                          
1157 Gustav Landauer, “Destroying the State by Creating Socialism,” in Anarchism: A Documentary History 
of Libertarian Ideas, Volume One, From Anarchy to Anarchism, ed. Robert Graham (Montreal: Black Rose 
Books, 2005), 165. 
1158 Ibid, 165. 
1159 Ibid, 165.   
1160 Ibid, 165.   
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resistance according to Landauer: “weaker and weaker will be the state power, the 
governing principle…if only the people begin to constitute themselves outside the 
state.”1161  This is to say that for Landauer, the object of an anarchist politics of resistance 
is a radical withdrawal of oneself from the state by entering into different relations with 
others, an ethic of counter-conduct that at once involves a position of voluntary 
inservitude and a perpetual striving toward a condition of autonomy, freedom, and 
equality in life.  An ethics of revolt based in the practices of freedom, autonomy, 
equality, and non-governance, is not a new set of moral values, but an ethos, a way of 
being in the world through resistance, a strategy of withdrawal and desertion oriented 
toward overcoming the constituent power of the state by constituting ungovernable forms 
of life outside of the state; it is an art of not being governed, an ethic of becoming-
ungovernable, a certain continuity between existence and resistance that allows the 
conditions of anarchy to emerge.  
  
                                                          
1161 Ibid, 164-165. 
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Conclusion 
From Revolution to Resistance: Destituent Politics as an Art of Not 
Being Governed 
Resistance is the motor of history.  Again and again we revolt against everything that 
exploits, oppresses, outrages, and depresses us; again and again our revolts are 
reabsorbed, becoming new conventions, new confines, new systems of control.  Buried in 
the sedimentary layers of our ancestor’s defeat it’s easy to forget what produced these 
structures and can tear them down again: our great unruliness.1162 
--Crimethinc Ex-Workers Collective 
 
Politics is about the movement between no power and state power, and it takes place 
through the creation of…a space of resistance and opposition to government.1163 
--Simon Critchley 
 
In a manner that echoes the core logic of Foucault’s fifth thesis from the History of 
Sexuality, “anarchy,” writes Peter Gelderloos, “thrives in the struggle against domination, 
and wherever oppression exists, resistance exists also.”1164  In this sense, anarchy is not 
understood as a post-revolutionary condition following a total eradication of the state, 
government, and capitalism, but rather as that which emerges as agōn, a condition 
brought about in the forms of struggle against power in all its manifestations.  Anarchy as 
such is neither prior nor anterior to the forms of power against which it struggles.  
Instead, rather, anarchism in the sense I have been elaborating throughout this study takes 
as its basis and emerges from the logic that “wherever oppression exists, resistance 
exists.”  As a correlative to this logic, “anarchy”—that is, a condition of being-without-
government—is what is historically expressed in the forms of resistance to power.  In 
other words, Foucault’s thesis “where there is power, there is resistance” designates the 
principal logic central to anarchism.  Beginning with a critical inquiry into the reasons 
why the field of the political is traditionally elaborated in the archic nexus between 
government and state sovereignty, the purpose of this study has examined the 
possibilities of elaborating an alternative theory of the political in the intersections 
                                                          
1162 The Crimethinc. Ex-Workers Collective, Rolling Thunder: An Anarchist Journal of Dangerous Living, 5 
(2008): 1. 
1163 Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless, 232-233. 
1164 Peter Gelderloos, Anarchy Works (California: Ardent Press, 2010), 266. 
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between Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchism.  In doing so, the aim of this study 
was to shift the site of politics away from the traditional archic paradigms of government 
and sovereignty toward the logic of the primacy of resistance.  Taking the primacy of 
resistance as the concept that reveals the history of the political in its agonistic 
specificity, it has been my contention that Foucault rethinks the political anarchically—
that is, rather than reducing the question of politics to the archic expressions of 
government and sovereign power, Foucault maintains that the field of the political is 
historically expressed as agōn, a permanent dynamic of struggle between power and 
resistance.  Consequently, however, because resistance designates a permanent 
component that can never be eradicated from the field of the political, it is the primacy of 
resistance and not the continuation of power that gives the political its form and 
historicity as such.  In this regard, it has been my contention that the critical attempts to 
reopen a space for political praxis situated at the horizon of the state and government 
hinge on a unique relationship between Foucault’s philosophy of resistance and 
anarchism.   
 In establishing a vital intersection between Foucault and anarchism through the 
logic of the primacy of resistance, the central challenge of this study has been to rethink 
the question of politics in a way that transcends the Aristotelian and Schmittian 
paradigms, and thus to gesture toward an alternative set of principles for a theory of the 
political opposed to, and autonomous from, the models of politics expressed in the forms 
of power exercised as sovereignty and government.  This alternative, agonistic theory of 
politics is what I have referred to throughout this project as an anarchist hypothesis of the 
political, in which the primacy of resistance ruptures the logic of the archē and 
redesignates the field of the political as an insurgent topology of struggle and 
contestation.  Following a discussion, via Aristotle and Schmitt, pertaining to the ways in 
which the question of politics has traditionally been reduced to the first principle of an 
archē, I then outlined how certain critical turns in political theory and philosophy such as 
metapolitics and postanarchism have set the tone for beginning to rethink the political 
and the question of politics in a way that gestures toward a fundamental return to the 
study of anarchism, while highlighting how this alternative understanding of politics 
ultimately turns upon the question of resistance.  In this regard, chapter two sought to 
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reintroduce anarchism in a manner that prefigures the postanarchist and metapolitical 
attempts to locate a theory of the political irreducible to the state, as well as a 
corresponding form of politics as resistance that could never assume the form of an 
oikonomia.  The goal here was at once to consider anarchism as a distinct form of 
political philosophy that relocates the question of politics in the fundamental distinction 
between government and resistance, as well as to demonstrate how the concept of 
resistance is not only what animates an agonistic conception of the political as such, but 
the condition of anarchy as well.  Tracing the concept of anarchy as a philosophical 
principle that affirms an alternative starting point for a critical theory of the political, as a 
historico-political principle in which the history of the political is retheorized as a 
permanent domain of agonistic struggle, and as a paradigm of politics as resistance it has 
been my contention that anarchism asserts a theory of the political through the unique 
question of resistance.  Taken together, the first two chapters were set inform the 
historical, philosophical, and political context in which Foucault’s thought can best be 
situated, and from which my own study of the radical political possibilities brought to 
light in the intersection between Foucault’s theory of resistance and anarchism proceeds. 
By situating the question of politics and the political at the horizon of the state 
and the exercise of government, it has been my contention that anarchist political theory 
fundamentally turns upon an alternative theory of the political, in which what is 
ultimately presupposed is not the primacy of the first principle of government, but a 
critical caesura between the political as archē and an insurgent, agonistic conception of 
the political.  It is in the context of the anarchist tradition, or rather in the critical tradition 
that attempts to rethink the terms of the political and the question of politics from the 
perspective of resistance in which the full potential of Foucault’s studies of power, 
politics, and governmentality can be realized.  In this regard, chapter three sought to 
introduce and highlight the importance of the concept of resistance to Foucault’s thought 
through the corresponding notion of “critique,” while further emphasizing how this 
notion of critique designates an inimitable approach to the study of the political.  
Beginning with what Foucault refers to as “anarchaeology,” a unique approach to the 
study of politics that begins anarchically—that is, a critical methodology that takes as its 
starting point the “non-necessity of all power of whatever kind”—I maintained that such 
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approach ultimately reveals the agonistic dimension specific to the history of the 
political.1165  Rather than beginning with the first principle of the archē, and thus that 
politics can be reducible to the techniques of government exercised within the domain of 
a state, Foucault instead reveals how politics is historically expressed agonistically in the 
permanent struggle between power exercised as government and the counter-historical 
movements of resistance manifest in terms of an “art of not being governed.”  Taking a 
critical elaboration of this “art of not being governed” as the conceptual key central to 
Foucault’s project, the following chapter introduced what I refer to as the primacy of 
resistance—via the fifth thesis on power from The History of Sexuality—as the 
conceptual nexus through which Foucault’s study of power, politics, and the history of 
the political can be understood in their anarchic and agonistic specificity.  With the 
primacy of resistance designating the conceptual key required in Foucault’s analytic of 
power, I argued that the condition of possibility of power relations and the field of the 
political turn upon the permanent potentiality of resistance, and further that this potential 
for revolt is what allows for power relations to be transformed into a form of agonistic 
struggle.     
 Focusing more directly on the question of politics, chapter five outlined a specific 
nexus between the power/resistance dynamic and Foucault’s war analytic of politics and 
the political.  While in Hobbes the condition of possibility of politics coincides with the 
eradication of the condition of war from the field of the political, I argued here that in 
Foucault’s reading of the Leviathan it is the permanence of “civil war,” or stasis, that 
gives the field of the political its agonistic specificity and allows for politics to emerge as 
a paradigm of resistance.  My central claim here is that just as resistance is primary with 
power for Foucault, the war model of the political asserts that resistance is also primary 
with the history of politics.  In the final chapter, I argued that rather than constituting a 
distinct break with his earlier studies in power and politics, Foucault’s turn towards the 
study of ethics in his final works reveals how his agonistic conception of politics as 
resistance is itself animated by a critical ethos of revolt.  Taking the ethical concept of 
“counter-conduct” as the key term by which Foucault redefines politics as resistance to 
power exercised as government, my claim here was that Foucault’s ethical turn ought to 
                                                          
1165 Michel Foucault, On the Government of the Living, 79; 78. 
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be understood as an attempt to locate a continuity between a form of ethics that animates 
his theory of resistance, and a form of politics as resistance that coincides with a radical, 
permanent ethics of revolt, a distinct way of being in the world through resistance—that 
is, a specific art of not being governed.  While the primacy of resistance reveals an 
anarchist hypothesis of the political in terms of a permanent struggle between the 
exercise of power and the counter-movements of resistance—the corresponding ethos of 
revolt through which politics emerges as resistance is elaborated in terms of an art of not 
being governed.   
Social Revolution or Resistance?  
While Foucault’s theory of resistance forms an indispensable reference through which the 
question of politics and the history of the political can be rethought agonistically, it has 
been my contention that this conception of politics reopens up the space for an anarchist 
theory of politics as resistance.  Indeed, while Foucault’s project shifts the question of 
politics from power to resistance, a critical theory of anarchism emerges in this space 
between the primacy of resistance and the art of not being governed.  In this regard, the 
aim of this concluding chapter is to explore the emergence of a new ethical terrain and 
political logic from which the question of resistance in anarchist political theory might be 
rethought neither as a revolutionary overthrow of power, nor in terms of an anarchy-to-
come, but rather as an art of not being governed, a certain continuity between life and 
resistance, in which the condition of anarchy arises not in the revolutionary overthrow of 
the state, but in the process of becoming-ungovernable.  In this regard, it is my contention 
that Foucault’s theory of resistance helps renew and revitalize the specific contours of an 
anarchist politics emerging as resistance.  
Nevertheless, in articulating an anarchist politics of resistance in terms of an art of 
not being governed, rather than the traditional concept of social revolution, my approach 
to the question of resistance within the anarchist tradition appears at odds with certain 
anarchist theorists such as Murray Bookchin who argues that the “polymorphous 
concepts of resistance are eroding the socialist character of the libertarian tradition.”1166  
                                                          
1166 Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm (California: AK 
Press, 1995), 9.  
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Indeed, the intersection staged throughout this study between anarchism and Foucault in 
terms of the primacy of resistance invites a return to the polemic debate initiated in 
Bookchin’s 1995 text, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable 
Chasm.  While Bookchin’s argument is premised on what he views as the irreconcilable 
difference between politics conceived as resistance and politics conceived as 
revolution—that is, between “lifestyle anarchism” and “social anarchism”—his critique is 
important in the context of my study since the eradication of social anarchism traced in 
this text is attributed, in large, to the spread of Foucault’s ideas and works.1167  In 
returning to Bookchin’s debate, my intention is neither to resolve the tension he 
establishes between the individualist and communalist forms of anarchism, nor to 
advocate for a “lifestyle anarchism” as such.  Instead, by way of concluding this study, 
my intention is to explore how the dichotomy Bookchin establishes between resistance 
and social revolution illustrates the ways in which the latter concept reproduces the logic 
of the archē and a form of praxis that tends to conceive of politics in terms of power 
rather than a theory of resistance as developed throughout this study.  Although I do not 
maintain, as does Bookchin, an irreconcilable difference between the so-called 
individualist and social traditions of anarchism, instead preferring Goldman’s notion that 
there is “no conflict between the individual and the social,”1168 it is necessary to turn to 
his critique of Foucault in order to highlight the ways in which the possibility of an 
anarchist politics today emerges as an art of not being governed, a form of resistance 
which rejects the institutional, universal, and totalizing aspects of social revolutionary 
theory and, in doing so, elaborates a form of politics that could never assume the form of 
an archē.          
                                                          
1167 Ibid, 9.  Although Bookchin’s polemic against lifestyle anarchism is situated in the wider context of a 
critique of Foucault, this text is not his most sustained critique of the latter’s ideas.  For a more direct 
critique of Foucault’s thought see: Murray Bookchin, Reenchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human 
Spirit Against Anti-Humanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism, and Primitivism (New York: Cassell, 1995), 172-
186.  Herein, Bookchin suggests that Foucault’s analytic of power fails insofar as it does not distinguish 
between power as domination and an institutional counter-power that might resist the state’s 
management of society.  For Bookchin, then what Foucault’s analytic of power neglects to theorize is the 
possibility of the “liberatory use of power…indispensable for creating a society based on self-
management…in short, free institutions.” (original emphasis, 183).       
1168 Emma Goldman, “Anarchism: What it Really Stands For,” 38.   
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Written in the context of a critique of contemporary anarchist ideas and 
movements of resistance, Bookchin begins his polemic by arguing that anarchism’s 
failure to achieve any wide-spread revolutionary changes within society can be fully 
explained by the “emergence of a phenomenon in Euro-American anarchism that cannot 
be ignored: the spread of individualist anarchism.”1169  Following the development 
throughout the 1960’s of what Bookchin refers to as the rise of “anarchic counter-
culture,” his text is written as a polemic against the ways in which these counter-cultural 
movements tend to reproduce a new form of anarcho-individualism, or what he 
pejoratively refers to as “lifestyle anarchism.” 1170  Although the individualist and 
socialist schools of anarchist thought have often coincided, Bookchin’s text argues that 
anarchism has traditionally “developed in the tension between two basically contradictory 
tendencies: a personalistic commitment to individual autonomy and a collectivist 
commitment to social freedom” (original emphasis).1171  It is in this division between 
autonomy and freedom, between the individualist and social tendencies, that Bookchin 
maintains “there exists a divide that cannot be bridged.”1172  Given that anarchists tend to 
emphasize both autonomy and freedom, Bookchin’s distinction should be rejected.  
Nevertheless, at stake in Bookchin’s critique is not to seek a fundamental reconciliation 
between the individual and social traditions of anarchism, but rather to critically oppose 
the difference between the ways in which the question of politics is treated in each of 
these traditions.  In illustrating a divide between the “anarchic” counter-cultural 
movements and traditional anarchism, it is clear that Bookchin privileges a rigid, 
universal conceptualization of anarcho-syndicalism, or what he often euphemistically 
refers to as “democratic communalism.”1173  This form of “traditional anarchism”—
which is the only real form of anarchism for Bookchin—must adhere to four basic tenets 
in order to be considered anarchist as such: “a confederation of decentralized 
municipalities; an unwavering opposition to statism; a belief in direct democracy; and a 
vision of a libertarian communist society.”1174   
                                                          
1169 Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism, 8. 
1170 Ibid, 9. 
1171 Ibid, 4.  
1172 Ibid, 54. 
1173 Ibid, 56.   
1174 Ibid, 60. 
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While it is clear that Bookchin’s polemic against lifestyle anarchism attempts to 
reinvigorate what he understands as a more traditional anarchism of the past, his critique 
of anarchic counter-cultural forms of resistance nevertheless betrays some of his other 
works in which he rejects the antiquated model of the proletariat as the locus of struggle, 
while analyzing counter-cultural movements toward new forms of community as the key 
fulcrum of resistance in contemporary society.1175  Nevertheless, with these basic tenets, 
it is clear that Bookchin understands anarchism from a much different perspective than 
the one elaborated throughout this project.  Since the first premise designates the 
alternative form of political praxis that animates Bookchin’s critique of the state-form, 
anarchism in this sense can be situated in relation to the key question that animates the 
political works of Plato and Aristotle—that is, a future vision of how society ought to 
best be organized, and a coinciding programme for implementing the management of 
such a society.  In other words anarchism, in the sense Bookchin, attributes to it 
designates a theory of politics in which an institutional counter-power (albeit in a non-
statist and decentralized form) might be implemented as an alternative to the state.  At 
stake in Bookchin’s critique is less the question of resistance than of a return to a 
classical conception of politics understood as a certain exercise and distribution of power.  
In Bookchin, then, the notion of a social revolution refers not to a struggle against, but 
toward, power—indeed, a struggle toward the development of an institutionalized 
counter-power that counter-acts and displaces the power of the state.  To be sure, 
Bookchin conceives of power as the very substance of politics.  As Bookchin maintains 
elsewhere, politics designates a choice between power possessed by the people or power 
possessed by the state: “Power that is not retained by the people is power that is given 
over to the state.”1176  Insofar as Bookchin’s theory of politics understands power as the 
substance of the political in which the development of a series of counter-institutions 
might come to countervail the power of the state, such a theory therefore requires, as 
                                                          
1175 For example, see: Murray Bookchin, “New Social Movements: The Anarchic Dimension,” in For 
Anarchism: History, Theory, and Practice, ed. David Goodway (New York: Routledge, 1989), 259-274.  Also 
see: Murray Bookchin, Social Ecology and Communalism (California: AK Press, 2006), 55-56. 
1176 Murray Bookchin, “The New Municipal Agenda,” in The Murray Bookchin Reader, ed. Janet Biehl 
(Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1999), 193. 
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Bookchin suggests, a “recovery of a classical conception of politics.”1177  Such a return to 
a classical conception of politics is set by Bookchin to describe what he refers to as the 
“democratic dimension of anarchism,” in which politics is exercised in terms of a 
“majoritarian administration of the public sphere”—that is, in terms of an oikonomia.1178  
While Bookchin attempts to eradicate the state rom the field of the political, the 
development of an institutional counter-power nevertheless still turns upon the problem 
of government as the locus through which politics is exercised.     
 I need not go into extensive detail here regarding a discussion of Bookchin’s 
commitment to so-called traditional anarchism; instead what is important is the decisive 
division he draws between politics conceived as resistance and politics conceived as a 
social revolution.  Indeed, it is in the context of a form of politics expressed as 
resistance—which Bookchin worries is in danger of supplanting the notion of social 
revolution—that the critique of Foucault which drives his text is situated.  Although 
Bookchin is not a particularly strong reader of Foucault, he nevertheless draws an 
immediate correspondence between “lifestyle anarchism” and the latter’s theory of 
resistance.  Bookchin writes:  
Consciously or not, many lifestyle anarchists articulate Michel Foucault’s 
approach of “personal insurrection” rather than social revolution, premised as it is 
on an ambiguous and cosmic critique of power as such rather than on a demand 
for the institutionalized empowerment of the oppressed (original emphasis).1179 
                                                          
1177 Ibid, 196.  Also see Murray Bookchin’s description of politics in his final book Social Ecology and 
Communalism, 57-60.  Here Bookchin maintains a clear distinction between state power and politics, and 
suggests that radical political theory therefore requires a more expansive redefinition of what is meant by 
the term politics.  While Bookchin acknowledges that a traditional conception of politics is often reducible 
to a theory of statecraft, he clarifies that the term “politics means the management of the community or 
polis by its members, the citizens” (60).  While Bookchin’s redefinition shifts the site of politics away from 
its sovereign locus in the state to the collective power of the people, the very activity of politics remains 
the same in both its statist and non-statist forms.  Politics, in the sense Bookchin attributes to the term, 
therefore designates a non-statist theory of an oikonomia, which is to say a particular form of governing 
communities.  Thus, although Bookchin’s attempted return at a classical conception of politics replaces 
the state with the people as the site of the political, the very question of politics can only be dealt with in 
terms of developing an institutional counter-power that challenges the state.     
1178 Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism, 57. 
1179 Ibid, 10.  Given how Bookchin maintains that one of the key characteristics of lifestyle anarchism is 
that it “bears a disdain for theory,” it seems strange that he invokes Foucault as the spokesperson for 
such a movement (11). 
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While Bookchin’s critique is less a critical assessment of Foucault’s work than a self-
reflexive nostalgic affirmation of an ‘authentic’ anarchism of the past, what is at stake in 
this passage is the contrast Bookchin posits between Foucault’s conception of politics as 
“insurrection” and the traditional notion of “social revolution.”  While Foucault never 
uses the term “personal insurrection,” Bookchin’s critique is at once directed against this 
conception of politics as insurrection, as well as how the question of “resistance” within 
this conception of politics “becomes entirely polymorphous.”1180  At stake in Bookchin’s 
critique, however, is less the distinction between insurrection and revolution, than the 
ways in which Foucault’s theory of resistance refuses to ascribe to a unifying logic from 
which a politics of resistance could assume the form of a universal “social revolution.”  
Because Foucault neither presupposes a universal character that binds all forms of 
resistance to a particular ideology, nor a singular, all-encompassing form of revolt from 
which the politics of resistance might assume the form of an institutional counter-power, 
Bookchin argues that there can be no possibility of revolution—and thus no possibility of 
anarchism—in Foucault.  To demonstrate this point, Bookchin cites part of Foucault’s 
fifth thesis in order to demonstrate how a “polymorphous” conception of resistance 
fundamentally eradicates the chance of a communal form of anarchism.  “Foucault,” 
Bookchin argues, “fosters a perspective that ‘resistance is never in position to 
power…Hence there is no single [read: universal] locus of Great refusal’” (Bookchin’s 
brackets).1181   
As indicated in the above passage from The History of Sexuality, what Bookchin 
takes issue with is how Foucault’s theory of resistance appears to exclude a certain 
universality through which individual revolts might be redirected toward a collective 
vision of how society could best be arranged.  For Bookchin, then, if “anarchism” is to 
“resolutely retain its character as a social movement,” then it must be “programmatic” 
(original emphasis).1182  In other words, Bookchin’s understanding of social revolution is 
prescriptive in regard to both the specific form revolt must assume, as well as a 
teleological prescription of how society must be organized in line with a particular 
                                                          
1180 Ibid, 11. 
1181 Ibid, 10. 
1182 Ibid, 60. 
429 
 
ideology.  In his critique of Foucault’s theory of resistance, Bookchin reveals his own 
nostalgia for what he views as a more traditional understanding of politics, in which 
anarchism designates the institutional development of a counter-power that rivals the 
state.  More critically, it is my contention that what is revealed in Bookchin’s polemic 
against “lifestyle anarchism” reproduces the logic of the archē anarchism opposes.   
While a lot more could be said about Bookchin’s polemic against “lifestyle 
anarchism,” it is my contention that if radical political theory is to avoid the logic of the 
archē traced throughout this study, that an anarchist theory of resistance ought to both 
resist a politics of program, as well as a prescriptive theory of how society ought to be 
arranged when one is freed from government.  In other words, an anarchist theory of 
resistance must be rethought anarchically, and thus against the traditional notion of social 
revolution.  Because Bookchin works squarely within a classical conception of politics, 
his theory of social revolution is less a theory of resistance, than a theory of power—that 
is, “municipalist confederal power to countervail the state.”1183  Yet as I have maintained 
throughout this study, power is to be resolutely distinguished from politics, wherein the 
latter can only be understood on condition of the permanent potential of resistance.  In 
this regard, it has been my contention that politics is not what takes place in a struggle 
toward power or in a revolutionary confrontation for a new order, but that which, in its 
agonistic specificity, emerges as a paradigm of resistance, a particular art of not being 
governed which, in withdrawing from power, could never assume the form of an archē.  
While such a conception does not necessarily exclude the idea of revolution, what is to be 
resisted is what Foucault refers to as the “pure law of the revolutionary” which, in 
prescribing not only the form revolt ought to take, but also how society ought to be 
organized, relocates the paradigm of the archē in the notion of revolution itself.1184    
Indeed, in a review of André Glucksmann’s 1977 text The Master Thinkers, 
Foucault invokes the example of the Gulag to explain the fundamental logic inherent in 
revolutionary discourse.  “In the Gulag,” Foucault writes, “one sees not the consequences 
of an unhappy mistake, but the effects of the ‘truest’ of theories in the political order.”1185  
                                                          
1183 Ibid, 60. 
1184 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 96. 
1185 Michel Foucault, cited in, The Passion of Michel Foucault (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
296. 
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The horrors that occurred in relation to Stalin’s revolutionary ideal, call into question, for 
Foucault, the very logic of revolution itself and not just Stalin’s alleged 
(mis)interpretation of it.  Anarchism, of course, has produced no Gulag of its own.  Yet, 
what is particularly striking in Foucault’s critique, is how the logic of revolution is 
intimately bound to the logic of the state, and thus that its very possibility always runs the 
risk of collapsing into a form of authoritarian biopolitics.  Thus, while Foucault maintains 
in The History of Sexuality that it is the “strategic codification of these points of 
resistances that makes a revolution possible,” we have seen how he laments in conclusion 
that this possibility of turning resistance into revolution is in fact “somewhat similar to 
the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration of power 
relationships.”1186  Indeed, herein lies the political aporia traditional thinkers such as 
Bookchin have never been able to overcome; a revolutionary politics is a form of politics 
that can only be instituted as archē; while the state emerges as a paradigm of the archē, 
revolution reintroduces the archē in the institution of a new order.  It is this fundamental 
nexus that links the politics of the state to the politics of revolution through the paradigm 
of the archē that has yet to be fully thought through in the anarchist tradition.  In this 
regard, rather than an anarchist theory of the political based in a universal logic of class 
struggle, in which politics is conceived as revolutionary overthrow of state power, it is 
my contention that what is required by anarchist philosophy is not only an alternative 
theory of the political in which resistance, rather than power, designates the emergence of 
politics, but also an anarchist theory of agonistic resistance in which politics refers to an 
insurrectionary withdrawal from power.  Such a form of politics can only be elaborated 
as an art of not being governed, a movement in life which, in refusing to constitute itself 
as power, prefigures the condition of anarchy in the ungovernable. 
Destituent Politics and the Art of Not Being Governed 
Although anarchism is by no means reducible to a theory of revolution, insofar as the 
notion of social revolution is often privileged as the dominant expression of an anarchist 
politics, it might be stated that problem of the archē has never been fully eradicated from 
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revolutionary discourse and praxis.  Indeed, inasmuch as anarchism has sought to 
articulate a politics of resistance in terms of revolution, anarchist theory has never been 
able to overcome the aporia that lies at the basis of this conception of politics; indeed, in 
attempting to realize anarchy through the revolution, the conceptual impasse anarchist 
theory has yet to overcome is how to realize anarchism without either reproducing the 
archē in the institution of a new order, or in the sovereign biopolitical logic that takes the 
elimination of one’s adversaries as the means of creating and maintaining a social 
revolution.  Although anarchists have attempted to rethink the possibility of revolution by 
distinguishing social revolution from the Marxist notion of a political revolution, the 
question of how to realize anarchism without reterritorializing on the problem of power 
has never been fully solved.  Thus when Alexander Berkman attempts to theorize a form 
of revolution that “seeks to alter the whole character of society,” he concludes that such a 
“social revolution…would have to fight not only government and capitalism, but it would 
also meet with opposition of popular ignorance and prejudice, those who believe in 
government and capitalism” (original emphasis).1187  If, then, a social revolution requires 
not only a struggle against government and capitalism, but also a struggle against “those 
who believe in government and capitalism,” Berkman is forced to ask “how is it then to 
come about?”1188  To be sure, anarchist theory has yet to figure out how to realize 
anarchism without having to eliminate not just the exercise of power, but those whose 
beliefs and ways of being differ from the truths held by anarchists themselves.         
Indeed, insofar as a certain equivalence can be drawn between the state and 
revolution this is because both fundamentally turn upon instituting a specific form of 
constituent power.  Thus, in order to rethink of a form of politics that could never assume 
the form of an archē, it is my contention that an anarchist politics of resistance can no 
longer be understood as a process of revolution—that is, of constituent power—but rather 
as destitution.  While Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have attempted to affirm the 
relation between constituent power1189 and a form of revolutionary praxis within the 
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1189 On their particular understanding of the concept of constituent power, see: Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, Labor of Dionysus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); and Antonio Negri, 
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universal revolutionary subjectivity they refer to as the “multitude,”1190 it is in 
Agamben’s work that the conception of a destituent politics emerges as an anarchic 
paradigm of resistance.1191  As we will see, what Agamben and The Invisible Committee 
refer to as destituent power invites a unique way to understand how the question of 
resistance in Foucault emerges as an art of not being governed rather than social 
revolution.  At the same time, however, what is at stake in this theory of destitution is not 
a return to the question of how to realize an anarchist vision of society, but rather a return 
to the relation between the politics of resistance and an ethos of revolt, a movement in 
life which contests the state and government not by overturning one form of power with 
another, but by withdrawing from its grasp.  It rejecting the traditional notion of an 
anarchist social revolution, it would be a mistake to affirm a politics of “lifestyle” in the 
sense Bookchin understands the term.  Nevertheless, in as much as anarchism seeks a 
transformation in one’s conditions and life, it seems that a theory of resistance 
necessitates a theory of life, not in terms of prescribing how one ought to live, but as an 
ethos of revolt, a way of being in the world through resistance.    
In a lecture titled “Elements for a Theory of Destituent Power” Agamben outlines 
how the question of constituent power designates a specific paradox that connects the 
logic of sovereignty to revolutionary praxis, through the paradigm of the archē.  Yet, the 
general thrust of Agamben’s lecture is that the nexus that links sovereignty to revolution 
through constituent power requires a radical rethinking of a form of politics that could 
never assume the form of an archē, a form of politics he refers to as “destituent 
power.”1192  Here Agamben analyzes Walter Benjamin’s short work “Critique of 
Violence,” and maintains that it is with Benjamin that the notion of a destituent politics 
emerges as an anarchic paradigm of resistance.  Agamben reads Benjamin’s essay as an 
                                                          
1190 See: Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, 351.  
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1191 See: Giorgio Agamben, “Elements for a Theory of Destituent Power,” trans. Stephanie Wakefield. 
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attempt to reserve a space for the possibility of a form of political violence fundamentally 
distinct from, and outside of, the constituent power, that links revolutionary violence 
together with state sovereignty.  This form of violence which does not reproduce the 
logic of sovereignty is what Benjamin refers as “pure,” or “divine violence.”1193  In 
Benjamin’s essay, the nexus that connects the problem of sovereignty to revolutionary 
praxis is laid bare in the distinction he draws between constituted power and constituting 
power.  While constituted power designates a form of “law-preserving violence” and 
refers to a form of power inseparable from a pre-established state power, both 
sovereignty and revolution are examples of a form of constituting power, or “law-making 
power.”1194  By positing an inherent link between sovereignty and revolution in terms of 
“law-making,” or constituting power, Benjamin’s point is to demonstrate how both 
notions ultimately turn upon the same modes of political praxis, or violence.  For 
Benjamin, if an inherent nexus can be made that connects sovereignty to the logic of 
revolutionary praxis, this is because: 
the function of violence in law-making is twofold, in the sense that lawmaking 
pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be established as law, 
but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss violence; rather, at this very 
moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an unalloyed by 
violence, but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under the title of power.  
Lawmaking is power making (original emphasis).1195  
Here, Benjamin’s argument is that both sovereignty and revolutionary praxis employ a 
type of violence as means toward achieving what is to be established as law; yet, the 
thrust of Benjamin’s critique is that lawmaking violence as such is intimately bound to 
power.  In the context of the anarchist notion of social revolution, Benjamin’s critique 
demonstrates how a form of power overthrown by revolutionary violence inevitably leads 
to another form of constituting power—that is, rather than eradicating the logic of the 
archē, revolutionary praxis is fundamentally bound to the archē it opposes.  Yet, it is 
against the nexus that links sovereignty to revolution, that Benjamin attempt to rethink 
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the possibility of a radical political praxis that could never reproduce the dialectic 
between law-making violence and law-preserving violence.  Indeed, in searching for 
another form of politics that neither turns upon the preservation or making of power, 
Benjamin’s penultimate point is to gesture toward another form of politics that could 
never assume the form an archē.  It is in the context of elaborating an anarchic political 
violence that Benjamin makes a further distinction between the “mythical violence” of 
constituting power and “divine violence,” a specific type of “law-destroying” or non 
violent violence.1196  While revolutionary violence can indeed be law-destroying, the 
distinction Benjamin draws between revolutionary praxis and “divine violence” lies in 
the way that the latter refuses to reterritorialize as power. “For this reason,” Benjamin 
writes, “the first of these undertakings (mythical violence) is law making but the second 
is anarchistic.”1197  Indeed, it is in this distinction between the constituting power of 
mythical violence and the “law-destroying” non-power of “divine violence” that 
Agamben locates the possibility of an anarchic politics of destitution. 
 To be sure, much of Agamben’s work is set to explore the possibilities of an 
“anarchistic” form of political praxis that refuses the traditional logic of a constituting 
power.  Thus in “Notes on Politics” Agamben argues that the “concepts of sovereignty 
and of constituent power, which are at the core of our political tradition, have to be 
abandoned” (original emphasis).1198  If these two concepts are to be abandoned this 
because sovereignty and constituent power are representations of “the being-hidden of 
the historical archē.”1199  In contrast to the attempts to affirm revolutionary political 
praxis, a form of praxis that reproduces the logic of the archē in the form of a constituting 
power, in a lecture given in 2013 Agamben invokes Benjamin’s concept of “divine 
violence” in order to elaborate what he refers to as “destituent power,” a unique form of 
praxis which, in its refusal to be reconstituted as revolutionary archic power designates an 
alternative paradigm for an anarchic politics of resistance.  Indeed, it is the elaboration of 
the concept and praxis of “destituent power,” and not that of revolution, that Agamben 
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assigns as key task for political theory.  For Agamben, then: “if revolutions…correspond 
to constituent power, that is, a violence that establishes and constitutes the new law, in 
order to think a destituent power we have to imagine completely other strategies, whose 
definition is the task of the coming politics.”1200  
By “destituent power” Agamben means to suggest a form of political praxis—
indeed of resistance—that deprives power of its archic foundation and, in doing so, 
deactivates the possibility of an oikonomia.  The fundamental distinction Agamben draws 
between constituent and destituent power has been further affirmed by The Invisible 
Committee in their text To Our Friends.  According to The Invisible Committee, “to 
institute or constitute power is to give it a basis, a foundation, a legitimacy;” in contrast, 
however, “to destitute power is to deprive it of its foundations,” which as The Invisible 
Committee concludes “is precisely what insurrections do.”1201  Indeed, it is because the 
traditional paradigm of revolution fundamentally turns upon constituting its own archic 
legitimacy, The Invisible Committee encourages us to “reconceive of revolution as pure 
destitution instead” (original emphasis).1202  As “pure destitution,” a form of politics 
which, in refusing to constitute itself as a form of power ruptures the logic of the archē, 
therefore appears not as a revolutionary struggle to overturn power, but instead as an 
“insurrectionary destitution” of power exercised as government.1203  For The Invisible 
Committee, then, “destituting this epoch’s specific form of power requires, for a start, 
that one challenge the notion that men need to be governed, either democratically by 
themselves or hierarchically by others.”1204  It is this notion of insurrectionary destitution 
that brings to light the fundamental relation Foucault posits between life and resistance in 
the concept of the art of not being governed.   
In challenging the constituent logic that has guided the traditional logic of 
revolution, which is to say depriving radical politics of its archic foundation, Agamben 
and Tiqqun both reveal that what is at stake in the politics of resistance is not a 
revolutionary overthrow of power, but instead another form-of-life, a fundamental being-
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1202 Ibid, 74. 
1203 Ibid, 77. 
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without government.  Indeed, at stake in a theory of destitution is not a decisive 
confrontation with power, but rather as Tiqqun suggests “certain coincidence between 
living and struggling, a coincidence that is never given without simultaneously requiring 
its construction.”1205  Rather than a revolutionary overthrow of power, it is this continuity 
between living and resistance—a certain condition of being-without-government—that 
best animates the history of anarchism.  Indeed, it is this elemental point in which the aim 
of resistance is to create another form-of-life and way of living that Bookchin neglects to 
notice in his polemic against Foucault and “lifestyle anarchism.”  For Agamben, then, 
“the destitution of power and its works is an arduous task, because it is first of all and 
only in a form-of-life that it can be carried out.”  In this way, “only a form-of-life,” 
Agamben concludes, “is completely destituent.”1206  To be sure, Agamben defines form-
of-life in a manner that captures the ways in which another way of life is itself what is 
ultimately at stake in destituting power.  A form-of-life, according to Agamben, is “a life 
that can never be separated from its form,” which is to say a life so closely tied to its form 
of living that it cannot be captured by power.1207  Thus, while Bookchin expels the 
possibilities of a politics of resistance developed through one’s ethos of revolt, or way of 
living in resistance Agamben, like Foucault, suggests that it is only in life that one is able 
to resist or destitute power effectively.  For Agamben, then, a “life that can never be 
separated from its form is a life for which, in its way of living, what is at stake is living 
itself, and, in its living, what is at stake above all else is its mode of living.”1208  Here 
Agamben emphasizes that what is at stake in the term “form-of-life” refers to a specific 
chiastic structure between life and its particular ethos; life is what is at stake in one’s 
mode of living; and yet at the same time, what is at stake in this form of living is the 
ethos, or way of living that gives life its form as such.  Further emphasizing the vital 
relation between life and its particular ethos, Tiqqun writes “[m]y form of life does not 
relate to what I am, but to how, to the specific way, I am what I am.”1209  Herein lies the 
key: insofar as an insurrectionary destitution of power can only take place within a form-
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of-life as the basic unit of revolt, the question of radical politics must be rethought as an 
art of not being governed, rather than a revolutionary overturning of power.  What is at 
stake in a theory of destituent power is the elaboration of a specific ethos of resistance, a 
specific nexus between one’s mode of living and resistance.  Indeed, a life so closely tied 
to its form of resistance, which is to say its specific way of living in the world through 
revolt, is what Agamben calls the “ungovernable.”  
Crucially, it is in this theory of destituent power that Agamben locates a real 
political possibility for rethinking possibility of an anarchist politics of resistance without 
collapsing into the constituent logic of revolutionary praxis.  “It is this destituent 
potentiality,” Agamben writes “that both the anarchist tradition and 20th century thought 
sought to define without ever actually succeeding.”1210  If the anarchist tradition 
neglected to understand the potentiality of a destituent politics, this failure itself arises in 
the failure to rethink the possibility of a politics of resistance outside of the constituent 
power of revolution, a form of praxis that could never reproduce the archē it opposes.  At 
the same time, however, it is within the intersection between Foucault’s theory of 
resistance and the anarchist tradition that one can begin to glimpse the beginnings of this 
form of destituent politics in the art of not being governed.  Destituent power is itself not 
a power, but a form of what Foucault would call “non-power.”  Yet as non-power, 
destituent power is a form of resistance which, in refusing to constitute itself as a form of 
power, ruptures the logic of the archē while opening up the possibility for life without 
government.  This destituent politics as a form of resistance corresponds with a particular 
ethos, a form-of-life, in which what is at stake in resistance is becoming-ungovernable.  It 
is in the context of a politics of destitution that the relation between Foucault and 
anarchism I have been elaborating throughout this project can be fully understood.     
 In shifting the site of politics away from its traditional location in power, 
government and sovereignty toward the sites of resistance, it is my contention that the 
question of resistance within the anarchist tradition can also be understood as a 
movement away from the field of power.  Whereas the concept of revolution designates a 
form of constituent power similar to the ends and means of sovereignty, an anarchic 
politics of resistance necessitates a theory of destitution which, in withdrawing from 
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power, deprives it of its archic foundation in the movements toward the ungovernable.  In 
this understanding, it is no longer necessary for anarchism to propose a universal logic of 
social revolution, nor a corresponding detailed prescription of how people ought to 
organize and live their lives after they are freed from oppression in the coming 
revolution.  What is necessary, however, is a retheorization of the fundamental relation 
between the politics of resistance and an insurrectionary ethos of revolt, a certain 
continuity between movements of resistance and movements in life, in which what is at 
stake in resistance is itself a particular form-of-life, an ethos, or way of being in the world 
through resistance—that is, a politics conceived in terms of becoming-ungovernable.  An 
anarchist politics of resistance as such finds its basis and is elaborated as an art of not 
being governed.    
When the concepts of power and government are understood to emerge on 
condition of resistance, the political conceived as archē reveals its own contingency, and 
the question of politics is redirected from a constituent theory of an oikonomia to a 
destituent theory of anarchy.  This condition of anarchy—of being-without-
government—is neither pre-existent nor that which proceeds from a revolutionary 
overthrow of power, but that which emerges as resistance to governmentality.  Politics as 
such is that which destitutes the power of an oikonomia, a movement of resistance that at 
once emerges with and prefigures the condition of anarchy.  Yet, while Foucault teaches 
us that politics emerges as resistance to governmentality, he also reveals that the site of 
resistance is not always located at the site of power, but rather in a withdrawal from 
power.  Although resistance often directly coincides with the sites of power, what is at 
stake in the movement of resistance against governmentality is not a fundamental 
contestation, or final war that might ultimately bring about an end to all power, but 
instead a transformation in life.  Such a form of politics as resistance is less a new set of 
arrangements than the refusal to be arranged, a withdrawal from power in the affirmation 
of becoming-ungovernable.  Resistance as a permanent process of becoming 
ungovernable is therefore not to be conceived as an end in itself, but as the means of 
transformation without end.  An anarchist politics of resistance without end does not, 
however, foreclose the possibility of realizing anarchism because the condition of 
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anarchy animated in the politics of resistance generates the very potentiality of its own 
persistence in the art of not being governed.  
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